This is part 2 of a four part entry and opens on page 12 pf a 35 page report. As I have noted in other Human Rights Watch, or HRW-centric entries, I don't hold a very high opinion on the NGO. They deal most often in uncoroborrated accusation and wholesale innuendo. In addition they portray themselves as non-partisan and in reality are anything but. In any event, this particular report offers a glimpse into Eastern Mindanao, the least populated part of Mindanao and therefore little known even by most Mindanowans. The issues discussed in the report, paramilitaries involved in illegal logging and illegal mining, serving as private muscle for local politicians are all things that are sadly, just as real today as they were nearly two decades ago when this report was published.
Showing how inadequate the late Corazon "Cory" Aquino was as a leader, and how far out of her element the poor woman was, we have the following nugget, gleaned from then-President Aquino's unforgettable speech at the Philippine Military Academy in 1992...
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pp12
The New People's Army and Human Rights
On February 16, 1992, a week before the sixth anniversary of her accession to office, Aquino hailed "a shining moment in our history," claiming "the defeat of all threat groups" under her Administration. "We broke the back of the Communist Insurgency," she told graduates of the Philippine Military Academy, the country's elite military college.
On the same day, some 300 rebels armed with mortars and machineguns ambushed and killed 47 soldiers in a remote logging tract in the province of Surigao del Sur, the Government's single largest battlefield loss in years. Survivors said the rebels systematically executed wounded soldiers with the rank of sergeant and above. Some analysts said that the attack demonstrated that the insurgency, despite arrests of dozens of leaders in the past five years, would continue to be a force to contend with for several years.
An estimated 17,000 fulltime New People's Army rebels were still believed to be operating in the Philippines in early 1992, down from a high of 26,000 in mid-1988. But while the number of armed rebels has declined, the intensity and number of military-rebel encounters in 1991 matched 1990, apparently due to President Aquino's directive that the insurgency be crushed by the end of her term.
Both sides in the conflict commit abuses, but it is difficult to confirm most reports of NPA abuses. There continued to be reports if killings and hostage taking if unarmed civilians, and at least one foreigner, an American, continued to ve held in a 1990 kidnapping. The source of information is usually the military, and attacks most often occur in remote areas that
are sealed off to investigators because of "ongoing military operations." Reports of rebel abuses furnished by the military are the headline stock-in-fare of some two dozen provincial tabloids in Mindanao, but poorly paid news reporters rarely investigate and cinfirm stories. In listing NPA "atrocities," moreover, the military generally fails to distinguish between NPA attacks on soldiers or paramilitary units, which are acts of war, and attacks on civilians not involved in hostilities. For their part, non-governmental human rights groups in the Philippines, do not investigate reports of human rights abuses of NPA abuses, saying that it is the perogative of the Government to investigate rebel violations. This has been a contentious issue in the Philippines, leading members of the military and the Commision on Human Rights to label non-governmental human rights groups "anti-Government" or "sympathetic to the NPA."
Human Rights Watch has confirmedome instances of human rights violations by rebel forces, and these are noted where there is a direct link to CAFGU abuses that are the focus of this report.
pp13
Mindanao: A Laboratory of Counterinsurgency
(a historical overview and geopolitical sketch that is redundant to the overall content- Raki)
pp14
NPA in Mindanao
From the early 1970s through the mid-1980s, most of Mindanao was fertile ground for the expansion of the New People's Army (NPA). The rebels have drawn recruits from among the ranks of landless peasants, plantation and factory workers paid sub-survival wages, and indigenous communities displaced from their lands by lowland encroachment and agro-industrial development projects. Despite grisly purges and other violent excesses by the rebels in the early and mid-1980s, which weakened support among urban intellectuals and among the general population in Western and Southern Mindanao, the armed insurgency continued to launch frequent attacks on military and economic targets in several central and eastern provinces in early 1992.
Military officials said roughly 700 armed rebels roamed the mountainous, heabily forested region of the Mt.Andap Valley, including the eastern half of Agusan del Sur Province and most of the province of Surigao del Sur. They declared Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Sur Provinces as the "hotbed" of insurgency in Mindanao and promised to "crush" insurgency there by 1992. The commander of the NPA in Mt.Andap Valley is reportedly the rebel priest, Father Frank Navarro. Targets of large scale rebel attacks in 1991 have included military detachments, jails, and commonly...
pp15
...municipal hall buildings. Members of the paramilitary CAFGU, particularly those posted in remote communities, have also often neen the target of NPA attack.
Scattered, smaller rebel commands were reportedly operating in other regions of Mindanao in early 1992. Encounters were frequently reported in the forested regions of western Agusan del Sur and just south of the Agusan del Sur border, in the province of Davao del Norte. In the southern provinces of South Cotabato, Davao del Sur, and Davao del Norte, an estimated 200 to 300 rebels continue to strikeat military and police targers, usually in operations intended to capture arms, and at "economic" targets, such as logging and mining firms. In Davao del Norte, nine civilians and two CAFGU were killed in an ambush of a passenger jeep. The NPA later issued a public apology. They wrote that the NPA would "investigate" to determine those responsible and punish them (July, 1991).
pp16
Militia Abuses in Areas of Ongoing Military Operations
In 1991 and early 1992, most military operations in Mindanao were taking place in two provinces, Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Sur. These are forested, mountainous regions peopled by unassimilated tribal minorities and by the newest, poorest migrant farmers. It is in these areas, remote from the public eye- and from public accountability- that most human rights abuses are taking place today.
The two neighboring provinces, located in the northeast part of the island, became the focus if a much-publicized military campaign in 1991. Between April and May 1991, more than 5,000 individuals fled to town centers from 18 villages around San Luis in Agusan del Sur and around Lianga and Tandag in Surigao del Sur because of military and NPA violence, In November 1991, Armed Forces chief General Lisandro Abadia ordered that additional troops be deployed in the two provinces.
Human Rights Watch documented several killings and numerous beatings by CAFGU members in Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Sur. Most cases investigated involved militia members operating without direct military supervision. In addition, Human Rights Watch frequently heard that CAFGU members carried their military issue high powered rifles at all times, even when unsupervised, and out of uniform; this was confirmed several times by sight and in news reports of encounters. As the Laywers Committee for Human Rights noted in 1990, these findings are in violation of "the intent, if not the letter, of Executive Order no.264 and the CAFGU regulations (LCHR "Out of Control" pp121).
Military guidelines mandate that the CAFGU is primarily responsible for defense and peacekeeping functions in areas already "cleared" by combat operations. But local human rights monitors and victims reported that CAFGU members also played a role in front line combat operations. CAFGU were also used as informants to identify subversives in local communities. Several cases investigated below indicate that CAFGU members pervert their role as informants by identifying as "subersives" individuals against whom they have a personal grudge.
In other cases, random violence by CAFGU members appeared to be in response to violence by the NPA. In remote areas targeted by rebel forces, CAFGU units appeared to be "sitting ducks" for NPA attacks, which were usually aimed at capturing arms. Because of their inferior numbers and training, the militiamen often handed over the arms immediately. Regional news reports often listed CAFGU among the casualties of military-NPA encounters. In one representative case, 150 guerillas attacked a CAFGU outpost of 30 in a remote village outside San Miguel, Surigao del Sur on June 25, 1991. Two CAFGUs were killed, one wounded and two taken hostage. The following day, one of the CAFGU involved in the encounter beat and threatened three residents, apparently arbitrarily.
Abuses and Impunity
Victims of CAFGU abuses rarely go to the military to seek redress for maltreatment. As one peasant cooperative leader in San Miguel who has been threatened and harrassed countless times over the past five years explained, local residents often live in fear of the CAFGU and his commanding officer. The victims usually know the CAFGU member personally because he lives in the community. Once complaints are filed, it may take a long time, if ever, before the perpetrator is disarmed.
pp17
In a few recent cases, victims filed cases with the Commission on Human Rights in Surigao del Sur or the provincial prosecutor. However, Human Rights Watch learned of only two cases in 1990 and 1991 where abusive CAFGU members, including one charged with murder, were discharged from active duty. In neither case was the militia member prosecuted by the courts. The same individuals continued to carry firearms freely, instiling fear in the community. In San Luis, human rights victims and their families continued to live in evacuation centers because of fear of returning to their homes.
CAFGU Abuses in San Luis
Along the banks of the Maasam River lies a forested, sparsely populated land liscenced to and logged by several large logging companies. The western banks are home to the Banwa'on Tribe, a non-literate, non-assimilated ethnic group. North of the Banwa'on areas, extending 15 miles to the town of Esperanza, lives another tribe called the Higaonon. To the south, around the municipality of La Paz, a community of Manobos live. The Higaonon and Manobo were both said to be interested in taking over some of the Banwa'on lands, which has resulted in a state of simmering tribal conflict since 1985.
The local tribal communities subsist on traditional slash and burn farming, hunting, fishing, and more recently, small scale logging. The Banwa'on territory is the most remote of the three tribal communities, accessible only by river, and more recently, by a single dirt logging road. By "gakit," or raft, the trip from the Banwa'on areas to the market center, Kalilid, takes about three days. Until recently, the people there had no schools, clinics, or other contact with government. All government services were located downstream east of the Maasam River in the largely Visayan population center. The Catholic Church, however, had built a small primary school and a health clinic for the Banwa'on, and acted as an advocate for the residents there.
Since the mid-1980s, however, the Banwa'on and other tribes have come to know the military very well. The forests along the Maasam River have been a refuge for the New People's Army, and both the NPA and the military have tried to engage the two tribal communities in the conflict. The Government , for its part, has had limited success. In 1985, under the leadership of a Higaonon Mayor, Lavi Manpatilan, the Higaonon of Esperanza signed up with the CHDF in large numbers. The Manobo also joined CHDF units. However, most of the Banwa'on of the lower Maasam River forests refused.
Since then local church workers and tribal leaders said the military has intermittingly attacked Banwa'on communities on suspicion if being rebels or rebel supporters. "We refused the (military's) guns because we do not want any part pf this war," explained Datu Mantalapuk, witness to killings described below. "But now, they accuse us of being rebels, and we are defenseless."
Some of the most vicious abuses have been committed by the Higaonon. In 1988, the training and arming of the Higaonon became the obsession of a renegade military commander, Lt.Col.Alexander Noble of the Army's 23IB, and Higaonon militia there are still known as the "Noble CAFGU." Noble staged a right wing revolt against the military in Agusan del Sur in July 1990. Upon his retreat to the forests west of Esperanza, he was joined by roughly 200 fiercely loyal Higaonon CAFGU, who defended Noble against capture for nearly two months against six Army and Marine battalions. However, when Noble eventually was captured and imprisoned, most of the CAFGU were pardoned. Within weeks they were re-activated under the command of the 36IB based in the town of Prosperidad.
In mid-1991, military forces, supported by the Esperanza-based CAFGU, intensified operations against the estimated 300 NPA in San Luis. The main target fell inside the Banwa'on areaa. Human Rights Groups said military operations had led more than 500 families from seven villages in the towns of San Luis and Prosperidad to seek refuge in town centers. Local military officials at the time were quoted as saying there were "some tolerable abuses"...
pp18
...by Government forces during operations.
Traditional avenues of justice long used to quell inter-tribal conflict, such as meetings of the local headmen, or "datu," appeared to have failed in 1991 with the entry of arbitrary military force. Armed with sophisticated guns and given liscence by ongoing military campaigns against supposed rebel hideouts in the area, the Higaonon and Manobo had become bolder in asserting claims over Banwa'on territory.
A leader of the Banwa'on Tribe believed his community was being attacked because of a land dispute:
"In 1988, Boy Mendoza, a Manobo logger, met me and said that he wanted to make the Banwa'on territory part of the Manobo Community Reservation, but I refused. He threatened me and said that our territory will be marked with 'red' if I refuse. After my refusal, a series of military operations happened in our place up to the present."
Human Rights Watch investigation of massacres in San Luis appeared to support the contention of local human rights groups and tribal advocates that Higaonon and Manobo CAFGU were perverting the aims of counterinsurgency to terrorize and evict civilian Banwa'on communities in 1991. Abuses documented by Human Rights Watch commonly occurred while residents were evacuating areas undergoing military operations, or during their return to their homes and farms. Human Rights Watch recorded first hand accounts of survivors of two killings of seven individuals by suspected CAFGU members in mid-1991. Three unconfirmed killings reported by local human rights monitors during the same period also pointed to CAFGU involvement.
In addition, Human Rights Watch documented several incidents where local residents were arrested without warrant and were maltreated by combined CAFGU and regular forces. Affadavits by several other victims suggested that warrantless arrest and mistreatment of civilians were routinely practiced during large scale military operations.
Four Killed in Kilabonog
Three survivors of multiple killings in Kilabonog, a western Banwa'on village of the town of San Luis in Agusan del Sur Province, described the attack by the Higaonon CAFGU which left four members of their extended family dead.
Mario Manliano, 25, recounted that the killings occurred at roughly 6AM on May 22, 1991 at a bend in the Maasam River, roughly 30 miles from the municipal center of Kalilid, San Luis.
An extended family of 30 individuals, all members of the Banwa'on Tribe living in a forest concession known as "Site I" and accessible only by river and by a single logging road, were traveling by river to Kalilid the morning of the incident. During the three days preceding, a large scale military operation had occurred near their community, including bombing and gunfire from helicopter gunships. As troops from the 36th and 8th Infantry Battalions approached their settlement, the group decided to evacuate downriver. At dusk on May 21, they packed their belongings on twi rafts and three longboats, and began floating in darkness downstream. The trip was expected to take three days. The group carried no weapons, and included at least fifteen children.
Just at dawn on the next morning, as the first longboat ridden by Betty Manlinawan was rounding a bend, shots rang out without warning from the right bank of the river. Manliano looked up, and saw ten men on the right bank, about 30 feet distant from the raft he was steering. They wore CAFGU uniforms and had automatic rifles outstretched at shoulder height; they fired ceaselessly for about five minutes. About 12 feet to his left he saw Cecil Salbuan, age 2, and Eding Hulibayan, age 50, as the two were struck by a single bullet that penetrated the chest of the child and then that of...
pp19
...the woman on whose lap he was sitting. After the first volley, Manliano and the others jumped into the river and fled into the dense forest.
For three days, he searched for the others until all of them were re-united. Then he returned to bury the bodies on May 25. Manliano found Manlinawan, age 20 and pregnant, with bullet wounds on her cheek, forehead, and right arm, shin, and lower back. Dodong Andres, 47, was shot on his forehead, upper left arm, both legs, and the back, with that bullet exiting his front chest. Three water buffalo and a dog were also found shot dead, and the group's clothes and a sack of rice were taken.
Manliano said he recognized all of the gunmen as Higaonon Tribesmen and as members of the CAFGU detachment based in Tagbilili, a village in the municipality of Esperanza. He knew them because he is a former member of a Civilian Home Defense Force detachment led by the brother of their CAFGU detachment leader. He identified the gunmen as Datu Manlinuhaw; Datu Mandumaging; Baldes Otasa; Manliwanay Mansalawag; Danilo Hulibayan; and six known only by their Higaonon first names, Tirso, Walah, Dalahutan, Biyasa, Gintulo, and Tagdiea. Two of the ten, Danilo Hulibayan and Baldes Otasa, are listed as active duty CAFGU and former CHDFs in the provincial governor's office; the others could not be confirmed because the victims did not know their Christian Names, under which they are offially listed.
Human Rights Watch interviewed two other eyewitnesses, Datu Mantalapuk and Ben Katanaw, whose accounts corroborated that of Manliano. The eyewitnesses said they believed the CAFGU were stationed there to seal off any escape from the areas where the military operations were going on.
The group fled to Kalilid, where they set up shelter on the outskirts of town and sought assistance by the Church in June, 1991. Also in June, Mantalapuk, who is the tribal leader, went with Manliano to the Mayor of San Luis, Jun Chua, to request that charges be filed against the perpetrators. Chua promised assistance and an investigation. Chua told Human Rights Watch that his Vice Mayor had investigated the case and submitted findings to the Provincial Governor's office in November 1991. As of January 1992, there was no record of any investigation at the Governor's office, nor had he heard of the case. The regional Commission on Human Rights (based six hours drive away in Cagayan del Oro City) also said they had no knowledge of the incident.
Although local clergy expressed fears for their security, the witnesses interviewed wished to testify in court. However, they said they needed financial and legal assistance. None was literate, nor were they at all familiar with the legal system; their poverty was so extreme that they had no funds to pay for personal travel to the provincial court in Prosperidad, about three hours away by jeep.
Killings in Tambo
A survivor of the Extra-Judicial Executions of three civilians in Tambo, a Manobo village in the west of Agusan del Sur, told Human Rights Watch the attack came whilr the family was eating dinner.
The witness, name withheld, said the attack occurred just at the beginning of dinner, after dark, at around 730PM pn September 23, 1991, in a tiny hillside community known only by the kilometer mark, "44," on the logging road that leads into the logging concession in San Luis municipality. At the time of the attack, there were seven people in the hut, a traditional Manobo hut set on six foot high stilts with a low roof but no enclosing walls, and they had just sat down to eat. On the floor they had lit a kerosene lamp, so the occupants were clearly visible from outside the hut. The nearest neighbor, however, is about a half mile away. None of them was armed.
That evening, the head of the household, Datu Mantalata, who was also the tribal leader of the community, had just returned from Kilometer Mark 60, about 11 miles west, where the manager of Ayala Logging Company was stationed. Mantalata had with him a box of provisions: sardines, candy, sugar, and biscuits, which he had just bought with some of the harvested rice. The others had just come in from a day harvesting rice in the fields nearby. Four people were seated in a line on the lower platform, and three on the slightly raised platform behind.
pp20
Suddenly, without any warning, the gunfire began "like firecrackers," the witness said. She was seated on the upper platform, to one side. The blast came seemingly from several directions at once, but it was dark, and the witnesses were unable to see the origin of the gunfire. During the firing, the witness said she immediately ducked over to lean on the body of the man next to her, a neighbor named Bensyo. She heard five gunshots.
When the survivors got up, they found the three men dead. The three appeared to be the targets, since none of the four others was even grazed. The dead included Datu Mamtalata, between 60 and 70 years old; his son, Aki Mantalata, 19 yeaea old, both of whom were seated on the lower, front platform at one end; and Bensyo Pacing, 55 years old, a neighbor who had come for a visit, and who was seated in the middle of the raised platform. Pacing died instantly from a bullet wound to the face; Aki Mantalata died of bullet wounds to the chest and crotch, apparently struck from a gunfire from under the floor; and one bullet struck Datu Mantalata in the underarm, penetrating the chest.
The survivors included the Datu's wife and 12 year old son, the Datu's invalid sister, a cousin and a neighbor. The group fled to the nearest neighbor's house, about a half mile away and over a hill. Upon returning the next morning, they found the shells of bullets used in Garand rifles, a type issued to local CAFGU recruits, and bootprints in three places; under the flooring, and on either side of the house.
Some relatives of the victims went to the nearby CAFGU detachment led by a former CHDF, Boy Mendoza, under the command of the 36th Infantry Battalion. At the time, Mendoza took photographs of the bodies and offered the corpses to be brought to the center of the barangay of Tambo, to the Baptist Church, despite family members' plea that the bodies be simply be buried near the house that same day.
The witness said she believed CAFGU members under the command of Boy Mendoza were responsible for the killings. The New People's Army is not active in the area, but the victims were suspected of being members of the "Alimaongs," or Manobo tribal warriors suspected of working with the NPA. She said the local CAFGU, who are generally tribespeople from the adjacent municipality of La Paz, are known to have committed abuses in the past.
The real motive for the killings, however, appeared to be a personal feud between Datu Mantalata and his neighbor, whose aons were CAFGU members. The neighbor had reportedly given Mantalata a water buffalo in exchange for chopping down the forest on his land. Because of the drought, however, the neighbor could not get transport for the lumber by the stream, and wanted his water buffalo returned. The week before the incident, several local CAFGU came and attempted to take Mantalata's water buffalo away by force, but failed . A teenage member of the local quasi-religious vigilante cult group, the "Pulhan" ("Red Ones," so called because they sport a red cloth on their heads or knife handles) told the witness a few days after the killings that Mantalata had been "under surveillance" by Boy Mendoza's CAFGU. On the day of the massacre, the teenager said, Mantalata was followed by a notorious local CAFGU from the Banwa'on Tribe known only as "Sammy."
The CAFGU and the Pulahans are known to be involved in small scale logging activities. The Pulahan believe that certain rituals protect them from being penetrated by bullets. Before going to battle with the New People's Army, they make signs of the cross on various parts of their bodies. According to the witness, many anti-Communist Pulahans had joined the local CAFGU forces as recruits or military assets.
The family reported the case to the San Luis Mayor, Chua, but as of January 1992, no case has been filed. The family of the victim had not returned to their home because of fears for their safety. Like witnesses in the previous case, they wanted to file a case, but had insufficient funds to travel the distance to the provincial courts in Prosperidad, at least a day's travel away.
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In my next and entry in this four part series I will finish the rest of this report.
Showing posts with label CAFGU. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CAFGU. Show all posts
Saturday, November 5, 2011
Wednesday, November 2, 2011
History of Mindanao, Part XX: "Bad Blood" HRW Report on AFP Sponsored Paramilitaries in Caraga, 1991, Part 1
The following "History" entry is quite different from my previous entries for a couple of reasons. First, it isn't an axcerpt but an entire publication, albeit one with substantially less content than most books. Secondly, it is of a much more recent vintage having been published almost 20 years ago. I also need to point out that the publisher, HRW, or Human Rights Watch, is one that I often find quite suspect. Recently I posted a three part series on HRW's report on the so called "Davao Death Squadl although found no serious factual errors, the report smacked of amateurish innuendo and nothing was corroborated. It was all subjective nonsense. Still, it drew international attention to the dynamic and did provide character sketches of 28 alleged victims. Likewise with this report. The jist of the work is that the AFP-sponsored armed reserves like the now defunct Integrated Civil Home Defense (ICHDF) or its succesor, today's Civilian Auxiliary Geographical Force Unit (CAFGU) as well as the Lumad (Animist Hilltribesmen) paramilitaries that were folded into the nascent CAFGU, just as they had been with the ICHDF.
Unlike the aforementioned Davao Death Squad report, "You Can Die at Anytim," this report, "Bad Blood: Militia Abuses in Mindanao, the Philippines," resulted in a very intencive investigation. For five weeks in January and February of 1992 HRW staffers covered the bloody violence in Mindanao's Caraga Region, specifically the borderlands of Agusan del Sur and Suriago del Sur Provinces, close to what was then the northern reaches of Davao del Norte Province, but what has since become Compostela Valley, or ComVal Province. The saddest thing is how nothing at all has changed in the nearly two decades since.
It is a thirty-six paged report but like so many of its ilk, the first several pages are tables, and report overviews, etc., so that I begin on page seven. This will be a three part entry.
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Bad Blood: Militia Abuses in Mindanao, the Philippines
pp7
The Military, the Paramilitary, and the NPA
From CHDF to CAFGU
Since its inception the Philippine Military has served primarily as an internal security force, directed to quell indigenous insurgencies rather than to fight external aggressors. Paramilitary auxiliaries, both official and unofficial, have been central to these internal operations. Paramilitary groups have allowed the military to circumvent the more costly alternative- large increases in the regular territorial foces- and have functioned as the military's grassroots "eyes and ears" in communities suspected of harboring subversives. Historically, the Government has had a poor record of convicting members of paramilitary groups on human rights grounds.
During the Japanese Occupation, the Philippine Constabulary (PC) , then the leading internal security force, worked closely with a paramilitary group known as the Civil Guards, which were armed by the PC and paid by landholder's collaborating with the Japanese. After World War II, Civil Guards were used in a brutal and successful war to crush a peasant uprising in Luzon known as the Huk Rebellion. Local fanatic cult groups were also deployed in terror campaigns in a strategy masterminded by the CIA's head Edward Lansdale. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Military continued to use civilian paramilitary organizations under various names under successive administrations.
In the mid-1970s, existing paramilitary organizations were absorbed into the new Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force, or ICHDF. In Mindanao, the IHCDF, or CHDF, was originally deployed together with Cristian armed fanatic groups against an uprising in the Muslim population. The CHDF often operated in independent teams, outside the chain of command. Under the supervision of Constabulary forces, the CHDF soon grew to more than 73,000 members, and gained international notoriety for brutality. Virtually every major international human rights organization working in the Philippines documented its abuses.
Beginning in 1974, the CHDF were also increasingly deployed against the New Peoples Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. By 1985, NPA forces , driven by worsening poverty and unprecedented levels of corruption in government, had grown to an estimated 25,000 armed insurgents. Most of the CHDF were deployed in Mindanao, which helped the NPA expand in that region, because "in addition to being incompetent , the CHDF were brutal" ("Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines" Richard Kessler [New Haven,Conn.:Yale University Press] [1989] pp121). In one particularly grisly example reported to the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, a mother described what the CHDF had done to her daughter:
"Last December 23, 1984, I was working at our farm in Sitio Bagacay, while my daughter Virginia was inside our nipa house. At about 4PM, I heard gunshots coming from the hill directly above where our house was located...I recognized the men as four members of the Civilian Home Defense Force...the four CHDF members approached Virginia, took her to our (farm) plot. Once there, they removed the dress, bra, and panties of Virginia...
pp8
...laid her on the ground and the four took turns having sexual intercourse with her. Virginia shouted for help twice and after her second appeal for help, (one of the CHDF) stabbed her with a dagger above her breast and below her navel, after which he shot her with his rifle. After looting the hut, the four CHDF members burned it down, fired several more shots in the air and left" (LCHR "Salvaging Democracy) pp33).
Because of many abuses like this one, the dissolution of the CHDF became a constant refrain of human rights groups and the political opposition to Marcos in the early 1980s. Opposition candidate Corazon Aquino made the end of the CHDF a key promise during her presidential campaign, and when she took office, she vowed to make good on her campaign pledge. The new Constitution, ratified in February 1987, provided that "all paramilitary forces including the CHDF...shall be dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force," but permitted the creation of a "citizens armed force" (Constitution Article XVII, Section 24).
The CHDF and other paramilitary units were officially dissolved six months later. Just ten days later, however, Aquino signed an Executive Irder creating the new Citizens Armed Forces- Geographical Unit (CAFGU) (Executive Order #275 dissolved the CHDF on 7/15/87 and Executive Order #264 created CAFGU on July 25, 1987). Initially, according to various Military estimates, between 30 and 70% of CAFGU recruits were former CHDF members.
Recognizing the brutality of the CHDF, military leaders made efforts to distinguish the CAFGU from the CHDF. The CAFGU, they said, was not a paramilitary force, which was now outlawed. It was rather a "reservist army" or militia, to be deployed solely in their home communities to defend against incursions by rebel forces. Guidelines assured that only "qualified" individuals would be admitted in a careful screening process, a process supervised by civil, as well as military authorities. Recruits with criminal, or "derogatory" records would be excluded. Ideally CAFGU recruits were to be drawn from the pool of roughly "one million idle Reservists, highschool graduates or ROTC or Civil Military Training courses or of summer military courses. In cases where there were insufficient numbers of eligible candidates, the Armed Forces may screen all able bodied male citizens and train them" (from Executive Order #264, line #240 under "Implementing Rules and Regulations").
In reality, the guidelines used in screening potential recruits are inadequate to prevent abusive individuals from being accepted. Given the poor record of prosecutions against human rights violators, many former CHDF and vigilante group members may be legally accepted. More worrisome, national and internation human rights groups have complained that even the limited screening safeguards are routinely ignored or purposely circumvented.
Training for CAFGU also appears to be inadequate. While the military points to the fact that the six week training for CAFGU includes several hours training on concepts of human rights. Human Rights Watch learned of several instances where training personnel (who after training became the unit's commanding officers) are themselves known to be abusive.
Guidelines drafted by the Department of National Defense provided that the CAFGU, unlike the CHDF, would be subject to the same discipline and chain of command as the regular armed forces. Each armed forces detachment would be liable for abuses committed by CAFGU members operating under its command. However, Human Rights Watch found that military officers often denied that especially abusive CAFGU members were under their command, despite evidence to the contrary.
pp9
In early 1992, some 89,000 CAFGU had been deployed, and plans were underway to increase the CAFGU by another 10,000. In rural areas, CAFGU forces were increasingly eclipsing local civilian government and police functions. Because of their superior knowledge of local territory and history, the CAFGUs were employed by the military in all aspects of military operations, from informants and guides to frontline forces in search and destroy operations against rebel hideouts.
Human Rights Watch documented dozens of grave human rights abuses, ranging from Extra-Judicial Killings to maltreatment while in custody, committed by CAFGU members in Mindanao. Little, it seems, had changed. The findings echo several earlier reports by international human rights organizations, which documented an alarming rise in cases of abuse by the militia in 1989.
Human Rights Watch findings cast serious doubt on the rigorousness of the CAFGU screening process and on the ability of regular forces to control and discipline units in Mindanao. Lists available through military and civil authorities revealed that a majority of recruits formerly belonged to the CHDF. In other cases, CAFGU members were known to belong to local fanatical cults or tribal armies, and still others reportedly had criminal records. The idea of drawing reservists from college level ROTC graduates was impossible to achieve in outlying areas, where the vast majority of residents have only a few years schooling. In cases where CAFGU abuses were reported to authorities, few militiamen were disarmed, discharged, tried, and convicted (in Agusan del Sur Province only 35% finished primary school and only 10% were graduates of any formal military training).
Worse, in a few documented cases where CAFGU members were officially discharged, the individuals continued to be employed in military operations against insurgents.
Human Rights Reforms
Few military, paramilitary, or militia members have ever been prosecuted by the courts. The problem is not one of laws, but one of enforcement. The Philippines is signatory to many of the principle human rights treaties, and the Philippine Constitution contains a comprehensive Bill of Rights.
Several Governmental bodies concerned with human rights exist. A Government Commision on Human Rights (CHR) laid down in the Constitution, is charged with investigating human rights abuses by both the Government and the NPA, and recommending cases for prosecution. It has no power to prosecute.
However, even within its limited mandate, the CHR has had little success in investigating abuses. Critics both within and outside the agency say the CHR has attempted to investigate too wide a variety of civil and criminal matters...
pp10
...and complain that its resources are too centralized in the capital. Of 679 staff on January 1992, 300 were in Manila. While the Manila office produced glossy brochures and detailed performance reports, investigators in the countryside complained about being short of staff and funds. Each regional office had the use of just one vehicle for investigators across an average of seven provinces; and budgets were so tight that investigators routinely paid for Xerox copying out of their own pocket. In Surigao del Sur Province, where numerous cases of abuse were reported, the field investigator said he had use of neither a type writer nor a Government vehicle.
The CHR is also hindered by its reputation for being ineffectual as an avenue for justice. Of 3,414 complaints filed with the CHR in 1991, only 836 were filed in the courts or in other agencies. The CHR was unable to point to any discharge or jail sentence of military as a result. Human rights groups also complained that CHR was too passive, failing to investigate reported abuses unless the complaintant filed a formal complaint, which the victims of abuse were often reluctant to do.
To its credit, the CHR appears to have showed some boldness in employing its new powers to delay schueduled promotions of military officers on the basis of existing human rights complaints. Human Rights Watch found evidence to suggest that this is having a strong psychological impact on higher ranks in the military. In Mindanao, for instance, Human Rights Watch was told by military sources that the promotion of a brigade commander in Bukidnon was held up because of complaints filed against a subordinate, a lieutenant colonel; two other colonels, one in Agusan del Sur and one in Bukidnon, were also not promoted because of complaints filed with the Commission on Human Rights going back to the mid-1980s. A major in Tupi, South Cotabato also said his promotion had been held up, and local human rights monitors said he has been consulting with them on human rights issues more frequently since then (the "major" in South Cotabato was Major Bermudez, interviewed by HRW on 1/21/92 and the "colonel in Bukidnon was Col.Rodolfo Rocamora interviewed by HRW at Camp Osito Bahian on 1/21/92).
The Presidential Human Rights Committee, a cabinet-level task force which includes representatives of the military, CHR, Departent of Justice and non-governmental human rights organizations, has pushed a member of human rights cases to the spotlight since 1989, but it remains to be seen whether any prosecutions can be attained. Under the leadership of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon and his successor, Silvestre N.Bello III, the PHRC launched several investigations. In November 1991, a Task Force was actively prosecuting several cases of political killings, including a case of multiple murder and arson against a military sergeant in the massacare of the Peralta family in Pangasinan. The PHRC also enacted several new directives, but implementation appeared to be a problem. For example, the PHRC drafted legislation instituting an important, critical program for protecting witnesses and their families. However, a year after the legislation had become law, and despite a hefty $1 Million budget, the program had still not been utilized in a single instance.
Officials in PHRC blamed the non-implementation of the program on the increasing political paralysis in the months leading up to the 1992 Elections.
pp11
There was an increasing sense of lawlessness during the election period. Three candidates were assassinated in February and early March. Government officials complained that the Armed Forces were "outgunned" by the estimated 143 private armies across the country. In fact, many of the "private" armies were manned by offduty soldiers and militia. The local and national press provided a daily litany of scandals describing soldiers and militiamen's involvement in illegal logging, extortion, kidnapping rings, and guns-for-hire rings.
Police commanders publicly expressed fears that CAFGU groups might be used by wealthy politicians to intimidate voters during the elections. In Central Mindanao, a police official announced that the CAFGU and vigilante forces were being mobilized by politicians as private armies. This prompted President Aquino to request that CAFGU deployed in areas where insurgency no longer posed a threat be disarmed. A week later, however, the Commissioner on Elections said the 89.000 CAFGU could keep their arms following a request by the Defense Secretary Renato de Villa that the CAFGU serve as official "poll watchers' and promised "clean and fair' elections.
The Military and Human Rights
The Philippine Military has long been characterized by excessive politicization and abusiveness. It has also been tainted by the image of illegitimacy. Historically it has served as a collaborator with foreign occupying powers, and as an instrument of elite repression. Even though the military had taken pains to clean up its tarnished image. At the highest levels, the military had cooperated with efforts by the legislature, the Department of Justice, and the Commission on Human Rights to strengthen civilian authority. In late 1990, the legislature passed a law dissolving the PC, a security force which was responsible for serious human rights abuses during the Marcos and Aquino Administrations, and instituted a new national police under civilian control. In June 1991, Aquino signed legislation which returned to civil courts jurisdiction over human rights and criminal offenses filed against members of the military.
However, for reasons not entirely clear, human rights reforms appeared to have successfully "trickled down" to the intermediate and rank and file level. In 1991, evidence of human rights abuses by soldiers and militia continued to be reported, although on a lesser scale. There appeared to be a serious lack of political will in combating remaining obstruction among military ranks. The military's commitment to enforcing the Government's legal commitments to preserving human rights appeared questionable.
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Parts 2, 3, and 4 to follow...
Unlike the aforementioned Davao Death Squad report, "You Can Die at Anytim," this report, "Bad Blood: Militia Abuses in Mindanao, the Philippines," resulted in a very intencive investigation. For five weeks in January and February of 1992 HRW staffers covered the bloody violence in Mindanao's Caraga Region, specifically the borderlands of Agusan del Sur and Suriago del Sur Provinces, close to what was then the northern reaches of Davao del Norte Province, but what has since become Compostela Valley, or ComVal Province. The saddest thing is how nothing at all has changed in the nearly two decades since.
It is a thirty-six paged report but like so many of its ilk, the first several pages are tables, and report overviews, etc., so that I begin on page seven. This will be a three part entry.
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Bad Blood: Militia Abuses in Mindanao, the Philippines
pp7
The Military, the Paramilitary, and the NPA
From CHDF to CAFGU
Since its inception the Philippine Military has served primarily as an internal security force, directed to quell indigenous insurgencies rather than to fight external aggressors. Paramilitary auxiliaries, both official and unofficial, have been central to these internal operations. Paramilitary groups have allowed the military to circumvent the more costly alternative- large increases in the regular territorial foces- and have functioned as the military's grassroots "eyes and ears" in communities suspected of harboring subversives. Historically, the Government has had a poor record of convicting members of paramilitary groups on human rights grounds.
During the Japanese Occupation, the Philippine Constabulary (PC) , then the leading internal security force, worked closely with a paramilitary group known as the Civil Guards, which were armed by the PC and paid by landholder's collaborating with the Japanese. After World War II, Civil Guards were used in a brutal and successful war to crush a peasant uprising in Luzon known as the Huk Rebellion. Local fanatic cult groups were also deployed in terror campaigns in a strategy masterminded by the CIA's head Edward Lansdale. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Military continued to use civilian paramilitary organizations under various names under successive administrations.
In the mid-1970s, existing paramilitary organizations were absorbed into the new Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force, or ICHDF. In Mindanao, the IHCDF, or CHDF, was originally deployed together with Cristian armed fanatic groups against an uprising in the Muslim population. The CHDF often operated in independent teams, outside the chain of command. Under the supervision of Constabulary forces, the CHDF soon grew to more than 73,000 members, and gained international notoriety for brutality. Virtually every major international human rights organization working in the Philippines documented its abuses.
Beginning in 1974, the CHDF were also increasingly deployed against the New Peoples Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. By 1985, NPA forces , driven by worsening poverty and unprecedented levels of corruption in government, had grown to an estimated 25,000 armed insurgents. Most of the CHDF were deployed in Mindanao, which helped the NPA expand in that region, because "in addition to being incompetent , the CHDF were brutal" ("Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines" Richard Kessler [New Haven,Conn.:Yale University Press] [1989] pp121). In one particularly grisly example reported to the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, a mother described what the CHDF had done to her daughter:
"Last December 23, 1984, I was working at our farm in Sitio Bagacay, while my daughter Virginia was inside our nipa house. At about 4PM, I heard gunshots coming from the hill directly above where our house was located...I recognized the men as four members of the Civilian Home Defense Force...the four CHDF members approached Virginia, took her to our (farm) plot. Once there, they removed the dress, bra, and panties of Virginia...
pp8
...laid her on the ground and the four took turns having sexual intercourse with her. Virginia shouted for help twice and after her second appeal for help, (one of the CHDF) stabbed her with a dagger above her breast and below her navel, after which he shot her with his rifle. After looting the hut, the four CHDF members burned it down, fired several more shots in the air and left" (LCHR "Salvaging Democracy) pp33).
Because of many abuses like this one, the dissolution of the CHDF became a constant refrain of human rights groups and the political opposition to Marcos in the early 1980s. Opposition candidate Corazon Aquino made the end of the CHDF a key promise during her presidential campaign, and when she took office, she vowed to make good on her campaign pledge. The new Constitution, ratified in February 1987, provided that "all paramilitary forces including the CHDF...shall be dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force," but permitted the creation of a "citizens armed force" (Constitution Article XVII, Section 24).
The CHDF and other paramilitary units were officially dissolved six months later. Just ten days later, however, Aquino signed an Executive Irder creating the new Citizens Armed Forces- Geographical Unit (CAFGU) (Executive Order #275 dissolved the CHDF on 7/15/87 and Executive Order #264 created CAFGU on July 25, 1987). Initially, according to various Military estimates, between 30 and 70% of CAFGU recruits were former CHDF members.
Recognizing the brutality of the CHDF, military leaders made efforts to distinguish the CAFGU from the CHDF. The CAFGU, they said, was not a paramilitary force, which was now outlawed. It was rather a "reservist army" or militia, to be deployed solely in their home communities to defend against incursions by rebel forces. Guidelines assured that only "qualified" individuals would be admitted in a careful screening process, a process supervised by civil, as well as military authorities. Recruits with criminal, or "derogatory" records would be excluded. Ideally CAFGU recruits were to be drawn from the pool of roughly "one million idle Reservists, highschool graduates or ROTC or Civil Military Training courses or of summer military courses. In cases where there were insufficient numbers of eligible candidates, the Armed Forces may screen all able bodied male citizens and train them" (from Executive Order #264, line #240 under "Implementing Rules and Regulations").
In reality, the guidelines used in screening potential recruits are inadequate to prevent abusive individuals from being accepted. Given the poor record of prosecutions against human rights violators, many former CHDF and vigilante group members may be legally accepted. More worrisome, national and internation human rights groups have complained that even the limited screening safeguards are routinely ignored or purposely circumvented.
Training for CAFGU also appears to be inadequate. While the military points to the fact that the six week training for CAFGU includes several hours training on concepts of human rights. Human Rights Watch learned of several instances where training personnel (who after training became the unit's commanding officers) are themselves known to be abusive.
Guidelines drafted by the Department of National Defense provided that the CAFGU, unlike the CHDF, would be subject to the same discipline and chain of command as the regular armed forces. Each armed forces detachment would be liable for abuses committed by CAFGU members operating under its command. However, Human Rights Watch found that military officers often denied that especially abusive CAFGU members were under their command, despite evidence to the contrary.
pp9
In early 1992, some 89,000 CAFGU had been deployed, and plans were underway to increase the CAFGU by another 10,000. In rural areas, CAFGU forces were increasingly eclipsing local civilian government and police functions. Because of their superior knowledge of local territory and history, the CAFGUs were employed by the military in all aspects of military operations, from informants and guides to frontline forces in search and destroy operations against rebel hideouts.
Human Rights Watch documented dozens of grave human rights abuses, ranging from Extra-Judicial Killings to maltreatment while in custody, committed by CAFGU members in Mindanao. Little, it seems, had changed. The findings echo several earlier reports by international human rights organizations, which documented an alarming rise in cases of abuse by the militia in 1989.
Human Rights Watch findings cast serious doubt on the rigorousness of the CAFGU screening process and on the ability of regular forces to control and discipline units in Mindanao. Lists available through military and civil authorities revealed that a majority of recruits formerly belonged to the CHDF. In other cases, CAFGU members were known to belong to local fanatical cults or tribal armies, and still others reportedly had criminal records. The idea of drawing reservists from college level ROTC graduates was impossible to achieve in outlying areas, where the vast majority of residents have only a few years schooling. In cases where CAFGU abuses were reported to authorities, few militiamen were disarmed, discharged, tried, and convicted (in Agusan del Sur Province only 35% finished primary school and only 10% were graduates of any formal military training).
Worse, in a few documented cases where CAFGU members were officially discharged, the individuals continued to be employed in military operations against insurgents.
Human Rights Reforms
Few military, paramilitary, or militia members have ever been prosecuted by the courts. The problem is not one of laws, but one of enforcement. The Philippines is signatory to many of the principle human rights treaties, and the Philippine Constitution contains a comprehensive Bill of Rights.
Several Governmental bodies concerned with human rights exist. A Government Commision on Human Rights (CHR) laid down in the Constitution, is charged with investigating human rights abuses by both the Government and the NPA, and recommending cases for prosecution. It has no power to prosecute.
However, even within its limited mandate, the CHR has had little success in investigating abuses. Critics both within and outside the agency say the CHR has attempted to investigate too wide a variety of civil and criminal matters...
pp10
...and complain that its resources are too centralized in the capital. Of 679 staff on January 1992, 300 were in Manila. While the Manila office produced glossy brochures and detailed performance reports, investigators in the countryside complained about being short of staff and funds. Each regional office had the use of just one vehicle for investigators across an average of seven provinces; and budgets were so tight that investigators routinely paid for Xerox copying out of their own pocket. In Surigao del Sur Province, where numerous cases of abuse were reported, the field investigator said he had use of neither a type writer nor a Government vehicle.
The CHR is also hindered by its reputation for being ineffectual as an avenue for justice. Of 3,414 complaints filed with the CHR in 1991, only 836 were filed in the courts or in other agencies. The CHR was unable to point to any discharge or jail sentence of military as a result. Human rights groups also complained that CHR was too passive, failing to investigate reported abuses unless the complaintant filed a formal complaint, which the victims of abuse were often reluctant to do.
To its credit, the CHR appears to have showed some boldness in employing its new powers to delay schueduled promotions of military officers on the basis of existing human rights complaints. Human Rights Watch found evidence to suggest that this is having a strong psychological impact on higher ranks in the military. In Mindanao, for instance, Human Rights Watch was told by military sources that the promotion of a brigade commander in Bukidnon was held up because of complaints filed against a subordinate, a lieutenant colonel; two other colonels, one in Agusan del Sur and one in Bukidnon, were also not promoted because of complaints filed with the Commission on Human Rights going back to the mid-1980s. A major in Tupi, South Cotabato also said his promotion had been held up, and local human rights monitors said he has been consulting with them on human rights issues more frequently since then (the "major" in South Cotabato was Major Bermudez, interviewed by HRW on 1/21/92 and the "colonel in Bukidnon was Col.Rodolfo Rocamora interviewed by HRW at Camp Osito Bahian on 1/21/92).
The Presidential Human Rights Committee, a cabinet-level task force which includes representatives of the military, CHR, Departent of Justice and non-governmental human rights organizations, has pushed a member of human rights cases to the spotlight since 1989, but it remains to be seen whether any prosecutions can be attained. Under the leadership of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon and his successor, Silvestre N.Bello III, the PHRC launched several investigations. In November 1991, a Task Force was actively prosecuting several cases of political killings, including a case of multiple murder and arson against a military sergeant in the massacare of the Peralta family in Pangasinan. The PHRC also enacted several new directives, but implementation appeared to be a problem. For example, the PHRC drafted legislation instituting an important, critical program for protecting witnesses and their families. However, a year after the legislation had become law, and despite a hefty $1 Million budget, the program had still not been utilized in a single instance.
Officials in PHRC blamed the non-implementation of the program on the increasing political paralysis in the months leading up to the 1992 Elections.
pp11
There was an increasing sense of lawlessness during the election period. Three candidates were assassinated in February and early March. Government officials complained that the Armed Forces were "outgunned" by the estimated 143 private armies across the country. In fact, many of the "private" armies were manned by offduty soldiers and militia. The local and national press provided a daily litany of scandals describing soldiers and militiamen's involvement in illegal logging, extortion, kidnapping rings, and guns-for-hire rings.
Police commanders publicly expressed fears that CAFGU groups might be used by wealthy politicians to intimidate voters during the elections. In Central Mindanao, a police official announced that the CAFGU and vigilante forces were being mobilized by politicians as private armies. This prompted President Aquino to request that CAFGU deployed in areas where insurgency no longer posed a threat be disarmed. A week later, however, the Commissioner on Elections said the 89.000 CAFGU could keep their arms following a request by the Defense Secretary Renato de Villa that the CAFGU serve as official "poll watchers' and promised "clean and fair' elections.
The Military and Human Rights
The Philippine Military has long been characterized by excessive politicization and abusiveness. It has also been tainted by the image of illegitimacy. Historically it has served as a collaborator with foreign occupying powers, and as an instrument of elite repression. Even though the military had taken pains to clean up its tarnished image. At the highest levels, the military had cooperated with efforts by the legislature, the Department of Justice, and the Commission on Human Rights to strengthen civilian authority. In late 1990, the legislature passed a law dissolving the PC, a security force which was responsible for serious human rights abuses during the Marcos and Aquino Administrations, and instituted a new national police under civilian control. In June 1991, Aquino signed legislation which returned to civil courts jurisdiction over human rights and criminal offenses filed against members of the military.
However, for reasons not entirely clear, human rights reforms appeared to have successfully "trickled down" to the intermediate and rank and file level. In 1991, evidence of human rights abuses by soldiers and militia continued to be reported, although on a lesser scale. There appeared to be a serious lack of political will in combating remaining obstruction among military ranks. The military's commitment to enforcing the Government's legal commitments to preserving human rights appeared questionable.
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Parts 2, 3, and 4 to follow...
Sunday, October 16, 2011
Remembering Father Nerilito "Neri" Dazo Satur
This past Thursday, October 14th, 2011, residents of Valencia City's Barangay Guinoyuran remembered a former Assistant Parish Priest, Father Nerilito "Neri" Dazo Satur. The day marks twenty years in which the loved ones and friends of the well liked priest have failed in their quest for justice.
Father Neri was born and raised in the municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte Province until, shortly after beginning highschool he and his family moved to the adjacent province of Bukidnon. Born to a peasant family Neri struggled with funding for his education and yet still managed to always keep one eye on the prize. Finally, at age 28, after much perseverance he was able to graduate from a Catholic seminary in Davao City. Assigned to the Diocese of Bukidnon, its Bishop, Gaudencio Rosales, assigned the ambitious young man to the Parish of Guinoyuran. Located nearly 12 kilometers to the northeast of Valencia proper Father Neri would climb aboard his treasured Honda 250 for the long trip to and from the barangay. Like most rural Philippine parishes Guinoyuran was devoid of a rectory and having grown up in a one room "nipa," as the bamboo and palm leaf thatch huts are known, Neri was in no rush to return to that hardscrabble existence and so he serviced his parish travelling to and fro from his room in a large rectory overlooking Valencia's jeepney terminal.
The Bukidnon Province of 1989, the year Neri graduated and arrived in Valencia, wasn't too far removed from the Bukidnon of today in that the same all pervasive corruption, mind numbing poverty, gratuitous violence, and plain old thuggery was over-abundant. In the mid-1980s peasants living in Bukidnon's municipality of San Fernando had with Church support engaged in a very vocal anti-logging campaign. With the Catholic Church then assuming the lead in this and several other environmentally sensitive causes the initiative took on a cachet of its own as rich and poor alike jumped on the ecological bandwagon. It wasn't long before the national media began to take notice and by December of 1986, after staging a hunger strike and a noisy street demonstration in Manila, the DENR, or Department of the Environment and Natural Resources began actually enforcing its own statutes and dedicated laws. Indeed, public sentiment was so strong that by the Summer of 1988 the DENR issued a moratorium on all logging in the province.
Not long after Father Neri arrived in Valencia (which hadn't become a city yet), the Diocese of Bukidnon's Bishop Gaudencio Rosales named the priest as one of five diocesan priests who were to be deputised by the DENR as "Forest Guards," Filipino-speak for "forest rangers," in September of 1990. It was in this capacity that Father Neri soon began stepping on some very important toes, neigh, even stomping on them. By the Summer of 1991, a mere 9 months after his deputisation, Father Neri had managed to confiscate nearly 7,000 board feet of valuable lumber.
Like most organised crime on Mindanao, illegal small scale logging, or "tablon-tablon," was deeply tied to the local power structure, especially the AFP and PNP, or the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police. Although a full moratorium on logging had been in place for nearly three years, Valencia itself had at least three sawmills operating full time, fed by the tablon-tablon trade. Both the sawmill operators as well as the loggers themselves paid steep bribes to the AFP/PNP in order to continue doing business.
At the same time the NPA Insurgency had recently peaked with an estimated 25,000 regulars in the nation's hills. The AFP has always used force multipliers to boost manpower and operational AOR ("Area of Responsibility," as in Area of Operation). The main force multiplier was the then-recently created CAFGU, or Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (today the acronym is defined as "Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit"). The CAFGU were and are trained as static armed reserves. Trained, armed, paid, and supervised by the AFP, CAFGU soldiers were and are geographically dedicated forces, manned by residents of a given municipality and allowed only to operate within the borders of that same municipality. The stipend given to CAAs, or Civilian Active Auxiliaries, as CAFGU soldiers are known, was and continues to be paltry at best so that CAFGU members are incredibly ill equipped and extremly underpaid. As a result certain supervisory officers, or AFP CAFGU Cadres, tend to look the other way when their subordinates engage in illegal profit-making enterprises.
Naturally, one of the foremost ways in which CAAs engage in such endevours is through tablon-tablon, whether as a logger, driver, wholesaler, sawmill operator, or middle man. Almost always the AFP cadre is taking his healthy cut as well. In terms of Barangay Guinoyuran, it and the adjacent Barangay Lourdes fell under the 26IB (Infantry Battalion). The 26IB's CO, or Commanding Officer had formed a profitable relationship with a local shaman of the Higaon-on Tribe, Datu Bantu Domia, who had developed a rabidly loyal following in that immediate area. Bantu, a highly charismatic leader condoned the wholesale rape of his tribe's traditional lands by both logging and mining. He viewed the AFP as only the lesser of two evils as opposed to actually being ideologically invested in either the Government in Manila, which even today ignores the Lumad, Igorot, and Tingguian Peoples, and the NPA who pay too much attention while providing nothing in the way of goods or services. If and when the NPA ever assumed power the Higaon-on would fare no better than they had under the faux Liberal Democracy imposed upon them by the Government.
By the time Father Neri arrived in Barangay Guinoyuran Datu Bantu's followers had assumed control of the local tablon-taboln trade feeding Valencia's aforementioned illegal sawmills. The silent majority in the two adjoining barangays were outgunned to the point that even the NPA couldn't assert itself. A modern parallel might be the municipality of San Francisco, popularly known as San Franz, in Agusan del Sur Province. Whatever NPA activity takes place within that town's borders is of a non-violent nature and highly secretive with the NPA being no match for the right wing paramilitaries supported by the government as well as by the highly sophisticated organised crime that pervades the town. One sees the NPA with its parallel governments in the Agusan del Sur municipalities of Trento, Bayugan, Prosperidad, and Lianga over the border in Surigao del Sur Province, all encompassing San Franz, but within San Franz itself the NPA doesn't dare rear its ugly head.
San Franz is the domain of two powerful clans, one of which is the Lademoras whose patriarch Carlos is the infamous Philippine Constabulary officer who ran the Ilaga during its anti-NPA phase, as well as being the man single handedly responsible for the extermination of an entire sitio on Samar in the Visayas Region, and of course for running rampant over the then-NPA controlled San Franz as he carved out the massive Guthrie Palm Oil Plantation in the late 1980s. Only when a commander is as ruthless as Carlos Lademora, or Luzon's Palparan, does one see the NPA pull back into the shadows. A lamentable reality and yet reality never the less. The 26IB was merely one of many IBs and brigades who held that same "all or nothing" view and sponsored questionable paramilitaries so as to obtain plausible deniability should things get ugly as they indeed did in Barangay Guinoyuran. The Guinoyuran CAFGU detachment earned its carte blance by killing an entire NPA Team. "Teams," the lowest rung in the NPA command structure, usually consisted of less than 10 guerillas.
Obstensibly to amicably solve the tension in Guinoyuran's Sitio Magsa, the last NPA baliwick in that barangay, Datu Bantu invited the NPA to attend a forum, Filipino speak for a mediation dialogue, as long as the guerillas entered the barangay unarmed. Guaranteeing their safety under a flag of truce Bantu finally convinced the reluctant NPA to attend. Upon entering the barangay all six guerillas were executed at point blank range. Of course it was the 26IB who received the commendations and praise, although the AFP handed Datu Bantu P100,000 ($2,500 at the time) as a "bounty." The praise received by the 26IB from the chain of command translated into the AFP taking its muzzle off of the Guinoyuran CAFGU in the hopes of it scoring another "victory."
The 26IB's Cadre in Guinoyuran was Seargant Catalino Gabison who delegated most responsibilities to the infamous CAFGU member Romeo Abesta. Abesta himself ended up serving 3 years of a 6 year sentence when his wanton murder and destruction exceeded even the AFP's extremely liberal allowances. On February 3rd, 1989, Abesta walked up to Sabeniano Borres, an NPA supporter (at the very least) from Valencia's Barangay Cawasan as the farmer stood in front of his barangay's public market. Borres had been repeatedly warned about his organising in the name of a Catholic organisation enmeshed in Liberation Theology. Without getting into a Shandyesque digression, Liberation Theology is a brand of Catholicism that arose out of 1960s Latin America and espoused Marxist-based social organising within the context of Catholicism. While the words "Marxist" and "Catholic" MAY seem mutually exclusive to some, Liberal Theologians viewed the Church as a vehicle for social change and though most theologians and adherants don't condone violence, the tiny leap from Marxist-based organising into armed "defence" wasn't that great a chasm.
Sabeniano Borres' death was merely one of several personally commited by Romeo Abesta. Offering a mere three examples that are irrefutably tied to Abesta:
1) On March 28th, 1987, Abesta, along with fellow CAFGU members, shot Martin Cabusas and Warlito Paraiso to death in front of their families and then hacked the corpses with bolos (machetes). Abesta and others then committed canibalism by consuming strips of their victims' thighs.
2) On December 30th, 1988, Abesta and friends opened fire on George Bahian and Francisco Tadiamon. Although Mr.Bahian was instantly killed Mr.Tadiamon survived, albeit with extremely critical wounds.
3) 10 months later, on November 22nd, 1990, Abesta et al shot Mr.Tadiamon's wife Juliana Tadiamon to death, her only crime having been her marriage to Francisco Tadiamon.
Three examples of other killings undertaken by other CAFGU memberss in that same detachment:
1) On December 7th, 1988, Felipe Camarillo was shot to death
2) On October 15th, 1990, a farmer from the last bastion of NPA control within the two barangays, Sitio Magsa in Barangay Guinoyoran was murdered in broad daylight. On the day in question CAFGU member Jody Gamayon and a second man only known by the eponym "Lito" carried out the killings.
3) On July 13th, 1991, Nasario Burlas shot to death by Romeo Abesta's cousin, Boyet Abesta.
On October 14th, 1991, Father Neri and a female assistant attended Barangay Guinoyuran's patron saint fiesta where Neri offered mass and hob knobbed amongst his parishoners. At a bit past 2PM Father Neri and his assistant remounted his trusted motorcycle to begin the long and arduous trip back to Valencia proper. Travelling at a high rate of speed Nari probably had no time to even process the situation as three men walked out of the jungle ahead of him, each carrying M16s. Raising their rifles they took aim and opened fire. Of fifteen rounds fired, seven met their mark, badly wounding the priest. His assistant, Jacqueline Lunzaga took a single round to the leg. The three gunmen, one of whom was unmasked quickly made their way over to the fallen priest and his assistant. Taking his M16 the unmasked attacker then began beating the priest in the head with it. On the third blow the rifle's stock broke into pieces due to the force with which it was wielded. Having killed the priest the attackers left Jacqueline writhing on the ground in pain as they made their escape through the underbrush.
The killing ended up galvanising a nation who had heretofore pointedly ignored the country's second largest island. Instead of giving into threats of violence Bishop Rosales then deputised 41 more clergymen as Forest Guards. After two CAFGU members:
1) Guillermo G.Ipanag
2) Carlito Baraquil
confessed their roles in planning the attack to Bishop Rosales, the cleric promptly notified local authorities. As a result, the Bukidnon PPO, or Provincial Police Office then promptly filed charges on October 30th, 1991 against four individuals:
1) Seargant Catalino Gabison, Cadre of the Guinoyoran CAFGU garrison
2) Datu Bantu Domia, Higaon+n shaman, spiritual leader of the Guinoyoran CAFGU garrison
3) Crispin Onor, CAFGU member
4) Allan Cesar Abesta, CAFGU member
The AFP responded by charging the two complaintants as the actual murderers and refused to even interrogate the four men charged by the Bukidnon PPO. The result was oh so typical of the Philippine justice system. Seargant Gabison was restricted to base after a quick transfer but other than that there were no consequences to anyone involved. Indeed, noone has ever been prosecuted for the heinous attack.
Father Neri was born and raised in the municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte Province until, shortly after beginning highschool he and his family moved to the adjacent province of Bukidnon. Born to a peasant family Neri struggled with funding for his education and yet still managed to always keep one eye on the prize. Finally, at age 28, after much perseverance he was able to graduate from a Catholic seminary in Davao City. Assigned to the Diocese of Bukidnon, its Bishop, Gaudencio Rosales, assigned the ambitious young man to the Parish of Guinoyuran. Located nearly 12 kilometers to the northeast of Valencia proper Father Neri would climb aboard his treasured Honda 250 for the long trip to and from the barangay. Like most rural Philippine parishes Guinoyuran was devoid of a rectory and having grown up in a one room "nipa," as the bamboo and palm leaf thatch huts are known, Neri was in no rush to return to that hardscrabble existence and so he serviced his parish travelling to and fro from his room in a large rectory overlooking Valencia's jeepney terminal.
The Bukidnon Province of 1989, the year Neri graduated and arrived in Valencia, wasn't too far removed from the Bukidnon of today in that the same all pervasive corruption, mind numbing poverty, gratuitous violence, and plain old thuggery was over-abundant. In the mid-1980s peasants living in Bukidnon's municipality of San Fernando had with Church support engaged in a very vocal anti-logging campaign. With the Catholic Church then assuming the lead in this and several other environmentally sensitive causes the initiative took on a cachet of its own as rich and poor alike jumped on the ecological bandwagon. It wasn't long before the national media began to take notice and by December of 1986, after staging a hunger strike and a noisy street demonstration in Manila, the DENR, or Department of the Environment and Natural Resources began actually enforcing its own statutes and dedicated laws. Indeed, public sentiment was so strong that by the Summer of 1988 the DENR issued a moratorium on all logging in the province.
Not long after Father Neri arrived in Valencia (which hadn't become a city yet), the Diocese of Bukidnon's Bishop Gaudencio Rosales named the priest as one of five diocesan priests who were to be deputised by the DENR as "Forest Guards," Filipino-speak for "forest rangers," in September of 1990. It was in this capacity that Father Neri soon began stepping on some very important toes, neigh, even stomping on them. By the Summer of 1991, a mere 9 months after his deputisation, Father Neri had managed to confiscate nearly 7,000 board feet of valuable lumber.
Like most organised crime on Mindanao, illegal small scale logging, or "tablon-tablon," was deeply tied to the local power structure, especially the AFP and PNP, or the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police. Although a full moratorium on logging had been in place for nearly three years, Valencia itself had at least three sawmills operating full time, fed by the tablon-tablon trade. Both the sawmill operators as well as the loggers themselves paid steep bribes to the AFP/PNP in order to continue doing business.
At the same time the NPA Insurgency had recently peaked with an estimated 25,000 regulars in the nation's hills. The AFP has always used force multipliers to boost manpower and operational AOR ("Area of Responsibility," as in Area of Operation). The main force multiplier was the then-recently created CAFGU, or Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (today the acronym is defined as "Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit"). The CAFGU were and are trained as static armed reserves. Trained, armed, paid, and supervised by the AFP, CAFGU soldiers were and are geographically dedicated forces, manned by residents of a given municipality and allowed only to operate within the borders of that same municipality. The stipend given to CAAs, or Civilian Active Auxiliaries, as CAFGU soldiers are known, was and continues to be paltry at best so that CAFGU members are incredibly ill equipped and extremly underpaid. As a result certain supervisory officers, or AFP CAFGU Cadres, tend to look the other way when their subordinates engage in illegal profit-making enterprises.
Naturally, one of the foremost ways in which CAAs engage in such endevours is through tablon-tablon, whether as a logger, driver, wholesaler, sawmill operator, or middle man. Almost always the AFP cadre is taking his healthy cut as well. In terms of Barangay Guinoyuran, it and the adjacent Barangay Lourdes fell under the 26IB (Infantry Battalion). The 26IB's CO, or Commanding Officer had formed a profitable relationship with a local shaman of the Higaon-on Tribe, Datu Bantu Domia, who had developed a rabidly loyal following in that immediate area. Bantu, a highly charismatic leader condoned the wholesale rape of his tribe's traditional lands by both logging and mining. He viewed the AFP as only the lesser of two evils as opposed to actually being ideologically invested in either the Government in Manila, which even today ignores the Lumad, Igorot, and Tingguian Peoples, and the NPA who pay too much attention while providing nothing in the way of goods or services. If and when the NPA ever assumed power the Higaon-on would fare no better than they had under the faux Liberal Democracy imposed upon them by the Government.
By the time Father Neri arrived in Barangay Guinoyuran Datu Bantu's followers had assumed control of the local tablon-taboln trade feeding Valencia's aforementioned illegal sawmills. The silent majority in the two adjoining barangays were outgunned to the point that even the NPA couldn't assert itself. A modern parallel might be the municipality of San Francisco, popularly known as San Franz, in Agusan del Sur Province. Whatever NPA activity takes place within that town's borders is of a non-violent nature and highly secretive with the NPA being no match for the right wing paramilitaries supported by the government as well as by the highly sophisticated organised crime that pervades the town. One sees the NPA with its parallel governments in the Agusan del Sur municipalities of Trento, Bayugan, Prosperidad, and Lianga over the border in Surigao del Sur Province, all encompassing San Franz, but within San Franz itself the NPA doesn't dare rear its ugly head.
San Franz is the domain of two powerful clans, one of which is the Lademoras whose patriarch Carlos is the infamous Philippine Constabulary officer who ran the Ilaga during its anti-NPA phase, as well as being the man single handedly responsible for the extermination of an entire sitio on Samar in the Visayas Region, and of course for running rampant over the then-NPA controlled San Franz as he carved out the massive Guthrie Palm Oil Plantation in the late 1980s. Only when a commander is as ruthless as Carlos Lademora, or Luzon's Palparan, does one see the NPA pull back into the shadows. A lamentable reality and yet reality never the less. The 26IB was merely one of many IBs and brigades who held that same "all or nothing" view and sponsored questionable paramilitaries so as to obtain plausible deniability should things get ugly as they indeed did in Barangay Guinoyuran. The Guinoyuran CAFGU detachment earned its carte blance by killing an entire NPA Team. "Teams," the lowest rung in the NPA command structure, usually consisted of less than 10 guerillas.
Obstensibly to amicably solve the tension in Guinoyuran's Sitio Magsa, the last NPA baliwick in that barangay, Datu Bantu invited the NPA to attend a forum, Filipino speak for a mediation dialogue, as long as the guerillas entered the barangay unarmed. Guaranteeing their safety under a flag of truce Bantu finally convinced the reluctant NPA to attend. Upon entering the barangay all six guerillas were executed at point blank range. Of course it was the 26IB who received the commendations and praise, although the AFP handed Datu Bantu P100,000 ($2,500 at the time) as a "bounty." The praise received by the 26IB from the chain of command translated into the AFP taking its muzzle off of the Guinoyuran CAFGU in the hopes of it scoring another "victory."
The 26IB's Cadre in Guinoyuran was Seargant Catalino Gabison who delegated most responsibilities to the infamous CAFGU member Romeo Abesta. Abesta himself ended up serving 3 years of a 6 year sentence when his wanton murder and destruction exceeded even the AFP's extremely liberal allowances. On February 3rd, 1989, Abesta walked up to Sabeniano Borres, an NPA supporter (at the very least) from Valencia's Barangay Cawasan as the farmer stood in front of his barangay's public market. Borres had been repeatedly warned about his organising in the name of a Catholic organisation enmeshed in Liberation Theology. Without getting into a Shandyesque digression, Liberation Theology is a brand of Catholicism that arose out of 1960s Latin America and espoused Marxist-based social organising within the context of Catholicism. While the words "Marxist" and "Catholic" MAY seem mutually exclusive to some, Liberal Theologians viewed the Church as a vehicle for social change and though most theologians and adherants don't condone violence, the tiny leap from Marxist-based organising into armed "defence" wasn't that great a chasm.
Sabeniano Borres' death was merely one of several personally commited by Romeo Abesta. Offering a mere three examples that are irrefutably tied to Abesta:
1) On March 28th, 1987, Abesta, along with fellow CAFGU members, shot Martin Cabusas and Warlito Paraiso to death in front of their families and then hacked the corpses with bolos (machetes). Abesta and others then committed canibalism by consuming strips of their victims' thighs.
2) On December 30th, 1988, Abesta and friends opened fire on George Bahian and Francisco Tadiamon. Although Mr.Bahian was instantly killed Mr.Tadiamon survived, albeit with extremely critical wounds.
3) 10 months later, on November 22nd, 1990, Abesta et al shot Mr.Tadiamon's wife Juliana Tadiamon to death, her only crime having been her marriage to Francisco Tadiamon.
Three examples of other killings undertaken by other CAFGU memberss in that same detachment:
1) On December 7th, 1988, Felipe Camarillo was shot to death
2) On October 15th, 1990, a farmer from the last bastion of NPA control within the two barangays, Sitio Magsa in Barangay Guinoyoran was murdered in broad daylight. On the day in question CAFGU member Jody Gamayon and a second man only known by the eponym "Lito" carried out the killings.
3) On July 13th, 1991, Nasario Burlas shot to death by Romeo Abesta's cousin, Boyet Abesta.
On October 14th, 1991, Father Neri and a female assistant attended Barangay Guinoyuran's patron saint fiesta where Neri offered mass and hob knobbed amongst his parishoners. At a bit past 2PM Father Neri and his assistant remounted his trusted motorcycle to begin the long and arduous trip back to Valencia proper. Travelling at a high rate of speed Nari probably had no time to even process the situation as three men walked out of the jungle ahead of him, each carrying M16s. Raising their rifles they took aim and opened fire. Of fifteen rounds fired, seven met their mark, badly wounding the priest. His assistant, Jacqueline Lunzaga took a single round to the leg. The three gunmen, one of whom was unmasked quickly made their way over to the fallen priest and his assistant. Taking his M16 the unmasked attacker then began beating the priest in the head with it. On the third blow the rifle's stock broke into pieces due to the force with which it was wielded. Having killed the priest the attackers left Jacqueline writhing on the ground in pain as they made their escape through the underbrush.
The killing ended up galvanising a nation who had heretofore pointedly ignored the country's second largest island. Instead of giving into threats of violence Bishop Rosales then deputised 41 more clergymen as Forest Guards. After two CAFGU members:
1) Guillermo G.Ipanag
2) Carlito Baraquil
confessed their roles in planning the attack to Bishop Rosales, the cleric promptly notified local authorities. As a result, the Bukidnon PPO, or Provincial Police Office then promptly filed charges on October 30th, 1991 against four individuals:
1) Seargant Catalino Gabison, Cadre of the Guinoyoran CAFGU garrison
2) Datu Bantu Domia, Higaon+n shaman, spiritual leader of the Guinoyoran CAFGU garrison
3) Crispin Onor, CAFGU member
4) Allan Cesar Abesta, CAFGU member
The AFP responded by charging the two complaintants as the actual murderers and refused to even interrogate the four men charged by the Bukidnon PPO. The result was oh so typical of the Philippine justice system. Seargant Gabison was restricted to base after a quick transfer but other than that there were no consequences to anyone involved. Indeed, noone has ever been prosecuted for the heinous attack.
Friday, May 6, 2011
NPA Armed Contacts,Second Quarter of 2011,Part I:2 PNP Stations Attacked,1 Captured
As I have noted time and again, the NPA on Mindanao is very well known for wearing PNP (Philippine National Police) or AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) uniforms to infiltrate official security installations. Municipal PNP stations are a favourite target for this type of subterfuge. After that Panabo City attack in Davao del Norte Province on March 19th this year in which 1 PNP officer and 1 Police Auxiliary were killed by NPA guerillas in military uniforms, PNP Director General Raul Bacalzo issued a stern and very explicit memorandum to all PNP installations warning all personnel to be absolutely alert and maintain a defencive stance at all times. Some of the nation's PNP officers have comprehended the message, others obviously have not.
On Thursday, April 28, 2011 in Lianga, Surigao del Sur Province most of the staion's personnel were fast asleep but 1 man was busy with his daily routine. 25 year old Rodel Aquilam is the station mascot. Though he doesn't get paid the young man cleans, cooks and runs errands for the officers in the station. In return Rodel is allowed to live there but more than that, his "job" has given him a sense of purpose and has made his life seem more meaningful. Often, after serving meals he cleans and washes dishes all by himself. If dinner is served late Rodel will often leave the dishes until the early morning hours when he awakens to prepare breakfast.
So it was that on that day, at 430AM Rodel was at the sink in the rear of the police station, tired but watching out the window when something caught his eye. At first he wasn't sure that he had really seen something but even as these thoughts were forming the shapes came closer and Rodel couldn't help but recognise the rifles. Immediately dropping to his knees Rodel crawled to the station's sleeping quarters and very quietly woke the duty officer. The officer in turn woke the others and just as the first officers were grabbing their M16s guerillas from the NPA's Front 19-A burst through the station entrance and announced their presence.
In what is now a routine the guerilla in charge announced that nobody would be hurt as long as all present complied. All they wanted the man said, were the station's weapons. Before the guerilla could finish his sentence a PNP officer fired his M16 hitting the wall near the lead guerilla. Quickly the NPA left the station foyer and took positions throughout the City Government compound. The 15 PNP, and 2 AFP soldiers, from 29IB (Infantry Battalion) augmenting the station not only held their own, they managed to effectively pin the guerillas down outside in the large compound. Twice guerillas tried infiltrating the Municipal Hall located in that same compound but were repelled under the heavy fire emanating from the PNP station.
Meanwhile, having been notified of the attack the 29IB deployed and implemented 2 Blocking Force positions along the only two avenues of escape, allowing the PNP's 13th Regional Public Safety Management Battalion (aka "RPSM" which recently replaced the PNP's "PMG," or "Police Mobile Group" structure) to reinforce the outmanned station personnel. Hearing of the deployments on a captured ICOM the NPA knew that its own Blocking Force would only add, at most, 15 minutes to their Safe Exit Time. Radioing to that Blocking Force the lead guerilla confirmed that they had set capable barricades along National Hiway, consisting of huge bonfires constructed out of tyres doused in kerosene. While that stopped any AFP from making it into the town proper, the PNP's 13th PSMG Battalion was rapidly approaching from the opposite direction and so it was time to withdraw. At 645AM, leaving the compound the guerillas rushed to their escape vehicles. As the assailants were scrambling NPA guerilla Eunilio "Ka Dindo" Pison took a shot to the back of the head. The resident of Barangay Pong-on in the municipality of San Agustin in Agusan del Sur Province was critically injured and was left where he fell along with a second guerilla who had been killed. Their loyal comrades drove off at a rapid pace, tyres screeching.
It needs to be mentioned that Pison was being billed by the Government, AFP and PNP as the "Vice Commander" of Front 19-A. In reality the man is an Assistant Team Leader. Within the NPA "Teams" are equivalent to conventional "squads." In other words, he helped command a group of 7 to 10 guerillas. As usual AFP propaganda falls way short of the watermark.
As the NPA's Tactical Element was driving away from the compound their Blocking Force on National Hiway, in the town's Barangay Ganayon got spooked and took a shot at a passing Hyundai Starex van. Unfortunately its driver, 35 year old Herminia Lozada was a civilian and what is even more unfortunate is that one of the bullets fired at her van ended up wounding her in the left foot. As unfortunate as that really is, her three young children who were also in that van are all unscathed, at least physically.
That Saturday, April 30th, DILG (Department of the Interior and Local Government, the entity which oversees the PNP) Secretary Jesse Robredo joined PNP National Director Raul Bacalzo in a personal visit to the station. There the 15 PNP who defended the station were each given the "Medalya ng Katapangan" (Medal for Bravery), cash awards and on the spot promotions to the next incremental rank. The 15 awardees:
1) Deputy Chief, SPO3 Dante Basada Obenza
2) PO3 Armand Baniagaso Juarbal
3) PO3 Antonieto Pesical Sarsale
4) PO2 Simporiano Camino Quevedo
5) PO2 Ronald Jarina de Castro
6) PO2 Roy Cano Sabellano
7) PO2 Ariel Osorio Aribal
8) PO1 Vergil Gomez Curada
9) PO1 Susano Egypto Vitanzos
10) SPO1 Ruben Pedrozo Gomez
11) SPO1 Cerelino Alicante Pedrozo
12) SPO1 Virgilio Jusayan Orbeta
13) SPO2 Florencio Pineda Hernandez
14) SPO3 Moreto Edera Gemao
15) (No Rank Available) Rogelio Tejero Balason
In a very nice touch, Rodel Aquilam, the station mascot was also given a medal and cash award. Secretary Robredo is recommending that the AFP consider rewarding the two soldiers from the 29IB:
1) Corporal Alnasur A.Samsuri
2) PFC. Melfer B.Yabo
The Government was especially pleased because this was the second NPA attack thwarted in that municipality within the last 6 months. In fact it was that same NPA element, Front 19-A that was repelled in that other attack as well. On October 2,2010 in Purok #5, Barangay San Isidro, that barangay's CAFGU (Civilian Auxiliary Geographical Force Unit, a Force Multiplication element manned by residents of a given barangay and its operations relegated to that same barangay, commanded by an AFP Non Comissioned Officer from a cadre battalion) post fended off a large NPA assault. Under the direction of its cadre, Cpl.Singson of 23IB's D Company, the CAFGU soldiers caused the guerillas to withdraw at the 15 minute mark.
The happiness Secretary Robredo and Director General Bacalzo felt surely dissipated on Tuesday, May 3rd. At 430PM that day a man in an AFP uniform entered the Municipal PNP Station in the town of Malitbog, in Bukidnon Province and said he wanted to file a criminal complaint. The station, in Purok #2, Barangay Poblacion was manned by 6 officers. The desk officer went to get the complaint form and as he did so 19 NPA guerillas rushed into the station, weapons drawn. At this point the AFP "soldier" revealed that he too was an NPA guerilla and ordered the desk officer to handcuff 3 of the 5 other police officers.
The guerillas, from Front 4-B, warned the officers to comply, they only wanted the weapons. All 6 surrendered. The NPA then removed their side arms as well as the station's complement of weaponry. Capturing eight M16s, three 9MM pistols, one 45 caliber pistol, one 38 caliber revolver and one 22 caliber pistol along with the station's ICOM (2 way radio with military and PNP frequencies), walkie-talkies, two computer towers, one computer monitor and spare uniforms before departing with the three handcuffed police officers as prisoners the NPA was in and out in less than 10 minutes without a single shot having been fired. Led by Lino "Ka Dahon" Namatidong the withdrawing force jogged 200 meters to a waiting Toyota Lite Ace and an orange panel truck that they had left idling in adjacent Barangay Kalingking's Sitio Manga, they uncuffed and released the prisoners before speeding off towards Barangay Mindagat. Passing from Barangay Mindagat to Barangay Kiabo and then crossing the provincial border into the municipality of Claveria in Misamis Oriental Province the guerillas were able to make a clean get away.
Ironically, back in October of 2010 I had posted in my entry entitled, "NPA Armed Engagements, Last Quarter of 2010: NPA Merry Go Round" that a Brigade Commander in 4ID (Infantry Division), Colonel Romeo Gapuz had bragged about eliminating Front 4-B. He said the Front was dead and buried. I noted then that these were "famous last words." In Col.Gapuz's defence he had barely had 60 days in the 4ID and just come out of a desk job though the attitude he expressed is all to often par for the course throughout the Philippine Military. He had made that ignorant comment at a Turn Over Ceremony at the Misamis Oriental Provincial Capitol, where 4ID turned over Local Security oversight to the provincial government. This takes place whenever a province is declared "pacified." On Mindanao only 4 provinces are pacified, well 3 depending upon the day you examine the situation since the Dinagat Islands keep flip-flopping their status thanks to a fickle Supreme Court (yet another subject I plan to post about).
The 3 other Pacified Provinces on Mindanao:
1) Surigao del Norte (Dinagat was cleaved off of this province and may belong to it again if current Supreme Court petitions are considered kindly)
2) Misamis Oriental (as I mentioned)
3) Camiguin (another Island Province, this one cleaved off of Misamis Oriental Province)
When a province has been declared "pacified" it doesn't mean that the insurgency is extinct there, only that the local government unit is able to deal with it on its own.
On Thursday, April 28, 2011 in Lianga, Surigao del Sur Province most of the staion's personnel were fast asleep but 1 man was busy with his daily routine. 25 year old Rodel Aquilam is the station mascot. Though he doesn't get paid the young man cleans, cooks and runs errands for the officers in the station. In return Rodel is allowed to live there but more than that, his "job" has given him a sense of purpose and has made his life seem more meaningful. Often, after serving meals he cleans and washes dishes all by himself. If dinner is served late Rodel will often leave the dishes until the early morning hours when he awakens to prepare breakfast.
So it was that on that day, at 430AM Rodel was at the sink in the rear of the police station, tired but watching out the window when something caught his eye. At first he wasn't sure that he had really seen something but even as these thoughts were forming the shapes came closer and Rodel couldn't help but recognise the rifles. Immediately dropping to his knees Rodel crawled to the station's sleeping quarters and very quietly woke the duty officer. The officer in turn woke the others and just as the first officers were grabbing their M16s guerillas from the NPA's Front 19-A burst through the station entrance and announced their presence.
In what is now a routine the guerilla in charge announced that nobody would be hurt as long as all present complied. All they wanted the man said, were the station's weapons. Before the guerilla could finish his sentence a PNP officer fired his M16 hitting the wall near the lead guerilla. Quickly the NPA left the station foyer and took positions throughout the City Government compound. The 15 PNP, and 2 AFP soldiers, from 29IB (Infantry Battalion) augmenting the station not only held their own, they managed to effectively pin the guerillas down outside in the large compound. Twice guerillas tried infiltrating the Municipal Hall located in that same compound but were repelled under the heavy fire emanating from the PNP station.
Meanwhile, having been notified of the attack the 29IB deployed and implemented 2 Blocking Force positions along the only two avenues of escape, allowing the PNP's 13th Regional Public Safety Management Battalion (aka "RPSM" which recently replaced the PNP's "PMG," or "Police Mobile Group" structure) to reinforce the outmanned station personnel. Hearing of the deployments on a captured ICOM the NPA knew that its own Blocking Force would only add, at most, 15 minutes to their Safe Exit Time. Radioing to that Blocking Force the lead guerilla confirmed that they had set capable barricades along National Hiway, consisting of huge bonfires constructed out of tyres doused in kerosene. While that stopped any AFP from making it into the town proper, the PNP's 13th PSMG Battalion was rapidly approaching from the opposite direction and so it was time to withdraw. At 645AM, leaving the compound the guerillas rushed to their escape vehicles. As the assailants were scrambling NPA guerilla Eunilio "Ka Dindo" Pison took a shot to the back of the head. The resident of Barangay Pong-on in the municipality of San Agustin in Agusan del Sur Province was critically injured and was left where he fell along with a second guerilla who had been killed. Their loyal comrades drove off at a rapid pace, tyres screeching.
It needs to be mentioned that Pison was being billed by the Government, AFP and PNP as the "Vice Commander" of Front 19-A. In reality the man is an Assistant Team Leader. Within the NPA "Teams" are equivalent to conventional "squads." In other words, he helped command a group of 7 to 10 guerillas. As usual AFP propaganda falls way short of the watermark.
As the NPA's Tactical Element was driving away from the compound their Blocking Force on National Hiway, in the town's Barangay Ganayon got spooked and took a shot at a passing Hyundai Starex van. Unfortunately its driver, 35 year old Herminia Lozada was a civilian and what is even more unfortunate is that one of the bullets fired at her van ended up wounding her in the left foot. As unfortunate as that really is, her three young children who were also in that van are all unscathed, at least physically.
That Saturday, April 30th, DILG (Department of the Interior and Local Government, the entity which oversees the PNP) Secretary Jesse Robredo joined PNP National Director Raul Bacalzo in a personal visit to the station. There the 15 PNP who defended the station were each given the "Medalya ng Katapangan" (Medal for Bravery), cash awards and on the spot promotions to the next incremental rank. The 15 awardees:
1) Deputy Chief, SPO3 Dante Basada Obenza
2) PO3 Armand Baniagaso Juarbal
3) PO3 Antonieto Pesical Sarsale
4) PO2 Simporiano Camino Quevedo
5) PO2 Ronald Jarina de Castro
6) PO2 Roy Cano Sabellano
7) PO2 Ariel Osorio Aribal
8) PO1 Vergil Gomez Curada
9) PO1 Susano Egypto Vitanzos
10) SPO1 Ruben Pedrozo Gomez
11) SPO1 Cerelino Alicante Pedrozo
12) SPO1 Virgilio Jusayan Orbeta
13) SPO2 Florencio Pineda Hernandez
14) SPO3 Moreto Edera Gemao
15) (No Rank Available) Rogelio Tejero Balason
In a very nice touch, Rodel Aquilam, the station mascot was also given a medal and cash award. Secretary Robredo is recommending that the AFP consider rewarding the two soldiers from the 29IB:
1) Corporal Alnasur A.Samsuri
2) PFC. Melfer B.Yabo
The Government was especially pleased because this was the second NPA attack thwarted in that municipality within the last 6 months. In fact it was that same NPA element, Front 19-A that was repelled in that other attack as well. On October 2,2010 in Purok #5, Barangay San Isidro, that barangay's CAFGU (Civilian Auxiliary Geographical Force Unit, a Force Multiplication element manned by residents of a given barangay and its operations relegated to that same barangay, commanded by an AFP Non Comissioned Officer from a cadre battalion) post fended off a large NPA assault. Under the direction of its cadre, Cpl.Singson of 23IB's D Company, the CAFGU soldiers caused the guerillas to withdraw at the 15 minute mark.
The happiness Secretary Robredo and Director General Bacalzo felt surely dissipated on Tuesday, May 3rd. At 430PM that day a man in an AFP uniform entered the Municipal PNP Station in the town of Malitbog, in Bukidnon Province and said he wanted to file a criminal complaint. The station, in Purok #2, Barangay Poblacion was manned by 6 officers. The desk officer went to get the complaint form and as he did so 19 NPA guerillas rushed into the station, weapons drawn. At this point the AFP "soldier" revealed that he too was an NPA guerilla and ordered the desk officer to handcuff 3 of the 5 other police officers.
The guerillas, from Front 4-B, warned the officers to comply, they only wanted the weapons. All 6 surrendered. The NPA then removed their side arms as well as the station's complement of weaponry. Capturing eight M16s, three 9MM pistols, one 45 caliber pistol, one 38 caliber revolver and one 22 caliber pistol along with the station's ICOM (2 way radio with military and PNP frequencies), walkie-talkies, two computer towers, one computer monitor and spare uniforms before departing with the three handcuffed police officers as prisoners the NPA was in and out in less than 10 minutes without a single shot having been fired. Led by Lino "Ka Dahon" Namatidong the withdrawing force jogged 200 meters to a waiting Toyota Lite Ace and an orange panel truck that they had left idling in adjacent Barangay Kalingking's Sitio Manga, they uncuffed and released the prisoners before speeding off towards Barangay Mindagat. Passing from Barangay Mindagat to Barangay Kiabo and then crossing the provincial border into the municipality of Claveria in Misamis Oriental Province the guerillas were able to make a clean get away.
Ironically, back in October of 2010 I had posted in my entry entitled, "NPA Armed Engagements, Last Quarter of 2010: NPA Merry Go Round" that a Brigade Commander in 4ID (Infantry Division), Colonel Romeo Gapuz had bragged about eliminating Front 4-B. He said the Front was dead and buried. I noted then that these were "famous last words." In Col.Gapuz's defence he had barely had 60 days in the 4ID and just come out of a desk job though the attitude he expressed is all to often par for the course throughout the Philippine Military. He had made that ignorant comment at a Turn Over Ceremony at the Misamis Oriental Provincial Capitol, where 4ID turned over Local Security oversight to the provincial government. This takes place whenever a province is declared "pacified." On Mindanao only 4 provinces are pacified, well 3 depending upon the day you examine the situation since the Dinagat Islands keep flip-flopping their status thanks to a fickle Supreme Court (yet another subject I plan to post about).
The 3 other Pacified Provinces on Mindanao:
1) Surigao del Norte (Dinagat was cleaved off of this province and may belong to it again if current Supreme Court petitions are considered kindly)
2) Misamis Oriental (as I mentioned)
3) Camiguin (another Island Province, this one cleaved off of Misamis Oriental Province)
When a province has been declared "pacified" it doesn't mean that the insurgency is extinct there, only that the local government unit is able to deal with it on its own.
Thursday, May 5, 2011
Development Aggression,Second Quarter of 2011,Part III:Landslide in Pantukan Kills 23
This past summer,2010,the nation suffered severe drought which has been attributed to the weather phenomenon"El Nino."As in all"Nino"years,his sister La Nina follows quickly and comes barreling in with an early and exaggerated Northeast Monsoon.Coming before its time,this extra-heavy Monsoon replaces the normally dry,crisp air of winter ("crisp"being a relative term in the tropics) and instead we are subjected to an extra hot,humid and rainy spring.With the heavy logging that takes place on Mindanao landslides are an annual occurrence that are only aggravated by the extra-heavy rains.Since the logging gets worse each year so do the landslides become more frequent.
Quite often these disasters take place in so called"Small Scale Mining"sites.Though most Small Scale Mining is legal,there is absolutely no oversight what so ever.The prospective miner pays a fee to his LGU (Local Govt.Unit,i.e.municipality and province).From that point there is no mandatory oversight though very,very rarely one finds a municipality that gets such miners to voluntarily enter into oversight agreements that guarantee periodic inspections and other supervisory oversight modalities.Still,even in those rare areas the miners denude the hills.If they aren't using the illegaly harvested timber for squatter homes or shoring up their haphazard tunnels and giant sluice rigs then they are selling the wood as quick as they can cut it down.
This Good Friday,April 22,2011 in the municipality of Pantukan in ComVal (Compostela Valley Province) miners were in their tunnels earlier than usual.Despite nominal adherance to Catholicism most miners retain indigenous beliefs.So it was that at 3AM that morning the illegaly dug tunnels were filled with small scale miners making offerings to the deity of the underworld,the patron of local miners.The ceremony,"Padugo"involves animal sacrifice,usually a chicken but sometimes a piglet whose blood is drained into the soil of the main shaft in front of an altar containing ceremonial plants and a saint statue.Without a doubt these miners were praying for protection from mishap in addition to pleading for good fortune.How ironic then that as they kneeled in their tunnels doing that at 230AM,1,200 cubic meters of mud cleaved off the hilltop above them and buried them.
The mining site lies in Sitio Panganason B,in the remote barangay of Kingking.Laying upcountry,13km as the crow flies from the centre of Pantukan proper,Barangay Poblacion,there are only rudimentary foot trails spanning several steep hills and crossing rapidly flowing creeks and rivlets.Even in dry season travel is relegated to off road motorcycles or more often,trekking in and out on foot.More over,the ubiqitous cell phones that seem to be attached at the hip of so many Filipinos are of no use that far out in the bush.If the mountains do no effect the signal inclement weather always will.It wasn't until 830AM that a breathless messenger ran into the municipal hall out of breath that the wider world had finally learned of the tragedy.
Mayor Celso V.Sarenas sprang into action being a veteran by now,of similar natural disasters since Small Scale Mining has been rampant in his municipality for more than 2 decades now.Indeed,in 2009 a landslide had befallen the immediately adjoining barangay of Napnapan killing at least 26 people.Mayor Sarenas immediately called the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) 1001st Brigade Headquarters in the nearby town of Maco as he began the official notifications and seeking military assistance.Afterwards the mayor followed Standard Operating Procedure,that favourite phrase uttered by technocrats and called the base camps of 3 mining tenement base camps.Only 1,the American-based multi national Russell Mining was able to offer heavy equipment.Located about 4km to the south of the effected area,Mayor Sarenas finally got the camp super on the line and asked him to donate any manpower and equipment he might be able to offer.More over he asked the super to call the base camp of Nationwide Development Corporation (NADECOR)/Saint Agustine,the other American-based outfit in the sector and ask for the same from them.The Russell camp superintendent offered his Catepillar D9,a bulldozer with a 4.2 meter wide blade but couldn't provide much in the way of manpower since the Easter Weekend was upon them.He did promise to call NADECOR/St.Agustine and then send the bulldozer over straight away.Back in the municipal hall the mayor was able to locate a phone number for the 3rd multi-national mining company,APEX and called and made the same request.APEX sent its Chief Engineer and a full crew of labourers.
Meanwhile,the 1001st Bde (Brigade) had called its Regional Command,EASMINCOM (Eastern Mindanao Command) headquartered in Davao City and made them aware of the situation.Immediately EASMINCOM scrambled a rescue helicopter from the PAF (Philippine Air Force) 505th Air Rescue Wing and so the rescue effort began.
By noon Russell Mining and the AFP's 71IB (Infantry Battalion),72IB and CAFGU (Citizens Auxiliary Forces Geographical Unit,a Force Multiplication entity composed of local residents who are armed,trained and directly supervised by AFP cadres) were digging by hand.Unlike more industrialised nations there aren't any sound detection or heat seeking equipment to help locate victims,alive OR dead.There aren't even any blueprints or even the most rudimentary of maps.In fact,for the first 3 days Mayor Sarenas had everyone operating on the assumption that there were 30 homes in the sitio.Indeed there were 112.Though,in the mayor's defence,a squatter community by its very nature exists off the grid.Its residents do not file deeds,let alone information about their home or family.The barangay's remote location relegated it to an unknown quantity.In fact,the mayor had warned the community to vacate the sitio in 2010 but had been ignored.In fact,when that 2009 landslide took place in Barangay Napnapan's Sitio Boringot,a non-fatal one had happened just hours later in Sitio Panganason-B,the very same site I am discussing.
As surviving miners offered later that day,with gold paying 2,000 Pesos per gram ($38) people will keep digging,safety be damned.One miner had been trying sleep off a late evening drinking bout when the bunkhouse he was sleeping in jumped off the ground and began quickly moving towards a nearby ravine.Having made his way out its doorway (luckily the crude strycture had no door or the man might now be with his friends buried under at least 6 meters of mud) and began swiming on the top of the quickly moving mass.By the time it stopped at the far end of the valley floor he was chest deep and certainly would have suffocated if others hadn't lassoed him and pulled him out by motorcycle.Still,he said that while he's still not sure about his own future in mining he is fatalistic.Now having survived 3 fatal mudslides and only 26 years old,he feels that when one's rime is up,its up.Destiny is what it is,especially in a country where children must grow up eating roadkill,when lucky.
Shortly after the messenger had made his way into the municipal hall,the first corpse was discovered and pulled free.15 year old John Ric"JunJun"Torrejos lived in Barangay Buan in Tagum City in the next province,Davao del Norte but was already a veteran miner working with his father and 12 year old brother in the family's tunnel mine and dmall ball mill operation.Both his younger brother and father would soon be found dead as well.Just after JunJun's battered corpse was identified by a distraught aunt who lived in the squatter camp below the hill the bulldozer arrived.After its arrival people began arriving in small groups,having hiked in from town.
The PAF Search and Rescue helicopter from the 505th swooped low not long after but the site's sharp ridgelines and unstable footing prevented an immediate landing.It would be much later in the day before the pilots were told the co+ordinates for Panganason Elementary School whose adjoining field had served as a helipad in the 2009 landslide.
With the latest 2 bodies hoped dimmed of finding anyone alive in the 5 separate tunnel systems dotting the fractured hillside.Still,Mayor Sarenas kept up appearances and didn't offically declare an end to Rescue Operations until Sunday night,April 24.After an intial 13 people were rescued,all within 10 minutes of the actual event,no other"happy endings"would be pulled out of the debris.Without helicopters the officials present decided to have local"habal-habal"(motorcycle taxis,in this case off road) strap the cadavers to boards fitted onto the back of the motorcycle and bring them to a funeral home in the town proper
.When the DENR Region XI's (Department of the Environment and Natural Resources) MGB (Mining and Geosciences Bureau,sublimated to the DENR) representative,Noel Angeles arrived on site he immediately issued a Stop Order barring all mining in both that sitio,Panganason-B as well as the adjoining Sitio Panganason-A.Mayor Sarenas then issueThe 30 became 68 spanning both sitions,A and B,and finally the order encompassed all outlying homes to the tune of 112.The Order was officially handed out on Monday,April 25,2PM,All residents were given 48 hours to vacate and the option of demolishing their own homes (something most naturally choose so as to save the materiel for its nect location).One imagines that if in fact the situation was as dangerous as the local government claimed-and I have every reason to imagine it was-that the mayor would have made his order effective immediately.Just after that meaningless directive 4 more dead victims were pulled from a single buried tunne:
1) Cristituto Torrejos Sr.,father of the first victim recovered,JunJun.Cristituto Sr.was 44 years old and like his son resided in Barangay Cuamboagan,Tagum City,Davao del Norte Province
2) Brindo Dani,age 26,Barangay Buan,Asuncion,Davao del Norte Province
3) Marvin A.Anglay,19 years old,same barangay,etc.as Victim #2
4) Pio Dennis Calapis,17 tears old,same barangay,etc.as Victim #1
By the time that the 48 hour deadline to vacate transpired on Wednesday,April 27th at 2PM three families refused to comply and the Philippines being the weak state that it is tried reasoning with these 3 families.In the end the 3 held their ground (no pun intended,OK.maybe just a tad bit) and continue to live in that otherwise barren sitio.The rest of the community was housed in the nearby Panganason Elementary School.Back at the site the heavy rains continued and so it was incredibly slow going.All the more si since the single piece of heavy equipment,lent by Russell Mining,was released back to its base camp since the ground was too innundated with moisture to allow effective use of heavy equipment.The Provincial Government had also brought a smaller bulldozer,a backhoe and a single axle dumptruck in over the weekend and they stayed on site continously though almost always off to the side due to unstable terrain.
On Tuesday,April 26th,as rains began coming heavier rescuers sighted 5 bodies.In quick succession the 5 were unearthed ahead of a heavy downpour with workers removing the 5th cadaver just as the skies opened up over head.The following 5 were identified immediately:
1) Jericho Escoto,38 years old,Baguio City,Mountain Province,Luzon Island
2) Felixberto Ynay,54 years old,resided in the same sitio where he died
3) Vincent Balog,21 years old,Barangay Mangalingay,Gitawtaw,Bukidnon Province
4) Junel Lapates,no age available,the same address as Victim #3
5) Noel Caincoy,aged 21,same address as Victims # 3 and 4
With the rains worked stop and did not resume until Thursday morning,April 28.On Wednesday a 22 man team of volunteers was deployed by the Pantukan Municipal Engineer's office to demolish the homes not already dismantled by their owners.Because of the rain they too didn't begin until Thursday,the 28th.Before finishing they demolished 52 homes.The work contimued on through Friday but otherwise nothing fruitful occurred.Both the Search and Rescue helicopter from the PAF 505th as well as 2 other Hueys (UH-1H) from the 11th TOG (Tactical Operations Group) at EASMINCOM were released and returned to their base in Davao City.Likwise the provincial government's heavy equipment was also released as the operation began winding down.
On Saturday,April 30th the last 2 bodies were sighted soon after operations began that morning.2 pairs of hands were seen,as if reaching for succor above the mud encasing both bodies at the bottom of a vertical shaft,10 meters deep.In checking the situation it was discovered that the 4 meter deep mud that had buried both those bodies had solidified and set.Using piped in water to soften the soil as personnel from the Davao City Fire and Rescue Department rapelled down,at significant danger to themselves and spent more than 3 hours carefully removing the 2 bodies.The first removed was a young man whose identity remained a mystery until Tuesday,May 3rd when his grieving mother was finally able to identify 16 year old Alejandro Justol.The last body removed,at 130PM that afternoon was 12 year old Cristituto Torrejos Jr.,brother of JunJun and son of Cristituti Sr.
On Sunday,May 1 the retrieval phase officially ended with 9 people still unaccounted for and presuned dead in addition to the 14 identified victims that had been recovered over the previous 9 days.
The 14 victims:
1) Cristituto Torrejos. Sr.,age 44 of Barangay Cuamboagan,Tagum City,Davao del Norte Province
2) Cristituto Torrejos Jr.,12,son of Victim #1,same address
3) Pio Dennis Calapis,17 years old,same address as Victims #1,2 and 3
4) John Ric Torrejos,15,son of Victim #1,elder brother of Victim #2,same address as them
5) Brindo Dani,26 years old,Barangay Buan,Asuncion,Davao del Norte Province
6) Marjon A.Guilbatan,19 years old,same address as Victim #4
7) Marvin A.Anglay,19 years old,same address as Victims #5 and 4
8) Relito T.Tebag,21 years old,same address as Victims #4,5 and 6
9) Felixberto Ynay,54 years old,lived in the squatter community,Sitio Panganason-B,Barangay Kingking,Pantukan,ComVal Province
10) Vincent Balog,21 years old,Barangay Mangalingay,Gitawtaw,Bukidnon Province
11) Noel Caincoy,21 years old,same address as Victim #10
12) Junel Lapates,age unknown,possibly juvenile,same address as Victims #10 and 11
13) Alejandro Justol,age 16,resident of that squatter community.He had initially been un-identified because his mother,also residing there,had gone into a catatonic-like stupor and so noone was willing to identify him until his mother re-gained a modicum of composure
14) Jericho Escoto,38 years old,Baguio City,Mountain Province,Luzon Island
Though not yet officially dead,the 8 miners who remain missing are of course dead as well.There names:
1) Bernard Celestial,of Tagum City
2) Bobit Celestial,same municipality
3) Jay Omega,Maco,ComVal Province
4) Alvin Caincoy,Barangay Mangalingay,Gitawtaw,Bukidnon Province
5) Andy Lapates,same address as Victim #4
6) Bitoy (no surname),Lasang,Davao del Sur Province
7) Erning (no surname),a Sama Tribesman,Samal Island,Davao del Sur Province
8) Jongjong,same information as Victim #7
Though not listed in any of the lists,there was a full wallet found,and locals insist that the following man is dead as well
9) Boloy Ensisel,Barangay San Roque,Panabo City,Davao del Norte Province
The fallout politically has been a tad bit more than we usually see.These kind of senseless deaths take place all too often and so the government rarely even bats an eye about it.This time however things have turned out differently.Perhaps it is a domino like effect from the AFP Corruption Scandal (General Garcia Case) that I began outlining in the"Last Quarter of 2010 AFP"entries.New attitudes just might be contagious.In any event,Bayan Muna Party List Congressman Teddy A.Casino has authored a Bill now siitting in the Natural Resources Committee,HB#4315,"People's Mining Act of 2011."It hopes to supercede the very faulty"People's Mining Act of 1991."Specifically it takes aim at Presidential Decree#1899 and to a lesser degree,#s 463 and 512.
Likewise,Senator Loren Legarda has authored a Senate Resolution seeking an investigation as well as a hearing with the DENR to find out just how it handles Small Scale Mining.
Quite often these disasters take place in so called"Small Scale Mining"sites.Though most Small Scale Mining is legal,there is absolutely no oversight what so ever.The prospective miner pays a fee to his LGU (Local Govt.Unit,i.e.municipality and province).From that point there is no mandatory oversight though very,very rarely one finds a municipality that gets such miners to voluntarily enter into oversight agreements that guarantee periodic inspections and other supervisory oversight modalities.Still,even in those rare areas the miners denude the hills.If they aren't using the illegaly harvested timber for squatter homes or shoring up their haphazard tunnels and giant sluice rigs then they are selling the wood as quick as they can cut it down.
This Good Friday,April 22,2011 in the municipality of Pantukan in ComVal (Compostela Valley Province) miners were in their tunnels earlier than usual.Despite nominal adherance to Catholicism most miners retain indigenous beliefs.So it was that at 3AM that morning the illegaly dug tunnels were filled with small scale miners making offerings to the deity of the underworld,the patron of local miners.The ceremony,"Padugo"involves animal sacrifice,usually a chicken but sometimes a piglet whose blood is drained into the soil of the main shaft in front of an altar containing ceremonial plants and a saint statue.Without a doubt these miners were praying for protection from mishap in addition to pleading for good fortune.How ironic then that as they kneeled in their tunnels doing that at 230AM,1,200 cubic meters of mud cleaved off the hilltop above them and buried them.
The mining site lies in Sitio Panganason B,in the remote barangay of Kingking.Laying upcountry,13km as the crow flies from the centre of Pantukan proper,Barangay Poblacion,there are only rudimentary foot trails spanning several steep hills and crossing rapidly flowing creeks and rivlets.Even in dry season travel is relegated to off road motorcycles or more often,trekking in and out on foot.More over,the ubiqitous cell phones that seem to be attached at the hip of so many Filipinos are of no use that far out in the bush.If the mountains do no effect the signal inclement weather always will.It wasn't until 830AM that a breathless messenger ran into the municipal hall out of breath that the wider world had finally learned of the tragedy.
Mayor Celso V.Sarenas sprang into action being a veteran by now,of similar natural disasters since Small Scale Mining has been rampant in his municipality for more than 2 decades now.Indeed,in 2009 a landslide had befallen the immediately adjoining barangay of Napnapan killing at least 26 people.Mayor Sarenas immediately called the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) 1001st Brigade Headquarters in the nearby town of Maco as he began the official notifications and seeking military assistance.Afterwards the mayor followed Standard Operating Procedure,that favourite phrase uttered by technocrats and called the base camps of 3 mining tenement base camps.Only 1,the American-based multi national Russell Mining was able to offer heavy equipment.Located about 4km to the south of the effected area,Mayor Sarenas finally got the camp super on the line and asked him to donate any manpower and equipment he might be able to offer.More over he asked the super to call the base camp of Nationwide Development Corporation (NADECOR)/Saint Agustine,the other American-based outfit in the sector and ask for the same from them.The Russell camp superintendent offered his Catepillar D9,a bulldozer with a 4.2 meter wide blade but couldn't provide much in the way of manpower since the Easter Weekend was upon them.He did promise to call NADECOR/St.Agustine and then send the bulldozer over straight away.Back in the municipal hall the mayor was able to locate a phone number for the 3rd multi-national mining company,APEX and called and made the same request.APEX sent its Chief Engineer and a full crew of labourers.
Meanwhile,the 1001st Bde (Brigade) had called its Regional Command,EASMINCOM (Eastern Mindanao Command) headquartered in Davao City and made them aware of the situation.Immediately EASMINCOM scrambled a rescue helicopter from the PAF (Philippine Air Force) 505th Air Rescue Wing and so the rescue effort began.
By noon Russell Mining and the AFP's 71IB (Infantry Battalion),72IB and CAFGU (Citizens Auxiliary Forces Geographical Unit,a Force Multiplication entity composed of local residents who are armed,trained and directly supervised by AFP cadres) were digging by hand.Unlike more industrialised nations there aren't any sound detection or heat seeking equipment to help locate victims,alive OR dead.There aren't even any blueprints or even the most rudimentary of maps.In fact,for the first 3 days Mayor Sarenas had everyone operating on the assumption that there were 30 homes in the sitio.Indeed there were 112.Though,in the mayor's defence,a squatter community by its very nature exists off the grid.Its residents do not file deeds,let alone information about their home or family.The barangay's remote location relegated it to an unknown quantity.In fact,the mayor had warned the community to vacate the sitio in 2010 but had been ignored.In fact,when that 2009 landslide took place in Barangay Napnapan's Sitio Boringot,a non-fatal one had happened just hours later in Sitio Panganason-B,the very same site I am discussing.
As surviving miners offered later that day,with gold paying 2,000 Pesos per gram ($38) people will keep digging,safety be damned.One miner had been trying sleep off a late evening drinking bout when the bunkhouse he was sleeping in jumped off the ground and began quickly moving towards a nearby ravine.Having made his way out its doorway (luckily the crude strycture had no door or the man might now be with his friends buried under at least 6 meters of mud) and began swiming on the top of the quickly moving mass.By the time it stopped at the far end of the valley floor he was chest deep and certainly would have suffocated if others hadn't lassoed him and pulled him out by motorcycle.Still,he said that while he's still not sure about his own future in mining he is fatalistic.Now having survived 3 fatal mudslides and only 26 years old,he feels that when one's rime is up,its up.Destiny is what it is,especially in a country where children must grow up eating roadkill,when lucky.
Shortly after the messenger had made his way into the municipal hall,the first corpse was discovered and pulled free.15 year old John Ric"JunJun"Torrejos lived in Barangay Buan in Tagum City in the next province,Davao del Norte but was already a veteran miner working with his father and 12 year old brother in the family's tunnel mine and dmall ball mill operation.Both his younger brother and father would soon be found dead as well.Just after JunJun's battered corpse was identified by a distraught aunt who lived in the squatter camp below the hill the bulldozer arrived.After its arrival people began arriving in small groups,having hiked in from town.
The PAF Search and Rescue helicopter from the 505th swooped low not long after but the site's sharp ridgelines and unstable footing prevented an immediate landing.It would be much later in the day before the pilots were told the co+ordinates for Panganason Elementary School whose adjoining field had served as a helipad in the 2009 landslide.
With the latest 2 bodies hoped dimmed of finding anyone alive in the 5 separate tunnel systems dotting the fractured hillside.Still,Mayor Sarenas kept up appearances and didn't offically declare an end to Rescue Operations until Sunday night,April 24.After an intial 13 people were rescued,all within 10 minutes of the actual event,no other"happy endings"would be pulled out of the debris.Without helicopters the officials present decided to have local"habal-habal"(motorcycle taxis,in this case off road) strap the cadavers to boards fitted onto the back of the motorcycle and bring them to a funeral home in the town proper
.When the DENR Region XI's (Department of the Environment and Natural Resources) MGB (Mining and Geosciences Bureau,sublimated to the DENR) representative,Noel Angeles arrived on site he immediately issued a Stop Order barring all mining in both that sitio,Panganason-B as well as the adjoining Sitio Panganason-A.Mayor Sarenas then issueThe 30 became 68 spanning both sitions,A and B,and finally the order encompassed all outlying homes to the tune of 112.The Order was officially handed out on Monday,April 25,2PM,All residents were given 48 hours to vacate and the option of demolishing their own homes (something most naturally choose so as to save the materiel for its nect location).One imagines that if in fact the situation was as dangerous as the local government claimed-and I have every reason to imagine it was-that the mayor would have made his order effective immediately.Just after that meaningless directive 4 more dead victims were pulled from a single buried tunne:
1) Cristituto Torrejos Sr.,father of the first victim recovered,JunJun.Cristituto Sr.was 44 years old and like his son resided in Barangay Cuamboagan,Tagum City,Davao del Norte Province
2) Brindo Dani,age 26,Barangay Buan,Asuncion,Davao del Norte Province
3) Marvin A.Anglay,19 years old,same barangay,etc.as Victim #2
4) Pio Dennis Calapis,17 tears old,same barangay,etc.as Victim #1
By the time that the 48 hour deadline to vacate transpired on Wednesday,April 27th at 2PM three families refused to comply and the Philippines being the weak state that it is tried reasoning with these 3 families.In the end the 3 held their ground (no pun intended,OK.maybe just a tad bit) and continue to live in that otherwise barren sitio.The rest of the community was housed in the nearby Panganason Elementary School.Back at the site the heavy rains continued and so it was incredibly slow going.All the more si since the single piece of heavy equipment,lent by Russell Mining,was released back to its base camp since the ground was too innundated with moisture to allow effective use of heavy equipment.The Provincial Government had also brought a smaller bulldozer,a backhoe and a single axle dumptruck in over the weekend and they stayed on site continously though almost always off to the side due to unstable terrain.
On Tuesday,April 26th,as rains began coming heavier rescuers sighted 5 bodies.In quick succession the 5 were unearthed ahead of a heavy downpour with workers removing the 5th cadaver just as the skies opened up over head.The following 5 were identified immediately:
1) Jericho Escoto,38 years old,Baguio City,Mountain Province,Luzon Island
2) Felixberto Ynay,54 years old,resided in the same sitio where he died
3) Vincent Balog,21 years old,Barangay Mangalingay,Gitawtaw,Bukidnon Province
4) Junel Lapates,no age available,the same address as Victim #3
5) Noel Caincoy,aged 21,same address as Victims # 3 and 4
With the rains worked stop and did not resume until Thursday morning,April 28.On Wednesday a 22 man team of volunteers was deployed by the Pantukan Municipal Engineer's office to demolish the homes not already dismantled by their owners.Because of the rain they too didn't begin until Thursday,the 28th.Before finishing they demolished 52 homes.The work contimued on through Friday but otherwise nothing fruitful occurred.Both the Search and Rescue helicopter from the PAF 505th as well as 2 other Hueys (UH-1H) from the 11th TOG (Tactical Operations Group) at EASMINCOM were released and returned to their base in Davao City.Likwise the provincial government's heavy equipment was also released as the operation began winding down.
On Saturday,April 30th the last 2 bodies were sighted soon after operations began that morning.2 pairs of hands were seen,as if reaching for succor above the mud encasing both bodies at the bottom of a vertical shaft,10 meters deep.In checking the situation it was discovered that the 4 meter deep mud that had buried both those bodies had solidified and set.Using piped in water to soften the soil as personnel from the Davao City Fire and Rescue Department rapelled down,at significant danger to themselves and spent more than 3 hours carefully removing the 2 bodies.The first removed was a young man whose identity remained a mystery until Tuesday,May 3rd when his grieving mother was finally able to identify 16 year old Alejandro Justol.The last body removed,at 130PM that afternoon was 12 year old Cristituto Torrejos Jr.,brother of JunJun and son of Cristituti Sr.
On Sunday,May 1 the retrieval phase officially ended with 9 people still unaccounted for and presuned dead in addition to the 14 identified victims that had been recovered over the previous 9 days.
The 14 victims:
1) Cristituto Torrejos. Sr.,age 44 of Barangay Cuamboagan,Tagum City,Davao del Norte Province
2) Cristituto Torrejos Jr.,12,son of Victim #1,same address
3) Pio Dennis Calapis,17 years old,same address as Victims #1,2 and 3
4) John Ric Torrejos,15,son of Victim #1,elder brother of Victim #2,same address as them
5) Brindo Dani,26 years old,Barangay Buan,Asuncion,Davao del Norte Province
6) Marjon A.Guilbatan,19 years old,same address as Victim #4
7) Marvin A.Anglay,19 years old,same address as Victims #5 and 4
8) Relito T.Tebag,21 years old,same address as Victims #4,5 and 6
9) Felixberto Ynay,54 years old,lived in the squatter community,Sitio Panganason-B,Barangay Kingking,Pantukan,ComVal Province
10) Vincent Balog,21 years old,Barangay Mangalingay,Gitawtaw,Bukidnon Province
11) Noel Caincoy,21 years old,same address as Victim #10
12) Junel Lapates,age unknown,possibly juvenile,same address as Victims #10 and 11
13) Alejandro Justol,age 16,resident of that squatter community.He had initially been un-identified because his mother,also residing there,had gone into a catatonic-like stupor and so noone was willing to identify him until his mother re-gained a modicum of composure
14) Jericho Escoto,38 years old,Baguio City,Mountain Province,Luzon Island
Though not yet officially dead,the 8 miners who remain missing are of course dead as well.There names:
1) Bernard Celestial,of Tagum City
2) Bobit Celestial,same municipality
3) Jay Omega,Maco,ComVal Province
4) Alvin Caincoy,Barangay Mangalingay,Gitawtaw,Bukidnon Province
5) Andy Lapates,same address as Victim #4
6) Bitoy (no surname),Lasang,Davao del Sur Province
7) Erning (no surname),a Sama Tribesman,Samal Island,Davao del Sur Province
8) Jongjong,same information as Victim #7
Though not listed in any of the lists,there was a full wallet found,and locals insist that the following man is dead as well
9) Boloy Ensisel,Barangay San Roque,Panabo City,Davao del Norte Province
The fallout politically has been a tad bit more than we usually see.These kind of senseless deaths take place all too often and so the government rarely even bats an eye about it.This time however things have turned out differently.Perhaps it is a domino like effect from the AFP Corruption Scandal (General Garcia Case) that I began outlining in the"Last Quarter of 2010 AFP"entries.New attitudes just might be contagious.In any event,Bayan Muna Party List Congressman Teddy A.Casino has authored a Bill now siitting in the Natural Resources Committee,HB#4315,"People's Mining Act of 2011."It hopes to supercede the very faulty"People's Mining Act of 1991."Specifically it takes aim at Presidential Decree#1899 and to a lesser degree,#s 463 and 512.
Likewise,Senator Loren Legarda has authored a Senate Resolution seeking an investigation as well as a hearing with the DENR to find out just how it handles Small Scale Mining.
Monday, December 13, 2010
The NPA Continues to Spread its Xmas Cheer
In my previous post I had gone into great detail about the jump starting of the decades old GRP-NDF Peace Process as well as a very brief description of a single NPA tactical offencive that took place 4 days ago in Davao City. Of course that 1 incident is only 1 of many armed engagements involving the NPA here in Mindanao so I thought it prudent to give a more in depth accounting of the latest NPA armed engagements.
As I had discussed in my previous post, Friday night, December 10, 2010 saw the NPA's Merardo Arce Command confound the 10ID (Infantry Division) with a full infiltration of the Barangay Mapula CAFGU (Citizens Armed Force Geographical Unit, an official paramilitary geographically linked to a specific municipality) in Davao City's Paquibato District. The NPA was able to do so without firing a single shot owing to the very experienced planning and execution of the operational commander. Leonicio "Ka Parago" Pitao personally led an element of his 1st Pulang Bagani Company, all of them dressed in AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) uniforms captured during previous armed contacts with the AFP.
Travelling to Mapula they abducted the Barangay Captain and a local datu (tribal chief) before the group set out for the CAFGU post.Like a typical CAFGU post anywhere in the nation on a Friday night the Mapula post had a skeleton crew on duty, 9 CAFGU soldiers and the detachment CO (Commanding Officer) ,an AFP NCO (Non Commisioned Officer) , Cpl.Fresilo Dosel of the 72IB (Infantry Battalion). As soon as the detachment realised that their friendly visitors were not AFP regulars but rather Maoist guerillas 8 of the 9 abandoned their post after throwing their rifles down and running away. Capturing the CO's M14 and the detachment's 9 M1s (vintage Garands) and taking the 1 CAFGU soldier and the AFP NCO hostage the group left. After travelling out of Paquibato District all 4 captives were released unharmed.
December 07, 2010, the same day that the annual Xmas Ceasefire was unilaterally announced by the NPA, in Purok #9, Barangay Pasian, Monkayo, ComVal (Compostela Valley Province), the 25IB
(Infantry Battalion) was on patrol when it stumbled onto a temporary encampment of 10 guerillas from the NPA's Front 3 (Alejandro Lanaja Command) inside an abandoned nipa (thatched hut, most common form of housing in the Philippines). After a brief but extremely intence fire fight 6 guerillas withdrew leaving behind 4 mates. 3 were dead but the 4th, Lea "Ka Tanya" Palma Gil from Mati, Davao Oriental Province had taken a round in her right thigh leaving her unable to move. The 25IB radioed in for a Medevac (helicopter evacuation for advanced medical treatment) to transport the young lady to Camp Panacan Hospital at 10ID (Infantry Division) HQ in Davao City. Unfortunately the bullet severed an artery and 20 minutes into the 25 minute flight Palma Gil died. In addition to the 4 dead guerillas rifles, all M16s, 3 of their fleeing comrades had abandoned theirs as well, for a total of 7 rifles captured by the AFP in that short engagement: 5 M16s, 1 M14 and 1 M1 (vintage Garand). Also captured were 2 IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices, aka "bombs").
On December 05, 2010 in Barangay Tandik, Maragusan, ComVal, the NPA's Front 27 ambushed a column from the Scout Rangers 2nd Battalion while the latter was on patrol but the NPA took the worst of it with 1 guerilla killed and his M16 captured by the AFP. The dead guerilla, Juanito "Ka JunJun" Bustamente was from Sitio Patalangon, Barangay Zone #1, Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Province. The young man was an assistant on a jeepney but when the vehicle's owner sold it in the Spring of 2010 Bustamente told his family he was going to try to find work in Manila. Instead he ended up as a bamboo harvester in ComVal. Starting that difficult job in late June, by August, 2010 he had become an NPA regular... little more than 60 days later he was dead.
On November 30, 2010 in Barangay Paloc, Maragusan, the NPA's Front 27 (Rhyme Petalcorin Command) ambushed a 50 man column of the Scout Rangers 5th Company with 3 simaltaneously detonated IEDs. 5 Scout Rangers were killed, 10 were wounded, 6 critically.The NPA lost 1 guerilla, known by his nom de guerre, "Ka Boogie,"
On November 25, 2010 in Barangay Hagpa, Impasug-ong, Bukidnon Province the family of a recently killed guerilla from the NPA's Julito Tiro Command were inexplicably denied permission by the 8IB to disinter the grave if their loved one, Joel "Ka Toto" Compas of Barangay Bangbang, Medina, Misamis Oriental
despite representatives from the ICRC (Red Cross) accompanying them. The family wished to re-bury Compas in his hometown but the 8IB citing security concerns in an NPA influenced barangay refused to issue a Safe Passage Permi to the party. Such permits are part of the SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) and allow bearers to circumvent AFP/CAFGU/PNP checkpoints unmolested. Usually the AFP will agree to provide an armed security detail or else disinter the remains themselves and deliver them to a nearby funeral home. For some reason known only to the 8IB CMO (Civil Military Officer) this family was told to let their loved one rot in a shallow grave in an expanse of hinterland junfle.
On November 19, 2010 in that same previous barangay, Hagpa, in Impasug-on in Bukidnon Province, as a composite force from the 8 and 29IBs conducted ground operations against the NPA, a series if 105MM shells slammed into Bundok Talundanan in Sitio Bagong Silang. Talundanan is a Higaon-an and Pulangiyen Tribal holysite. Perhaps the 8IB's denial of passage to the ICRC 6 days later had a bit to do with negligently fired artillery shells...
November 16, 2010, in Sitio Membanta, Barangay Upper Ulip, Monkayo, in ComVal, Cpl.Daiem Amsali Hadjaie of the 25IB left his camp on his motorcycle en route to Camp Panacan Hospital in Davao City seeking treatment for abdominal cramping and a possibly unrelated skin condition. Minutes later he came across an NPA checkpoint implemented by Front 20 (Conrado Heredia Commamd). This time the NPA bit off more than their pouty little mouths could chew, Cpl.Hadjaie's abduction was a propagandist's nightmare. Not only was the 25 year old NCO ill, his wife was 8 and a half months pregnant and waiting for him in Camp Panacan. Going from bad to worse, Hadjaie is a Tausug Tribesmen, a Muslim. This by itself would be a major headache because of the risk in alienating other insurgent movements. The cherry on top was that the day in question was a Muslim holiday.
Both the MILF and MNLF quickly went to bat for the NCO which is as hypocritical as it gets seeing as how both those insurgencies kill AFP soldiers regardless of their tribal or religious allegiances. In any event Hadjaie was released to Vice Mayor Rodrigo Duterte of Davao City on November 28.
That same day in Barangay Limot, Luuk, ComVal, Bagani (tribal paramilitary sancrioned by the AFP but officially denied so as to avoid culpability when these poorly trained soldiers run amok) soldier under Kumander (CO) Isagani Carmelotes and based in Sitio Logom, Barangay Pagwas lured 2 local NPA regulars," Ka Jeffrey" and "Ka Iso," to the home of a 2nd Bagani soldier.The 2 guerillas were tortured and then had their limbs hacked off while still alive, before they bled to death. Isgani then personally surrendered the 2 guerillas' M16s to the post manned by 26IB's C COY (Company C) in Barangay Del Monte, Veruela, Agusan del Sur Province. The 2 dead NPA guerillas had been part of the detachment from Front 3 that had ambushed a composite AFP detachment from 26IB, 3rd Special Forces (Airborne) Battalion and Isgani's Bagani Company just days earlier.
November 10, 2010 in Barangay Upper Bala, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur Province, a detachment from the NPA's Valentin Palamine Command disarmed that barangay's CVO (Civilian Volunteer Auxiliary, the PNP equivalent of the AFP's CAFGU though almost always only found in Muslim areas). The NPA captured 2 M1s (Garands), 7 pump shotguns and a single 9MM pistols. The disarmament took place without a single shot being fired.
Lest anyone imagine the NPA to somehow be morally superior after reading my synopsis of the Bagani soldiers gruesome killing of 2 NPA guerillas in ComVal...
On November 02, 2010 in Sitio Bango, Barangay Ngan in the town of Compostela, in ComVal, offduty CAFGU soldier Albert Meniza was enjoying a rare quiet night off with his family when 3 female NPA guerillas kicked in his door, tied his arms behind his back and frog marched him into the jungle. Reaching a clearing hours later he was tied to a tree. Shortly there after a detachment from the Merardo Arce Command's Pulang Bagani Company 4 under "Ka Jason" entered the clearing. After interrogating Meniza Ka Jason warned him that he had until December 01 to withdraw his CAFGU commission or he and his family would be killed.
On October 29, 2010 in Barabgay Langgawesan, Maragusan, ComVal, 2 off duty CAFGU soldiers, Rey Ciba and Panpilo Lupogan were both at home with their families when a group of NPA guerillas entered each home and tied their arms behind their backs. Prodding them with the stocks of their rifles they were marched to the home of Junior Lagungan of that barangay's Sitio Hanginan. Waiting inside the home was a female guerilla who identified herself as "Ka Jen Jen" who ordered both soldiers to resign their CAFGU commissions immediately lest she execute a 3rd CAFGU soldier from their detachment as a "lesson,"
As I had discussed in my previous post, Friday night, December 10, 2010 saw the NPA's Merardo Arce Command confound the 10ID (Infantry Division) with a full infiltration of the Barangay Mapula CAFGU (Citizens Armed Force Geographical Unit, an official paramilitary geographically linked to a specific municipality) in Davao City's Paquibato District. The NPA was able to do so without firing a single shot owing to the very experienced planning and execution of the operational commander. Leonicio "Ka Parago" Pitao personally led an element of his 1st Pulang Bagani Company, all of them dressed in AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) uniforms captured during previous armed contacts with the AFP.
Travelling to Mapula they abducted the Barangay Captain and a local datu (tribal chief) before the group set out for the CAFGU post.Like a typical CAFGU post anywhere in the nation on a Friday night the Mapula post had a skeleton crew on duty, 9 CAFGU soldiers and the detachment CO (Commanding Officer) ,an AFP NCO (Non Commisioned Officer) , Cpl.Fresilo Dosel of the 72IB (Infantry Battalion). As soon as the detachment realised that their friendly visitors were not AFP regulars but rather Maoist guerillas 8 of the 9 abandoned their post after throwing their rifles down and running away. Capturing the CO's M14 and the detachment's 9 M1s (vintage Garands) and taking the 1 CAFGU soldier and the AFP NCO hostage the group left. After travelling out of Paquibato District all 4 captives were released unharmed.
December 07, 2010, the same day that the annual Xmas Ceasefire was unilaterally announced by the NPA, in Purok #9, Barangay Pasian, Monkayo, ComVal (Compostela Valley Province), the 25IB
(Infantry Battalion) was on patrol when it stumbled onto a temporary encampment of 10 guerillas from the NPA's Front 3 (Alejandro Lanaja Command) inside an abandoned nipa (thatched hut, most common form of housing in the Philippines). After a brief but extremely intence fire fight 6 guerillas withdrew leaving behind 4 mates. 3 were dead but the 4th, Lea "Ka Tanya" Palma Gil from Mati, Davao Oriental Province had taken a round in her right thigh leaving her unable to move. The 25IB radioed in for a Medevac (helicopter evacuation for advanced medical treatment) to transport the young lady to Camp Panacan Hospital at 10ID (Infantry Division) HQ in Davao City. Unfortunately the bullet severed an artery and 20 minutes into the 25 minute flight Palma Gil died. In addition to the 4 dead guerillas rifles, all M16s, 3 of their fleeing comrades had abandoned theirs as well, for a total of 7 rifles captured by the AFP in that short engagement: 5 M16s, 1 M14 and 1 M1 (vintage Garand). Also captured were 2 IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices, aka "bombs").
On December 05, 2010 in Barangay Tandik, Maragusan, ComVal, the NPA's Front 27 ambushed a column from the Scout Rangers 2nd Battalion while the latter was on patrol but the NPA took the worst of it with 1 guerilla killed and his M16 captured by the AFP. The dead guerilla, Juanito "Ka JunJun" Bustamente was from Sitio Patalangon, Barangay Zone #1, Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Province. The young man was an assistant on a jeepney but when the vehicle's owner sold it in the Spring of 2010 Bustamente told his family he was going to try to find work in Manila. Instead he ended up as a bamboo harvester in ComVal. Starting that difficult job in late June, by August, 2010 he had become an NPA regular... little more than 60 days later he was dead.
On November 30, 2010 in Barangay Paloc, Maragusan, the NPA's Front 27 (Rhyme Petalcorin Command) ambushed a 50 man column of the Scout Rangers 5th Company with 3 simaltaneously detonated IEDs. 5 Scout Rangers were killed, 10 were wounded, 6 critically.The NPA lost 1 guerilla, known by his nom de guerre, "Ka Boogie,"
On November 25, 2010 in Barangay Hagpa, Impasug-ong, Bukidnon Province the family of a recently killed guerilla from the NPA's Julito Tiro Command were inexplicably denied permission by the 8IB to disinter the grave if their loved one, Joel "Ka Toto" Compas of Barangay Bangbang, Medina, Misamis Oriental
despite representatives from the ICRC (Red Cross) accompanying them. The family wished to re-bury Compas in his hometown but the 8IB citing security concerns in an NPA influenced barangay refused to issue a Safe Passage Permi to the party. Such permits are part of the SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) and allow bearers to circumvent AFP/CAFGU/PNP checkpoints unmolested. Usually the AFP will agree to provide an armed security detail or else disinter the remains themselves and deliver them to a nearby funeral home. For some reason known only to the 8IB CMO (Civil Military Officer) this family was told to let their loved one rot in a shallow grave in an expanse of hinterland junfle.
On November 19, 2010 in that same previous barangay, Hagpa, in Impasug-on in Bukidnon Province, as a composite force from the 8 and 29IBs conducted ground operations against the NPA, a series if 105MM shells slammed into Bundok Talundanan in Sitio Bagong Silang. Talundanan is a Higaon-an and Pulangiyen Tribal holysite. Perhaps the 8IB's denial of passage to the ICRC 6 days later had a bit to do with negligently fired artillery shells...
November 16, 2010, in Sitio Membanta, Barangay Upper Ulip, Monkayo, in ComVal, Cpl.Daiem Amsali Hadjaie of the 25IB left his camp on his motorcycle en route to Camp Panacan Hospital in Davao City seeking treatment for abdominal cramping and a possibly unrelated skin condition. Minutes later he came across an NPA checkpoint implemented by Front 20 (Conrado Heredia Commamd). This time the NPA bit off more than their pouty little mouths could chew, Cpl.Hadjaie's abduction was a propagandist's nightmare. Not only was the 25 year old NCO ill, his wife was 8 and a half months pregnant and waiting for him in Camp Panacan. Going from bad to worse, Hadjaie is a Tausug Tribesmen, a Muslim. This by itself would be a major headache because of the risk in alienating other insurgent movements. The cherry on top was that the day in question was a Muslim holiday.
Both the MILF and MNLF quickly went to bat for the NCO which is as hypocritical as it gets seeing as how both those insurgencies kill AFP soldiers regardless of their tribal or religious allegiances. In any event Hadjaie was released to Vice Mayor Rodrigo Duterte of Davao City on November 28.
That same day in Barangay Limot, Luuk, ComVal, Bagani (tribal paramilitary sancrioned by the AFP but officially denied so as to avoid culpability when these poorly trained soldiers run amok) soldier under Kumander (CO) Isagani Carmelotes and based in Sitio Logom, Barangay Pagwas lured 2 local NPA regulars," Ka Jeffrey" and "Ka Iso," to the home of a 2nd Bagani soldier.The 2 guerillas were tortured and then had their limbs hacked off while still alive, before they bled to death. Isgani then personally surrendered the 2 guerillas' M16s to the post manned by 26IB's C COY (Company C) in Barangay Del Monte, Veruela, Agusan del Sur Province. The 2 dead NPA guerillas had been part of the detachment from Front 3 that had ambushed a composite AFP detachment from 26IB, 3rd Special Forces (Airborne) Battalion and Isgani's Bagani Company just days earlier.
November 10, 2010 in Barangay Upper Bala, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur Province, a detachment from the NPA's Valentin Palamine Command disarmed that barangay's CVO (Civilian Volunteer Auxiliary, the PNP equivalent of the AFP's CAFGU though almost always only found in Muslim areas). The NPA captured 2 M1s (Garands), 7 pump shotguns and a single 9MM pistols. The disarmament took place without a single shot being fired.
Lest anyone imagine the NPA to somehow be morally superior after reading my synopsis of the Bagani soldiers gruesome killing of 2 NPA guerillas in ComVal...
On November 02, 2010 in Sitio Bango, Barangay Ngan in the town of Compostela, in ComVal, offduty CAFGU soldier Albert Meniza was enjoying a rare quiet night off with his family when 3 female NPA guerillas kicked in his door, tied his arms behind his back and frog marched him into the jungle. Reaching a clearing hours later he was tied to a tree. Shortly there after a detachment from the Merardo Arce Command's Pulang Bagani Company 4 under "Ka Jason" entered the clearing. After interrogating Meniza Ka Jason warned him that he had until December 01 to withdraw his CAFGU commission or he and his family would be killed.
On October 29, 2010 in Barabgay Langgawesan, Maragusan, ComVal, 2 off duty CAFGU soldiers, Rey Ciba and Panpilo Lupogan were both at home with their families when a group of NPA guerillas entered each home and tied their arms behind their backs. Prodding them with the stocks of their rifles they were marched to the home of Junior Lagungan of that barangay's Sitio Hanginan. Waiting inside the home was a female guerilla who identified herself as "Ka Jen Jen" who ordered both soldiers to resign their CAFGU commissions immediately lest she execute a 3rd CAFGU soldier from their detachment as a "lesson,"
The Annual NPA Dog and Pony Show
Here on our tropical isle of Mindanao some might think that we aren't as blessed as many Westerners are when it comes to the Xmas Season. Those living in colder climes for example, can very easily make do without their calendars and simply observe the changing colours of the leaves, or fill the air grow nippier. No, we may not be able to enjoy THOSE seasonal changes but we likewise have some peculiarly all our own. When one hears the NPA announce a Ceasefire they can fire up that jeepney and race to Swiss Market for some eggnog because you can bet a plethora of Pesos that its time for old Saint Nick to make his presence known. Those that are in the know however will always wait fir the Ceasefire to commence before rushing anywhere since the days leading up to the implementation of the Ceasefire are always the bloodiest of the preceeding year.
Speaking of "implementation," when will this year's quiet time begin? On December 07th the NPA unilaterally announced that this year's Xmas Ceasefire will begin at 6AM, on December 16th and will last (one hopes) until January 03rd. The date of commencement was by no means arbitrary in that December 16th marks the beginning of the Philippine Xmas Season. The duration of 17 days makes the 2010 Ceasefire the longest in a decade. Again, not an arbitrary fact given the fact that almost immediately after the end of the cessation the resumption of the long stalled GRP-NDF Peace Process takes place in Oslo, Norway.
The Ceasefire Announcement took place after a fortuitous week for the NPA and its political facet, the CPP (Communist Party of the Phillipines). On December 01 and 02 in Hong Kong, long time Chairperson of the NDF Peace Panel, Luis Jalandoni met with his GRP counterpart, Alexander "Alex" Padilla in an informal tet a tet. Also present was Jalandoni's wife and #2 on the NDF Panel, Coni Ledesma. Joining Padilla was GRP Panel member Pablito Sanidad and both sides were joined by attorney Rachel Pastores who is consulting for the overall Peace Process. As was expected both Padilla and Jalandoni got along quite well and dates for both Informal Talks (January 14 through January 18) and the First Round of Formal Talks (February 19 through February 25) were tenatively agreed upon pending formal approval by their respective entities.
During their 2 day meeting in Hong Kong Padilla formally handed Jalandoni a copy of the HDO (Hold Departure Order) had been in effect with GRP's Bureau of Immigration since June 29, 1992. HDOs are issued by the DOJ (Department of Justice) and enforced by the Bureau of Immigration when a targeted individual attempts to leave via a commercial flight. Prior to leaving Manila Padilla had been instructed to hand over the official notification by Malacanang's Chief Counsel Ricardo Paras III. In addition, Padilla also handed Jalandoni an official notification that JASIG (Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees) was still viable. JASIG was a product of a 1995 Round in the Peace Process. It allows for NDF Panel members and other NDF members closely involved in the Process to freely enter and leave the Philippimes as well as to remain unmolested during visits. JASIG had been suspended by former-President Arroyo during the 2004 meltdown following the US and EU classification of the CPP-NPA as "Terrorist Organisations." President Arroyo had lobbied hard for the groups' inclusion in an irrational bout of egotism. Her theatrics then derailed the Process until the present.
JASIG is an extremely relevant issue for the entire NDF but more so for Jalandoni on a personal level given that his aged mother, still in tje Philippines, is quite ill. Jalandoni had wanted to visit his mother for perhaps the last time but the questuin of JASIG's viability loomed large. Jalandoni et al had been informed that President Arroyo had actually lifted her own Suspension Order on July 17, 2009 but without an official notification that fact didn't mean much. On December 04, official notifications in hand, Jalandoni and his wife arrived in Manila aboard a Cathay Pacific flight out of Hong Kong.
As I mentioned, the days leading up to the annual Xmas Ceasefires are inevitably filled with the blood and gore of increasingly bold tactically offencive operations. Case in point? Ka Parago's evening visit to the CAFGU post in Davao City's Barangay Mapula. The post is located in the city's Paquibato District, 1 of 4 city districts in which former Mayor (and current Vice Mayor under his daughter Sarah Duterte Carpio) Rodrigo "Roddy" Duterte had given the NPA free reign.
When Vice Mayor Duterte was stlll a Davao City Prosecutor he had come to a working arrangement with the Maoists.
By 1984, not long after Ka Parago had moved his family from Laak in Davao del Norte Province (the town is now within Compostela Valley Province, aka ComVal, the province later carved out of the northwest corner of Davao del Norte) to the coastal bsrangay of Isla Verde in Davao City the NPA was so deeply ensconced in the poorer barangays that ring Mindanao's largest city that authorities all but conceeded it as NPA territory. From 1979 until that point the organisation had been exponentially all over the Central and Southern Philippines. As so often happens in such situations this uber-rapid expansion severely weakened the NPA's ideological foundation. Forget about Mao, most NPA regulars of the era had no idea who Marx was (granted that today that things have not progressed all that much).
As with any base of power people were joining the NPA for a variety of reasons and virtually none of them were good. Among them were a group of petty criminals in the city's Agado District, an area encompassing some of the city's most depressed barangays.By mid-1984 the NPA began cleaning house, deploying SPARU Teams (Special Partisan Armed Revolutionary Units, often mis transliterated as "Sparrow") to publicly murder NPA members that ran afoul of their hierarchy (in addition to the assasinations of PNP, government officials, informers and non-combatants the group erroneously marked as informers). As SPARU operations became much more frequent elements like those petty criminals abandoned ship. Knowing that withdrawing from the NPA not only did nothing to alleviate their vulnerability but actually made them much more probable targets they banded together and formed an anti-NPA organisation called "Alsa Masa" (Masses Arise).
A lot has been said, erroneously, about Vice Mayor Duterte's suuport of Alsa Masa. Indeed it is claimed often enough that he led the organisation! Duterte did reluctantly develop a working relationship with the group after intially targetting them for prosecution. He really did not have a choice in the matter after the AFP officially sanctioned the group as an integral cog in its Force Multiplication scheme in the Davao Region. By the time the late President Corazon Aquino came to town amd vowed to support Alsa Masa in a nationally televised speech Duterte had long been in bed with the group.
Alsa Masa was the tip of the iceberg in the AFP's anti-Communist Force Multiplication so that by the start of 1989 the NPA was relegated to the city's hinterlands, where it has remained ensconced ever since. The afore mentioned 4 NPA controoled districts, Paquibato, Tugbok, Marilog and Toril (Calinan and Baguio also have a moderate presence if not used tactically), have been consigned to the NPA with understanding that they will refrain from re-entering (or entering as the case may be) the city's other districts. One could say Duterte has merely been a pragmatist but others (the brave and the few) say a lot worse.
The AFP almost always refrains from publicly commenting on Duterte's self-described "Back Door Policy" (aaaah, is THAT what they are calling it these days?) though that nearly changed when current Mayor Sarah Duterte Carpio actually crossed the line and withdrew the city's support for AFP operations within the city's borders.Following through on a threat her father had been making for years Carpio severed municipal support while accusing the AFP of disregard for non-combatants in those 4 NPA controlled districts. The 2 sides have since made uo with Carpio giving the keynote speech at the Commencement Ceremony for a
P and D Mission (Peace and Development, civic oriented projects such as infrastructural improvements or MEDCAPS, aka medical and dental fairs...though in this case the operation merely involved the recently arrived 84 Infantry Battalion doing a house by house census in Toril District). In her speech Carpio lauded the non-combative nature of the current operation and pledged Davao City's assistance.
When one mentions the NPA and Davao City in the same sentence it is a fair assumption that Leonicio "Ka Parago" Pitao's name will soon be following. Pitao is the CO (Commanding Officer) of the Merardo Arce Command, a battalion sized entity that while primarily operating within the 4 districts I mentioned also inclucludes Davao del Sur (the province in which Davao City sits) as well as parts of Davao del Norte and Davao Oriental Provinces. Comprised of 5 COYs (Companies, a "COY" generally contains 90 to 110 riflemen) of which only 4 are currently operational. Of these COYs, Pulang Bagani Company 1 through 5 (Red Warriors Company 1 through 5), Pitao personally commands Coy 1. Known as Pulang Bagani Company 1, or PBC1, it perhaps the best equipped of all NPA elements on Mindanao, if not the entire nation.
In a long and often brutal relationship the AFP hace. Been at each others' throats. Aside from capturing him at his family home after his sister Evelyn tipped authorities, he has never been caught and this fact cause an extreme amount of consternation. The capture I just mentioned took place almost immediatel after PBC1 released s Brigadier General it captured along with other AFP personnel. That capture was an amazing propaganda coup for the Communist and so it really msade Pitao the highest value target. In the end he spent just over a year incarcerated before being freed sans pre-conditions as President Estrada sought to jumpstart the GRP-NDF Peace Process.
From 2000 onwards Pitao loomed extremely large in AFP sights.
In June of 2008 Pitao's younger brother Danilo was abducted and summarily executed. Unlike his older brother Danilo not only stayed on the right side of the law but actually worked as a Provincial Guard in the Davao del Norte Provincial Capitol Complex in Tagum City. With a sister turned informer and a brother murdered, both because of his role in the insurgency Pitao might have re-thought his long involvement with the organisation...but in fact it seems to have only strengthened his resolve.
After a series of stunning tactical operations in early 2009, Pitao's youngest daughter, Rebelyn "Ivy" Maasin Pitao was kidnnapped as she returned to the family's home in Bago Gallera in Davao City. Found the next day,in Davao del Norte Province, her corpse half naked, physically tortured (including sexually), the 20 year old paid the highest price for her father's membership in the NPA. The AFP denied all involvement but despite its initial reluctance to do so, opened an internal investigation into the matter. Predicting correctly that the military would do nothing the NPA conducted its own investigation and pointed the finger at an AFP Intelligence detachment ensconced in the town of Carmen, Davao del Norte Province and even listed involved personnel by name. After placing the personnel on Restriction to Barracks for almost 3 months the investigation was swept under the rug...though the NPA deployed SPARU Teams who killed a number of the listed men.
Fast forward to December 10, 2010 and Leonicio "Ka Parago" Pitao's PBC1 abducted the Barangay Captain of Barangay Mapula and a well known local datu (tribal chief) and while wearing AFP uniforms had the Barangay Captain and datuaccompany them to the Barangay Mapula's CAFGU (Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit), an official paramilitary under direct supervision of the AFP) post. Using the Barangay Captain and datu to infiltrate the post compound. Once inside they disarmed all personnel and made off with a nice haul. I am sure that they will look great under the tree...
Not a single shot fired, Ka Parago strikes again.
Speaking of "implementation," when will this year's quiet time begin? On December 07th the NPA unilaterally announced that this year's Xmas Ceasefire will begin at 6AM, on December 16th and will last (one hopes) until January 03rd. The date of commencement was by no means arbitrary in that December 16th marks the beginning of the Philippine Xmas Season. The duration of 17 days makes the 2010 Ceasefire the longest in a decade. Again, not an arbitrary fact given the fact that almost immediately after the end of the cessation the resumption of the long stalled GRP-NDF Peace Process takes place in Oslo, Norway.
The Ceasefire Announcement took place after a fortuitous week for the NPA and its political facet, the CPP (Communist Party of the Phillipines). On December 01 and 02 in Hong Kong, long time Chairperson of the NDF Peace Panel, Luis Jalandoni met with his GRP counterpart, Alexander "Alex" Padilla in an informal tet a tet. Also present was Jalandoni's wife and #2 on the NDF Panel, Coni Ledesma. Joining Padilla was GRP Panel member Pablito Sanidad and both sides were joined by attorney Rachel Pastores who is consulting for the overall Peace Process. As was expected both Padilla and Jalandoni got along quite well and dates for both Informal Talks (January 14 through January 18) and the First Round of Formal Talks (February 19 through February 25) were tenatively agreed upon pending formal approval by their respective entities.
During their 2 day meeting in Hong Kong Padilla formally handed Jalandoni a copy of the HDO (Hold Departure Order) had been in effect with GRP's Bureau of Immigration since June 29, 1992. HDOs are issued by the DOJ (Department of Justice) and enforced by the Bureau of Immigration when a targeted individual attempts to leave via a commercial flight. Prior to leaving Manila Padilla had been instructed to hand over the official notification by Malacanang's Chief Counsel Ricardo Paras III. In addition, Padilla also handed Jalandoni an official notification that JASIG (Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees) was still viable. JASIG was a product of a 1995 Round in the Peace Process. It allows for NDF Panel members and other NDF members closely involved in the Process to freely enter and leave the Philippimes as well as to remain unmolested during visits. JASIG had been suspended by former-President Arroyo during the 2004 meltdown following the US and EU classification of the CPP-NPA as "Terrorist Organisations." President Arroyo had lobbied hard for the groups' inclusion in an irrational bout of egotism. Her theatrics then derailed the Process until the present.
JASIG is an extremely relevant issue for the entire NDF but more so for Jalandoni on a personal level given that his aged mother, still in tje Philippines, is quite ill. Jalandoni had wanted to visit his mother for perhaps the last time but the questuin of JASIG's viability loomed large. Jalandoni et al had been informed that President Arroyo had actually lifted her own Suspension Order on July 17, 2009 but without an official notification that fact didn't mean much. On December 04, official notifications in hand, Jalandoni and his wife arrived in Manila aboard a Cathay Pacific flight out of Hong Kong.
As I mentioned, the days leading up to the annual Xmas Ceasefires are inevitably filled with the blood and gore of increasingly bold tactically offencive operations. Case in point? Ka Parago's evening visit to the CAFGU post in Davao City's Barangay Mapula. The post is located in the city's Paquibato District, 1 of 4 city districts in which former Mayor (and current Vice Mayor under his daughter Sarah Duterte Carpio) Rodrigo "Roddy" Duterte had given the NPA free reign.
When Vice Mayor Duterte was stlll a Davao City Prosecutor he had come to a working arrangement with the Maoists.
By 1984, not long after Ka Parago had moved his family from Laak in Davao del Norte Province (the town is now within Compostela Valley Province, aka ComVal, the province later carved out of the northwest corner of Davao del Norte) to the coastal bsrangay of Isla Verde in Davao City the NPA was so deeply ensconced in the poorer barangays that ring Mindanao's largest city that authorities all but conceeded it as NPA territory. From 1979 until that point the organisation had been exponentially all over the Central and Southern Philippines. As so often happens in such situations this uber-rapid expansion severely weakened the NPA's ideological foundation. Forget about Mao, most NPA regulars of the era had no idea who Marx was (granted that today that things have not progressed all that much).
As with any base of power people were joining the NPA for a variety of reasons and virtually none of them were good. Among them were a group of petty criminals in the city's Agado District, an area encompassing some of the city's most depressed barangays.By mid-1984 the NPA began cleaning house, deploying SPARU Teams (Special Partisan Armed Revolutionary Units, often mis transliterated as "Sparrow") to publicly murder NPA members that ran afoul of their hierarchy (in addition to the assasinations of PNP, government officials, informers and non-combatants the group erroneously marked as informers). As SPARU operations became much more frequent elements like those petty criminals abandoned ship. Knowing that withdrawing from the NPA not only did nothing to alleviate their vulnerability but actually made them much more probable targets they banded together and formed an anti-NPA organisation called "Alsa Masa" (Masses Arise).
A lot has been said, erroneously, about Vice Mayor Duterte's suuport of Alsa Masa. Indeed it is claimed often enough that he led the organisation! Duterte did reluctantly develop a working relationship with the group after intially targetting them for prosecution. He really did not have a choice in the matter after the AFP officially sanctioned the group as an integral cog in its Force Multiplication scheme in the Davao Region. By the time the late President Corazon Aquino came to town amd vowed to support Alsa Masa in a nationally televised speech Duterte had long been in bed with the group.
Alsa Masa was the tip of the iceberg in the AFP's anti-Communist Force Multiplication so that by the start of 1989 the NPA was relegated to the city's hinterlands, where it has remained ensconced ever since. The afore mentioned 4 NPA controoled districts, Paquibato, Tugbok, Marilog and Toril (Calinan and Baguio also have a moderate presence if not used tactically), have been consigned to the NPA with understanding that they will refrain from re-entering (or entering as the case may be) the city's other districts. One could say Duterte has merely been a pragmatist but others (the brave and the few) say a lot worse.
The AFP almost always refrains from publicly commenting on Duterte's self-described "Back Door Policy" (aaaah, is THAT what they are calling it these days?) though that nearly changed when current Mayor Sarah Duterte Carpio actually crossed the line and withdrew the city's support for AFP operations within the city's borders.Following through on a threat her father had been making for years Carpio severed municipal support while accusing the AFP of disregard for non-combatants in those 4 NPA controlled districts. The 2 sides have since made uo with Carpio giving the keynote speech at the Commencement Ceremony for a
P and D Mission (Peace and Development, civic oriented projects such as infrastructural improvements or MEDCAPS, aka medical and dental fairs...though in this case the operation merely involved the recently arrived 84 Infantry Battalion doing a house by house census in Toril District). In her speech Carpio lauded the non-combative nature of the current operation and pledged Davao City's assistance.
When one mentions the NPA and Davao City in the same sentence it is a fair assumption that Leonicio "Ka Parago" Pitao's name will soon be following. Pitao is the CO (Commanding Officer) of the Merardo Arce Command, a battalion sized entity that while primarily operating within the 4 districts I mentioned also inclucludes Davao del Sur (the province in which Davao City sits) as well as parts of Davao del Norte and Davao Oriental Provinces. Comprised of 5 COYs (Companies, a "COY" generally contains 90 to 110 riflemen) of which only 4 are currently operational. Of these COYs, Pulang Bagani Company 1 through 5 (Red Warriors Company 1 through 5), Pitao personally commands Coy 1. Known as Pulang Bagani Company 1, or PBC1, it perhaps the best equipped of all NPA elements on Mindanao, if not the entire nation.
In a long and often brutal relationship the AFP hace. Been at each others' throats. Aside from capturing him at his family home after his sister Evelyn tipped authorities, he has never been caught and this fact cause an extreme amount of consternation. The capture I just mentioned took place almost immediatel after PBC1 released s Brigadier General it captured along with other AFP personnel. That capture was an amazing propaganda coup for the Communist and so it really msade Pitao the highest value target. In the end he spent just over a year incarcerated before being freed sans pre-conditions as President Estrada sought to jumpstart the GRP-NDF Peace Process.
From 2000 onwards Pitao loomed extremely large in AFP sights.
In June of 2008 Pitao's younger brother Danilo was abducted and summarily executed. Unlike his older brother Danilo not only stayed on the right side of the law but actually worked as a Provincial Guard in the Davao del Norte Provincial Capitol Complex in Tagum City. With a sister turned informer and a brother murdered, both because of his role in the insurgency Pitao might have re-thought his long involvement with the organisation...but in fact it seems to have only strengthened his resolve.
After a series of stunning tactical operations in early 2009, Pitao's youngest daughter, Rebelyn "Ivy" Maasin Pitao was kidnnapped as she returned to the family's home in Bago Gallera in Davao City. Found the next day,in Davao del Norte Province, her corpse half naked, physically tortured (including sexually), the 20 year old paid the highest price for her father's membership in the NPA. The AFP denied all involvement but despite its initial reluctance to do so, opened an internal investigation into the matter. Predicting correctly that the military would do nothing the NPA conducted its own investigation and pointed the finger at an AFP Intelligence detachment ensconced in the town of Carmen, Davao del Norte Province and even listed involved personnel by name. After placing the personnel on Restriction to Barracks for almost 3 months the investigation was swept under the rug...though the NPA deployed SPARU Teams who killed a number of the listed men.
Fast forward to December 10, 2010 and Leonicio "Ka Parago" Pitao's PBC1 abducted the Barangay Captain of Barangay Mapula and a well known local datu (tribal chief) and while wearing AFP uniforms had the Barangay Captain and datuaccompany them to the Barangay Mapula's CAFGU (Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit), an official paramilitary under direct supervision of the AFP) post. Using the Barangay Captain and datu to infiltrate the post compound. Once inside they disarmed all personnel and made off with a nice haul. I am sure that they will look great under the tree...
Not a single shot fired, Ka Parago strikes again.
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