In this, my third and next to last installment on the Human Rights Watch, or HRW report, "Bad Blood: ," I will finish highlighting a critical part of Mindanaowan History. Covering the start of
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"Abduction and Mistreatment of Civilians by Militart anf CAFGU
Seven cases of maltreatment of civilians during a May 1991 military offensive were documented by Human Rights Watch.
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In each case, CAFGU from Aurora, a village about five miles away from the site of the military operations, accompanied the soldiers from the 36th and 8th IBs, beyond the territory they are restricted to under the guidelines set up by the Government. The three CAFGU members who were positively identified were listed as active-duty CAFGU and were also listed as former CHDF in rosters filed at the Provincial Government offices.
Jose Abing
A farmer, Jose Abing, 29, asserted in a May 20th, 1991 affadavit filed with the Provincial Prosecutor that he was tortured after he was picked up in an area of recent military operationa by a group of CAFGU members and soldiers in the village of New Visayas, in the town of Prosperidad.
At 8AM on May 2nd, 1991, Abing was picked up at his farm by soldiers from the 36th and the 8th IBs accompanied by nine CAFFU members, whom he identified as Felipe Rodriguez, Leonicio Ebanez, Helimon Ebanez, and six known only as Abawan, Rolly, Benben, Tony Carting, and Doloy Guyay. He stated that the CAFGU grabbed him and hung him upside down out of the window of Abing's own house. Then they forced Abing to drink a half-gallon of vinager. Soon afterwards, the CAFGU released him and left, taking his rooster and his neighbour's chickens.
Abduction of Six Residents
Two farmers from the village of New Visayas, witin the municipality of Prosperidad stated in a joint affadavit that they were picked up by a group of CAFGU members and soldiers from the 36th and 8th IBs and tortured on suspicion that they were NPA rebels.
In their May 20th affadavit filed with the Provincial Prosecutor, Jaime Baluyos, 27, and Bonifacio Gabuya, 21, stated that they were forcibly taken out of their homes on May 4th, 1991 at 530AM. They asserted that they were shown no warrant of arresr and that they had not committed any crime (under Philippine Law, warrantless arrests are considered legal if the arresting officer has grounds to believe that the suspect is a member of the Communist Party or the NPA). They stated that they were also repeatedly punched and kicked by nine CAFGU members, identified by name as the same men who apprehended Jose Abing (above). Their Commander, a Sergeant Felasol og the 36th IB, looked on but did not stop the beatingsm
Afterwards, the CAFGU bound their hands and tied a noose around Baluyo's and Gabuya's necks, using nylon rope. In this manner, they were marched overland to the village of Cecilia, in the town of San Luis, about seven miles away. When they arrived, they were given food, but every time they tried to swallow, the soldiers yanked their nooses tight. Then a soldier, a member of the 8th Infantry Battalion, approached the two with a knife and threatened to cut off their ears, but was restrained by the others, who said the two were needed as guides. Later, however, they were released for no apparent reason.
A day later, four residents, a farmer, name withheld, was abducted along with his son, his neighbor, and his neighbor's son by military forces on May 5th, 1991.
The farmer recounted that the four were apprehended at their house, about a mile and a half from the center of the village of Muritula. The site of the incident was only roughly a mile from Cecilia, the village named in the May 4th incident above. Muritula is about six miles north of the municipal center of San Luis.
In the weeks immediately preceding this abduction, troops belonging to the 36th IB based in the village center had been waging an offensive against supposed NPA guerillas in the area. During the offensive, the farmer claimed, the military ransacked their peasant cooperative store. At the time, the farmer and his family had fled their farm for the evacuation center in San Luis town center. But food ran low, so he decided to return with his eldest son Larry on May 5th, 1991 to retreive some corn and mill it with his wooden mill. A neighbor, Cresensio Ando, 38, and his son also returned to receive some of their harvest.
Upon leaving the mill that afternoon at about 440PM, the four suddenly encountered between 45 and 60 military men, a composite team from the 36th Infantry Battalion and the CAFGU detachment. The leaders approached...
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...the farmers and took their sacks of corn. Upon questioning, the four said the corm was for their families, but the military insisted the food was for the NPAs.
"There were so many soldiers that it seemed like wherever I looked, there was the color of uniforms. I was shaking with fear, because they were pointing their firearms at us. I thought to myself, what can I di to stop my being kiLled?" the farmer recalled.
The soldiers accused the men of feeding the NPA, and the four responded that they had done so at times in the past, but had no choice. Then, the farmer watched as four of the soldiers, one with the name patch that read "Cornello," the other "Reyes," began kicking Anda all over his body while accusing him of being an NPA "murderer."
The four were ordered to accompany the troops on their march northwards. Over the next 14 days, they continued to be held in custody. They accompanied the troops by foot for 20 miles, and were used several times as guides in the military's search for rebel hideouts. At the military encampment, they were ordered to do the daily cooking and cleaning.
No charges were presented during their 15 day abduction, in violation of laws limiting detention without charges for 36 hours. On May 19th, after more interrogation, the four were released in Bayugan, a municipality about 30 miles north of San Luis. One of the four, Cresensio Anda, filed an affadavit a week later in San Francisco (San Franz), Agusan del Sur. As of January, 1992, the Provincial Prosecutor haf still not brought charges against the 36th IB. The farmer said he wanted to press charges, but probably would not do so. "I have no experience in filing a case," he said, "and I must admit, I'm scared too because the military aand CAFGU are still there in my neighborhood."
Dante Marevilles
A week later in Muritula, a fifth resident, Dante Marevillas, 25, asserted in a May 25th affadavit that he, too, was picked up by two members if the 36th Infantry Battalion at 6AM on May 14th outside Muritula. He stated that the two accused him of being an NPA sniper responsible for an ambush in their village. He denied the allegation, and the two responded by binding his wrists and ankles with plastic coated wire. Then Marevilles was repeatedly kicked, poked, and humiliated. The soldiers then stapled fliers to his ears. Marevilles was released later the same day. He has since gone into hiding.
CAFGU Abuses in San Miguel
San Miguel is a dusty frontier town located in one of the least populated , wildest corners of Northeast Mindanao. In the 1970s to early 1980s, San Miguel, like much of the province of Surigao del Sur, was largely under the sway of the insurgent "shadow" government, backed by hundreds of armed, barefoot rebels under the command of a former Catholic priest, Father Francisco Navarro.
In late January 1992, the town was in a state of military occupation. In more remote communities, soldiers were lodging in residents' homes; until early January, troops had also been encamped right in front of the central primary school. Military officials pointed to Surigao del Sur as a focal point in the Government's counterinsurgency campaign, and weekly reports of military encounters in San Miguel found their way into regional newspapers, which were not available to local residents, and onto radio, which was. There were also stories describing the elaborately staged "surrender" ceremonies of entire communities, which military officials used to back up claims that they were winning the war.
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Local officials concurred that the NPA had indeed lost ground in San Miguel in 1991, but military officials estimated that there were still between 500 and 700 more rebels in the area; police officials said 60% of villages, or "barangays," were controlled or infiltrated by the Communist Party. In one instance on July 25, 1991, roughly 250 rebels waged simultaneous attacks on a barangay and the municipal hall in downtown San Miguel, resulting in four military and six civilian deaths and the wounding of 19 others.
The military's success in beating back the insurgency, however, had its costs. The continued proximity of active rebel forces had legitimized the military's almost complete dominance over civilian authorities. Village officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told Human Rights Watch they had lost authority over police and civic functions and were afraid of reprisals should they complain. Tainted by long associations withthe rebels, they were unwilling to speak out against abuses by drunken or abusive militia members.
By and large, the victims of assaults, harassment, and other threats continued to be members and leaders of legal peasant cooperatives and their supporters in the Church. In most cases documented by Human Rights Watch, the attackers belonged to the 62 member CAFGU in San Miguel. Meanwhile, the Military had plans to recruit and train an additional 88 members in 1992.
Abuses Against Peasant Organizations
The vast majority of San Miguels 30,000 residents are impoverished tenant farmers and small landholders, who eke out a meager subsistence cultivating rice, corn, and vegetables for family consumption. In early 1992, none of the town's 18 barangays had electricity or running water, and the few dirt roads connecting the farms to the market were often impassable during the six month long rainy season.
Poor peasants, driven by economic expediency and encouraged by an activist church, have organized community based farming cooperatives throughout San Miguel. Roughly ten percent of households had joined cooperatives affiliated with the local peasant organization, KAMAGTONG, which is a local chapter of the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), a national militant peasants' organization. The military had openly labeled these cooperatives as Communist-led or -infiltrated organizations. But the peasants, despite threats, maintaned and even strengthened the cooperatives, insisting that they had brought demonstrable improvements in people's standard of living.
Military and militia threats and harassment continued throughout 1991 and early 1992, despite the fact that several of the cooperatives had gained official legitimacy, obtaining loans from national and international lending organizations. In January 1992, soldiers raided a cooperative storage shed in Apique, San Miguel, seizing 46 sacks of rice. The battalion commander insisted that the rice was set aside as payment- in- kind for interest on a 200,000 Peso ($8,000) loan from the Land Bank, the national lending institution for agricultural development projectd.
Human Rights Watch documented several cases of abuse by militia in 1991, usually in the presence of, if not direct participation of, regular forces in San Miguel.
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Rodrigo Princesa, a 38 year old farmer from the village of Santa Cruz, San Miguel, described how he was threatened and beaten unconscious by a group of CAFGU in the presence of their military commander. He said that at 4PM on December 16, he and a friend, Marcos Avila, went to a local storehouse owned by Ceding Galindo to get diesel fuel for Avila's bulldozer. Upon approaching the house, a neighbor told them that some CAFGU men from the local detachment and their commander from the 29IB were inside drinking.
The owner invited them in for a drink, so the two sat down in the kitchen, the next room away from where the militiamen were seated. All the militiamen were in uniform and armed with Garands, and were evidently drunk. One of the CAFGU members, Romy Cabacas, asked them to join the group for a drink and so Avila ordered a round of beer and joined the militiamen.
Princesa was nervous about joining the CAFGU, since he is a member of KAMAGTONG, and Princesa's neighbors had also told him there were rumors that he was going to be "salvaged," a term in the Philippines for Extra-Judicial Killings. But Princesa joined them around the small table so as not to appear rude. Later on in the evening, the cadre, Sergeant Alejandro "Al" Calooy, put his arm on Princesa's shoulder and drew him towards the door because he wanted to "have a talk." As Princesa approached the door, Jimmy Otera, a CAFGU member, grabbed Princesa by the neck and threw him down on the floor and began kicking Princesa's prone body. The other CAFGU members, identified as Eddie Roluna, Orly Orturo, and Romy Cabacas, immediately joined Otera. Sgt.Calooy stood by. Princesa lost consciousness momentarily.
While Princesa was lying on his back, Otero stomped on his abdomen and chest with enough force to break two ribs and leave bootprint shaped bruises on his chest. His cheeks, head, and legs were also bruised. Two months later, he had trouble breathing and was still unable to do farmwork.
At some point, the son of the resturant owner approached and helped Princesa stand up and get out of the house. Otero followed, laughing, and when Princesa was about 45 feet away from the store, Otera fired two shots in the air, shouting, "You brave man! You lousy NPA!"
The following day, Princesa reported the incident to a village councilman, who advised him to go to the Commission on Human Rights. He then filed an affadavit with the CHR. On November 18, Princesa sought the help of the local human rights monitor, who brought him to the provincial hospital in Tandag for x-rays and treatment.
Princesa and other community members interviewed said several of the attackers- Otera, Orturo, and Cabacas- are known as especially abusive when drunk. Human Rights monitors said Cabacas is implicated in a killing in a community a mile and a half away from Santa Cruz. Two months later, in January 1992, Otera, Cabacas, and Orturo were still listed as active duty CAFGU at the 29IB Headquarters. Calooy, of the 29IB, has himself been implicated in attacks on members of peasant cooperatives in San Miguel in 1990 and 1991.
Despite the fact that Calooy's battalion, the 29IB, had been transferred the month before, Calooy had stayed behind with the CAFGU unit he trained. Calooy was one of four commanders left behind with their CAFGU detachments according to military officials. The 29IB was transferred after its reputation was tarnished by numerous human rights abuses, including the unprovoked killing of two civilians and wounding of five in August 1990 in Libas Sud, a remote community of San Miguel (Multiple Murder charges were pending against the alleged leader of the attack, Lt.Felix Mangyao, after local government and Church investigators issued a report, "A Fact Finding Mission Report on the Massacre Incident in Barangay Libas Sud, San Miguel," Diocese of Tandag Justice and Peace Office, Surigao del Sur, Sept.20, 1990. The report strongly implicated the commanding officer and his company. Sixteen months after the shootings, victims in Libas Sud received Government funds for medical and burial fees from the Commission on Human Rights).
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Abduction and Beating of Two Farmers
The father of a farmer recounted the story of his son's abduction by two CAFGU members in June 26, 1991 in the municipal center of San Miguel. The son was also a member of KAMAGTONG.
A day before the incident, the NPA had waged a full scale attack on the town of San Miguel. One of the main targets of the attack was said to be a CAFGU member, Tony de Guzman, who resides in the town center. De Guzman escaped harm, but 14 were killed in the attack and de Guzman's close associate, CAFGU member Eddie Roluna, was one of 19 wounded.
On the evening of the incident, the man's son and two companions were waiting on a street corner in San Miguel for a ride to take them back to their homes in Bolhoon, about 10 miles away. At that time, they were approached by two armed men; they were CAFGU members Tony de Guzman, and de Guzman's son in law, nicknamed "Bodoy." De Guzman grabbed the young man by his face, and yelled, "You are one of the NPAs in that attack on San Miguel!" The young man denied it, and de Guzman began to punch him, striking his head and ear with his M14 rifle. Then he struck the victim's ribs, so hard that the rifle broke. The young man and his two companions were then forced into a dark alley. At that moment, however, an old woman passed by and looked their way. De Guzman ceased the beating, and let the three go, after warning them not to tell anyone about the incident.
The group recognized de Guzman and Bodoy. The two and a group of CAFGU members had passed through their neighborhood in Bolhoon several times in the past year, asking families if they were giving aid to the NPA. When they came, the man said, they stole things, like chickens. De Guzman always appeared to be the leader. The year before, Bodoy had been among those shot and injured in an NPA ambush in a neighboring community.
The father saw his son the morning after the attack. His head was bloody, and there were bruises on his chest. He had a cut above his right ear. The young man went into hiding soon after, and his whereabouts in January 1992 were unlnown.
Jaime Quieta
Jaime Quieta, 25, chairman of a local farmer's organization, described how a masked CAFGU member pressed a lit cigarette in his face in full view of the soldiers from the 29th IB, in Bolhoon, San Miguel. He and two neighbors said they were used as a shield by the Military's troops after the attack.
At 3AM on August 27, 1991, when the farmer and his wife awoke to the sound of dogs barking. At about 4, they peered out the window and saw that soldiers, about 30 of them, had surrounded their neighbor's house, about 40 feet distant. A few minutes later, soldiers surrounded Quieta's house and ordered the family outside. Quieta said the soldiers were in combat position, lying on the ground with rifles poised to fire on him. Three soldiers approached Quieta, with rifles drawn, and demanded to be shown the firearms and the two NPA rebels they had been told were in his house. Quieta repeatedly denied the claims. After several minutes of interrogation, during which he was not touched, one soldier told him, "If you don't admit these things, you better watch yourself."
Then the soldiers left him alone while they initiated a search of his house. At this point, a man wearing a white hood showing only his eyes approached Quieta. He was smoking a cigarette, "You'd better confess, because we have a reliable report," he told Quieta, and continued pressing him about the whereabouts of the rebels they had been told were in his house. Quieta protested again that he knew nothing and would answer no more questions. The man responded, "So you're good at answering questions," and grabbed his head pressing a lit cigarette into his face. Quieta recognized the voice as that of a CAFGU member, Tony de Guzman, who is familiar as a fish vendor in the neighborhood.
At that moment, a soldier, who Quieta presumed to be the Commanding Officer, ordered all the men in the neighborhood out of their houses. Ten of them were forced to line up in single file. "We were made to understand that we were going to walk with them to San Roque as a ahield because they thought the NPA wouldn't attack them if we were alongside," he said. The men marched with them up to San Roque, a village about two and a half miles away where they were encamped, and then released.
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Quieta's neighbor, name withheld, recalled that, at about 3 that morning, men yelled at him to open his door. He refused because it was still dark and he was afraid. But the soldiers went around back, and, led by a CAFGU member, five of them broke through a hole above the kitchen door. The CAFGU man had a white mask beneath his military helmet but the neighbor recognized him right away as Tony de Guzman.
The witness said the soldiers, who were members of the 29th Infantry Battalion, pointed their firearms at him and asked him to tell them where the NPA rebels were hiding. He couldn't identify them, because he is illiterate and could not read their nameplates. He repeatedly denied having any knowledge of the NPA's whereabouts, and after several minutes the soldiers left and went to Quieta's house. A little while later, soldiers returned and ordered him out of the house. He was pushed into the road, where about eight men in the neighborhood were already gathered. There were between 20 and 50 soldiers, he said. One man was sent to wake the village head. When the head came out, the commanding officer asked "permission" to bring the men along as escorts on their route back to the detachment, adding that none of the men would be hurt. A second neighbor corroborated Quieta's and the first neighbor's story.
The shielding incident clearly violated International Laws of War. Under Protocol I, Article 51, Number 7 of the Optional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions, to which the Philippines is signatory.
"Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations."
Col.Santos Gabison Jr., who was stationed in Bolhoon at the time of the incident, told Human Rights Watch that his troops did not use civilians as a shield.
The incident also illustrated how the local CAFGU- in this case, Tony de Guzman- were used to pinpoint and "rough up" local residents suspected of sympathies for the NPA.
Col.Gabison, however, denied that de Guzman was present during that operation. De Guzman, he said, "was not utilized by us on that occaison. I told my people we should not be utilizing him."
Several community leaders interviewed by Human Rights Watch recalled that during the past three years, Tony de Guzman had physically assaulted several of them, whom he pinpointed as NPA rebels. De Guzman abducted a local resident, Jesus Martinez, in 1986, while de Guzman was with the CHDF. According to a relative of Martinez, the victim was later found floating dead in the Tago River. "But that was before there were human rights investigators," she said.
Local Church council memembers and human rights monitors were also able to identify a dozen separate victims allegedly killed by Tony de Guzman over the past seven years. All of those killed were farmers suspected of being NPA. In most cases described, the victims were taken from their houses, and later found dead by a single shot in the head. In one case in 1986, de Guzman was suspected of setting a hut on fire, incinerating an elderly couple inside.
De Guzman is known throughout the area. He is often seen wearing a red headscarf, and people say he carries a human kneecap as a talisman to make him impenetrable to bullets. His background as a fish peddler and passenger motorbike driver made de Guzman familiar with the remotest settlements, and may explain why he has often been used as a guide in military ambushes of the NPA.
Lack of Accountability
According to Military officials, the CAFGU commanding officer and the local civilian leaders are supposed to share supervision of the CAFGU troops. In San Miguel, it sometimes seemed as if noone was in charge.
When asked about disciplining the CAFGU recruits currently stationed in San Miguel, the commander of the newly posted 67th Infantry Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Jose Barbieto, told Human Rights Watch that he was not authorised to discharge or punish abusive militia; the 29th Infantry Battalion, which had just been transferred to a post 20 miles away, "did not cede to us the discipline of these CAFGUs," he said.
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However, Barbieto's testimony was directly contradicted by that of the commander of the 29th IB in Tandag. Maj.Esperidion Balintag. Balintag said his battalion was no longer in charge of the discipline and punishment of the CAFGUs in San Miguel.
Noone wanted to take responsibility for CAFGU member Tony de Guzman. Military officials told Human Rights Watch that de Guzman was discharged from Active Duty CAFGU service on August 1, 1990, by orders of the Regional Command. However, this contradicted both the eyewitness reports of residents in Bolhoon, as well as the statemnts by the Mayor of the town of San Miguel and other local officials, who asked that their names not be used. Mayor Josite T.Elizalde asserted that de Guzman was one of fourteen CAFGU members posted in the town center. In 1990, he was discharged. But in July 1991, after the NPA staged its attack in San Miguel, he was re-activated. He could recall numerous abuses by de Guzman from his constituents, but he said de Guzman was "out of his hands."
"For the civilians, he's so hostile," explained Elizalde. "But for the Military he's an Asset."
"Forced Surrender," Forced Recruitment of Village Guards
CAFGU abuses in San Miguel took place in a climate of widespread military coercion and intimidation of civilians and challenges to civilian authority. Allegations of population control below appear to suggest that the Military would not tolerate even the slightest dissent in areas of ongoing military operations.
Village Guards
Father Eligio Bianchi, San Miguel Parish Priest, described the forced recruitment of unarmed Vilage Guards, called the "Bantay Bayan." From July to November, 1991, after the NPA attacked the village of Siago and the town center of San Miguel, a 10PM to Dawn Curfew was instituted. All adult male residents in the "Puroks" of San Miguel , each purok representing 20 to 30 households, were enlisted into the local Bantay Bayan. Each purok was obliged to man checkpoints from 5PM to 5AM every night. In some cases, when soldiers found that a checkpoint was not manned, residents were punched, and in other cases, some were forced to work at the army detachment without pay. Those who failed to show up for work were accused of being sympathizers. "While the people were guarding the town, the soldiers were sleeping. It was keeping the people from their work because they were too overtired to work in the fields" Bianch said.
The Parish Council protested the formation of the Bantay Bayan in a press statement published September 12, 1991. A day later, the detachment commander of the 29th IB accused Bianchi of bringing rice to the NPA rebels and of owning a machinegun. Nothing came of the charges, perhaps because the battalion was transferred out in November, and replaced by the 67th IB.
Anti-Communist Seminars
The practice of holding Anti-Communist seminars culminating in a formal "surrender" of entire civilian communities in an explicit part of the Philippines Armed Forces counterinsurgency strategy. In the village of Santa Cruz, San Miguel, three residents, two of whom were members of local peasant cooperative, gave first hand accounts of how residents were forced to "surrender" to the Government in a village meeting, or "pulong-pulong" organized by the 67th IB on January 12, 1992.
The day before, military officers had gone to the local elementary school and told children to tell their parents that anyone over 12 had to come to the school for the pulong-pulong.
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If they did not attend the military would assume that they were NPA. That same evening the soldiers went to the houses of the 15 individuals belonging to the peasant cooperative, which is suspected of being a rebel "front" organization. One 64 year old grandmother said her house was searched while the military interviewed her. Another, a 57 year old farmer and mother of 5, said the military insisted she had a code name and encouraged her and her husband to sign a paper, which, she was led to believe, identified her as a "rebel surrenderee." The soldiers assured the family that nothing would happen to them if they signed the paper, she said.
The chairman of the local peasant cooperative, Samuel Ravelo, 44, was also visited the evening before the meeting. The soldiers told him he was a "Communist" and he was made to believe that he would have "problems" if he failed to "surrender." He said it was the second time the community had been forced to "surrender," the first time being in 1986, when local forces led by Tony de Guzman led raids on local houses of suspected NPA supporters.
At the pulong-pulong, the officer in charge, a certain Corporal Rogelio, told the crowd that their cooperative was a "Communist System," and all were asked to sign "confessions" that they were rebel sympathisers. One person recalled. "The Military told us that we could not deny our support for the NPA, because they said they have a list with all of us in Santa Cruz and Sagbayan (a neighboring community).
Military Harassment
Local village officials of Ubas Sud, a remote settlement of 351 households also in San Miguel, said they had been continuously harassed since they had filed charges against a lieutenant from the 29th IB who allegedly killed 12 townspeople in a midnite raid in June 1990. In January, soldiers from the 67th IB came to each of their houses. The soldiers forced them to sign affadavits asserting that they were members of the NPA and that they were "surrendering" to the Government. The military told them that their community organizations, including a UNICEF sponsored children's program were rebel "front" organizations.
One local council member explained that noone was safe from suspicion. "The Military insists that we are all rebels," he said. "It all started in 1990, when we started filing human rights complaints against them. We really followed up, executing affadavits. If we complain against the war, then we must be rebels."
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Part 4, the final part in this series will be posted shortly.
Showing posts with label 67IB. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 67IB. Show all posts
Thursday, November 10, 2011
Monday, August 15, 2011
NPA Armed Contacts, Third Quarter of 2011, Part II: NPA Captures Mayor Dano of Lingig
On Saturday, August 6th, 2011 GPH, or Government of the Philippines, Peace Panel Chairperson Alexander "Alex" Padilla was whiling away the hours beating his head against the wall- I mean TALKING - with a Panelist from the NDFP, or National Democratic Front of the Philippines, Fidel Agcaoili. Their meeting of course focused on the now stalled GPH-NDFP Peace Process. The NDFP, which serves as the above board proxy for the CPP/NPA (Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army), took great issue with the Government's spectacular failure to keep its word and release incarcerated "Consultants" to the NDFP Peace Panel. Ironically, as this tense meeting was taking place in Metro Manila's Makati City, and both sides tried beyond all reasonable hope to salvage what had been the best opportunity either side has seen in more than 6 years, a "meeting" of a different sort was taking place between members of the NDFP and GPH almost 1,000 kilometers to the south, on Mindanao. The NPA's Front 20 (Conrado Heredia Front, Southern Mindanao Regional Committee, or SMRC) was launching a tactical strike against an elected official, but first, in Shandesque fashion let me colour in a bit of the background.
The municipality of Lingig, in the province of Surigao del Sur on the island's eastcoast is, like many Mindanowan population centres, non-descript and low key at first appearance. As the adage tells us though, appearances can often be deceiving. Founded in 1921 when the residents of an outlying barrio in the town of Hinatuan chafed at having to walk 14 kilometers down a muddy jungle trail to take care of even the simplest of personal business affairs. During Monsoon the trail was usually impassable and so two of the barrio's leading families were able to convince (of course I mean "pay") Congressman Tiongco to sponsor a Bill seeking the barrio's conversion into a full fledged municipality. On March 21st, 1921 Lingig officialy entered existence but as these things go, only the families that had sponsored its creation realised any sort of tangible benefits.
So it was that virtually all the townspeople existed much as they always had, struggling to produce abaca in upland farmsteads, while on the coast most fished or farmed rice. For them Manila might as well be another planet. Aside from the Japanese Occupation life stayed as it had always been...until 1986 and EDSA I. EDSA I, or the "Peoples Power Revolution" forced Philippine dictator Fidel Marcos into exile and ushered in an era of naïve hopefulness and anticipation. The first post-Marcos Presidency, that of the late Corazon "Cory" Aquino, who rode her husband's assasination into office, was a tad bit less thab stellar (put very lightly). Like the nation she was charged to run, Ms.Aquino was unsophisticated and out of her league but what she lacked in geo-political acumen and diplomatic finesse she certainly compensated for with her unabashed exuberance and optimism over the many opportunities at hand.
Indicative of both President Aquino's optimism AS WELL AS her naivete was her radical scheme to wipe the board clean at the municipal level and appoint OICs, or Officers in Charge in place of town and city mayors. On the surface it may appear to be astute, or even necesary, whereas in reality she was discarding local government executives, many with two decades of administrative experience in their particular corner of the world, and in their stead unilaterally installing inexperienced pople whose only real qualification, for the most part, was a recorded aversion to Marcos and his policies. The old "The enemy of my enemy is my friend" might pass muster in a game of Stratego but when implemented in real life simply produced inept administration, more often than not with disasterous results.
In Lingig the man chosen to run the town was the son of a former mayor who himself had served just one term immediately after the Japanese Occupation. Though not particularly known for any opposition to the Marcos regime, the son's converse lack of support for that regime was almost as good. So it was that Amerosin V.Onsing became the OIC Mayor of Linsing in 1986. Aside from the confidence of Manila OIC Mayor Onsing also managed to gain the mandate of his constituency when the townspeople followed up President Aquino's decision and voted him in as the municipality's first truly elected mayor. In 1998, having reached his term limit of three terms (12 years), Mayor Onsing did as so many Philippine politicians do and made a pact with his Vice Mayor, William B.Lim. Lim would run for Mayor and Onsing would run for Vice Mayor with the understanding that come 2001, Lim would re-assume his current role as Vice Mayor under Onsing.
Although most Philippine politicians honour such self-serving pacts there are isolated cases where, having now tasted life at the top of the local pyramid, heretofore lesser politicians have refused to play nice and return to their previous, lesser office. Mayor Lim was one such exception. Complicating matters, a powerful local "businessman," Roberto "Jimmy" Luna Jr. entered the fray by submitting his COC, or Certificate of Candidacy for that 2001 Election.
An ambitious, self-made man, Jimmy Luna believed then, as indeed he does now, that success is a combination of preparedness AND opportunity, but by the same token there is nothing wrong with creating one's own opportunity. His eye on the mayoralty, Mr.Luna recognised that of the two other contenders, Onsing was by far the most pressing threat. The Mayor cum Vice Mayor had spent the previous 15 years building a formidable political machine. Dislodging it would be next to impossible. To work his way around this seemingly insurmountable hurdle Jimmy Luna took the path of most expediency. One Sunday morning, as most of Lingig's leading citizens were at the town's Catholic Church, having just finshed with Mass, a skimasked man entered the Church, approached Vice Mayor Onsing and blew off the back of his skull with a 45 caliber pistol.
Though several local residents, speaking off the record to investigators admitted having seen the fleeing killer enter Luna's residential compound shortly after the murder, the Lingig MPO, or Municipal Police Office was stymied by the lack of witnesses willing to testify to that fact via affadavit. In truth, although Vice Mayor Onsing had enough friends on the town's police force, experienced police officers tend to try and remain aloof with regard to local political violence. Unfortunately Standard Operating Procedure at the DILG, or Department of the Interior and Local Government, the entity under which all MPOs and municipal governments BOTH work serve, imbues local government executives with the power to make or break MPO deployments. In simpler terms, a police officer over-exerting himself while investigating the assassination of a mayor or vice mayor will often find himself out of a job as soon as the deceased official's successor assumes office.
With that spectacular public murder Jimmy Luna soon found himself running unopposed for Mayor as Mayor Lim withdrew his own incumbent candidacy. Almost from the day he assumed office Mayor Roberto "Jimmy" Luna Jr. concentrated on enriching himself and his family. Of course this is what most Filipino politicians do but Mayor Luna did so with a certain elan. In trying to quickly amass as much land as possible at the most advantageous price Luna very quickly made enemies. In addition, both Onsing and Lim still had more than a few supporters, especially in the ranks of the Linsing CVO, or Civilian Volunteer Organisation. The CVO is the PNP, or Philippine National Police equivalent to the military's CAA, or Civilian Active Auxiliary programme. The CAA, via the CAFGU (Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit) and lesser known entities collectively serve as the cornerstone of the military's COIN, or Counterinsurgency programme. Limited to operations within a given geographical sector in which all enlisted men reside, they work under a cadre infantry battalion in parallel with other military elements. Whereas the CAA programmes are under the military and therefore the Department of National Defense, or DND, the CVO are under the PNP, which, as stated earlier, serves under the DILG (I know, I know, acronyms ad naseum but Filipinos have a strange penchant for them). The DILG of course, as I have already explained, is the Department of the Interior and the Local Government.
Before too long the supporters of Onsing and Lim coallesced into a distinct and troublesome faction within the town's CVO. Within this faction the leading personalities were a pair of brothers from the towns Barangay Union. Alejandro "Alejandrito" L.Suazo, aged 45 and Romulo "Romulito" L. Suazo age 48 began agitating for revenge. Not one to cut corners, Mayor Luna swiftly responded. On March 2003 the Suazo brothers, along with two other CVO members were deployed to Sitio B within Barangay Union to respond to "concerned citizens' " reports concerning an unknown band of armed men. Rushing to the scene the four CVO members were mowed down by M16 fire immediately and left to bleed out.
With the murder of the Suazo Brothers the organised opposition to Mayor Luna dissipated rapidly. Emboldened Luna increased his depradations as he sought to accumulate more and more land. Like any Mindanowan politician worth his (or her) weight Luna soon co-opted the town CVO and began utilising it as his personal paramilitary. Though no longer a political neophyte his momentum was admirable nonetheless...until he hit a large speedbump.
On February 3rd, 2006 Mayor Luna set off to visit a friend in Lingig's Barangay Pagtila'an. Upon entering that barangay though he ran into a checkpoint. As he opened his window to admonish the "soldiers" manning that checkpoint he had two M16 barrels shoved in his face. As one guerilla got into the front seat of Luna's Ford Expedition three others packed the rear seat, their barrels trained on him...or so the story goes according to Luna. Ordered to return to his home in the town's Barangay Mandus. Driving off the checkpoint quickly shut down with most of the guerillas who had manned in getting into three cargo vans. One van proceeded to Mayor Luna's home while the other two took up Blocking Positions for Phase II of the operation.
Luna drove with his four "passengers" into his residential compound and was brusquely ordered into his house and to produce three M203 grenade launchers and one M16, the NPA already knowing his personal stash. Quickly returning to the Expedition just as the van full of guerillas reached the compound the two vehicles travelled together to Lingig's municipal compound. Seeing the Mayor who appeared to be nonplussed the police officer on duty as sentry saw nothing out of the ordinary in that Mayor Luna was often seen sheparding AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines members in and about the municipal compound. Likewise the additional police officer performing sentry duty at the entrance to the Lingig MPO. Upon entering the 24 man MPO garrison a guerilla ordered all personnel on duty to lay face down, remain absolutely quiet, and to obey all directives without exception. Announcing that all personnel should remain still he ordered subordinate guerillas to frisk all personnel. Without firing a single shot the NPA captured an additional ten M16s, a 38 caliber revolver, and three 45 caliber pistols.
Rushing out the way that they had come and taking Mayor Luna with them for insurance as a Human Shield they rendevouzed with the two additional vans and all four vehicles took different routes into the municipality of Boston across the provincial line in Davao Oriental Province. On February 6th a group of guerillas drove Mayor Luna into Lingig in his own Ford Expedition. There they released him but drove off in his SUV to ensure their own escape. Luna had been held by the NPA's Front 20 (Conrado Heredia Front, SMRC) for three days but had managed to survive none the worse for the wear. Director of the PNP, General Arturo Lombiao went ballistic. Not only did he can the Chief of the Lingig MPO, Inspector Evelyn Frugalidad but sacked the Director of the Police Provincial Office, or PPO, Admirante Josue. He then relieved the entire 24 man garrison and re-deployed them to Camp Crame for thorough re-training. Still not placated Lombiao publicly accused Mayor Luna of conspiring with the NPA. In fact, he stated in a speech given less than a week after the incident that while inside the Lingig MPO, as the NPA was divesting the garrison of its arsenal, Luna had been the one directing the guerillas! Interestingly Luna never responded to the remarks, this in a nation where people sue for libel when accused by journalists of poor performance. Quite telling indeed.
Though the 2007 Election was uneventful, after the unforgettable experience of 2006, Luna was now in his third and final mayoral term and like the predecessor he murdered, Mayor Luna arranged to switch places with his Vice Mayor, Henry Santos Dano in the 2010 Election.
As the 2010 Election drew very close the Luna Family endured a minor crisis as Mayor Luna's son took deathly ill and was rushed to Davao City where physicians were able to stave off the boy's fever. Still, he remained in Davao Doctors Hospital for his recuperation. At 330AM on May 2010 Mayor Luna and his bodyguards left Lingig in two vehicles, a Nissan Navarra and a Toyota Hi-Lux en route to Davao City to visit his son. Leaving Agusan del Sur Province and entering Barangay Pasian in the municipality of Monkayo, in Compostela Valley (Comval) Province the two trucks ran into yet another one of the many checkpoints up and down Davao-Agusan National Hiway. By the time the trucks inched up to the point of inspection the well armed men conducting vehicular checks drew down their M16s and began barking orders. By this time Mayor Luna must have had no illusions, he was once again being "captured" by the NPA, the very same element none the less, Front 20. Disarming the Mayor's security detail the NPA captured five M16s, two 45 caliber pistols, one 380 caliber pistol, and one 38 revolver.
The guerillas ordered Luna out of the vehicle alone with 4 members of his security detail:
1) Pfc. (Private First Class) Johnrey Abao, 58IB (Infantry Battalion)
2) Pfc. Arnel Dizon, 58IB.
3) PO2 (Police Officer Second Grade) Boy de Castro, Lingig MPO
4) PO3 Alan Dapitanon, Lingig MPO
The NPA claimed that the had captured Mayor Luna for a variety of offences "against the people." They rightly accused him or murdering Vice Mayor Onsing in 2001 though they referred to him as "Mayor Onsing" and claimed that ge had preceeded Luna as mayor. They also mentioned the murder of the Suazo brothers BUT erroneously gave the year of that incident as 2007 instead of the correct 2003. The Philippine Media, as inept as it nearly always is, simply re-gurgitated whatever spiel the NPA force fed it. The media erroneously seized upon 2007 as the year the NPA had used Luna to raid the Lingig MPO. Of course as I just noted that incident took place in 2006. Moreover, many media outlets are claiming that the NPA captured Luna twice in 2007, making the 2010 incident his third capture. He was never captured in 2007 and 2010 is the second and last incident.
On May 17th, 2010 all 5 men were released in the jungle where Lingig borders Davao Oriental and Agusan del Sur Provinces. Luna's family, on his instructions, had paid the NPA 3 million Pesos (60,000 US roughly speaking) to make "restitution to the people." Though the ordeal cost Luna a pretty penny, and couldn't have come at a worse time with his youngest son hospitalised, all was not dismal as he had in fact emerged victorious in his bid to gain the Vice Mayoralty and have his heretofore Vice Mayor Henry Santos Dano take the Mayoral seat.
Fast forward to August 6th, 2011 and the meeting taking place that day in Makati between GPH Peace Panel Chairperson Alex Padilla and NDFP Peace Panelist Fidel Agcaoili...
That morning, just after daybreak, a man in the typical Barong Tagalog, a semi-dress shirt utilised by most National Bureau of Investigation officers, appeared at the gate of Mayor Dano's residential compound. Speaking with one of the Mayor's AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines bodyguards he introduced himself as an NBI agent paying the requisite courtesy call on the municipality's executive(s) before launching an operation in Lingig. As courtesy dictates the AFP "bodyguard" opened the compound gate to allow the agent in. At this point the gate was rushed by dozens of NPA guerillas who quickly disarmed all present before taking Mayor Dano and two of his AFP bodyguards:
1) Corporal Alrey Villasis de Samparado, 75IB, an S2 (Intelligence Rated)
2) Pfc. Roland Saban, 75IB, S2
I need to note that as usual the media has dropped the ball and recorded the second subject's name incorrectly as "Pfc. Alan Pelino."
The guerillas, from Front 20, captured two M16s and two 45 pistols before herding all three men quickly out of the compound and into one of two idling vans, a green Hyundai Starex and a blue Toyota Hi-Lux. Each van took a different route but both were seen crossing out of Lingig and into the municipality of Boston across the provincial line in Davao Oriental.
75IB immediately set out in hot pursuit. Using one AFP SUV and two civilian pick up trucks entered Sitio Mahayahay in Lingig's Barangay Pabacatan they were ambushed by an NPA Blocking Force. The initial IED, or Improvised Explosive Device (as in "bomb") detonation killed one soldier:
1) Private (Pvt.) Wenceslao K.Pena, 75IB
and wounded 5 more and 1 CAA. By the time the 6 wounded men arrived at the hospital another soldier had died:
1) Pvt.Reymund H.Valencia, 75IB
Despite the great danger posed by the AFP's famously inept "rescue operations" the military has continued thrashing to and fro, running full speed through the jungles of Caraga and Davao Regions. In Thursday, August 11th the 67IB, operating in the municipality of Cateel in Davao Oriental Province walked unawares into a fully manned NPA camp in Barangay Abejod. After an intense 1 hour firefight that critically wounded 4 AFP soldiers and merely wounding a single guerilla, the NPA withdrew leaving the AFP to savour its spoils. Though they did manage to capture the wounded guerilla, a female medic named Lyka Navarro, they did gain a very rare success with a huge cache in terms of NPA weaponry, all of which is usually gained one weapon at a time. Five M16s, two M653s (a bull pup M16, or Baby Armalite in AFP slang), two M14s, five M4s, one M203 grenade launcher, and three Kenwood walkie talkies.
The municipality of Lingig, in the province of Surigao del Sur on the island's eastcoast is, like many Mindanowan population centres, non-descript and low key at first appearance. As the adage tells us though, appearances can often be deceiving. Founded in 1921 when the residents of an outlying barrio in the town of Hinatuan chafed at having to walk 14 kilometers down a muddy jungle trail to take care of even the simplest of personal business affairs. During Monsoon the trail was usually impassable and so two of the barrio's leading families were able to convince (of course I mean "pay") Congressman Tiongco to sponsor a Bill seeking the barrio's conversion into a full fledged municipality. On March 21st, 1921 Lingig officialy entered existence but as these things go, only the families that had sponsored its creation realised any sort of tangible benefits.
So it was that virtually all the townspeople existed much as they always had, struggling to produce abaca in upland farmsteads, while on the coast most fished or farmed rice. For them Manila might as well be another planet. Aside from the Japanese Occupation life stayed as it had always been...until 1986 and EDSA I. EDSA I, or the "Peoples Power Revolution" forced Philippine dictator Fidel Marcos into exile and ushered in an era of naïve hopefulness and anticipation. The first post-Marcos Presidency, that of the late Corazon "Cory" Aquino, who rode her husband's assasination into office, was a tad bit less thab stellar (put very lightly). Like the nation she was charged to run, Ms.Aquino was unsophisticated and out of her league but what she lacked in geo-political acumen and diplomatic finesse she certainly compensated for with her unabashed exuberance and optimism over the many opportunities at hand.
Indicative of both President Aquino's optimism AS WELL AS her naivete was her radical scheme to wipe the board clean at the municipal level and appoint OICs, or Officers in Charge in place of town and city mayors. On the surface it may appear to be astute, or even necesary, whereas in reality she was discarding local government executives, many with two decades of administrative experience in their particular corner of the world, and in their stead unilaterally installing inexperienced pople whose only real qualification, for the most part, was a recorded aversion to Marcos and his policies. The old "The enemy of my enemy is my friend" might pass muster in a game of Stratego but when implemented in real life simply produced inept administration, more often than not with disasterous results.
In Lingig the man chosen to run the town was the son of a former mayor who himself had served just one term immediately after the Japanese Occupation. Though not particularly known for any opposition to the Marcos regime, the son's converse lack of support for that regime was almost as good. So it was that Amerosin V.Onsing became the OIC Mayor of Linsing in 1986. Aside from the confidence of Manila OIC Mayor Onsing also managed to gain the mandate of his constituency when the townspeople followed up President Aquino's decision and voted him in as the municipality's first truly elected mayor. In 1998, having reached his term limit of three terms (12 years), Mayor Onsing did as so many Philippine politicians do and made a pact with his Vice Mayor, William B.Lim. Lim would run for Mayor and Onsing would run for Vice Mayor with the understanding that come 2001, Lim would re-assume his current role as Vice Mayor under Onsing.
Although most Philippine politicians honour such self-serving pacts there are isolated cases where, having now tasted life at the top of the local pyramid, heretofore lesser politicians have refused to play nice and return to their previous, lesser office. Mayor Lim was one such exception. Complicating matters, a powerful local "businessman," Roberto "Jimmy" Luna Jr. entered the fray by submitting his COC, or Certificate of Candidacy for that 2001 Election.
An ambitious, self-made man, Jimmy Luna believed then, as indeed he does now, that success is a combination of preparedness AND opportunity, but by the same token there is nothing wrong with creating one's own opportunity. His eye on the mayoralty, Mr.Luna recognised that of the two other contenders, Onsing was by far the most pressing threat. The Mayor cum Vice Mayor had spent the previous 15 years building a formidable political machine. Dislodging it would be next to impossible. To work his way around this seemingly insurmountable hurdle Jimmy Luna took the path of most expediency. One Sunday morning, as most of Lingig's leading citizens were at the town's Catholic Church, having just finshed with Mass, a skimasked man entered the Church, approached Vice Mayor Onsing and blew off the back of his skull with a 45 caliber pistol.
Though several local residents, speaking off the record to investigators admitted having seen the fleeing killer enter Luna's residential compound shortly after the murder, the Lingig MPO, or Municipal Police Office was stymied by the lack of witnesses willing to testify to that fact via affadavit. In truth, although Vice Mayor Onsing had enough friends on the town's police force, experienced police officers tend to try and remain aloof with regard to local political violence. Unfortunately Standard Operating Procedure at the DILG, or Department of the Interior and Local Government, the entity under which all MPOs and municipal governments BOTH work serve, imbues local government executives with the power to make or break MPO deployments. In simpler terms, a police officer over-exerting himself while investigating the assassination of a mayor or vice mayor will often find himself out of a job as soon as the deceased official's successor assumes office.
With that spectacular public murder Jimmy Luna soon found himself running unopposed for Mayor as Mayor Lim withdrew his own incumbent candidacy. Almost from the day he assumed office Mayor Roberto "Jimmy" Luna Jr. concentrated on enriching himself and his family. Of course this is what most Filipino politicians do but Mayor Luna did so with a certain elan. In trying to quickly amass as much land as possible at the most advantageous price Luna very quickly made enemies. In addition, both Onsing and Lim still had more than a few supporters, especially in the ranks of the Linsing CVO, or Civilian Volunteer Organisation. The CVO is the PNP, or Philippine National Police equivalent to the military's CAA, or Civilian Active Auxiliary programme. The CAA, via the CAFGU (Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit) and lesser known entities collectively serve as the cornerstone of the military's COIN, or Counterinsurgency programme. Limited to operations within a given geographical sector in which all enlisted men reside, they work under a cadre infantry battalion in parallel with other military elements. Whereas the CAA programmes are under the military and therefore the Department of National Defense, or DND, the CVO are under the PNP, which, as stated earlier, serves under the DILG (I know, I know, acronyms ad naseum but Filipinos have a strange penchant for them). The DILG of course, as I have already explained, is the Department of the Interior and the Local Government.
Before too long the supporters of Onsing and Lim coallesced into a distinct and troublesome faction within the town's CVO. Within this faction the leading personalities were a pair of brothers from the towns Barangay Union. Alejandro "Alejandrito" L.Suazo, aged 45 and Romulo "Romulito" L. Suazo age 48 began agitating for revenge. Not one to cut corners, Mayor Luna swiftly responded. On March 2003 the Suazo brothers, along with two other CVO members were deployed to Sitio B within Barangay Union to respond to "concerned citizens' " reports concerning an unknown band of armed men. Rushing to the scene the four CVO members were mowed down by M16 fire immediately and left to bleed out.
With the murder of the Suazo Brothers the organised opposition to Mayor Luna dissipated rapidly. Emboldened Luna increased his depradations as he sought to accumulate more and more land. Like any Mindanowan politician worth his (or her) weight Luna soon co-opted the town CVO and began utilising it as his personal paramilitary. Though no longer a political neophyte his momentum was admirable nonetheless...until he hit a large speedbump.
On February 3rd, 2006 Mayor Luna set off to visit a friend in Lingig's Barangay Pagtila'an. Upon entering that barangay though he ran into a checkpoint. As he opened his window to admonish the "soldiers" manning that checkpoint he had two M16 barrels shoved in his face. As one guerilla got into the front seat of Luna's Ford Expedition three others packed the rear seat, their barrels trained on him...or so the story goes according to Luna. Ordered to return to his home in the town's Barangay Mandus. Driving off the checkpoint quickly shut down with most of the guerillas who had manned in getting into three cargo vans. One van proceeded to Mayor Luna's home while the other two took up Blocking Positions for Phase II of the operation.
Luna drove with his four "passengers" into his residential compound and was brusquely ordered into his house and to produce three M203 grenade launchers and one M16, the NPA already knowing his personal stash. Quickly returning to the Expedition just as the van full of guerillas reached the compound the two vehicles travelled together to Lingig's municipal compound. Seeing the Mayor who appeared to be nonplussed the police officer on duty as sentry saw nothing out of the ordinary in that Mayor Luna was often seen sheparding AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines members in and about the municipal compound. Likewise the additional police officer performing sentry duty at the entrance to the Lingig MPO. Upon entering the 24 man MPO garrison a guerilla ordered all personnel on duty to lay face down, remain absolutely quiet, and to obey all directives without exception. Announcing that all personnel should remain still he ordered subordinate guerillas to frisk all personnel. Without firing a single shot the NPA captured an additional ten M16s, a 38 caliber revolver, and three 45 caliber pistols.
Rushing out the way that they had come and taking Mayor Luna with them for insurance as a Human Shield they rendevouzed with the two additional vans and all four vehicles took different routes into the municipality of Boston across the provincial line in Davao Oriental Province. On February 6th a group of guerillas drove Mayor Luna into Lingig in his own Ford Expedition. There they released him but drove off in his SUV to ensure their own escape. Luna had been held by the NPA's Front 20 (Conrado Heredia Front, SMRC) for three days but had managed to survive none the worse for the wear. Director of the PNP, General Arturo Lombiao went ballistic. Not only did he can the Chief of the Lingig MPO, Inspector Evelyn Frugalidad but sacked the Director of the Police Provincial Office, or PPO, Admirante Josue. He then relieved the entire 24 man garrison and re-deployed them to Camp Crame for thorough re-training. Still not placated Lombiao publicly accused Mayor Luna of conspiring with the NPA. In fact, he stated in a speech given less than a week after the incident that while inside the Lingig MPO, as the NPA was divesting the garrison of its arsenal, Luna had been the one directing the guerillas! Interestingly Luna never responded to the remarks, this in a nation where people sue for libel when accused by journalists of poor performance. Quite telling indeed.
Though the 2007 Election was uneventful, after the unforgettable experience of 2006, Luna was now in his third and final mayoral term and like the predecessor he murdered, Mayor Luna arranged to switch places with his Vice Mayor, Henry Santos Dano in the 2010 Election.
As the 2010 Election drew very close the Luna Family endured a minor crisis as Mayor Luna's son took deathly ill and was rushed to Davao City where physicians were able to stave off the boy's fever. Still, he remained in Davao Doctors Hospital for his recuperation. At 330AM on May 2010 Mayor Luna and his bodyguards left Lingig in two vehicles, a Nissan Navarra and a Toyota Hi-Lux en route to Davao City to visit his son. Leaving Agusan del Sur Province and entering Barangay Pasian in the municipality of Monkayo, in Compostela Valley (Comval) Province the two trucks ran into yet another one of the many checkpoints up and down Davao-Agusan National Hiway. By the time the trucks inched up to the point of inspection the well armed men conducting vehicular checks drew down their M16s and began barking orders. By this time Mayor Luna must have had no illusions, he was once again being "captured" by the NPA, the very same element none the less, Front 20. Disarming the Mayor's security detail the NPA captured five M16s, two 45 caliber pistols, one 380 caliber pistol, and one 38 revolver.
The guerillas ordered Luna out of the vehicle alone with 4 members of his security detail:
1) Pfc. (Private First Class) Johnrey Abao, 58IB (Infantry Battalion)
2) Pfc. Arnel Dizon, 58IB.
3) PO2 (Police Officer Second Grade) Boy de Castro, Lingig MPO
4) PO3 Alan Dapitanon, Lingig MPO
The NPA claimed that the had captured Mayor Luna for a variety of offences "against the people." They rightly accused him or murdering Vice Mayor Onsing in 2001 though they referred to him as "Mayor Onsing" and claimed that ge had preceeded Luna as mayor. They also mentioned the murder of the Suazo brothers BUT erroneously gave the year of that incident as 2007 instead of the correct 2003. The Philippine Media, as inept as it nearly always is, simply re-gurgitated whatever spiel the NPA force fed it. The media erroneously seized upon 2007 as the year the NPA had used Luna to raid the Lingig MPO. Of course as I just noted that incident took place in 2006. Moreover, many media outlets are claiming that the NPA captured Luna twice in 2007, making the 2010 incident his third capture. He was never captured in 2007 and 2010 is the second and last incident.
On May 17th, 2010 all 5 men were released in the jungle where Lingig borders Davao Oriental and Agusan del Sur Provinces. Luna's family, on his instructions, had paid the NPA 3 million Pesos (60,000 US roughly speaking) to make "restitution to the people." Though the ordeal cost Luna a pretty penny, and couldn't have come at a worse time with his youngest son hospitalised, all was not dismal as he had in fact emerged victorious in his bid to gain the Vice Mayoralty and have his heretofore Vice Mayor Henry Santos Dano take the Mayoral seat.
Fast forward to August 6th, 2011 and the meeting taking place that day in Makati between GPH Peace Panel Chairperson Alex Padilla and NDFP Peace Panelist Fidel Agcaoili...
That morning, just after daybreak, a man in the typical Barong Tagalog, a semi-dress shirt utilised by most National Bureau of Investigation officers, appeared at the gate of Mayor Dano's residential compound. Speaking with one of the Mayor's AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines bodyguards he introduced himself as an NBI agent paying the requisite courtesy call on the municipality's executive(s) before launching an operation in Lingig. As courtesy dictates the AFP "bodyguard" opened the compound gate to allow the agent in. At this point the gate was rushed by dozens of NPA guerillas who quickly disarmed all present before taking Mayor Dano and two of his AFP bodyguards:
1) Corporal Alrey Villasis de Samparado, 75IB, an S2 (Intelligence Rated)
2) Pfc. Roland Saban, 75IB, S2
I need to note that as usual the media has dropped the ball and recorded the second subject's name incorrectly as "Pfc. Alan Pelino."
The guerillas, from Front 20, captured two M16s and two 45 pistols before herding all three men quickly out of the compound and into one of two idling vans, a green Hyundai Starex and a blue Toyota Hi-Lux. Each van took a different route but both were seen crossing out of Lingig and into the municipality of Boston across the provincial line in Davao Oriental.
75IB immediately set out in hot pursuit. Using one AFP SUV and two civilian pick up trucks entered Sitio Mahayahay in Lingig's Barangay Pabacatan they were ambushed by an NPA Blocking Force. The initial IED, or Improvised Explosive Device (as in "bomb") detonation killed one soldier:
1) Private (Pvt.) Wenceslao K.Pena, 75IB
and wounded 5 more and 1 CAA. By the time the 6 wounded men arrived at the hospital another soldier had died:
1) Pvt.Reymund H.Valencia, 75IB
Despite the great danger posed by the AFP's famously inept "rescue operations" the military has continued thrashing to and fro, running full speed through the jungles of Caraga and Davao Regions. In Thursday, August 11th the 67IB, operating in the municipality of Cateel in Davao Oriental Province walked unawares into a fully manned NPA camp in Barangay Abejod. After an intense 1 hour firefight that critically wounded 4 AFP soldiers and merely wounding a single guerilla, the NPA withdrew leaving the AFP to savour its spoils. Though they did manage to capture the wounded guerilla, a female medic named Lyka Navarro, they did gain a very rare success with a huge cache in terms of NPA weaponry, all of which is usually gained one weapon at a time. Five M16s, two M653s (a bull pup M16, or Baby Armalite in AFP slang), two M14s, five M4s, one M203 grenade launcher, and three Kenwood walkie talkies.
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