In what is clearly a case of pandering to poltical tastes, the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ), Leila de Lima, led a multi-agency task force to a non-desript empty parcel of land in the municipality of Datu Hofer Ampatuan- not to be confused with the municipality of Datu Saudi Ampatuan- OR- the municipality OF Ampatuan- in Maguindanao Province in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, known to most simply as "ARMM." With Secretary de Lima was an excavator and other assorted heavy equipment that began tearing into the knee high Cogon Grass and loam beneath it in search of yet even more victims of what is today perhaps the most recognisable clan on Mindanao, the Ampatuans- despite most of the clan's heavy hitters being buried under the jail in Camp Bagong Diwa, in Metro Manila's Taguig City.
The men are jailed there of course for their having created the monstrosity known as the Maguindanao Massacre two years and a day before Secretary tried to collect anal-Pogi Points by alerting the media to what should be a highly sensitive excavation. Sensitive politicaly, militarily, and even religiously owing to Islamic Law not exactly smiling on disinternment of human remains- though, for the life of me, I don't recall a single Muslim on Mindanao ever once objecting to what has become an all too regular facet of life on our fair isle. Most of all, the operation is extremely sensitive to the loved ones of the Ampatuan Clan's many victims over the decades.
Although more than one set of skeletal remains was uncovered within the first 90 minutes of digging, I will relegate the Ps and Qs of that sordid outing to an entry I plan to compose within the next day or so although I reckon it just might make better sense to await the excavation's closure to see just what might pop out of the task force's many potholes. This entry is instead about a Human Rights Watch report that the American-based NGO whipped up to memorialise the Maguindanao Massacre, on the incident's first anniversary, November 23rd, 2010. Entitled, "They Own the People," the report doesn't deal with the Massacre, but rather it discusses what is said to be at least five dozen victims of the clan who were murdered for a variety of reasons, in a variety of ways- including dismemberment by chainsaw, in the decades before the Massacre.
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"They Own the People"
pp1 (Title and Contents)
pp2 (Map of Mindanao with a Focus on ARMM)
pp3 (Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations)
pp4 Summary
"In Maguindanao, the word of the Ampatuans was the law. It was either you said 'yes' to (them), or you got yourself killed for daring to say 'no'."- Suwaib Upham, Ampatuan militia member, March 9th, 2010.
"Warlordism exists because it has blessing from the top [sic]."- Philippine academic, Mindanao State University, General Santos City, February 14th, 2010
On November 23rd, 2009, around 200 armed men stopped a convoy carrying family members and supporters of a local vice mayor in the southern Philippine island of Mindanao as they went to register his candidacy in upcoming gubernatorial elections. The gunmen forced the group of 58 people- which included some 30 media workers and six passerby, off the highway near the town of Ampatuan, ordered them from their vehicles, and then executed them all.
The massacre- the worst in recent Philippine history- has since been attributed to members of the Ampatuan family, which has controlled life and death in Maguindanao Province for more than two decades through a "private army" of 2,000 to 5,000 armed men comprised of Government-supported militia, local police, and military personnel. Many members of the family, which is headed by Andal Ampatuan Sr.-Maguindanao's Governor from 2001 to 2009- hold official posts in the province and in the region. Before the 2007 Elections, most of Maguindanao's 27 mayors were the sons, grandsons, or other relatives of Andal Ampatuan Sr., including his son, Andal Jr., who stands charged with 57 counts of Murder in connection with the 2009 massacre. Ampatuan Jr. is currently on trial in Manila for the killings, together with 16 police officers and two alleged militia members. Currently, 195 people have been charged, including 29 members of the Ampatuan family and their allies; over half of those charged remain at large.
While killings among ruling families in Central Mindanao are not uncommon, the scale and brutality of the November 23rd massacre far exceed previous attacks in this violent region. It also focused international attention on ruling families like the Ampatuans, and the lawlessness that persists in much of the Philippines. Less scrutinized than the violence itself, however, but ultimately of greater significance, is the support that the National Government provides such families throughout the country, and the near total impunity that their abusive militias enjoy. Successive National Governments have not dismanteled and disarmed these militia forces, as stipulated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, nor have they investigated and prosecuted unlawful activities by those who control, arm, and used them for private ends. Indeed, rather than trying to prevent militias from carrying out illegal criminal acts, the military and police often provide them with manpower, weapons, and protection from prosecution.
This report focuses on the Ampatuan family and its forces, one of the most powerful and abusive state-backed militias in the Philippines. It charts the Ampatuans' rise and expansion, aided by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who relied on the family for crucial votes and support in the protracted armed conflict with Moro armed groups in Mindanao. The report also details the Ampatuans' many abuses, including more than 50 incidents of killings, torture, sexual assault, and abductions and "disappearances." In addition to the 58 killed in the Maguindanao Massacre, the family is implicated over the years in the killing of at least 56 people, including relatives of opposition politicians, landowners who resisted forced acquisition of their property, eyewitnesses to the Ampatuans' crimes, including their own militia members, and even children.
One year after the Maguindanao Massacre, the Ampatuans remain a powerful and dangerous force with which to be reckoned. For more than two decades, the Ampatuans operated unchecked by the Philippine National Police, the Military, and the Department of Justice, which not only have failed to seriously investigate crimes allegedly committed by the family's militia, but have even armed and worked alongside its members. Despite an initial flurry of activity after the November 23rd killings, including some arrests, 126 suspects remain at large and the Government prosecution remains woefully slow and limited. Senior police and military officers who failed to act upon knowledge of Ampatuan crimes have not been investigated; investigations into the source of the family's weapons have lacked transparency and independence; and the national institutions responsible for accountability- the Justice Department, the Ombudsman's Office, and the Commission on Human Rights- have done nothing significant to address the situation. "What can we do?" asked one police officer. "This is an influential family."
In his successful campaign for the presidency this year, Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino III vowed to abolish private armies that flourished under President Arroyo, who authorized the arming of Civilian Volunteer Organizations (CVOs) and Police Auxiliary Units, and allowed Local Government Units to enter contractual arrangements with the Military for barely trained militia forces called Special CAFGUs (SCAAs). Aquino also promised to hold accountable the perpetrators of the Maguindanao Massacre, and seek justice for the hundreds of other human rights abuses. Aquino should fufill these promises by taking immediate action to disarm and disband all militias, including state-sanctioned paramilitary forces, in Maguindanao and throughout the country. He should also institute tougher controls on local government procurement of weapons, and prosecute perpetrators of human rights abuses regardless of position or rabk.
Broad and lasting change will not come easily. Suspicious of police collusion, few victims or witnesses of crimes by government officials trust the country's haphazard Witness Protection Program. Many of the Ampatuan's victims have never reported the abuses they have suffered at the hands of the family which has long relied on threats and other forms of intimidation to build and maintain its power. Indeed, several victims and witnesses declined to be interviewed by Human Rights Watch, despite undertaking actions to protect their identities, because they feared retaliation by the family and its private army.
The term "private army" is commonly used in the Philippines to describe security forces of powerful politicians, wealthy landowners, and other private interests. The term is accurate in that it describes the loyalties of such forces- armed bodies that act on behalf of private, an not public, interests. As a result, human rights abuses committed by private armies are often dismissed as a manifestation of regional culture or an exhibition of "Rido," or clan conflict. But such explanations- and the very term "private armies"- fails to capture the state's role in these forces make-up, support, and involvement in abuses.
According to inviduals with knowledge of the Ampatuans' force structure, most members of their private army are also members of the state-sanctioned paramilitary forces, namely the Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO), Police Auxiliary Unit, Citizens Active Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU), or Special Citizens Active Auxiliary. Their forces also include regular members of the police or military. Many are relatives of local government officials. Militia members, who receive virtually no training, swear allegiance to the family and operate without police or military supervision, as is required by law. The number of militiamen is limited only by the local government's ability to fund operational costs.
The Ampatuans have provided their militia with formidable modern military weaponry. In the aftermath of the Maguindanao Massacre, investigators recovered at least 1,000 weapons in and around the homes of Andal Ampatuan Sr. and Jr., including anti-tank weapons, mortars, machine guns, automatic pistols, and sniper and assault rifles, as well as tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition. Ampatuan family insiders and police officers investigating the Massacre say that the Military and police provided the Ampatuans with most of these weapons, a situation facilitated by Philippine law, which permits local government officials to legally buy an unlimited number of weapons without any obligation to report the type or number purchased.
According to insiders, the Ampatuans used their militia for a wide range of criminal activity intended to eliminate threats to the family's rule, or to warn anyone considering posing such a threat. Cases involving the Ampatuan militia forces include:
• On July 20th, 2005, about 25 armed men in military uniforms shot and killed Haji Noria Tambungalan and her child in Barangay Kitango. Her husband, Mando Tambungalan, said he recognized three of the armed men as hired killers on the Ampatuan payroll. He told Human Rights Watch that he had been targeted by the Ampatuans since running for Vice Mayor of Datu Piang in 2001.
• On December 2nd, 2006, in Cotabato City, motorcycle riding gunmen linked to the Ampatuan Clan shot and killed Judge Sahara Silongan while he was driving his family home. A relative of the judge believes he was killed for failing to issue an illegal warrant of arrest demanded by the Ampatuans: "It was a form of liquidation." Noone has been arrested for the killing.
• On June 23rd, 2006, the Ampatuans planted a bomb which exploded near the Shariff Ahuak Market, killing five people including Ed Mangansakan. Mangansakan was a known weapons supplier for the Ampatuans. A man working as a CVO for the Ampatuans at this time told Human Rights Watch that Ampatuans' men planted the bomb in order to get weapons purchased from Mangansakan for free.
• On August 28th, 2008, a cousin of Andal Ampatuan Jr., and his armed men allegedly shot and killed eight members of the Lumenda and Aleb families, including one child, as they harvested rice in Barangay Tapikan, in Shariff Aguak municipality. One gunman, a member of the Police Auxiliary Unit, told Human Rights Watch that he and others were ordered to shoot the family because the Ampatuans doubted their loyalty.
Crimes linked to Ampatuan family members have not stopped since the Maguindanao Massacre and the massive attention focused on the case and the region. A member of the family's militia who participated in the killings- Suwaib Upham, 27- told Human Rights Watch that he had killed a witness to the Maguindanao shootings with a grenade launcher several days after Andal Ampatuan Jr. was arrested by authorities. Upham described himself as close to the Ampatuan family for most of his life and gave his statement to a Private Prosecutor, which was then submitted ro the authorities under a pseudonym. He was shot and killed on June 14th, 2010, while still awaiting inclusion in the Government Witness Protection Program.
The private army of the Ampatuan family may be among the most abusive in the Philippines, but it is just one among many. More than 100 private armies, large and small, are estimated to be operating throughout the Philippines, primarily but not exclusively in rural areas, and often but not always where there is an active insurgency. The level of direct Government support for these militias varies, but if the Ampatuan example is any indication, a history of abuses is no disqualifier. So long as such official support continues, so will these forces and the atrocities for which they have been responsible. The Maguindanao Massacre was an aberation only because of how many people died, not because of its cold blooded brutality, which the Government, Military, and police has long tolerated, and even fueled. Instead, the killings were an atrocity waiting to happen. It is up to the Aquino Administration to ensure they are the last of their kind.
pp5
(Methodology)
pp6
I) Background
The Legacy of Violence in Mindanao
The Philippines main southern island of Mindanao has been a focal point for insurgencies since the beginning of the American colonial period at the turn of the twentieth century. The Muslim population, known as "Moros," make up more than 20% of Mindanao, and have long resisted encroachment by the predominantly Christian majority.
Since Philippine Independence in 1946, armed conflict between Moro groups and the Philippine Government have continued with varying levels of intensity.
In the 1970s Moro secessionists formed a separatist movement, the Moro National Liberation Movement (MNLF), which later splintered, creating the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Since then, armed confrontations between the Government and the Moro groups have resulted in the death of an estimated 120,000 people, mostly civilians, and the displacement of some two million more.
Negotiations in the 1980s led to the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 1990, discussed below. After a resurgence of violence in 2008, a shaky ceasefire was forged in 2009. At this writing, the Aquino Government and the MILF are preparing to engage in peace negotiations.
Violence in Mindanao has many forms. Mindanao was a stronghold of the Communist New People's Army (NPA) from the late 1970s until the mid-1980s, when it was confronted not only by the army and militia forces, but by abusive state supported "viginlante groups" such as "Alsa Masa" (Masses Arise). A radical Islamist group, Abu Sayyaf, emerged in the 1990s. All of these forces continue to perpetrate numerous serious human rights abuses- including abductions, torture, and killings- against suspected adversaries and ordinary civilains in Mindanao.
In Mindanao, as elsewhere in the Philippines, wealthy and politically powerful families have sought to defend and expand their holdings through the use of so called "private armies." While the size, composition, and strength of these forces varies considerably, their designation as "private" is a misnomer. They frequently consist of state-endorsed paramilitary forces and unofficial militia forces and have the direct support of local police and military personnel.
Nowhere in Mindanao in recent years have the complexities of these volatile forces been as evident as in the case of Ampatuans, the most powerful ruling family in Maguindanao Province. The Ampatuans, who are themselves Muslims, have been a loyal ally of sucessive national governments against Moro separatists. Fightings between the Ampatuans and the MILF leaders has at times been treated as "Rido," or clan conflict, but the actual situation is more complex. Ampatuan family members and other Maguindanao residents said that the conflict developed because the Ampatuans are identified with the Government f
Forces, because the Ampatuans perpetrate human rights abuses, and because they target emerging Moro leaders who are considered a threat to their power.
Human rights abuses by local officials backed by private armies continue to be a factor in drawing individuals into the MILF. A November 2004 confidential AFP memorandum on the effects of family feuds in Maguindanao reportedly stated that communities pillaged and looted by CVO and Special CAFGU members "often seek the protection of the MILF because they perceive the Military to be partial to the Ampatuans and his political allies" [sic]. Human Rights Watch documented several cases in which the victims of militia abuses joined the MILF. An MILF commander, "Commander Rustam," told Human Rights Watch: "Many people seek refuge from the Ampatuans (with) the MILF." For example, "Fayyad" evacuated from Datu Piang and sought protection in an MILF community after three of his relatives were killed in 2002 and 2003, allegedly by the Ampatuans and CAFGU members working with them. He told Human Rights Watch that he still cannot leave the MILF community in which he resides to go into Datu Piang town center or Cotabato City without an escort.
The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
The ARMM oficially came into being on November 6th, 1990, after plebiscites took place in several provinces and cities in accordance with the Organic Act of 1989. Autonomy essentially arose out of the December 23rd, 1976 Tripoli Agreement, which ended the 1971-76 separatist conflict. The ARMM conmprises five provinces: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi Tawi, and Basilan, and one city, Marawi. It is the most impoverished region in the Philippines.
Cotabato City, which is predominantly Moro, is located within the boundries of Maguindanao, but is independent of the province and is not part of the ARMM.
The ARMM Government operates with a degree of autonomy. However, the President of the Philipines exercises general supervision over the regional governor to ensure that his acts are within the scope of his powers and functions, and has the power to suspend him. Aditionally, the National Government provides provincial, municipal, and city governments in the ARMM with the vast share of their annual budget via the Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), creating a financial dependence that greatly limits autonomy.
Executive power in the ARMM is vested in the elected Regional Governor, assisted by a Cabinet. The Regional Legislative Assembly has the power to legislate "for the benefit of the people and for the development of the region." This power does not extend to issues such as National Security and Administration of Justice, though it may legislate on matters relating to Shari'a (Islamic Law).
The Philippine Government and MILF Peace Panels are currently preparing to negotiate an agreement that is expected to enhance ARMM autonomy by increasin both its geographical bounds and its political and economic powers. The Peace Panels negotiated such an agreement, the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain, in 2008. However, prior to the signing, scheduled for August 2008 in Malaysia, the Supreme Court of the Philippines issued a Temporary Restraining Order blocking it, on the Petition of local and national Christian political leaders. In October 2008, the Court ruled the Agreement un-Constitutional. The Agreement's collapse has been cited as one of the causes of renewed fighting in Central Mindanao in 2008 to 2009.
Rise of the Ampatuans
The Ampatuan family is a Moro Clan that lives in Maguindanao Province. Under successive Philippine Administrations since the 1980s, the Ampatuans have consolidated power and, over time, acquired control over the political, security, and commercial life of Maguindanao. Andal Ampatuan Sr., the family patriarch, was the Governor of Maguindanao from 2001 to 2009. His sons and other family members have held numerous elected and appointed Government offices. Most notably, Zaldy Ampatuan was the elected Regional Governor of the ARMM from 2005 to 2009 and Andal Ampatuan Jr., commonly known as "Datu Unsay," was the Mayor of Datu Unsay municipality from 2004 to 2010.
Andal Ampatuan Sr. first entered local politics in Maguindanao in the 1970s, following President Ferdinand Marco's declaration of Martial Law in the country. During this period, the Military perpetrated widespread human rights violations throughout the Philippines. Ampatuan Sr., went from commander of a paramilitary unit to Vice Mayor and then Mayor of Maganoy (now Shariff Aguak), a municipality in Maguindanao. Two years after the 1986 "People Power Revolution" drove Marcos from power, Ampatuan Sr. was reelected the Mayor of Maganoy in an election plagued by violence. For example, on December 30th, 1987, unidentified armed men ambushed the Campaign Manager of Ampatuan Sr.'s chief rival Surab Abutazil, and his two companions. In January 1988, an Election Aide was shot dead by unidentified assailants. And on January 5th, 1990, Abutazil was shot dead in broad daylight in the Maganoy town center after having challenged the legality of Ampatuan Sr.'s reelection.
Several residents of Maguindanao alleged that since the late 1980s the Ampatuans gained commercial power by using threats and unlawful force to acquire land. "Hassan," a former resident of Shariff Aguak, who said he was once close with Ampatuan Sr., told Human Rights Watch, "He would give the landowner two options: allow him to buy the land for P10,000 ($220) or choose the bullet." "Kedtog," a former community leader in Barangay Kuloy said that in 1988:
"We were called for a meeting with Andal Ampatuan Sr. Inside, on a table was a 45 caliber pistol and a sum of money put side by side in front of the old man (Ampatuan Sr.). We were asked which of the two we would choose...In Kuloy, almost all the villagers were forced to leave. There were thousands of hectares...They built fences around the (land) which (was taken)."
Kedtog said he did not go to the meeting with Ampatuan Sr., out of fear, but his 5 1/2 hectares of land was still forcibly taken. Only two landowners actually attended such meetings and "chose" the nominal payment. One landowner that attended such a meeting, "Akil," said that he chose to take the money, fearing he would be killed if he did not.
Through his lawyers, Ampatuan Sr., denied any allegations of forcible takeover of land, saying that the properties owned by the Ampatuan family have been "acquired through lawful transactions evidenced by contracts and duly issued titles."
In the early 1990s, the Vice Mayor of Maganoy, Paglala Bantilan, and several of his family members and supporters were killed after he announced he would contest Ampatuan's election. Those responsible were never brought to trial.
These killings and many other serious crimes allegedly carried out by Ampatuan family members were reported to President Arroyo in a May 2002 letter, some of which are detailed below:
• In July 1992, more than 20 men in fatigue uniforms armed with rifles and allegedly commander by "Commander Beri"- the head of Ampatuan Sr.'s militia at the time- killed a candidate for local government and his child, and wounded his seven year old child while they slept in their home in Maganoy (now Shariff Aguak), Maguindanao. The victim, Haji Usop Akmad, had run for Municipal Councilor in the May 1992 Elections. CAFGUs allegedly killed another of Akmad's sons later that year.
• In February 1994 Ampatuan Sr. allegedly killed Garcia Upham in Barangay Makir, Dinaig town (now Datu Odin Sinsuat). According to a witness, he had been sitting with Upham in a kiosk along the National Hiway in Makir when the nearly 50 vehicle convoy- including about six police cars- of Ampatuan Sr. passed by. According to the witness, Ampatuan Sr. "got out of the vehicle and shot (and killed) Garcia with his 45 caliber pistol. He then got back inside his car and drove on to Cotabato City.
• On March 14th, 1994, Zaldy Ampatuan allegedly gunned down cousins Akas Pagala and Rashid Mamalantong, Vice Mayor Bantilan's son, at a gas station in Cotabato City.
The Ampatuan family gained significant power when Ampatuan Sr. was elected Governor of Maguindanao in 2001, despite accusations of Electoral Fraud. He consolidated his power by giving family members various positions in the province and isolating mayors he did not consider loyal. He was reelected Governor in 2004 and ran unopposed in 2007. Until the 2007 elections, the majority of Maguindanao's 27 mayors were the sons, grandsons, or other relatives of Ampatuan Sr. Newspaper reports quoted Ampatuan Sr. as saying this dominance was due to "popular support...Because I am so loved by the constituencies of the municipalities, they ask me to have my sons as representatives." He added that "not a single candidate for the opposition dared to challenge his slate." In 2007, all but one of the town mayors allied with Ampatuan Sr. ran unopposed.
On June 9th, 2007, the Maguindanao school district supervisor, Musa Dimasidsing, who had exposed alleged Election Fraud, was shot dead in a madrassa (Islamic school) in Maguindanao during a brief power outage. No one has been prosecuted for his killing.
The Ampatuan family took advantage of Zaldy Ampatuan's position as Governor of the ARMM and their influence over the Regional Assembly to create new municipalities and strengthen their control over the region. In 2009, the Regional Assembly created the municipalities of Datu Hoffer, Datu Salibo, and Sharoff Saydona Mustapha. Zaldy Ampatuan used his power as Regional Governor to appoint Officers- in- Charge, including his wife, Bongbong Midtimbang Ampatuan, as Acting Mayor of Datu Hoffer Ampatuan; Akmad Ampatuan as Acting Mayor of Datu Salibo; and his sister in law, Ampatuan Jr.'s wife, Zandria Ampatuan, as Acting Mayor of Shariff Saydona Mustapha. Each of these Ampatuans was elected in the May 2010 Elections.
The arrests that followed the November 2009 Maguindanao Massacre appear to have weakened, but by no means eliminated Ampatuan power in the region. As a result of the May 2010 Elections, 8 of the 34 mayors in Maguindanao carry the Ampatuan name; still others are related to Ampatuan Sr. Only 6 of the 29 Ampatuan family members and allies accused of involvement in the Massacre are in custody: Andal Ampatuan Sr.,his sons Andal Jr., Zaldy, Anwar Sr., Sajid Islam, and son in law Akmad "Tato" Ampatuan.
Paramilitary Forces and Private Armies
"It would not be right to say 'private armies,' they are paramilitary units...They are created, armed, and funded by the Government."- A senior member of the Ampatuan family, General Santos City, Fenruary 21st, 2010.
" (Local governments) create civilian armed groups, thereby providing a cloak of legitimacy to the action of these groups who are presumed to be acting in accordance with their official duties, when more often than not they simply do the bidding of their political godfathers."- Justice Monina Averalo -Zenarosa, Chair of the Independent Commission Against Private Armies, May 5th, 2010.
State supported militias have existed in the Philippines since the late 1940s. The Government organised these paramilitaries to defend against Communist insurgents- first the Hukbalahap and later the New People's Army- and Moro separatist forces. Frequently the Army or police deployed them in offensive operations. Whatever their guise or official status, these militias have been responsible for widespread abuses against suspected rebels and ordinary civilians. Despite this, successive Philippine Governments have taken no serious steps to either dismantle or disarm the militias on a large scale. Over the years only a few members have been prosecuted for abuses, and none of their commanders have ever been charged on the basis of Command or Superior Responsibility.
In the 1960s, the paramilitary forces were called the Barrio Self Defense Units. Later that decade, President Ferdinand Marcos replaced these units with the Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force, which was enlarged in 1976 to include the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF). Each of these militias was implicated in numerous atrocities, though the CHDF was regarded as particularly brutal.
The post-Marcos Constitution of 1987 provided for the dismanteling of private armies and dissolving paramilitary forces. Despite President Corazon Aquino's July 1987 Order that paramilitaries be dissolved within 180 days, the Government merely replaced the CHDF with the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU). In 1989, the Government instituted a Special CAFGU Program, which alowed businesses to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Armed Forces to effectively apply CAFGUs as armed security guards. Since then, CAFGU militiamen have been involved in serious human rights abuses.
Anti-insurgent "vigilante groups" have operated alongside the militias since the mid-1980s. These armed groups have taken various forms, from small religious sects such as the "Tadtad" (literall "chop chop") armed with "Bolo" (machete" knives, to mass based groups such as "Alsa Masa" (Masses Arise) in Davao City that had the open support of the authorities, including President Corazon Aquino. The Military increasingly armed and supported the vigilante groups with military weaponry and deployed them in offensive counterinsurgency operations, where they quickly became notorious for abuses and lack of accountability.
In 1986, many vigilante groups were officialy named Civilian Volunteer Organizations (CVOs) to give the appearance, if not the actual practice, of state regulation and control. The next year the Aquino Government issued guidelines on Civilian Volunteer Defense Organizations, ostensibly regulating the activities of such groups rather than disbanding them. The "Bantay Bayan" (People's Guard), the officially sanctioned CVO, was unarmed and was not to engage in counterinsurgency operations. These limits were not observed. In practice, the Bantay Bayan continued to operate as an auxiliary armed force that was repeatedly implicated in abuses. In September 1993, President Fidel Ramos issued an Administrative Order seeking to dismantle private armies, acknowledging that "there are Government officials and abusive personalities who utilize numerous AFP, PNP, or civilian bodyguards, as security personnel to the consternation of the general public." He ordered the AFP and the PNP to evaluate "the tactical necessity of all community defense forses (e.g. CAFGUs, CVOs, etc.) Organized according to law and immediately deactivate those which are no longer needed for counterinsurgency operations (Administrative Order #81, September 13th, 1993)."
In 1996, President Ramos empowered city and municipal mayors in the National Capital Region to organize, support, and finance local police auxiliary units in response to an increasing crime problem in Manila. However, these auxiliaries were not issued, or even permitted to carry firearms, nor were they to be detailed or assigned as general security of local officials.
As the threat from the New People's Army receded during the late 1990s, serious abuses by all sides declined. Successuve Philippine Administrations have publicly committed to disbanding CAFGUs, vigilante groups, and so called private armies from time to time, but efforts have been cursory. In 1998, the AFP announced that CAFGUs were disbanded, but they remained active in rural areas. In 2000, the CAFGU force still contained about 30,000 members.
In July 2001, President Arroyo's Government announced that the CAFGU force would be "revitalized" in Mindanao to fight against the Communist Insurgency. Today, the force comprises some 56,000 members. In 2004, the Special CAFGU Program was expanded to allow local governments, not just businesses, to contract Soecial CAFGUs. The Arroyo Administration also expanded and increasingly armed police auxiliary forces, comprised of members of CVOs and Police Auxiliary Forces.
In 2006, President Arroyo issued Executive Order #546, following major fighting between the Ampatuan's militia and the 105 Base Command of the MILF from June 28th to July 6th, 2006. This was interpreted as legal grounds to arm CVOs, which were previously only authorized to carry "a baton and a flashlight." The order authorized police to assist the Military in counterinsurgency operations and "Barangay Tanods"- unarmed, village-based law enforcement officers- to be used as "Force Multipliers," supposedly under police control. CVOs were armed on a selective basis.
In late 2006, the Armed Forces authorized four new Special CAFGU companies for the Ampatuans, each with 88 armed civilians and 12 soldiers ("The Philippines: After the Maguindanao Massacre" International Crisis Group, "Asia Briefing #98," December 21st, 2009). In August 2008, when hostilities again erupted between the MILF and Government Forces, the Interior Secretary Ronald Puno distributed more than 12,000 shotguns to police auxiliary forces in Central Mindanao's Conflict Affected Areas. The Armed Forces said that there were 2,000 Special CAFGU militiamen in Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato, and Maguindanao at the time of the Massacre on November 23rd, 2009. Lieutenant General Raymundo Ferrer, the AFP Commander for Eastern Mindanao, told Human Rights Watch that in some areas, "CAFGUs make the problems worse because they are committing the abuse...Relatives bring them in as body guards and use them to harass the opposition."
In practice, the various paramilitary forces created in Maguindanao fell under the command of the ruling Ampatuan family. The Special CAFGUs were contracted directly to the Government units, run by the Ampatuans. The police and police auxiliary forces reported directly to the Ampatuans rather than to the police command structure. These armed men were then converted into the Ampatuan's private army, used not only to fight the MILF and the New People's Army, but to do the bidding of local politicians.
While this report focuses on militia abuses in Maguindanao Province, state backed militias perpetrate abuses throughout much of Mindanao and elsewhere in the country. As Lieutenant General Ferrer told the media, abuse of power and "warlordism" is not a phenomenon limited to the Ampatuans.
"(President Arroyo's) party expelled the Ampatuans, and got the Mangudadatus...Now they are they allies with the Masturas. The Masturas are also warlords, right? (The Mangudadatus have) many guns, and they have allied themselves with the Sinsuats. Those people have also have private armed groups, and they have not surrendered any firearms. Combine all their arms, and that's another group of warlords.'
In its report to President Arroyo, the Independent Commission Against Private Armies highlighted the existence of such groups in Surigao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao City, Zamboanga del Norte, Tagum City, and Abra. Nowhere do the authorities take adequate steps to investigate and prosecute militia abuses or the Government officials who are responsible for their actions. A barangay official told Human Rights Watch, "The establishment of private armies of CVOs us an agreement between the Government, Governor, and the Military. Almost all the Mayors' political clans have their own CVOs." A senior member of the Ampatuan family echoed this, saying, "In all areas where there are insurgencies...(Governing families) are provided with CAFGUs and CVOs to promote peace and order in areas."
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The preceding section on "paramilitaries," CAFGU, etc., is riddled with factual inaccuracies. In facr, I noted seven majot factual errors so, please just that entire section with a grain of sand. The last, and final part of this two part entry will begin where I left off, page 7.
Showing posts with label HRW Reports. Show all posts
Showing posts with label HRW Reports. Show all posts
Friday, December 9, 2011
Thursday, November 10, 2011
History of Mindanao, Part XX: Bad Blood: HRW Report on AFP Sponsored Paramilitaries in Caraga, 1991, Part 3
In this, my third and next to last installment on the Human Rights Watch, or HRW report, "Bad Blood: ," I will finish highlighting a critical part of Mindanaowan History. Covering the start of
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pp20 (continued)
"Abduction and Mistreatment of Civilians by Militart anf CAFGU
Seven cases of maltreatment of civilians during a May 1991 military offensive were documented by Human Rights Watch.
pp21
In each case, CAFGU from Aurora, a village about five miles away from the site of the military operations, accompanied the soldiers from the 36th and 8th IBs, beyond the territory they are restricted to under the guidelines set up by the Government. The three CAFGU members who were positively identified were listed as active-duty CAFGU and were also listed as former CHDF in rosters filed at the Provincial Government offices.
Jose Abing
A farmer, Jose Abing, 29, asserted in a May 20th, 1991 affadavit filed with the Provincial Prosecutor that he was tortured after he was picked up in an area of recent military operationa by a group of CAFGU members and soldiers in the village of New Visayas, in the town of Prosperidad.
At 8AM on May 2nd, 1991, Abing was picked up at his farm by soldiers from the 36th and the 8th IBs accompanied by nine CAFFU members, whom he identified as Felipe Rodriguez, Leonicio Ebanez, Helimon Ebanez, and six known only as Abawan, Rolly, Benben, Tony Carting, and Doloy Guyay. He stated that the CAFGU grabbed him and hung him upside down out of the window of Abing's own house. Then they forced Abing to drink a half-gallon of vinager. Soon afterwards, the CAFGU released him and left, taking his rooster and his neighbour's chickens.
Abduction of Six Residents
Two farmers from the village of New Visayas, witin the municipality of Prosperidad stated in a joint affadavit that they were picked up by a group of CAFGU members and soldiers from the 36th and 8th IBs and tortured on suspicion that they were NPA rebels.
In their May 20th affadavit filed with the Provincial Prosecutor, Jaime Baluyos, 27, and Bonifacio Gabuya, 21, stated that they were forcibly taken out of their homes on May 4th, 1991 at 530AM. They asserted that they were shown no warrant of arresr and that they had not committed any crime (under Philippine Law, warrantless arrests are considered legal if the arresting officer has grounds to believe that the suspect is a member of the Communist Party or the NPA). They stated that they were also repeatedly punched and kicked by nine CAFGU members, identified by name as the same men who apprehended Jose Abing (above). Their Commander, a Sergeant Felasol og the 36th IB, looked on but did not stop the beatingsm
Afterwards, the CAFGU bound their hands and tied a noose around Baluyo's and Gabuya's necks, using nylon rope. In this manner, they were marched overland to the village of Cecilia, in the town of San Luis, about seven miles away. When they arrived, they were given food, but every time they tried to swallow, the soldiers yanked their nooses tight. Then a soldier, a member of the 8th Infantry Battalion, approached the two with a knife and threatened to cut off their ears, but was restrained by the others, who said the two were needed as guides. Later, however, they were released for no apparent reason.
A day later, four residents, a farmer, name withheld, was abducted along with his son, his neighbor, and his neighbor's son by military forces on May 5th, 1991.
The farmer recounted that the four were apprehended at their house, about a mile and a half from the center of the village of Muritula. The site of the incident was only roughly a mile from Cecilia, the village named in the May 4th incident above. Muritula is about six miles north of the municipal center of San Luis.
In the weeks immediately preceding this abduction, troops belonging to the 36th IB based in the village center had been waging an offensive against supposed NPA guerillas in the area. During the offensive, the farmer claimed, the military ransacked their peasant cooperative store. At the time, the farmer and his family had fled their farm for the evacuation center in San Luis town center. But food ran low, so he decided to return with his eldest son Larry on May 5th, 1991 to retreive some corn and mill it with his wooden mill. A neighbor, Cresensio Ando, 38, and his son also returned to receive some of their harvest.
Upon leaving the mill that afternoon at about 440PM, the four suddenly encountered between 45 and 60 military men, a composite team from the 36th Infantry Battalion and the CAFGU detachment. The leaders approached...
pp22
...the farmers and took their sacks of corn. Upon questioning, the four said the corm was for their families, but the military insisted the food was for the NPAs.
"There were so many soldiers that it seemed like wherever I looked, there was the color of uniforms. I was shaking with fear, because they were pointing their firearms at us. I thought to myself, what can I di to stop my being kiLled?" the farmer recalled.
The soldiers accused the men of feeding the NPA, and the four responded that they had done so at times in the past, but had no choice. Then, the farmer watched as four of the soldiers, one with the name patch that read "Cornello," the other "Reyes," began kicking Anda all over his body while accusing him of being an NPA "murderer."
The four were ordered to accompany the troops on their march northwards. Over the next 14 days, they continued to be held in custody. They accompanied the troops by foot for 20 miles, and were used several times as guides in the military's search for rebel hideouts. At the military encampment, they were ordered to do the daily cooking and cleaning.
No charges were presented during their 15 day abduction, in violation of laws limiting detention without charges for 36 hours. On May 19th, after more interrogation, the four were released in Bayugan, a municipality about 30 miles north of San Luis. One of the four, Cresensio Anda, filed an affadavit a week later in San Francisco (San Franz), Agusan del Sur. As of January, 1992, the Provincial Prosecutor haf still not brought charges against the 36th IB. The farmer said he wanted to press charges, but probably would not do so. "I have no experience in filing a case," he said, "and I must admit, I'm scared too because the military aand CAFGU are still there in my neighborhood."
Dante Marevilles
A week later in Muritula, a fifth resident, Dante Marevillas, 25, asserted in a May 25th affadavit that he, too, was picked up by two members if the 36th Infantry Battalion at 6AM on May 14th outside Muritula. He stated that the two accused him of being an NPA sniper responsible for an ambush in their village. He denied the allegation, and the two responded by binding his wrists and ankles with plastic coated wire. Then Marevilles was repeatedly kicked, poked, and humiliated. The soldiers then stapled fliers to his ears. Marevilles was released later the same day. He has since gone into hiding.
CAFGU Abuses in San Miguel
San Miguel is a dusty frontier town located in one of the least populated , wildest corners of Northeast Mindanao. In the 1970s to early 1980s, San Miguel, like much of the province of Surigao del Sur, was largely under the sway of the insurgent "shadow" government, backed by hundreds of armed, barefoot rebels under the command of a former Catholic priest, Father Francisco Navarro.
In late January 1992, the town was in a state of military occupation. In more remote communities, soldiers were lodging in residents' homes; until early January, troops had also been encamped right in front of the central primary school. Military officials pointed to Surigao del Sur as a focal point in the Government's counterinsurgency campaign, and weekly reports of military encounters in San Miguel found their way into regional newspapers, which were not available to local residents, and onto radio, which was. There were also stories describing the elaborately staged "surrender" ceremonies of entire communities, which military officials used to back up claims that they were winning the war.
pp23
Local officials concurred that the NPA had indeed lost ground in San Miguel in 1991, but military officials estimated that there were still between 500 and 700 more rebels in the area; police officials said 60% of villages, or "barangays," were controlled or infiltrated by the Communist Party. In one instance on July 25, 1991, roughly 250 rebels waged simultaneous attacks on a barangay and the municipal hall in downtown San Miguel, resulting in four military and six civilian deaths and the wounding of 19 others.
The military's success in beating back the insurgency, however, had its costs. The continued proximity of active rebel forces had legitimized the military's almost complete dominance over civilian authorities. Village officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told Human Rights Watch they had lost authority over police and civic functions and were afraid of reprisals should they complain. Tainted by long associations withthe rebels, they were unwilling to speak out against abuses by drunken or abusive militia members.
By and large, the victims of assaults, harassment, and other threats continued to be members and leaders of legal peasant cooperatives and their supporters in the Church. In most cases documented by Human Rights Watch, the attackers belonged to the 62 member CAFGU in San Miguel. Meanwhile, the Military had plans to recruit and train an additional 88 members in 1992.
Abuses Against Peasant Organizations
The vast majority of San Miguels 30,000 residents are impoverished tenant farmers and small landholders, who eke out a meager subsistence cultivating rice, corn, and vegetables for family consumption. In early 1992, none of the town's 18 barangays had electricity or running water, and the few dirt roads connecting the farms to the market were often impassable during the six month long rainy season.
Poor peasants, driven by economic expediency and encouraged by an activist church, have organized community based farming cooperatives throughout San Miguel. Roughly ten percent of households had joined cooperatives affiliated with the local peasant organization, KAMAGTONG, which is a local chapter of the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), a national militant peasants' organization. The military had openly labeled these cooperatives as Communist-led or -infiltrated organizations. But the peasants, despite threats, maintaned and even strengthened the cooperatives, insisting that they had brought demonstrable improvements in people's standard of living.
Military and militia threats and harassment continued throughout 1991 and early 1992, despite the fact that several of the cooperatives had gained official legitimacy, obtaining loans from national and international lending organizations. In January 1992, soldiers raided a cooperative storage shed in Apique, San Miguel, seizing 46 sacks of rice. The battalion commander insisted that the rice was set aside as payment- in- kind for interest on a 200,000 Peso ($8,000) loan from the Land Bank, the national lending institution for agricultural development projectd.
Human Rights Watch documented several cases of abuse by militia in 1991, usually in the presence of, if not direct participation of, regular forces in San Miguel.
pp24
Rodrigo Princesa, a 38 year old farmer from the village of Santa Cruz, San Miguel, described how he was threatened and beaten unconscious by a group of CAFGU in the presence of their military commander. He said that at 4PM on December 16, he and a friend, Marcos Avila, went to a local storehouse owned by Ceding Galindo to get diesel fuel for Avila's bulldozer. Upon approaching the house, a neighbor told them that some CAFGU men from the local detachment and their commander from the 29IB were inside drinking.
The owner invited them in for a drink, so the two sat down in the kitchen, the next room away from where the militiamen were seated. All the militiamen were in uniform and armed with Garands, and were evidently drunk. One of the CAFGU members, Romy Cabacas, asked them to join the group for a drink and so Avila ordered a round of beer and joined the militiamen.
Princesa was nervous about joining the CAFGU, since he is a member of KAMAGTONG, and Princesa's neighbors had also told him there were rumors that he was going to be "salvaged," a term in the Philippines for Extra-Judicial Killings. But Princesa joined them around the small table so as not to appear rude. Later on in the evening, the cadre, Sergeant Alejandro "Al" Calooy, put his arm on Princesa's shoulder and drew him towards the door because he wanted to "have a talk." As Princesa approached the door, Jimmy Otera, a CAFGU member, grabbed Princesa by the neck and threw him down on the floor and began kicking Princesa's prone body. The other CAFGU members, identified as Eddie Roluna, Orly Orturo, and Romy Cabacas, immediately joined Otera. Sgt.Calooy stood by. Princesa lost consciousness momentarily.
While Princesa was lying on his back, Otero stomped on his abdomen and chest with enough force to break two ribs and leave bootprint shaped bruises on his chest. His cheeks, head, and legs were also bruised. Two months later, he had trouble breathing and was still unable to do farmwork.
At some point, the son of the resturant owner approached and helped Princesa stand up and get out of the house. Otero followed, laughing, and when Princesa was about 45 feet away from the store, Otera fired two shots in the air, shouting, "You brave man! You lousy NPA!"
The following day, Princesa reported the incident to a village councilman, who advised him to go to the Commission on Human Rights. He then filed an affadavit with the CHR. On November 18, Princesa sought the help of the local human rights monitor, who brought him to the provincial hospital in Tandag for x-rays and treatment.
Princesa and other community members interviewed said several of the attackers- Otera, Orturo, and Cabacas- are known as especially abusive when drunk. Human Rights monitors said Cabacas is implicated in a killing in a community a mile and a half away from Santa Cruz. Two months later, in January 1992, Otera, Cabacas, and Orturo were still listed as active duty CAFGU at the 29IB Headquarters. Calooy, of the 29IB, has himself been implicated in attacks on members of peasant cooperatives in San Miguel in 1990 and 1991.
Despite the fact that Calooy's battalion, the 29IB, had been transferred the month before, Calooy had stayed behind with the CAFGU unit he trained. Calooy was one of four commanders left behind with their CAFGU detachments according to military officials. The 29IB was transferred after its reputation was tarnished by numerous human rights abuses, including the unprovoked killing of two civilians and wounding of five in August 1990 in Libas Sud, a remote community of San Miguel (Multiple Murder charges were pending against the alleged leader of the attack, Lt.Felix Mangyao, after local government and Church investigators issued a report, "A Fact Finding Mission Report on the Massacre Incident in Barangay Libas Sud, San Miguel," Diocese of Tandag Justice and Peace Office, Surigao del Sur, Sept.20, 1990. The report strongly implicated the commanding officer and his company. Sixteen months after the shootings, victims in Libas Sud received Government funds for medical and burial fees from the Commission on Human Rights).
pp25
Abduction and Beating of Two Farmers
The father of a farmer recounted the story of his son's abduction by two CAFGU members in June 26, 1991 in the municipal center of San Miguel. The son was also a member of KAMAGTONG.
A day before the incident, the NPA had waged a full scale attack on the town of San Miguel. One of the main targets of the attack was said to be a CAFGU member, Tony de Guzman, who resides in the town center. De Guzman escaped harm, but 14 were killed in the attack and de Guzman's close associate, CAFGU member Eddie Roluna, was one of 19 wounded.
On the evening of the incident, the man's son and two companions were waiting on a street corner in San Miguel for a ride to take them back to their homes in Bolhoon, about 10 miles away. At that time, they were approached by two armed men; they were CAFGU members Tony de Guzman, and de Guzman's son in law, nicknamed "Bodoy." De Guzman grabbed the young man by his face, and yelled, "You are one of the NPAs in that attack on San Miguel!" The young man denied it, and de Guzman began to punch him, striking his head and ear with his M14 rifle. Then he struck the victim's ribs, so hard that the rifle broke. The young man and his two companions were then forced into a dark alley. At that moment, however, an old woman passed by and looked their way. De Guzman ceased the beating, and let the three go, after warning them not to tell anyone about the incident.
The group recognized de Guzman and Bodoy. The two and a group of CAFGU members had passed through their neighborhood in Bolhoon several times in the past year, asking families if they were giving aid to the NPA. When they came, the man said, they stole things, like chickens. De Guzman always appeared to be the leader. The year before, Bodoy had been among those shot and injured in an NPA ambush in a neighboring community.
The father saw his son the morning after the attack. His head was bloody, and there were bruises on his chest. He had a cut above his right ear. The young man went into hiding soon after, and his whereabouts in January 1992 were unlnown.
Jaime Quieta
Jaime Quieta, 25, chairman of a local farmer's organization, described how a masked CAFGU member pressed a lit cigarette in his face in full view of the soldiers from the 29th IB, in Bolhoon, San Miguel. He and two neighbors said they were used as a shield by the Military's troops after the attack.
At 3AM on August 27, 1991, when the farmer and his wife awoke to the sound of dogs barking. At about 4, they peered out the window and saw that soldiers, about 30 of them, had surrounded their neighbor's house, about 40 feet distant. A few minutes later, soldiers surrounded Quieta's house and ordered the family outside. Quieta said the soldiers were in combat position, lying on the ground with rifles poised to fire on him. Three soldiers approached Quieta, with rifles drawn, and demanded to be shown the firearms and the two NPA rebels they had been told were in his house. Quieta repeatedly denied the claims. After several minutes of interrogation, during which he was not touched, one soldier told him, "If you don't admit these things, you better watch yourself."
Then the soldiers left him alone while they initiated a search of his house. At this point, a man wearing a white hood showing only his eyes approached Quieta. He was smoking a cigarette, "You'd better confess, because we have a reliable report," he told Quieta, and continued pressing him about the whereabouts of the rebels they had been told were in his house. Quieta protested again that he knew nothing and would answer no more questions. The man responded, "So you're good at answering questions," and grabbed his head pressing a lit cigarette into his face. Quieta recognized the voice as that of a CAFGU member, Tony de Guzman, who is familiar as a fish vendor in the neighborhood.
At that moment, a soldier, who Quieta presumed to be the Commanding Officer, ordered all the men in the neighborhood out of their houses. Ten of them were forced to line up in single file. "We were made to understand that we were going to walk with them to San Roque as a ahield because they thought the NPA wouldn't attack them if we were alongside," he said. The men marched with them up to San Roque, a village about two and a half miles away where they were encamped, and then released.
pp26
Quieta's neighbor, name withheld, recalled that, at about 3 that morning, men yelled at him to open his door. He refused because it was still dark and he was afraid. But the soldiers went around back, and, led by a CAFGU member, five of them broke through a hole above the kitchen door. The CAFGU man had a white mask beneath his military helmet but the neighbor recognized him right away as Tony de Guzman.
The witness said the soldiers, who were members of the 29th Infantry Battalion, pointed their firearms at him and asked him to tell them where the NPA rebels were hiding. He couldn't identify them, because he is illiterate and could not read their nameplates. He repeatedly denied having any knowledge of the NPA's whereabouts, and after several minutes the soldiers left and went to Quieta's house. A little while later, soldiers returned and ordered him out of the house. He was pushed into the road, where about eight men in the neighborhood were already gathered. There were between 20 and 50 soldiers, he said. One man was sent to wake the village head. When the head came out, the commanding officer asked "permission" to bring the men along as escorts on their route back to the detachment, adding that none of the men would be hurt. A second neighbor corroborated Quieta's and the first neighbor's story.
The shielding incident clearly violated International Laws of War. Under Protocol I, Article 51, Number 7 of the Optional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions, to which the Philippines is signatory.
"Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations."
Col.Santos Gabison Jr., who was stationed in Bolhoon at the time of the incident, told Human Rights Watch that his troops did not use civilians as a shield.
The incident also illustrated how the local CAFGU- in this case, Tony de Guzman- were used to pinpoint and "rough up" local residents suspected of sympathies for the NPA.
Col.Gabison, however, denied that de Guzman was present during that operation. De Guzman, he said, "was not utilized by us on that occaison. I told my people we should not be utilizing him."
Several community leaders interviewed by Human Rights Watch recalled that during the past three years, Tony de Guzman had physically assaulted several of them, whom he pinpointed as NPA rebels. De Guzman abducted a local resident, Jesus Martinez, in 1986, while de Guzman was with the CHDF. According to a relative of Martinez, the victim was later found floating dead in the Tago River. "But that was before there were human rights investigators," she said.
Local Church council memembers and human rights monitors were also able to identify a dozen separate victims allegedly killed by Tony de Guzman over the past seven years. All of those killed were farmers suspected of being NPA. In most cases described, the victims were taken from their houses, and later found dead by a single shot in the head. In one case in 1986, de Guzman was suspected of setting a hut on fire, incinerating an elderly couple inside.
De Guzman is known throughout the area. He is often seen wearing a red headscarf, and people say he carries a human kneecap as a talisman to make him impenetrable to bullets. His background as a fish peddler and passenger motorbike driver made de Guzman familiar with the remotest settlements, and may explain why he has often been used as a guide in military ambushes of the NPA.
Lack of Accountability
According to Military officials, the CAFGU commanding officer and the local civilian leaders are supposed to share supervision of the CAFGU troops. In San Miguel, it sometimes seemed as if noone was in charge.
When asked about disciplining the CAFGU recruits currently stationed in San Miguel, the commander of the newly posted 67th Infantry Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Jose Barbieto, told Human Rights Watch that he was not authorised to discharge or punish abusive militia; the 29th Infantry Battalion, which had just been transferred to a post 20 miles away, "did not cede to us the discipline of these CAFGUs," he said.
pp27
However, Barbieto's testimony was directly contradicted by that of the commander of the 29th IB in Tandag. Maj.Esperidion Balintag. Balintag said his battalion was no longer in charge of the discipline and punishment of the CAFGUs in San Miguel.
Noone wanted to take responsibility for CAFGU member Tony de Guzman. Military officials told Human Rights Watch that de Guzman was discharged from Active Duty CAFGU service on August 1, 1990, by orders of the Regional Command. However, this contradicted both the eyewitness reports of residents in Bolhoon, as well as the statemnts by the Mayor of the town of San Miguel and other local officials, who asked that their names not be used. Mayor Josite T.Elizalde asserted that de Guzman was one of fourteen CAFGU members posted in the town center. In 1990, he was discharged. But in July 1991, after the NPA staged its attack in San Miguel, he was re-activated. He could recall numerous abuses by de Guzman from his constituents, but he said de Guzman was "out of his hands."
"For the civilians, he's so hostile," explained Elizalde. "But for the Military he's an Asset."
"Forced Surrender," Forced Recruitment of Village Guards
CAFGU abuses in San Miguel took place in a climate of widespread military coercion and intimidation of civilians and challenges to civilian authority. Allegations of population control below appear to suggest that the Military would not tolerate even the slightest dissent in areas of ongoing military operations.
Village Guards
Father Eligio Bianchi, San Miguel Parish Priest, described the forced recruitment of unarmed Vilage Guards, called the "Bantay Bayan." From July to November, 1991, after the NPA attacked the village of Siago and the town center of San Miguel, a 10PM to Dawn Curfew was instituted. All adult male residents in the "Puroks" of San Miguel , each purok representing 20 to 30 households, were enlisted into the local Bantay Bayan. Each purok was obliged to man checkpoints from 5PM to 5AM every night. In some cases, when soldiers found that a checkpoint was not manned, residents were punched, and in other cases, some were forced to work at the army detachment without pay. Those who failed to show up for work were accused of being sympathizers. "While the people were guarding the town, the soldiers were sleeping. It was keeping the people from their work because they were too overtired to work in the fields" Bianch said.
The Parish Council protested the formation of the Bantay Bayan in a press statement published September 12, 1991. A day later, the detachment commander of the 29th IB accused Bianchi of bringing rice to the NPA rebels and of owning a machinegun. Nothing came of the charges, perhaps because the battalion was transferred out in November, and replaced by the 67th IB.
Anti-Communist Seminars
The practice of holding Anti-Communist seminars culminating in a formal "surrender" of entire civilian communities in an explicit part of the Philippines Armed Forces counterinsurgency strategy. In the village of Santa Cruz, San Miguel, three residents, two of whom were members of local peasant cooperative, gave first hand accounts of how residents were forced to "surrender" to the Government in a village meeting, or "pulong-pulong" organized by the 67th IB on January 12, 1992.
The day before, military officers had gone to the local elementary school and told children to tell their parents that anyone over 12 had to come to the school for the pulong-pulong.
pp28
If they did not attend the military would assume that they were NPA. That same evening the soldiers went to the houses of the 15 individuals belonging to the peasant cooperative, which is suspected of being a rebel "front" organization. One 64 year old grandmother said her house was searched while the military interviewed her. Another, a 57 year old farmer and mother of 5, said the military insisted she had a code name and encouraged her and her husband to sign a paper, which, she was led to believe, identified her as a "rebel surrenderee." The soldiers assured the family that nothing would happen to them if they signed the paper, she said.
The chairman of the local peasant cooperative, Samuel Ravelo, 44, was also visited the evening before the meeting. The soldiers told him he was a "Communist" and he was made to believe that he would have "problems" if he failed to "surrender." He said it was the second time the community had been forced to "surrender," the first time being in 1986, when local forces led by Tony de Guzman led raids on local houses of suspected NPA supporters.
At the pulong-pulong, the officer in charge, a certain Corporal Rogelio, told the crowd that their cooperative was a "Communist System," and all were asked to sign "confessions" that they were rebel sympathisers. One person recalled. "The Military told us that we could not deny our support for the NPA, because they said they have a list with all of us in Santa Cruz and Sagbayan (a neighboring community).
Military Harassment
Local village officials of Ubas Sud, a remote settlement of 351 households also in San Miguel, said they had been continuously harassed since they had filed charges against a lieutenant from the 29th IB who allegedly killed 12 townspeople in a midnite raid in June 1990. In January, soldiers from the 67th IB came to each of their houses. The soldiers forced them to sign affadavits asserting that they were members of the NPA and that they were "surrendering" to the Government. The military told them that their community organizations, including a UNICEF sponsored children's program were rebel "front" organizations.
One local council member explained that noone was safe from suspicion. "The Military insists that we are all rebels," he said. "It all started in 1990, when we started filing human rights complaints against them. We really followed up, executing affadavits. If we complain against the war, then we must be rebels."
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Part 4, the final part in this series will be posted shortly.
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pp20 (continued)
"Abduction and Mistreatment of Civilians by Militart anf CAFGU
Seven cases of maltreatment of civilians during a May 1991 military offensive were documented by Human Rights Watch.
pp21
In each case, CAFGU from Aurora, a village about five miles away from the site of the military operations, accompanied the soldiers from the 36th and 8th IBs, beyond the territory they are restricted to under the guidelines set up by the Government. The three CAFGU members who were positively identified were listed as active-duty CAFGU and were also listed as former CHDF in rosters filed at the Provincial Government offices.
Jose Abing
A farmer, Jose Abing, 29, asserted in a May 20th, 1991 affadavit filed with the Provincial Prosecutor that he was tortured after he was picked up in an area of recent military operationa by a group of CAFGU members and soldiers in the village of New Visayas, in the town of Prosperidad.
At 8AM on May 2nd, 1991, Abing was picked up at his farm by soldiers from the 36th and the 8th IBs accompanied by nine CAFFU members, whom he identified as Felipe Rodriguez, Leonicio Ebanez, Helimon Ebanez, and six known only as Abawan, Rolly, Benben, Tony Carting, and Doloy Guyay. He stated that the CAFGU grabbed him and hung him upside down out of the window of Abing's own house. Then they forced Abing to drink a half-gallon of vinager. Soon afterwards, the CAFGU released him and left, taking his rooster and his neighbour's chickens.
Abduction of Six Residents
Two farmers from the village of New Visayas, witin the municipality of Prosperidad stated in a joint affadavit that they were picked up by a group of CAFGU members and soldiers from the 36th and 8th IBs and tortured on suspicion that they were NPA rebels.
In their May 20th affadavit filed with the Provincial Prosecutor, Jaime Baluyos, 27, and Bonifacio Gabuya, 21, stated that they were forcibly taken out of their homes on May 4th, 1991 at 530AM. They asserted that they were shown no warrant of arresr and that they had not committed any crime (under Philippine Law, warrantless arrests are considered legal if the arresting officer has grounds to believe that the suspect is a member of the Communist Party or the NPA). They stated that they were also repeatedly punched and kicked by nine CAFGU members, identified by name as the same men who apprehended Jose Abing (above). Their Commander, a Sergeant Felasol og the 36th IB, looked on but did not stop the beatingsm
Afterwards, the CAFGU bound their hands and tied a noose around Baluyo's and Gabuya's necks, using nylon rope. In this manner, they were marched overland to the village of Cecilia, in the town of San Luis, about seven miles away. When they arrived, they were given food, but every time they tried to swallow, the soldiers yanked their nooses tight. Then a soldier, a member of the 8th Infantry Battalion, approached the two with a knife and threatened to cut off their ears, but was restrained by the others, who said the two were needed as guides. Later, however, they were released for no apparent reason.
A day later, four residents, a farmer, name withheld, was abducted along with his son, his neighbor, and his neighbor's son by military forces on May 5th, 1991.
The farmer recounted that the four were apprehended at their house, about a mile and a half from the center of the village of Muritula. The site of the incident was only roughly a mile from Cecilia, the village named in the May 4th incident above. Muritula is about six miles north of the municipal center of San Luis.
In the weeks immediately preceding this abduction, troops belonging to the 36th IB based in the village center had been waging an offensive against supposed NPA guerillas in the area. During the offensive, the farmer claimed, the military ransacked their peasant cooperative store. At the time, the farmer and his family had fled their farm for the evacuation center in San Luis town center. But food ran low, so he decided to return with his eldest son Larry on May 5th, 1991 to retreive some corn and mill it with his wooden mill. A neighbor, Cresensio Ando, 38, and his son also returned to receive some of their harvest.
Upon leaving the mill that afternoon at about 440PM, the four suddenly encountered between 45 and 60 military men, a composite team from the 36th Infantry Battalion and the CAFGU detachment. The leaders approached...
pp22
...the farmers and took their sacks of corn. Upon questioning, the four said the corm was for their families, but the military insisted the food was for the NPAs.
"There were so many soldiers that it seemed like wherever I looked, there was the color of uniforms. I was shaking with fear, because they were pointing their firearms at us. I thought to myself, what can I di to stop my being kiLled?" the farmer recalled.
The soldiers accused the men of feeding the NPA, and the four responded that they had done so at times in the past, but had no choice. Then, the farmer watched as four of the soldiers, one with the name patch that read "Cornello," the other "Reyes," began kicking Anda all over his body while accusing him of being an NPA "murderer."
The four were ordered to accompany the troops on their march northwards. Over the next 14 days, they continued to be held in custody. They accompanied the troops by foot for 20 miles, and were used several times as guides in the military's search for rebel hideouts. At the military encampment, they were ordered to do the daily cooking and cleaning.
No charges were presented during their 15 day abduction, in violation of laws limiting detention without charges for 36 hours. On May 19th, after more interrogation, the four were released in Bayugan, a municipality about 30 miles north of San Luis. One of the four, Cresensio Anda, filed an affadavit a week later in San Francisco (San Franz), Agusan del Sur. As of January, 1992, the Provincial Prosecutor haf still not brought charges against the 36th IB. The farmer said he wanted to press charges, but probably would not do so. "I have no experience in filing a case," he said, "and I must admit, I'm scared too because the military aand CAFGU are still there in my neighborhood."
Dante Marevilles
A week later in Muritula, a fifth resident, Dante Marevillas, 25, asserted in a May 25th affadavit that he, too, was picked up by two members if the 36th Infantry Battalion at 6AM on May 14th outside Muritula. He stated that the two accused him of being an NPA sniper responsible for an ambush in their village. He denied the allegation, and the two responded by binding his wrists and ankles with plastic coated wire. Then Marevilles was repeatedly kicked, poked, and humiliated. The soldiers then stapled fliers to his ears. Marevilles was released later the same day. He has since gone into hiding.
CAFGU Abuses in San Miguel
San Miguel is a dusty frontier town located in one of the least populated , wildest corners of Northeast Mindanao. In the 1970s to early 1980s, San Miguel, like much of the province of Surigao del Sur, was largely under the sway of the insurgent "shadow" government, backed by hundreds of armed, barefoot rebels under the command of a former Catholic priest, Father Francisco Navarro.
In late January 1992, the town was in a state of military occupation. In more remote communities, soldiers were lodging in residents' homes; until early January, troops had also been encamped right in front of the central primary school. Military officials pointed to Surigao del Sur as a focal point in the Government's counterinsurgency campaign, and weekly reports of military encounters in San Miguel found their way into regional newspapers, which were not available to local residents, and onto radio, which was. There were also stories describing the elaborately staged "surrender" ceremonies of entire communities, which military officials used to back up claims that they were winning the war.
pp23
Local officials concurred that the NPA had indeed lost ground in San Miguel in 1991, but military officials estimated that there were still between 500 and 700 more rebels in the area; police officials said 60% of villages, or "barangays," were controlled or infiltrated by the Communist Party. In one instance on July 25, 1991, roughly 250 rebels waged simultaneous attacks on a barangay and the municipal hall in downtown San Miguel, resulting in four military and six civilian deaths and the wounding of 19 others.
The military's success in beating back the insurgency, however, had its costs. The continued proximity of active rebel forces had legitimized the military's almost complete dominance over civilian authorities. Village officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told Human Rights Watch they had lost authority over police and civic functions and were afraid of reprisals should they complain. Tainted by long associations withthe rebels, they were unwilling to speak out against abuses by drunken or abusive militia members.
By and large, the victims of assaults, harassment, and other threats continued to be members and leaders of legal peasant cooperatives and their supporters in the Church. In most cases documented by Human Rights Watch, the attackers belonged to the 62 member CAFGU in San Miguel. Meanwhile, the Military had plans to recruit and train an additional 88 members in 1992.
Abuses Against Peasant Organizations
The vast majority of San Miguels 30,000 residents are impoverished tenant farmers and small landholders, who eke out a meager subsistence cultivating rice, corn, and vegetables for family consumption. In early 1992, none of the town's 18 barangays had electricity or running water, and the few dirt roads connecting the farms to the market were often impassable during the six month long rainy season.
Poor peasants, driven by economic expediency and encouraged by an activist church, have organized community based farming cooperatives throughout San Miguel. Roughly ten percent of households had joined cooperatives affiliated with the local peasant organization, KAMAGTONG, which is a local chapter of the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), a national militant peasants' organization. The military had openly labeled these cooperatives as Communist-led or -infiltrated organizations. But the peasants, despite threats, maintaned and even strengthened the cooperatives, insisting that they had brought demonstrable improvements in people's standard of living.
Military and militia threats and harassment continued throughout 1991 and early 1992, despite the fact that several of the cooperatives had gained official legitimacy, obtaining loans from national and international lending organizations. In January 1992, soldiers raided a cooperative storage shed in Apique, San Miguel, seizing 46 sacks of rice. The battalion commander insisted that the rice was set aside as payment- in- kind for interest on a 200,000 Peso ($8,000) loan from the Land Bank, the national lending institution for agricultural development projectd.
Human Rights Watch documented several cases of abuse by militia in 1991, usually in the presence of, if not direct participation of, regular forces in San Miguel.
pp24
Rodrigo Princesa, a 38 year old farmer from the village of Santa Cruz, San Miguel, described how he was threatened and beaten unconscious by a group of CAFGU in the presence of their military commander. He said that at 4PM on December 16, he and a friend, Marcos Avila, went to a local storehouse owned by Ceding Galindo to get diesel fuel for Avila's bulldozer. Upon approaching the house, a neighbor told them that some CAFGU men from the local detachment and their commander from the 29IB were inside drinking.
The owner invited them in for a drink, so the two sat down in the kitchen, the next room away from where the militiamen were seated. All the militiamen were in uniform and armed with Garands, and were evidently drunk. One of the CAFGU members, Romy Cabacas, asked them to join the group for a drink and so Avila ordered a round of beer and joined the militiamen.
Princesa was nervous about joining the CAFGU, since he is a member of KAMAGTONG, and Princesa's neighbors had also told him there were rumors that he was going to be "salvaged," a term in the Philippines for Extra-Judicial Killings. But Princesa joined them around the small table so as not to appear rude. Later on in the evening, the cadre, Sergeant Alejandro "Al" Calooy, put his arm on Princesa's shoulder and drew him towards the door because he wanted to "have a talk." As Princesa approached the door, Jimmy Otera, a CAFGU member, grabbed Princesa by the neck and threw him down on the floor and began kicking Princesa's prone body. The other CAFGU members, identified as Eddie Roluna, Orly Orturo, and Romy Cabacas, immediately joined Otera. Sgt.Calooy stood by. Princesa lost consciousness momentarily.
While Princesa was lying on his back, Otero stomped on his abdomen and chest with enough force to break two ribs and leave bootprint shaped bruises on his chest. His cheeks, head, and legs were also bruised. Two months later, he had trouble breathing and was still unable to do farmwork.
At some point, the son of the resturant owner approached and helped Princesa stand up and get out of the house. Otero followed, laughing, and when Princesa was about 45 feet away from the store, Otera fired two shots in the air, shouting, "You brave man! You lousy NPA!"
The following day, Princesa reported the incident to a village councilman, who advised him to go to the Commission on Human Rights. He then filed an affadavit with the CHR. On November 18, Princesa sought the help of the local human rights monitor, who brought him to the provincial hospital in Tandag for x-rays and treatment.
Princesa and other community members interviewed said several of the attackers- Otera, Orturo, and Cabacas- are known as especially abusive when drunk. Human Rights monitors said Cabacas is implicated in a killing in a community a mile and a half away from Santa Cruz. Two months later, in January 1992, Otera, Cabacas, and Orturo were still listed as active duty CAFGU at the 29IB Headquarters. Calooy, of the 29IB, has himself been implicated in attacks on members of peasant cooperatives in San Miguel in 1990 and 1991.
Despite the fact that Calooy's battalion, the 29IB, had been transferred the month before, Calooy had stayed behind with the CAFGU unit he trained. Calooy was one of four commanders left behind with their CAFGU detachments according to military officials. The 29IB was transferred after its reputation was tarnished by numerous human rights abuses, including the unprovoked killing of two civilians and wounding of five in August 1990 in Libas Sud, a remote community of San Miguel (Multiple Murder charges were pending against the alleged leader of the attack, Lt.Felix Mangyao, after local government and Church investigators issued a report, "A Fact Finding Mission Report on the Massacre Incident in Barangay Libas Sud, San Miguel," Diocese of Tandag Justice and Peace Office, Surigao del Sur, Sept.20, 1990. The report strongly implicated the commanding officer and his company. Sixteen months after the shootings, victims in Libas Sud received Government funds for medical and burial fees from the Commission on Human Rights).
pp25
Abduction and Beating of Two Farmers
The father of a farmer recounted the story of his son's abduction by two CAFGU members in June 26, 1991 in the municipal center of San Miguel. The son was also a member of KAMAGTONG.
A day before the incident, the NPA had waged a full scale attack on the town of San Miguel. One of the main targets of the attack was said to be a CAFGU member, Tony de Guzman, who resides in the town center. De Guzman escaped harm, but 14 were killed in the attack and de Guzman's close associate, CAFGU member Eddie Roluna, was one of 19 wounded.
On the evening of the incident, the man's son and two companions were waiting on a street corner in San Miguel for a ride to take them back to their homes in Bolhoon, about 10 miles away. At that time, they were approached by two armed men; they were CAFGU members Tony de Guzman, and de Guzman's son in law, nicknamed "Bodoy." De Guzman grabbed the young man by his face, and yelled, "You are one of the NPAs in that attack on San Miguel!" The young man denied it, and de Guzman began to punch him, striking his head and ear with his M14 rifle. Then he struck the victim's ribs, so hard that the rifle broke. The young man and his two companions were then forced into a dark alley. At that moment, however, an old woman passed by and looked their way. De Guzman ceased the beating, and let the three go, after warning them not to tell anyone about the incident.
The group recognized de Guzman and Bodoy. The two and a group of CAFGU members had passed through their neighborhood in Bolhoon several times in the past year, asking families if they were giving aid to the NPA. When they came, the man said, they stole things, like chickens. De Guzman always appeared to be the leader. The year before, Bodoy had been among those shot and injured in an NPA ambush in a neighboring community.
The father saw his son the morning after the attack. His head was bloody, and there were bruises on his chest. He had a cut above his right ear. The young man went into hiding soon after, and his whereabouts in January 1992 were unlnown.
Jaime Quieta
Jaime Quieta, 25, chairman of a local farmer's organization, described how a masked CAFGU member pressed a lit cigarette in his face in full view of the soldiers from the 29th IB, in Bolhoon, San Miguel. He and two neighbors said they were used as a shield by the Military's troops after the attack.
At 3AM on August 27, 1991, when the farmer and his wife awoke to the sound of dogs barking. At about 4, they peered out the window and saw that soldiers, about 30 of them, had surrounded their neighbor's house, about 40 feet distant. A few minutes later, soldiers surrounded Quieta's house and ordered the family outside. Quieta said the soldiers were in combat position, lying on the ground with rifles poised to fire on him. Three soldiers approached Quieta, with rifles drawn, and demanded to be shown the firearms and the two NPA rebels they had been told were in his house. Quieta repeatedly denied the claims. After several minutes of interrogation, during which he was not touched, one soldier told him, "If you don't admit these things, you better watch yourself."
Then the soldiers left him alone while they initiated a search of his house. At this point, a man wearing a white hood showing only his eyes approached Quieta. He was smoking a cigarette, "You'd better confess, because we have a reliable report," he told Quieta, and continued pressing him about the whereabouts of the rebels they had been told were in his house. Quieta protested again that he knew nothing and would answer no more questions. The man responded, "So you're good at answering questions," and grabbed his head pressing a lit cigarette into his face. Quieta recognized the voice as that of a CAFGU member, Tony de Guzman, who is familiar as a fish vendor in the neighborhood.
At that moment, a soldier, who Quieta presumed to be the Commanding Officer, ordered all the men in the neighborhood out of their houses. Ten of them were forced to line up in single file. "We were made to understand that we were going to walk with them to San Roque as a ahield because they thought the NPA wouldn't attack them if we were alongside," he said. The men marched with them up to San Roque, a village about two and a half miles away where they were encamped, and then released.
pp26
Quieta's neighbor, name withheld, recalled that, at about 3 that morning, men yelled at him to open his door. He refused because it was still dark and he was afraid. But the soldiers went around back, and, led by a CAFGU member, five of them broke through a hole above the kitchen door. The CAFGU man had a white mask beneath his military helmet but the neighbor recognized him right away as Tony de Guzman.
The witness said the soldiers, who were members of the 29th Infantry Battalion, pointed their firearms at him and asked him to tell them where the NPA rebels were hiding. He couldn't identify them, because he is illiterate and could not read their nameplates. He repeatedly denied having any knowledge of the NPA's whereabouts, and after several minutes the soldiers left and went to Quieta's house. A little while later, soldiers returned and ordered him out of the house. He was pushed into the road, where about eight men in the neighborhood were already gathered. There were between 20 and 50 soldiers, he said. One man was sent to wake the village head. When the head came out, the commanding officer asked "permission" to bring the men along as escorts on their route back to the detachment, adding that none of the men would be hurt. A second neighbor corroborated Quieta's and the first neighbor's story.
The shielding incident clearly violated International Laws of War. Under Protocol I, Article 51, Number 7 of the Optional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions, to which the Philippines is signatory.
"Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations."
Col.Santos Gabison Jr., who was stationed in Bolhoon at the time of the incident, told Human Rights Watch that his troops did not use civilians as a shield.
The incident also illustrated how the local CAFGU- in this case, Tony de Guzman- were used to pinpoint and "rough up" local residents suspected of sympathies for the NPA.
Col.Gabison, however, denied that de Guzman was present during that operation. De Guzman, he said, "was not utilized by us on that occaison. I told my people we should not be utilizing him."
Several community leaders interviewed by Human Rights Watch recalled that during the past three years, Tony de Guzman had physically assaulted several of them, whom he pinpointed as NPA rebels. De Guzman abducted a local resident, Jesus Martinez, in 1986, while de Guzman was with the CHDF. According to a relative of Martinez, the victim was later found floating dead in the Tago River. "But that was before there were human rights investigators," she said.
Local Church council memembers and human rights monitors were also able to identify a dozen separate victims allegedly killed by Tony de Guzman over the past seven years. All of those killed were farmers suspected of being NPA. In most cases described, the victims were taken from their houses, and later found dead by a single shot in the head. In one case in 1986, de Guzman was suspected of setting a hut on fire, incinerating an elderly couple inside.
De Guzman is known throughout the area. He is often seen wearing a red headscarf, and people say he carries a human kneecap as a talisman to make him impenetrable to bullets. His background as a fish peddler and passenger motorbike driver made de Guzman familiar with the remotest settlements, and may explain why he has often been used as a guide in military ambushes of the NPA.
Lack of Accountability
According to Military officials, the CAFGU commanding officer and the local civilian leaders are supposed to share supervision of the CAFGU troops. In San Miguel, it sometimes seemed as if noone was in charge.
When asked about disciplining the CAFGU recruits currently stationed in San Miguel, the commander of the newly posted 67th Infantry Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Jose Barbieto, told Human Rights Watch that he was not authorised to discharge or punish abusive militia; the 29th Infantry Battalion, which had just been transferred to a post 20 miles away, "did not cede to us the discipline of these CAFGUs," he said.
pp27
However, Barbieto's testimony was directly contradicted by that of the commander of the 29th IB in Tandag. Maj.Esperidion Balintag. Balintag said his battalion was no longer in charge of the discipline and punishment of the CAFGUs in San Miguel.
Noone wanted to take responsibility for CAFGU member Tony de Guzman. Military officials told Human Rights Watch that de Guzman was discharged from Active Duty CAFGU service on August 1, 1990, by orders of the Regional Command. However, this contradicted both the eyewitness reports of residents in Bolhoon, as well as the statemnts by the Mayor of the town of San Miguel and other local officials, who asked that their names not be used. Mayor Josite T.Elizalde asserted that de Guzman was one of fourteen CAFGU members posted in the town center. In 1990, he was discharged. But in July 1991, after the NPA staged its attack in San Miguel, he was re-activated. He could recall numerous abuses by de Guzman from his constituents, but he said de Guzman was "out of his hands."
"For the civilians, he's so hostile," explained Elizalde. "But for the Military he's an Asset."
"Forced Surrender," Forced Recruitment of Village Guards
CAFGU abuses in San Miguel took place in a climate of widespread military coercion and intimidation of civilians and challenges to civilian authority. Allegations of population control below appear to suggest that the Military would not tolerate even the slightest dissent in areas of ongoing military operations.
Village Guards
Father Eligio Bianchi, San Miguel Parish Priest, described the forced recruitment of unarmed Vilage Guards, called the "Bantay Bayan." From July to November, 1991, after the NPA attacked the village of Siago and the town center of San Miguel, a 10PM to Dawn Curfew was instituted. All adult male residents in the "Puroks" of San Miguel , each purok representing 20 to 30 households, were enlisted into the local Bantay Bayan. Each purok was obliged to man checkpoints from 5PM to 5AM every night. In some cases, when soldiers found that a checkpoint was not manned, residents were punched, and in other cases, some were forced to work at the army detachment without pay. Those who failed to show up for work were accused of being sympathizers. "While the people were guarding the town, the soldiers were sleeping. It was keeping the people from their work because they were too overtired to work in the fields" Bianch said.
The Parish Council protested the formation of the Bantay Bayan in a press statement published September 12, 1991. A day later, the detachment commander of the 29th IB accused Bianchi of bringing rice to the NPA rebels and of owning a machinegun. Nothing came of the charges, perhaps because the battalion was transferred out in November, and replaced by the 67th IB.
Anti-Communist Seminars
The practice of holding Anti-Communist seminars culminating in a formal "surrender" of entire civilian communities in an explicit part of the Philippines Armed Forces counterinsurgency strategy. In the village of Santa Cruz, San Miguel, three residents, two of whom were members of local peasant cooperative, gave first hand accounts of how residents were forced to "surrender" to the Government in a village meeting, or "pulong-pulong" organized by the 67th IB on January 12, 1992.
The day before, military officers had gone to the local elementary school and told children to tell their parents that anyone over 12 had to come to the school for the pulong-pulong.
pp28
If they did not attend the military would assume that they were NPA. That same evening the soldiers went to the houses of the 15 individuals belonging to the peasant cooperative, which is suspected of being a rebel "front" organization. One 64 year old grandmother said her house was searched while the military interviewed her. Another, a 57 year old farmer and mother of 5, said the military insisted she had a code name and encouraged her and her husband to sign a paper, which, she was led to believe, identified her as a "rebel surrenderee." The soldiers assured the family that nothing would happen to them if they signed the paper, she said.
The chairman of the local peasant cooperative, Samuel Ravelo, 44, was also visited the evening before the meeting. The soldiers told him he was a "Communist" and he was made to believe that he would have "problems" if he failed to "surrender." He said it was the second time the community had been forced to "surrender," the first time being in 1986, when local forces led by Tony de Guzman led raids on local houses of suspected NPA supporters.
At the pulong-pulong, the officer in charge, a certain Corporal Rogelio, told the crowd that their cooperative was a "Communist System," and all were asked to sign "confessions" that they were rebel sympathisers. One person recalled. "The Military told us that we could not deny our support for the NPA, because they said they have a list with all of us in Santa Cruz and Sagbayan (a neighboring community).
Military Harassment
Local village officials of Ubas Sud, a remote settlement of 351 households also in San Miguel, said they had been continuously harassed since they had filed charges against a lieutenant from the 29th IB who allegedly killed 12 townspeople in a midnite raid in June 1990. In January, soldiers from the 67th IB came to each of their houses. The soldiers forced them to sign affadavits asserting that they were members of the NPA and that they were "surrendering" to the Government. The military told them that their community organizations, including a UNICEF sponsored children's program were rebel "front" organizations.
One local council member explained that noone was safe from suspicion. "The Military insists that we are all rebels," he said. "It all started in 1990, when we started filing human rights complaints against them. We really followed up, executing affadavits. If we complain against the war, then we must be rebels."
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Part 4, the final part in this series will be posted shortly.
Saturday, November 5, 2011
History of Mindanao, Part XX: Bad Blood: HRW Report on AFP Sponsored Paramilitaries in Caraga, 1991, Part 2
This is part 2 of a four part entry and opens on page 12 pf a 35 page report. As I have noted in other Human Rights Watch, or HRW-centric entries, I don't hold a very high opinion on the NGO. They deal most often in uncoroborrated accusation and wholesale innuendo. In addition they portray themselves as non-partisan and in reality are anything but. In any event, this particular report offers a glimpse into Eastern Mindanao, the least populated part of Mindanao and therefore little known even by most Mindanowans. The issues discussed in the report, paramilitaries involved in illegal logging and illegal mining, serving as private muscle for local politicians are all things that are sadly, just as real today as they were nearly two decades ago when this report was published.
Showing how inadequate the late Corazon "Cory" Aquino was as a leader, and how far out of her element the poor woman was, we have the following nugget, gleaned from then-President Aquino's unforgettable speech at the Philippine Military Academy in 1992...
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pp12
The New People's Army and Human Rights
On February 16, 1992, a week before the sixth anniversary of her accession to office, Aquino hailed "a shining moment in our history," claiming "the defeat of all threat groups" under her Administration. "We broke the back of the Communist Insurgency," she told graduates of the Philippine Military Academy, the country's elite military college.
On the same day, some 300 rebels armed with mortars and machineguns ambushed and killed 47 soldiers in a remote logging tract in the province of Surigao del Sur, the Government's single largest battlefield loss in years. Survivors said the rebels systematically executed wounded soldiers with the rank of sergeant and above. Some analysts said that the attack demonstrated that the insurgency, despite arrests of dozens of leaders in the past five years, would continue to be a force to contend with for several years.
An estimated 17,000 fulltime New People's Army rebels were still believed to be operating in the Philippines in early 1992, down from a high of 26,000 in mid-1988. But while the number of armed rebels has declined, the intensity and number of military-rebel encounters in 1991 matched 1990, apparently due to President Aquino's directive that the insurgency be crushed by the end of her term.
Both sides in the conflict commit abuses, but it is difficult to confirm most reports of NPA abuses. There continued to be reports if killings and hostage taking if unarmed civilians, and at least one foreigner, an American, continued to ve held in a 1990 kidnapping. The source of information is usually the military, and attacks most often occur in remote areas that
are sealed off to investigators because of "ongoing military operations." Reports of rebel abuses furnished by the military are the headline stock-in-fare of some two dozen provincial tabloids in Mindanao, but poorly paid news reporters rarely investigate and cinfirm stories. In listing NPA "atrocities," moreover, the military generally fails to distinguish between NPA attacks on soldiers or paramilitary units, which are acts of war, and attacks on civilians not involved in hostilities. For their part, non-governmental human rights groups in the Philippines, do not investigate reports of human rights abuses of NPA abuses, saying that it is the perogative of the Government to investigate rebel violations. This has been a contentious issue in the Philippines, leading members of the military and the Commision on Human Rights to label non-governmental human rights groups "anti-Government" or "sympathetic to the NPA."
Human Rights Watch has confirmedome instances of human rights violations by rebel forces, and these are noted where there is a direct link to CAFGU abuses that are the focus of this report.
pp13
Mindanao: A Laboratory of Counterinsurgency
(a historical overview and geopolitical sketch that is redundant to the overall content- Raki)
pp14
NPA in Mindanao
From the early 1970s through the mid-1980s, most of Mindanao was fertile ground for the expansion of the New People's Army (NPA). The rebels have drawn recruits from among the ranks of landless peasants, plantation and factory workers paid sub-survival wages, and indigenous communities displaced from their lands by lowland encroachment and agro-industrial development projects. Despite grisly purges and other violent excesses by the rebels in the early and mid-1980s, which weakened support among urban intellectuals and among the general population in Western and Southern Mindanao, the armed insurgency continued to launch frequent attacks on military and economic targets in several central and eastern provinces in early 1992.
Military officials said roughly 700 armed rebels roamed the mountainous, heabily forested region of the Mt.Andap Valley, including the eastern half of Agusan del Sur Province and most of the province of Surigao del Sur. They declared Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Sur Provinces as the "hotbed" of insurgency in Mindanao and promised to "crush" insurgency there by 1992. The commander of the NPA in Mt.Andap Valley is reportedly the rebel priest, Father Frank Navarro. Targets of large scale rebel attacks in 1991 have included military detachments, jails, and commonly...
pp15
...municipal hall buildings. Members of the paramilitary CAFGU, particularly those posted in remote communities, have also often neen the target of NPA attack.
Scattered, smaller rebel commands were reportedly operating in other regions of Mindanao in early 1992. Encounters were frequently reported in the forested regions of western Agusan del Sur and just south of the Agusan del Sur border, in the province of Davao del Norte. In the southern provinces of South Cotabato, Davao del Sur, and Davao del Norte, an estimated 200 to 300 rebels continue to strikeat military and police targers, usually in operations intended to capture arms, and at "economic" targets, such as logging and mining firms. In Davao del Norte, nine civilians and two CAFGU were killed in an ambush of a passenger jeep. The NPA later issued a public apology. They wrote that the NPA would "investigate" to determine those responsible and punish them (July, 1991).
pp16
Militia Abuses in Areas of Ongoing Military Operations
In 1991 and early 1992, most military operations in Mindanao were taking place in two provinces, Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Sur. These are forested, mountainous regions peopled by unassimilated tribal minorities and by the newest, poorest migrant farmers. It is in these areas, remote from the public eye- and from public accountability- that most human rights abuses are taking place today.
The two neighboring provinces, located in the northeast part of the island, became the focus if a much-publicized military campaign in 1991. Between April and May 1991, more than 5,000 individuals fled to town centers from 18 villages around San Luis in Agusan del Sur and around Lianga and Tandag in Surigao del Sur because of military and NPA violence, In November 1991, Armed Forces chief General Lisandro Abadia ordered that additional troops be deployed in the two provinces.
Human Rights Watch documented several killings and numerous beatings by CAFGU members in Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Sur. Most cases investigated involved militia members operating without direct military supervision. In addition, Human Rights Watch frequently heard that CAFGU members carried their military issue high powered rifles at all times, even when unsupervised, and out of uniform; this was confirmed several times by sight and in news reports of encounters. As the Laywers Committee for Human Rights noted in 1990, these findings are in violation of "the intent, if not the letter, of Executive Order no.264 and the CAFGU regulations (LCHR "Out of Control" pp121).
Military guidelines mandate that the CAFGU is primarily responsible for defense and peacekeeping functions in areas already "cleared" by combat operations. But local human rights monitors and victims reported that CAFGU members also played a role in front line combat operations. CAFGU were also used as informants to identify subversives in local communities. Several cases investigated below indicate that CAFGU members pervert their role as informants by identifying as "subersives" individuals against whom they have a personal grudge.
In other cases, random violence by CAFGU members appeared to be in response to violence by the NPA. In remote areas targeted by rebel forces, CAFGU units appeared to be "sitting ducks" for NPA attacks, which were usually aimed at capturing arms. Because of their inferior numbers and training, the militiamen often handed over the arms immediately. Regional news reports often listed CAFGU among the casualties of military-NPA encounters. In one representative case, 150 guerillas attacked a CAFGU outpost of 30 in a remote village outside San Miguel, Surigao del Sur on June 25, 1991. Two CAFGUs were killed, one wounded and two taken hostage. The following day, one of the CAFGU involved in the encounter beat and threatened three residents, apparently arbitrarily.
Abuses and Impunity
Victims of CAFGU abuses rarely go to the military to seek redress for maltreatment. As one peasant cooperative leader in San Miguel who has been threatened and harrassed countless times over the past five years explained, local residents often live in fear of the CAFGU and his commanding officer. The victims usually know the CAFGU member personally because he lives in the community. Once complaints are filed, it may take a long time, if ever, before the perpetrator is disarmed.
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In a few recent cases, victims filed cases with the Commission on Human Rights in Surigao del Sur or the provincial prosecutor. However, Human Rights Watch learned of only two cases in 1990 and 1991 where abusive CAFGU members, including one charged with murder, were discharged from active duty. In neither case was the militia member prosecuted by the courts. The same individuals continued to carry firearms freely, instiling fear in the community. In San Luis, human rights victims and their families continued to live in evacuation centers because of fear of returning to their homes.
CAFGU Abuses in San Luis
Along the banks of the Maasam River lies a forested, sparsely populated land liscenced to and logged by several large logging companies. The western banks are home to the Banwa'on Tribe, a non-literate, non-assimilated ethnic group. North of the Banwa'on areas, extending 15 miles to the town of Esperanza, lives another tribe called the Higaonon. To the south, around the municipality of La Paz, a community of Manobos live. The Higaonon and Manobo were both said to be interested in taking over some of the Banwa'on lands, which has resulted in a state of simmering tribal conflict since 1985.
The local tribal communities subsist on traditional slash and burn farming, hunting, fishing, and more recently, small scale logging. The Banwa'on territory is the most remote of the three tribal communities, accessible only by river, and more recently, by a single dirt logging road. By "gakit," or raft, the trip from the Banwa'on areas to the market center, Kalilid, takes about three days. Until recently, the people there had no schools, clinics, or other contact with government. All government services were located downstream east of the Maasam River in the largely Visayan population center. The Catholic Church, however, had built a small primary school and a health clinic for the Banwa'on, and acted as an advocate for the residents there.
Since the mid-1980s, however, the Banwa'on and other tribes have come to know the military very well. The forests along the Maasam River have been a refuge for the New People's Army, and both the NPA and the military have tried to engage the two tribal communities in the conflict. The Government , for its part, has had limited success. In 1985, under the leadership of a Higaonon Mayor, Lavi Manpatilan, the Higaonon of Esperanza signed up with the CHDF in large numbers. The Manobo also joined CHDF units. However, most of the Banwa'on of the lower Maasam River forests refused.
Since then local church workers and tribal leaders said the military has intermittingly attacked Banwa'on communities on suspicion if being rebels or rebel supporters. "We refused the (military's) guns because we do not want any part pf this war," explained Datu Mantalapuk, witness to killings described below. "But now, they accuse us of being rebels, and we are defenseless."
Some of the most vicious abuses have been committed by the Higaonon. In 1988, the training and arming of the Higaonon became the obsession of a renegade military commander, Lt.Col.Alexander Noble of the Army's 23IB, and Higaonon militia there are still known as the "Noble CAFGU." Noble staged a right wing revolt against the military in Agusan del Sur in July 1990. Upon his retreat to the forests west of Esperanza, he was joined by roughly 200 fiercely loyal Higaonon CAFGU, who defended Noble against capture for nearly two months against six Army and Marine battalions. However, when Noble eventually was captured and imprisoned, most of the CAFGU were pardoned. Within weeks they were re-activated under the command of the 36IB based in the town of Prosperidad.
In mid-1991, military forces, supported by the Esperanza-based CAFGU, intensified operations against the estimated 300 NPA in San Luis. The main target fell inside the Banwa'on areaa. Human Rights Groups said military operations had led more than 500 families from seven villages in the towns of San Luis and Prosperidad to seek refuge in town centers. Local military officials at the time were quoted as saying there were "some tolerable abuses"...
pp18
...by Government forces during operations.
Traditional avenues of justice long used to quell inter-tribal conflict, such as meetings of the local headmen, or "datu," appeared to have failed in 1991 with the entry of arbitrary military force. Armed with sophisticated guns and given liscence by ongoing military campaigns against supposed rebel hideouts in the area, the Higaonon and Manobo had become bolder in asserting claims over Banwa'on territory.
A leader of the Banwa'on Tribe believed his community was being attacked because of a land dispute:
"In 1988, Boy Mendoza, a Manobo logger, met me and said that he wanted to make the Banwa'on territory part of the Manobo Community Reservation, but I refused. He threatened me and said that our territory will be marked with 'red' if I refuse. After my refusal, a series of military operations happened in our place up to the present."
Human Rights Watch investigation of massacres in San Luis appeared to support the contention of local human rights groups and tribal advocates that Higaonon and Manobo CAFGU were perverting the aims of counterinsurgency to terrorize and evict civilian Banwa'on communities in 1991. Abuses documented by Human Rights Watch commonly occurred while residents were evacuating areas undergoing military operations, or during their return to their homes and farms. Human Rights Watch recorded first hand accounts of survivors of two killings of seven individuals by suspected CAFGU members in mid-1991. Three unconfirmed killings reported by local human rights monitors during the same period also pointed to CAFGU involvement.
In addition, Human Rights Watch documented several incidents where local residents were arrested without warrant and were maltreated by combined CAFGU and regular forces. Affadavits by several other victims suggested that warrantless arrest and mistreatment of civilians were routinely practiced during large scale military operations.
Four Killed in Kilabonog
Three survivors of multiple killings in Kilabonog, a western Banwa'on village of the town of San Luis in Agusan del Sur Province, described the attack by the Higaonon CAFGU which left four members of their extended family dead.
Mario Manliano, 25, recounted that the killings occurred at roughly 6AM on May 22, 1991 at a bend in the Maasam River, roughly 30 miles from the municipal center of Kalilid, San Luis.
An extended family of 30 individuals, all members of the Banwa'on Tribe living in a forest concession known as "Site I" and accessible only by river and by a single logging road, were traveling by river to Kalilid the morning of the incident. During the three days preceding, a large scale military operation had occurred near their community, including bombing and gunfire from helicopter gunships. As troops from the 36th and 8th Infantry Battalions approached their settlement, the group decided to evacuate downriver. At dusk on May 21, they packed their belongings on twi rafts and three longboats, and began floating in darkness downstream. The trip was expected to take three days. The group carried no weapons, and included at least fifteen children.
Just at dawn on the next morning, as the first longboat ridden by Betty Manlinawan was rounding a bend, shots rang out without warning from the right bank of the river. Manliano looked up, and saw ten men on the right bank, about 30 feet distant from the raft he was steering. They wore CAFGU uniforms and had automatic rifles outstretched at shoulder height; they fired ceaselessly for about five minutes. About 12 feet to his left he saw Cecil Salbuan, age 2, and Eding Hulibayan, age 50, as the two were struck by a single bullet that penetrated the chest of the child and then that of...
pp19
...the woman on whose lap he was sitting. After the first volley, Manliano and the others jumped into the river and fled into the dense forest.
For three days, he searched for the others until all of them were re-united. Then he returned to bury the bodies on May 25. Manliano found Manlinawan, age 20 and pregnant, with bullet wounds on her cheek, forehead, and right arm, shin, and lower back. Dodong Andres, 47, was shot on his forehead, upper left arm, both legs, and the back, with that bullet exiting his front chest. Three water buffalo and a dog were also found shot dead, and the group's clothes and a sack of rice were taken.
Manliano said he recognized all of the gunmen as Higaonon Tribesmen and as members of the CAFGU detachment based in Tagbilili, a village in the municipality of Esperanza. He knew them because he is a former member of a Civilian Home Defense Force detachment led by the brother of their CAFGU detachment leader. He identified the gunmen as Datu Manlinuhaw; Datu Mandumaging; Baldes Otasa; Manliwanay Mansalawag; Danilo Hulibayan; and six known only by their Higaonon first names, Tirso, Walah, Dalahutan, Biyasa, Gintulo, and Tagdiea. Two of the ten, Danilo Hulibayan and Baldes Otasa, are listed as active duty CAFGU and former CHDFs in the provincial governor's office; the others could not be confirmed because the victims did not know their Christian Names, under which they are offially listed.
Human Rights Watch interviewed two other eyewitnesses, Datu Mantalapuk and Ben Katanaw, whose accounts corroborated that of Manliano. The eyewitnesses said they believed the CAFGU were stationed there to seal off any escape from the areas where the military operations were going on.
The group fled to Kalilid, where they set up shelter on the outskirts of town and sought assistance by the Church in June, 1991. Also in June, Mantalapuk, who is the tribal leader, went with Manliano to the Mayor of San Luis, Jun Chua, to request that charges be filed against the perpetrators. Chua promised assistance and an investigation. Chua told Human Rights Watch that his Vice Mayor had investigated the case and submitted findings to the Provincial Governor's office in November 1991. As of January 1992, there was no record of any investigation at the Governor's office, nor had he heard of the case. The regional Commission on Human Rights (based six hours drive away in Cagayan del Oro City) also said they had no knowledge of the incident.
Although local clergy expressed fears for their security, the witnesses interviewed wished to testify in court. However, they said they needed financial and legal assistance. None was literate, nor were they at all familiar with the legal system; their poverty was so extreme that they had no funds to pay for personal travel to the provincial court in Prosperidad, about three hours away by jeep.
Killings in Tambo
A survivor of the Extra-Judicial Executions of three civilians in Tambo, a Manobo village in the west of Agusan del Sur, told Human Rights Watch the attack came whilr the family was eating dinner.
The witness, name withheld, said the attack occurred just at the beginning of dinner, after dark, at around 730PM pn September 23, 1991, in a tiny hillside community known only by the kilometer mark, "44," on the logging road that leads into the logging concession in San Luis municipality. At the time of the attack, there were seven people in the hut, a traditional Manobo hut set on six foot high stilts with a low roof but no enclosing walls, and they had just sat down to eat. On the floor they had lit a kerosene lamp, so the occupants were clearly visible from outside the hut. The nearest neighbor, however, is about a half mile away. None of them was armed.
That evening, the head of the household, Datu Mantalata, who was also the tribal leader of the community, had just returned from Kilometer Mark 60, about 11 miles west, where the manager of Ayala Logging Company was stationed. Mantalata had with him a box of provisions: sardines, candy, sugar, and biscuits, which he had just bought with some of the harvested rice. The others had just come in from a day harvesting rice in the fields nearby. Four people were seated in a line on the lower platform, and three on the slightly raised platform behind.
pp20
Suddenly, without any warning, the gunfire began "like firecrackers," the witness said. She was seated on the upper platform, to one side. The blast came seemingly from several directions at once, but it was dark, and the witnesses were unable to see the origin of the gunfire. During the firing, the witness said she immediately ducked over to lean on the body of the man next to her, a neighbor named Bensyo. She heard five gunshots.
When the survivors got up, they found the three men dead. The three appeared to be the targets, since none of the four others was even grazed. The dead included Datu Mamtalata, between 60 and 70 years old; his son, Aki Mantalata, 19 yeaea old, both of whom were seated on the lower, front platform at one end; and Bensyo Pacing, 55 years old, a neighbor who had come for a visit, and who was seated in the middle of the raised platform. Pacing died instantly from a bullet wound to the face; Aki Mantalata died of bullet wounds to the chest and crotch, apparently struck from a gunfire from under the floor; and one bullet struck Datu Mantalata in the underarm, penetrating the chest.
The survivors included the Datu's wife and 12 year old son, the Datu's invalid sister, a cousin and a neighbor. The group fled to the nearest neighbor's house, about a half mile away and over a hill. Upon returning the next morning, they found the shells of bullets used in Garand rifles, a type issued to local CAFGU recruits, and bootprints in three places; under the flooring, and on either side of the house.
Some relatives of the victims went to the nearby CAFGU detachment led by a former CHDF, Boy Mendoza, under the command of the 36th Infantry Battalion. At the time, Mendoza took photographs of the bodies and offered the corpses to be brought to the center of the barangay of Tambo, to the Baptist Church, despite family members' plea that the bodies be simply be buried near the house that same day.
The witness said she believed CAFGU members under the command of Boy Mendoza were responsible for the killings. The New People's Army is not active in the area, but the victims were suspected of being members of the "Alimaongs," or Manobo tribal warriors suspected of working with the NPA. She said the local CAFGU, who are generally tribespeople from the adjacent municipality of La Paz, are known to have committed abuses in the past.
The real motive for the killings, however, appeared to be a personal feud between Datu Mantalata and his neighbor, whose aons were CAFGU members. The neighbor had reportedly given Mantalata a water buffalo in exchange for chopping down the forest on his land. Because of the drought, however, the neighbor could not get transport for the lumber by the stream, and wanted his water buffalo returned. The week before the incident, several local CAFGU came and attempted to take Mantalata's water buffalo away by force, but failed . A teenage member of the local quasi-religious vigilante cult group, the "Pulhan" ("Red Ones," so called because they sport a red cloth on their heads or knife handles) told the witness a few days after the killings that Mantalata had been "under surveillance" by Boy Mendoza's CAFGU. On the day of the massacre, the teenager said, Mantalata was followed by a notorious local CAFGU from the Banwa'on Tribe known only as "Sammy."
The CAFGU and the Pulahans are known to be involved in small scale logging activities. The Pulahan believe that certain rituals protect them from being penetrated by bullets. Before going to battle with the New People's Army, they make signs of the cross on various parts of their bodies. According to the witness, many anti-Communist Pulahans had joined the local CAFGU forces as recruits or military assets.
The family reported the case to the San Luis Mayor, Chua, but as of January 1992, no case has been filed. The family of the victim had not returned to their home because of fears for their safety. Like witnesses in the previous case, they wanted to file a case, but had insufficient funds to travel the distance to the provincial courts in Prosperidad, at least a day's travel away.
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In my next and entry in this four part series I will finish the rest of this report.
Showing how inadequate the late Corazon "Cory" Aquino was as a leader, and how far out of her element the poor woman was, we have the following nugget, gleaned from then-President Aquino's unforgettable speech at the Philippine Military Academy in 1992...
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pp12
The New People's Army and Human Rights
On February 16, 1992, a week before the sixth anniversary of her accession to office, Aquino hailed "a shining moment in our history," claiming "the defeat of all threat groups" under her Administration. "We broke the back of the Communist Insurgency," she told graduates of the Philippine Military Academy, the country's elite military college.
On the same day, some 300 rebels armed with mortars and machineguns ambushed and killed 47 soldiers in a remote logging tract in the province of Surigao del Sur, the Government's single largest battlefield loss in years. Survivors said the rebels systematically executed wounded soldiers with the rank of sergeant and above. Some analysts said that the attack demonstrated that the insurgency, despite arrests of dozens of leaders in the past five years, would continue to be a force to contend with for several years.
An estimated 17,000 fulltime New People's Army rebels were still believed to be operating in the Philippines in early 1992, down from a high of 26,000 in mid-1988. But while the number of armed rebels has declined, the intensity and number of military-rebel encounters in 1991 matched 1990, apparently due to President Aquino's directive that the insurgency be crushed by the end of her term.
Both sides in the conflict commit abuses, but it is difficult to confirm most reports of NPA abuses. There continued to be reports if killings and hostage taking if unarmed civilians, and at least one foreigner, an American, continued to ve held in a 1990 kidnapping. The source of information is usually the military, and attacks most often occur in remote areas that
are sealed off to investigators because of "ongoing military operations." Reports of rebel abuses furnished by the military are the headline stock-in-fare of some two dozen provincial tabloids in Mindanao, but poorly paid news reporters rarely investigate and cinfirm stories. In listing NPA "atrocities," moreover, the military generally fails to distinguish between NPA attacks on soldiers or paramilitary units, which are acts of war, and attacks on civilians not involved in hostilities. For their part, non-governmental human rights groups in the Philippines, do not investigate reports of human rights abuses of NPA abuses, saying that it is the perogative of the Government to investigate rebel violations. This has been a contentious issue in the Philippines, leading members of the military and the Commision on Human Rights to label non-governmental human rights groups "anti-Government" or "sympathetic to the NPA."
Human Rights Watch has confirmedome instances of human rights violations by rebel forces, and these are noted where there is a direct link to CAFGU abuses that are the focus of this report.
pp13
Mindanao: A Laboratory of Counterinsurgency
(a historical overview and geopolitical sketch that is redundant to the overall content- Raki)
pp14
NPA in Mindanao
From the early 1970s through the mid-1980s, most of Mindanao was fertile ground for the expansion of the New People's Army (NPA). The rebels have drawn recruits from among the ranks of landless peasants, plantation and factory workers paid sub-survival wages, and indigenous communities displaced from their lands by lowland encroachment and agro-industrial development projects. Despite grisly purges and other violent excesses by the rebels in the early and mid-1980s, which weakened support among urban intellectuals and among the general population in Western and Southern Mindanao, the armed insurgency continued to launch frequent attacks on military and economic targets in several central and eastern provinces in early 1992.
Military officials said roughly 700 armed rebels roamed the mountainous, heabily forested region of the Mt.Andap Valley, including the eastern half of Agusan del Sur Province and most of the province of Surigao del Sur. They declared Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Sur Provinces as the "hotbed" of insurgency in Mindanao and promised to "crush" insurgency there by 1992. The commander of the NPA in Mt.Andap Valley is reportedly the rebel priest, Father Frank Navarro. Targets of large scale rebel attacks in 1991 have included military detachments, jails, and commonly...
pp15
...municipal hall buildings. Members of the paramilitary CAFGU, particularly those posted in remote communities, have also often neen the target of NPA attack.
Scattered, smaller rebel commands were reportedly operating in other regions of Mindanao in early 1992. Encounters were frequently reported in the forested regions of western Agusan del Sur and just south of the Agusan del Sur border, in the province of Davao del Norte. In the southern provinces of South Cotabato, Davao del Sur, and Davao del Norte, an estimated 200 to 300 rebels continue to strikeat military and police targers, usually in operations intended to capture arms, and at "economic" targets, such as logging and mining firms. In Davao del Norte, nine civilians and two CAFGU were killed in an ambush of a passenger jeep. The NPA later issued a public apology. They wrote that the NPA would "investigate" to determine those responsible and punish them (July, 1991).
pp16
Militia Abuses in Areas of Ongoing Military Operations
In 1991 and early 1992, most military operations in Mindanao were taking place in two provinces, Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Sur. These are forested, mountainous regions peopled by unassimilated tribal minorities and by the newest, poorest migrant farmers. It is in these areas, remote from the public eye- and from public accountability- that most human rights abuses are taking place today.
The two neighboring provinces, located in the northeast part of the island, became the focus if a much-publicized military campaign in 1991. Between April and May 1991, more than 5,000 individuals fled to town centers from 18 villages around San Luis in Agusan del Sur and around Lianga and Tandag in Surigao del Sur because of military and NPA violence, In November 1991, Armed Forces chief General Lisandro Abadia ordered that additional troops be deployed in the two provinces.
Human Rights Watch documented several killings and numerous beatings by CAFGU members in Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Sur. Most cases investigated involved militia members operating without direct military supervision. In addition, Human Rights Watch frequently heard that CAFGU members carried their military issue high powered rifles at all times, even when unsupervised, and out of uniform; this was confirmed several times by sight and in news reports of encounters. As the Laywers Committee for Human Rights noted in 1990, these findings are in violation of "the intent, if not the letter, of Executive Order no.264 and the CAFGU regulations (LCHR "Out of Control" pp121).
Military guidelines mandate that the CAFGU is primarily responsible for defense and peacekeeping functions in areas already "cleared" by combat operations. But local human rights monitors and victims reported that CAFGU members also played a role in front line combat operations. CAFGU were also used as informants to identify subversives in local communities. Several cases investigated below indicate that CAFGU members pervert their role as informants by identifying as "subersives" individuals against whom they have a personal grudge.
In other cases, random violence by CAFGU members appeared to be in response to violence by the NPA. In remote areas targeted by rebel forces, CAFGU units appeared to be "sitting ducks" for NPA attacks, which were usually aimed at capturing arms. Because of their inferior numbers and training, the militiamen often handed over the arms immediately. Regional news reports often listed CAFGU among the casualties of military-NPA encounters. In one representative case, 150 guerillas attacked a CAFGU outpost of 30 in a remote village outside San Miguel, Surigao del Sur on June 25, 1991. Two CAFGUs were killed, one wounded and two taken hostage. The following day, one of the CAFGU involved in the encounter beat and threatened three residents, apparently arbitrarily.
Abuses and Impunity
Victims of CAFGU abuses rarely go to the military to seek redress for maltreatment. As one peasant cooperative leader in San Miguel who has been threatened and harrassed countless times over the past five years explained, local residents often live in fear of the CAFGU and his commanding officer. The victims usually know the CAFGU member personally because he lives in the community. Once complaints are filed, it may take a long time, if ever, before the perpetrator is disarmed.
pp17
In a few recent cases, victims filed cases with the Commission on Human Rights in Surigao del Sur or the provincial prosecutor. However, Human Rights Watch learned of only two cases in 1990 and 1991 where abusive CAFGU members, including one charged with murder, were discharged from active duty. In neither case was the militia member prosecuted by the courts. The same individuals continued to carry firearms freely, instiling fear in the community. In San Luis, human rights victims and their families continued to live in evacuation centers because of fear of returning to their homes.
CAFGU Abuses in San Luis
Along the banks of the Maasam River lies a forested, sparsely populated land liscenced to and logged by several large logging companies. The western banks are home to the Banwa'on Tribe, a non-literate, non-assimilated ethnic group. North of the Banwa'on areas, extending 15 miles to the town of Esperanza, lives another tribe called the Higaonon. To the south, around the municipality of La Paz, a community of Manobos live. The Higaonon and Manobo were both said to be interested in taking over some of the Banwa'on lands, which has resulted in a state of simmering tribal conflict since 1985.
The local tribal communities subsist on traditional slash and burn farming, hunting, fishing, and more recently, small scale logging. The Banwa'on territory is the most remote of the three tribal communities, accessible only by river, and more recently, by a single dirt logging road. By "gakit," or raft, the trip from the Banwa'on areas to the market center, Kalilid, takes about three days. Until recently, the people there had no schools, clinics, or other contact with government. All government services were located downstream east of the Maasam River in the largely Visayan population center. The Catholic Church, however, had built a small primary school and a health clinic for the Banwa'on, and acted as an advocate for the residents there.
Since the mid-1980s, however, the Banwa'on and other tribes have come to know the military very well. The forests along the Maasam River have been a refuge for the New People's Army, and both the NPA and the military have tried to engage the two tribal communities in the conflict. The Government , for its part, has had limited success. In 1985, under the leadership of a Higaonon Mayor, Lavi Manpatilan, the Higaonon of Esperanza signed up with the CHDF in large numbers. The Manobo also joined CHDF units. However, most of the Banwa'on of the lower Maasam River forests refused.
Since then local church workers and tribal leaders said the military has intermittingly attacked Banwa'on communities on suspicion if being rebels or rebel supporters. "We refused the (military's) guns because we do not want any part pf this war," explained Datu Mantalapuk, witness to killings described below. "But now, they accuse us of being rebels, and we are defenseless."
Some of the most vicious abuses have been committed by the Higaonon. In 1988, the training and arming of the Higaonon became the obsession of a renegade military commander, Lt.Col.Alexander Noble of the Army's 23IB, and Higaonon militia there are still known as the "Noble CAFGU." Noble staged a right wing revolt against the military in Agusan del Sur in July 1990. Upon his retreat to the forests west of Esperanza, he was joined by roughly 200 fiercely loyal Higaonon CAFGU, who defended Noble against capture for nearly two months against six Army and Marine battalions. However, when Noble eventually was captured and imprisoned, most of the CAFGU were pardoned. Within weeks they were re-activated under the command of the 36IB based in the town of Prosperidad.
In mid-1991, military forces, supported by the Esperanza-based CAFGU, intensified operations against the estimated 300 NPA in San Luis. The main target fell inside the Banwa'on areaa. Human Rights Groups said military operations had led more than 500 families from seven villages in the towns of San Luis and Prosperidad to seek refuge in town centers. Local military officials at the time were quoted as saying there were "some tolerable abuses"...
pp18
...by Government forces during operations.
Traditional avenues of justice long used to quell inter-tribal conflict, such as meetings of the local headmen, or "datu," appeared to have failed in 1991 with the entry of arbitrary military force. Armed with sophisticated guns and given liscence by ongoing military campaigns against supposed rebel hideouts in the area, the Higaonon and Manobo had become bolder in asserting claims over Banwa'on territory.
A leader of the Banwa'on Tribe believed his community was being attacked because of a land dispute:
"In 1988, Boy Mendoza, a Manobo logger, met me and said that he wanted to make the Banwa'on territory part of the Manobo Community Reservation, but I refused. He threatened me and said that our territory will be marked with 'red' if I refuse. After my refusal, a series of military operations happened in our place up to the present."
Human Rights Watch investigation of massacres in San Luis appeared to support the contention of local human rights groups and tribal advocates that Higaonon and Manobo CAFGU were perverting the aims of counterinsurgency to terrorize and evict civilian Banwa'on communities in 1991. Abuses documented by Human Rights Watch commonly occurred while residents were evacuating areas undergoing military operations, or during their return to their homes and farms. Human Rights Watch recorded first hand accounts of survivors of two killings of seven individuals by suspected CAFGU members in mid-1991. Three unconfirmed killings reported by local human rights monitors during the same period also pointed to CAFGU involvement.
In addition, Human Rights Watch documented several incidents where local residents were arrested without warrant and were maltreated by combined CAFGU and regular forces. Affadavits by several other victims suggested that warrantless arrest and mistreatment of civilians were routinely practiced during large scale military operations.
Four Killed in Kilabonog
Three survivors of multiple killings in Kilabonog, a western Banwa'on village of the town of San Luis in Agusan del Sur Province, described the attack by the Higaonon CAFGU which left four members of their extended family dead.
Mario Manliano, 25, recounted that the killings occurred at roughly 6AM on May 22, 1991 at a bend in the Maasam River, roughly 30 miles from the municipal center of Kalilid, San Luis.
An extended family of 30 individuals, all members of the Banwa'on Tribe living in a forest concession known as "Site I" and accessible only by river and by a single logging road, were traveling by river to Kalilid the morning of the incident. During the three days preceding, a large scale military operation had occurred near their community, including bombing and gunfire from helicopter gunships. As troops from the 36th and 8th Infantry Battalions approached their settlement, the group decided to evacuate downriver. At dusk on May 21, they packed their belongings on twi rafts and three longboats, and began floating in darkness downstream. The trip was expected to take three days. The group carried no weapons, and included at least fifteen children.
Just at dawn on the next morning, as the first longboat ridden by Betty Manlinawan was rounding a bend, shots rang out without warning from the right bank of the river. Manliano looked up, and saw ten men on the right bank, about 30 feet distant from the raft he was steering. They wore CAFGU uniforms and had automatic rifles outstretched at shoulder height; they fired ceaselessly for about five minutes. About 12 feet to his left he saw Cecil Salbuan, age 2, and Eding Hulibayan, age 50, as the two were struck by a single bullet that penetrated the chest of the child and then that of...
pp19
...the woman on whose lap he was sitting. After the first volley, Manliano and the others jumped into the river and fled into the dense forest.
For three days, he searched for the others until all of them were re-united. Then he returned to bury the bodies on May 25. Manliano found Manlinawan, age 20 and pregnant, with bullet wounds on her cheek, forehead, and right arm, shin, and lower back. Dodong Andres, 47, was shot on his forehead, upper left arm, both legs, and the back, with that bullet exiting his front chest. Three water buffalo and a dog were also found shot dead, and the group's clothes and a sack of rice were taken.
Manliano said he recognized all of the gunmen as Higaonon Tribesmen and as members of the CAFGU detachment based in Tagbilili, a village in the municipality of Esperanza. He knew them because he is a former member of a Civilian Home Defense Force detachment led by the brother of their CAFGU detachment leader. He identified the gunmen as Datu Manlinuhaw; Datu Mandumaging; Baldes Otasa; Manliwanay Mansalawag; Danilo Hulibayan; and six known only by their Higaonon first names, Tirso, Walah, Dalahutan, Biyasa, Gintulo, and Tagdiea. Two of the ten, Danilo Hulibayan and Baldes Otasa, are listed as active duty CAFGU and former CHDFs in the provincial governor's office; the others could not be confirmed because the victims did not know their Christian Names, under which they are offially listed.
Human Rights Watch interviewed two other eyewitnesses, Datu Mantalapuk and Ben Katanaw, whose accounts corroborated that of Manliano. The eyewitnesses said they believed the CAFGU were stationed there to seal off any escape from the areas where the military operations were going on.
The group fled to Kalilid, where they set up shelter on the outskirts of town and sought assistance by the Church in June, 1991. Also in June, Mantalapuk, who is the tribal leader, went with Manliano to the Mayor of San Luis, Jun Chua, to request that charges be filed against the perpetrators. Chua promised assistance and an investigation. Chua told Human Rights Watch that his Vice Mayor had investigated the case and submitted findings to the Provincial Governor's office in November 1991. As of January 1992, there was no record of any investigation at the Governor's office, nor had he heard of the case. The regional Commission on Human Rights (based six hours drive away in Cagayan del Oro City) also said they had no knowledge of the incident.
Although local clergy expressed fears for their security, the witnesses interviewed wished to testify in court. However, they said they needed financial and legal assistance. None was literate, nor were they at all familiar with the legal system; their poverty was so extreme that they had no funds to pay for personal travel to the provincial court in Prosperidad, about three hours away by jeep.
Killings in Tambo
A survivor of the Extra-Judicial Executions of three civilians in Tambo, a Manobo village in the west of Agusan del Sur, told Human Rights Watch the attack came whilr the family was eating dinner.
The witness, name withheld, said the attack occurred just at the beginning of dinner, after dark, at around 730PM pn September 23, 1991, in a tiny hillside community known only by the kilometer mark, "44," on the logging road that leads into the logging concession in San Luis municipality. At the time of the attack, there were seven people in the hut, a traditional Manobo hut set on six foot high stilts with a low roof but no enclosing walls, and they had just sat down to eat. On the floor they had lit a kerosene lamp, so the occupants were clearly visible from outside the hut. The nearest neighbor, however, is about a half mile away. None of them was armed.
That evening, the head of the household, Datu Mantalata, who was also the tribal leader of the community, had just returned from Kilometer Mark 60, about 11 miles west, where the manager of Ayala Logging Company was stationed. Mantalata had with him a box of provisions: sardines, candy, sugar, and biscuits, which he had just bought with some of the harvested rice. The others had just come in from a day harvesting rice in the fields nearby. Four people were seated in a line on the lower platform, and three on the slightly raised platform behind.
pp20
Suddenly, without any warning, the gunfire began "like firecrackers," the witness said. She was seated on the upper platform, to one side. The blast came seemingly from several directions at once, but it was dark, and the witnesses were unable to see the origin of the gunfire. During the firing, the witness said she immediately ducked over to lean on the body of the man next to her, a neighbor named Bensyo. She heard five gunshots.
When the survivors got up, they found the three men dead. The three appeared to be the targets, since none of the four others was even grazed. The dead included Datu Mamtalata, between 60 and 70 years old; his son, Aki Mantalata, 19 yeaea old, both of whom were seated on the lower, front platform at one end; and Bensyo Pacing, 55 years old, a neighbor who had come for a visit, and who was seated in the middle of the raised platform. Pacing died instantly from a bullet wound to the face; Aki Mantalata died of bullet wounds to the chest and crotch, apparently struck from a gunfire from under the floor; and one bullet struck Datu Mantalata in the underarm, penetrating the chest.
The survivors included the Datu's wife and 12 year old son, the Datu's invalid sister, a cousin and a neighbor. The group fled to the nearest neighbor's house, about a half mile away and over a hill. Upon returning the next morning, they found the shells of bullets used in Garand rifles, a type issued to local CAFGU recruits, and bootprints in three places; under the flooring, and on either side of the house.
Some relatives of the victims went to the nearby CAFGU detachment led by a former CHDF, Boy Mendoza, under the command of the 36th Infantry Battalion. At the time, Mendoza took photographs of the bodies and offered the corpses to be brought to the center of the barangay of Tambo, to the Baptist Church, despite family members' plea that the bodies be simply be buried near the house that same day.
The witness said she believed CAFGU members under the command of Boy Mendoza were responsible for the killings. The New People's Army is not active in the area, but the victims were suspected of being members of the "Alimaongs," or Manobo tribal warriors suspected of working with the NPA. She said the local CAFGU, who are generally tribespeople from the adjacent municipality of La Paz, are known to have committed abuses in the past.
The real motive for the killings, however, appeared to be a personal feud between Datu Mantalata and his neighbor, whose aons were CAFGU members. The neighbor had reportedly given Mantalata a water buffalo in exchange for chopping down the forest on his land. Because of the drought, however, the neighbor could not get transport for the lumber by the stream, and wanted his water buffalo returned. The week before the incident, several local CAFGU came and attempted to take Mantalata's water buffalo away by force, but failed . A teenage member of the local quasi-religious vigilante cult group, the "Pulhan" ("Red Ones," so called because they sport a red cloth on their heads or knife handles) told the witness a few days after the killings that Mantalata had been "under surveillance" by Boy Mendoza's CAFGU. On the day of the massacre, the teenager said, Mantalata was followed by a notorious local CAFGU from the Banwa'on Tribe known only as "Sammy."
The CAFGU and the Pulahans are known to be involved in small scale logging activities. The Pulahan believe that certain rituals protect them from being penetrated by bullets. Before going to battle with the New People's Army, they make signs of the cross on various parts of their bodies. According to the witness, many anti-Communist Pulahans had joined the local CAFGU forces as recruits or military assets.
The family reported the case to the San Luis Mayor, Chua, but as of January 1992, no case has been filed. The family of the victim had not returned to their home because of fears for their safety. Like witnesses in the previous case, they wanted to file a case, but had insufficient funds to travel the distance to the provincial courts in Prosperidad, at least a day's travel away.
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In my next and entry in this four part series I will finish the rest of this report.
Wednesday, November 2, 2011
History of Mindanao, Part XX: "Bad Blood" HRW Report on AFP Sponsored Paramilitaries in Caraga, 1991, Part 1
The following "History" entry is quite different from my previous entries for a couple of reasons. First, it isn't an axcerpt but an entire publication, albeit one with substantially less content than most books. Secondly, it is of a much more recent vintage having been published almost 20 years ago. I also need to point out that the publisher, HRW, or Human Rights Watch, is one that I often find quite suspect. Recently I posted a three part series on HRW's report on the so called "Davao Death Squadl although found no serious factual errors, the report smacked of amateurish innuendo and nothing was corroborated. It was all subjective nonsense. Still, it drew international attention to the dynamic and did provide character sketches of 28 alleged victims. Likewise with this report. The jist of the work is that the AFP-sponsored armed reserves like the now defunct Integrated Civil Home Defense (ICHDF) or its succesor, today's Civilian Auxiliary Geographical Force Unit (CAFGU) as well as the Lumad (Animist Hilltribesmen) paramilitaries that were folded into the nascent CAFGU, just as they had been with the ICHDF.
Unlike the aforementioned Davao Death Squad report, "You Can Die at Anytim," this report, "Bad Blood: Militia Abuses in Mindanao, the Philippines," resulted in a very intencive investigation. For five weeks in January and February of 1992 HRW staffers covered the bloody violence in Mindanao's Caraga Region, specifically the borderlands of Agusan del Sur and Suriago del Sur Provinces, close to what was then the northern reaches of Davao del Norte Province, but what has since become Compostela Valley, or ComVal Province. The saddest thing is how nothing at all has changed in the nearly two decades since.
It is a thirty-six paged report but like so many of its ilk, the first several pages are tables, and report overviews, etc., so that I begin on page seven. This will be a three part entry.
*****************************************************************************************************
Bad Blood: Militia Abuses in Mindanao, the Philippines
pp7
The Military, the Paramilitary, and the NPA
From CHDF to CAFGU
Since its inception the Philippine Military has served primarily as an internal security force, directed to quell indigenous insurgencies rather than to fight external aggressors. Paramilitary auxiliaries, both official and unofficial, have been central to these internal operations. Paramilitary groups have allowed the military to circumvent the more costly alternative- large increases in the regular territorial foces- and have functioned as the military's grassroots "eyes and ears" in communities suspected of harboring subversives. Historically, the Government has had a poor record of convicting members of paramilitary groups on human rights grounds.
During the Japanese Occupation, the Philippine Constabulary (PC) , then the leading internal security force, worked closely with a paramilitary group known as the Civil Guards, which were armed by the PC and paid by landholder's collaborating with the Japanese. After World War II, Civil Guards were used in a brutal and successful war to crush a peasant uprising in Luzon known as the Huk Rebellion. Local fanatic cult groups were also deployed in terror campaigns in a strategy masterminded by the CIA's head Edward Lansdale. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Military continued to use civilian paramilitary organizations under various names under successive administrations.
In the mid-1970s, existing paramilitary organizations were absorbed into the new Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force, or ICHDF. In Mindanao, the IHCDF, or CHDF, was originally deployed together with Cristian armed fanatic groups against an uprising in the Muslim population. The CHDF often operated in independent teams, outside the chain of command. Under the supervision of Constabulary forces, the CHDF soon grew to more than 73,000 members, and gained international notoriety for brutality. Virtually every major international human rights organization working in the Philippines documented its abuses.
Beginning in 1974, the CHDF were also increasingly deployed against the New Peoples Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. By 1985, NPA forces , driven by worsening poverty and unprecedented levels of corruption in government, had grown to an estimated 25,000 armed insurgents. Most of the CHDF were deployed in Mindanao, which helped the NPA expand in that region, because "in addition to being incompetent , the CHDF were brutal" ("Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines" Richard Kessler [New Haven,Conn.:Yale University Press] [1989] pp121). In one particularly grisly example reported to the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, a mother described what the CHDF had done to her daughter:
"Last December 23, 1984, I was working at our farm in Sitio Bagacay, while my daughter Virginia was inside our nipa house. At about 4PM, I heard gunshots coming from the hill directly above where our house was located...I recognized the men as four members of the Civilian Home Defense Force...the four CHDF members approached Virginia, took her to our (farm) plot. Once there, they removed the dress, bra, and panties of Virginia...
pp8
...laid her on the ground and the four took turns having sexual intercourse with her. Virginia shouted for help twice and after her second appeal for help, (one of the CHDF) stabbed her with a dagger above her breast and below her navel, after which he shot her with his rifle. After looting the hut, the four CHDF members burned it down, fired several more shots in the air and left" (LCHR "Salvaging Democracy) pp33).
Because of many abuses like this one, the dissolution of the CHDF became a constant refrain of human rights groups and the political opposition to Marcos in the early 1980s. Opposition candidate Corazon Aquino made the end of the CHDF a key promise during her presidential campaign, and when she took office, she vowed to make good on her campaign pledge. The new Constitution, ratified in February 1987, provided that "all paramilitary forces including the CHDF...shall be dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force," but permitted the creation of a "citizens armed force" (Constitution Article XVII, Section 24).
The CHDF and other paramilitary units were officially dissolved six months later. Just ten days later, however, Aquino signed an Executive Irder creating the new Citizens Armed Forces- Geographical Unit (CAFGU) (Executive Order #275 dissolved the CHDF on 7/15/87 and Executive Order #264 created CAFGU on July 25, 1987). Initially, according to various Military estimates, between 30 and 70% of CAFGU recruits were former CHDF members.
Recognizing the brutality of the CHDF, military leaders made efforts to distinguish the CAFGU from the CHDF. The CAFGU, they said, was not a paramilitary force, which was now outlawed. It was rather a "reservist army" or militia, to be deployed solely in their home communities to defend against incursions by rebel forces. Guidelines assured that only "qualified" individuals would be admitted in a careful screening process, a process supervised by civil, as well as military authorities. Recruits with criminal, or "derogatory" records would be excluded. Ideally CAFGU recruits were to be drawn from the pool of roughly "one million idle Reservists, highschool graduates or ROTC or Civil Military Training courses or of summer military courses. In cases where there were insufficient numbers of eligible candidates, the Armed Forces may screen all able bodied male citizens and train them" (from Executive Order #264, line #240 under "Implementing Rules and Regulations").
In reality, the guidelines used in screening potential recruits are inadequate to prevent abusive individuals from being accepted. Given the poor record of prosecutions against human rights violators, many former CHDF and vigilante group members may be legally accepted. More worrisome, national and internation human rights groups have complained that even the limited screening safeguards are routinely ignored or purposely circumvented.
Training for CAFGU also appears to be inadequate. While the military points to the fact that the six week training for CAFGU includes several hours training on concepts of human rights. Human Rights Watch learned of several instances where training personnel (who after training became the unit's commanding officers) are themselves known to be abusive.
Guidelines drafted by the Department of National Defense provided that the CAFGU, unlike the CHDF, would be subject to the same discipline and chain of command as the regular armed forces. Each armed forces detachment would be liable for abuses committed by CAFGU members operating under its command. However, Human Rights Watch found that military officers often denied that especially abusive CAFGU members were under their command, despite evidence to the contrary.
pp9
In early 1992, some 89,000 CAFGU had been deployed, and plans were underway to increase the CAFGU by another 10,000. In rural areas, CAFGU forces were increasingly eclipsing local civilian government and police functions. Because of their superior knowledge of local territory and history, the CAFGUs were employed by the military in all aspects of military operations, from informants and guides to frontline forces in search and destroy operations against rebel hideouts.
Human Rights Watch documented dozens of grave human rights abuses, ranging from Extra-Judicial Killings to maltreatment while in custody, committed by CAFGU members in Mindanao. Little, it seems, had changed. The findings echo several earlier reports by international human rights organizations, which documented an alarming rise in cases of abuse by the militia in 1989.
Human Rights Watch findings cast serious doubt on the rigorousness of the CAFGU screening process and on the ability of regular forces to control and discipline units in Mindanao. Lists available through military and civil authorities revealed that a majority of recruits formerly belonged to the CHDF. In other cases, CAFGU members were known to belong to local fanatical cults or tribal armies, and still others reportedly had criminal records. The idea of drawing reservists from college level ROTC graduates was impossible to achieve in outlying areas, where the vast majority of residents have only a few years schooling. In cases where CAFGU abuses were reported to authorities, few militiamen were disarmed, discharged, tried, and convicted (in Agusan del Sur Province only 35% finished primary school and only 10% were graduates of any formal military training).
Worse, in a few documented cases where CAFGU members were officially discharged, the individuals continued to be employed in military operations against insurgents.
Human Rights Reforms
Few military, paramilitary, or militia members have ever been prosecuted by the courts. The problem is not one of laws, but one of enforcement. The Philippines is signatory to many of the principle human rights treaties, and the Philippine Constitution contains a comprehensive Bill of Rights.
Several Governmental bodies concerned with human rights exist. A Government Commision on Human Rights (CHR) laid down in the Constitution, is charged with investigating human rights abuses by both the Government and the NPA, and recommending cases for prosecution. It has no power to prosecute.
However, even within its limited mandate, the CHR has had little success in investigating abuses. Critics both within and outside the agency say the CHR has attempted to investigate too wide a variety of civil and criminal matters...
pp10
...and complain that its resources are too centralized in the capital. Of 679 staff on January 1992, 300 were in Manila. While the Manila office produced glossy brochures and detailed performance reports, investigators in the countryside complained about being short of staff and funds. Each regional office had the use of just one vehicle for investigators across an average of seven provinces; and budgets were so tight that investigators routinely paid for Xerox copying out of their own pocket. In Surigao del Sur Province, where numerous cases of abuse were reported, the field investigator said he had use of neither a type writer nor a Government vehicle.
The CHR is also hindered by its reputation for being ineffectual as an avenue for justice. Of 3,414 complaints filed with the CHR in 1991, only 836 were filed in the courts or in other agencies. The CHR was unable to point to any discharge or jail sentence of military as a result. Human rights groups also complained that CHR was too passive, failing to investigate reported abuses unless the complaintant filed a formal complaint, which the victims of abuse were often reluctant to do.
To its credit, the CHR appears to have showed some boldness in employing its new powers to delay schueduled promotions of military officers on the basis of existing human rights complaints. Human Rights Watch found evidence to suggest that this is having a strong psychological impact on higher ranks in the military. In Mindanao, for instance, Human Rights Watch was told by military sources that the promotion of a brigade commander in Bukidnon was held up because of complaints filed against a subordinate, a lieutenant colonel; two other colonels, one in Agusan del Sur and one in Bukidnon, were also not promoted because of complaints filed with the Commission on Human Rights going back to the mid-1980s. A major in Tupi, South Cotabato also said his promotion had been held up, and local human rights monitors said he has been consulting with them on human rights issues more frequently since then (the "major" in South Cotabato was Major Bermudez, interviewed by HRW on 1/21/92 and the "colonel in Bukidnon was Col.Rodolfo Rocamora interviewed by HRW at Camp Osito Bahian on 1/21/92).
The Presidential Human Rights Committee, a cabinet-level task force which includes representatives of the military, CHR, Departent of Justice and non-governmental human rights organizations, has pushed a member of human rights cases to the spotlight since 1989, but it remains to be seen whether any prosecutions can be attained. Under the leadership of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon and his successor, Silvestre N.Bello III, the PHRC launched several investigations. In November 1991, a Task Force was actively prosecuting several cases of political killings, including a case of multiple murder and arson against a military sergeant in the massacare of the Peralta family in Pangasinan. The PHRC also enacted several new directives, but implementation appeared to be a problem. For example, the PHRC drafted legislation instituting an important, critical program for protecting witnesses and their families. However, a year after the legislation had become law, and despite a hefty $1 Million budget, the program had still not been utilized in a single instance.
Officials in PHRC blamed the non-implementation of the program on the increasing political paralysis in the months leading up to the 1992 Elections.
pp11
There was an increasing sense of lawlessness during the election period. Three candidates were assassinated in February and early March. Government officials complained that the Armed Forces were "outgunned" by the estimated 143 private armies across the country. In fact, many of the "private" armies were manned by offduty soldiers and militia. The local and national press provided a daily litany of scandals describing soldiers and militiamen's involvement in illegal logging, extortion, kidnapping rings, and guns-for-hire rings.
Police commanders publicly expressed fears that CAFGU groups might be used by wealthy politicians to intimidate voters during the elections. In Central Mindanao, a police official announced that the CAFGU and vigilante forces were being mobilized by politicians as private armies. This prompted President Aquino to request that CAFGU deployed in areas where insurgency no longer posed a threat be disarmed. A week later, however, the Commissioner on Elections said the 89.000 CAFGU could keep their arms following a request by the Defense Secretary Renato de Villa that the CAFGU serve as official "poll watchers' and promised "clean and fair' elections.
The Military and Human Rights
The Philippine Military has long been characterized by excessive politicization and abusiveness. It has also been tainted by the image of illegitimacy. Historically it has served as a collaborator with foreign occupying powers, and as an instrument of elite repression. Even though the military had taken pains to clean up its tarnished image. At the highest levels, the military had cooperated with efforts by the legislature, the Department of Justice, and the Commission on Human Rights to strengthen civilian authority. In late 1990, the legislature passed a law dissolving the PC, a security force which was responsible for serious human rights abuses during the Marcos and Aquino Administrations, and instituted a new national police under civilian control. In June 1991, Aquino signed legislation which returned to civil courts jurisdiction over human rights and criminal offenses filed against members of the military.
However, for reasons not entirely clear, human rights reforms appeared to have successfully "trickled down" to the intermediate and rank and file level. In 1991, evidence of human rights abuses by soldiers and militia continued to be reported, although on a lesser scale. There appeared to be a serious lack of political will in combating remaining obstruction among military ranks. The military's commitment to enforcing the Government's legal commitments to preserving human rights appeared questionable.
***********************************************************************************************************
Parts 2, 3, and 4 to follow...
Unlike the aforementioned Davao Death Squad report, "You Can Die at Anytim," this report, "Bad Blood: Militia Abuses in Mindanao, the Philippines," resulted in a very intencive investigation. For five weeks in January and February of 1992 HRW staffers covered the bloody violence in Mindanao's Caraga Region, specifically the borderlands of Agusan del Sur and Suriago del Sur Provinces, close to what was then the northern reaches of Davao del Norte Province, but what has since become Compostela Valley, or ComVal Province. The saddest thing is how nothing at all has changed in the nearly two decades since.
It is a thirty-six paged report but like so many of its ilk, the first several pages are tables, and report overviews, etc., so that I begin on page seven. This will be a three part entry.
*****************************************************************************************************
Bad Blood: Militia Abuses in Mindanao, the Philippines
pp7
The Military, the Paramilitary, and the NPA
From CHDF to CAFGU
Since its inception the Philippine Military has served primarily as an internal security force, directed to quell indigenous insurgencies rather than to fight external aggressors. Paramilitary auxiliaries, both official and unofficial, have been central to these internal operations. Paramilitary groups have allowed the military to circumvent the more costly alternative- large increases in the regular territorial foces- and have functioned as the military's grassroots "eyes and ears" in communities suspected of harboring subversives. Historically, the Government has had a poor record of convicting members of paramilitary groups on human rights grounds.
During the Japanese Occupation, the Philippine Constabulary (PC) , then the leading internal security force, worked closely with a paramilitary group known as the Civil Guards, which were armed by the PC and paid by landholder's collaborating with the Japanese. After World War II, Civil Guards were used in a brutal and successful war to crush a peasant uprising in Luzon known as the Huk Rebellion. Local fanatic cult groups were also deployed in terror campaigns in a strategy masterminded by the CIA's head Edward Lansdale. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Military continued to use civilian paramilitary organizations under various names under successive administrations.
In the mid-1970s, existing paramilitary organizations were absorbed into the new Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force, or ICHDF. In Mindanao, the IHCDF, or CHDF, was originally deployed together with Cristian armed fanatic groups against an uprising in the Muslim population. The CHDF often operated in independent teams, outside the chain of command. Under the supervision of Constabulary forces, the CHDF soon grew to more than 73,000 members, and gained international notoriety for brutality. Virtually every major international human rights organization working in the Philippines documented its abuses.
Beginning in 1974, the CHDF were also increasingly deployed against the New Peoples Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. By 1985, NPA forces , driven by worsening poverty and unprecedented levels of corruption in government, had grown to an estimated 25,000 armed insurgents. Most of the CHDF were deployed in Mindanao, which helped the NPA expand in that region, because "in addition to being incompetent , the CHDF were brutal" ("Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines" Richard Kessler [New Haven,Conn.:Yale University Press] [1989] pp121). In one particularly grisly example reported to the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, a mother described what the CHDF had done to her daughter:
"Last December 23, 1984, I was working at our farm in Sitio Bagacay, while my daughter Virginia was inside our nipa house. At about 4PM, I heard gunshots coming from the hill directly above where our house was located...I recognized the men as four members of the Civilian Home Defense Force...the four CHDF members approached Virginia, took her to our (farm) plot. Once there, they removed the dress, bra, and panties of Virginia...
pp8
...laid her on the ground and the four took turns having sexual intercourse with her. Virginia shouted for help twice and after her second appeal for help, (one of the CHDF) stabbed her with a dagger above her breast and below her navel, after which he shot her with his rifle. After looting the hut, the four CHDF members burned it down, fired several more shots in the air and left" (LCHR "Salvaging Democracy) pp33).
Because of many abuses like this one, the dissolution of the CHDF became a constant refrain of human rights groups and the political opposition to Marcos in the early 1980s. Opposition candidate Corazon Aquino made the end of the CHDF a key promise during her presidential campaign, and when she took office, she vowed to make good on her campaign pledge. The new Constitution, ratified in February 1987, provided that "all paramilitary forces including the CHDF...shall be dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force," but permitted the creation of a "citizens armed force" (Constitution Article XVII, Section 24).
The CHDF and other paramilitary units were officially dissolved six months later. Just ten days later, however, Aquino signed an Executive Irder creating the new Citizens Armed Forces- Geographical Unit (CAFGU) (Executive Order #275 dissolved the CHDF on 7/15/87 and Executive Order #264 created CAFGU on July 25, 1987). Initially, according to various Military estimates, between 30 and 70% of CAFGU recruits were former CHDF members.
Recognizing the brutality of the CHDF, military leaders made efforts to distinguish the CAFGU from the CHDF. The CAFGU, they said, was not a paramilitary force, which was now outlawed. It was rather a "reservist army" or militia, to be deployed solely in their home communities to defend against incursions by rebel forces. Guidelines assured that only "qualified" individuals would be admitted in a careful screening process, a process supervised by civil, as well as military authorities. Recruits with criminal, or "derogatory" records would be excluded. Ideally CAFGU recruits were to be drawn from the pool of roughly "one million idle Reservists, highschool graduates or ROTC or Civil Military Training courses or of summer military courses. In cases where there were insufficient numbers of eligible candidates, the Armed Forces may screen all able bodied male citizens and train them" (from Executive Order #264, line #240 under "Implementing Rules and Regulations").
In reality, the guidelines used in screening potential recruits are inadequate to prevent abusive individuals from being accepted. Given the poor record of prosecutions against human rights violators, many former CHDF and vigilante group members may be legally accepted. More worrisome, national and internation human rights groups have complained that even the limited screening safeguards are routinely ignored or purposely circumvented.
Training for CAFGU also appears to be inadequate. While the military points to the fact that the six week training for CAFGU includes several hours training on concepts of human rights. Human Rights Watch learned of several instances where training personnel (who after training became the unit's commanding officers) are themselves known to be abusive.
Guidelines drafted by the Department of National Defense provided that the CAFGU, unlike the CHDF, would be subject to the same discipline and chain of command as the regular armed forces. Each armed forces detachment would be liable for abuses committed by CAFGU members operating under its command. However, Human Rights Watch found that military officers often denied that especially abusive CAFGU members were under their command, despite evidence to the contrary.
pp9
In early 1992, some 89,000 CAFGU had been deployed, and plans were underway to increase the CAFGU by another 10,000. In rural areas, CAFGU forces were increasingly eclipsing local civilian government and police functions. Because of their superior knowledge of local territory and history, the CAFGUs were employed by the military in all aspects of military operations, from informants and guides to frontline forces in search and destroy operations against rebel hideouts.
Human Rights Watch documented dozens of grave human rights abuses, ranging from Extra-Judicial Killings to maltreatment while in custody, committed by CAFGU members in Mindanao. Little, it seems, had changed. The findings echo several earlier reports by international human rights organizations, which documented an alarming rise in cases of abuse by the militia in 1989.
Human Rights Watch findings cast serious doubt on the rigorousness of the CAFGU screening process and on the ability of regular forces to control and discipline units in Mindanao. Lists available through military and civil authorities revealed that a majority of recruits formerly belonged to the CHDF. In other cases, CAFGU members were known to belong to local fanatical cults or tribal armies, and still others reportedly had criminal records. The idea of drawing reservists from college level ROTC graduates was impossible to achieve in outlying areas, where the vast majority of residents have only a few years schooling. In cases where CAFGU abuses were reported to authorities, few militiamen were disarmed, discharged, tried, and convicted (in Agusan del Sur Province only 35% finished primary school and only 10% were graduates of any formal military training).
Worse, in a few documented cases where CAFGU members were officially discharged, the individuals continued to be employed in military operations against insurgents.
Human Rights Reforms
Few military, paramilitary, or militia members have ever been prosecuted by the courts. The problem is not one of laws, but one of enforcement. The Philippines is signatory to many of the principle human rights treaties, and the Philippine Constitution contains a comprehensive Bill of Rights.
Several Governmental bodies concerned with human rights exist. A Government Commision on Human Rights (CHR) laid down in the Constitution, is charged with investigating human rights abuses by both the Government and the NPA, and recommending cases for prosecution. It has no power to prosecute.
However, even within its limited mandate, the CHR has had little success in investigating abuses. Critics both within and outside the agency say the CHR has attempted to investigate too wide a variety of civil and criminal matters...
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...and complain that its resources are too centralized in the capital. Of 679 staff on January 1992, 300 were in Manila. While the Manila office produced glossy brochures and detailed performance reports, investigators in the countryside complained about being short of staff and funds. Each regional office had the use of just one vehicle for investigators across an average of seven provinces; and budgets were so tight that investigators routinely paid for Xerox copying out of their own pocket. In Surigao del Sur Province, where numerous cases of abuse were reported, the field investigator said he had use of neither a type writer nor a Government vehicle.
The CHR is also hindered by its reputation for being ineffectual as an avenue for justice. Of 3,414 complaints filed with the CHR in 1991, only 836 were filed in the courts or in other agencies. The CHR was unable to point to any discharge or jail sentence of military as a result. Human rights groups also complained that CHR was too passive, failing to investigate reported abuses unless the complaintant filed a formal complaint, which the victims of abuse were often reluctant to do.
To its credit, the CHR appears to have showed some boldness in employing its new powers to delay schueduled promotions of military officers on the basis of existing human rights complaints. Human Rights Watch found evidence to suggest that this is having a strong psychological impact on higher ranks in the military. In Mindanao, for instance, Human Rights Watch was told by military sources that the promotion of a brigade commander in Bukidnon was held up because of complaints filed against a subordinate, a lieutenant colonel; two other colonels, one in Agusan del Sur and one in Bukidnon, were also not promoted because of complaints filed with the Commission on Human Rights going back to the mid-1980s. A major in Tupi, South Cotabato also said his promotion had been held up, and local human rights monitors said he has been consulting with them on human rights issues more frequently since then (the "major" in South Cotabato was Major Bermudez, interviewed by HRW on 1/21/92 and the "colonel in Bukidnon was Col.Rodolfo Rocamora interviewed by HRW at Camp Osito Bahian on 1/21/92).
The Presidential Human Rights Committee, a cabinet-level task force which includes representatives of the military, CHR, Departent of Justice and non-governmental human rights organizations, has pushed a member of human rights cases to the spotlight since 1989, but it remains to be seen whether any prosecutions can be attained. Under the leadership of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon and his successor, Silvestre N.Bello III, the PHRC launched several investigations. In November 1991, a Task Force was actively prosecuting several cases of political killings, including a case of multiple murder and arson against a military sergeant in the massacare of the Peralta family in Pangasinan. The PHRC also enacted several new directives, but implementation appeared to be a problem. For example, the PHRC drafted legislation instituting an important, critical program for protecting witnesses and their families. However, a year after the legislation had become law, and despite a hefty $1 Million budget, the program had still not been utilized in a single instance.
Officials in PHRC blamed the non-implementation of the program on the increasing political paralysis in the months leading up to the 1992 Elections.
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There was an increasing sense of lawlessness during the election period. Three candidates were assassinated in February and early March. Government officials complained that the Armed Forces were "outgunned" by the estimated 143 private armies across the country. In fact, many of the "private" armies were manned by offduty soldiers and militia. The local and national press provided a daily litany of scandals describing soldiers and militiamen's involvement in illegal logging, extortion, kidnapping rings, and guns-for-hire rings.
Police commanders publicly expressed fears that CAFGU groups might be used by wealthy politicians to intimidate voters during the elections. In Central Mindanao, a police official announced that the CAFGU and vigilante forces were being mobilized by politicians as private armies. This prompted President Aquino to request that CAFGU deployed in areas where insurgency no longer posed a threat be disarmed. A week later, however, the Commissioner on Elections said the 89.000 CAFGU could keep their arms following a request by the Defense Secretary Renato de Villa that the CAFGU serve as official "poll watchers' and promised "clean and fair' elections.
The Military and Human Rights
The Philippine Military has long been characterized by excessive politicization and abusiveness. It has also been tainted by the image of illegitimacy. Historically it has served as a collaborator with foreign occupying powers, and as an instrument of elite repression. Even though the military had taken pains to clean up its tarnished image. At the highest levels, the military had cooperated with efforts by the legislature, the Department of Justice, and the Commission on Human Rights to strengthen civilian authority. In late 1990, the legislature passed a law dissolving the PC, a security force which was responsible for serious human rights abuses during the Marcos and Aquino Administrations, and instituted a new national police under civilian control. In June 1991, Aquino signed legislation which returned to civil courts jurisdiction over human rights and criminal offenses filed against members of the military.
However, for reasons not entirely clear, human rights reforms appeared to have successfully "trickled down" to the intermediate and rank and file level. In 1991, evidence of human rights abuses by soldiers and militia continued to be reported, although on a lesser scale. There appeared to be a serious lack of political will in combating remaining obstruction among military ranks. The military's commitment to enforcing the Government's legal commitments to preserving human rights appeared questionable.
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Parts 2, 3, and 4 to follow...
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