The following "History" entry is quite different from my previous entries for a couple of reasons. First, it isn't an axcerpt but an entire publication, albeit one with substantially less content than most books. Secondly, it is of a much more recent vintage having been published almost 20 years ago. I also need to point out that the publisher, HRW, or Human Rights Watch, is one that I often find quite suspect. Recently I posted a three part series on HRW's report on the so called "Davao Death Squadl although found no serious factual errors, the report smacked of amateurish innuendo and nothing was corroborated. It was all subjective nonsense. Still, it drew international attention to the dynamic and did provide character sketches of 28 alleged victims. Likewise with this report. The jist of the work is that the AFP-sponsored armed reserves like the now defunct Integrated Civil Home Defense (ICHDF) or its succesor, today's Civilian Auxiliary Geographical Force Unit (CAFGU) as well as the Lumad (Animist Hilltribesmen) paramilitaries that were folded into the nascent CAFGU, just as they had been with the ICHDF.
Unlike the aforementioned Davao Death Squad report, "You Can Die at Anytim," this report, "Bad Blood: Militia Abuses in Mindanao, the Philippines," resulted in a very intencive investigation. For five weeks in January and February of 1992 HRW staffers covered the bloody violence in Mindanao's Caraga Region, specifically the borderlands of Agusan del Sur and Suriago del Sur Provinces, close to what was then the northern reaches of Davao del Norte Province, but what has since become Compostela Valley, or ComVal Province. The saddest thing is how nothing at all has changed in the nearly two decades since.
It is a thirty-six paged report but like so many of its ilk, the first several pages are tables, and report overviews, etc., so that I begin on page seven. This will be a three part entry.
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Bad Blood: Militia Abuses in Mindanao, the Philippines
pp7
The Military, the Paramilitary, and the NPA
From CHDF to CAFGU
Since its inception the Philippine Military has served primarily as an internal security force, directed to quell indigenous insurgencies rather than to fight external aggressors. Paramilitary auxiliaries, both official and unofficial, have been central to these internal operations. Paramilitary groups have allowed the military to circumvent the more costly alternative- large increases in the regular territorial foces- and have functioned as the military's grassroots "eyes and ears" in communities suspected of harboring subversives. Historically, the Government has had a poor record of convicting members of paramilitary groups on human rights grounds.
During the Japanese Occupation, the Philippine Constabulary (PC) , then the leading internal security force, worked closely with a paramilitary group known as the Civil Guards, which were armed by the PC and paid by landholder's collaborating with the Japanese. After World War II, Civil Guards were used in a brutal and successful war to crush a peasant uprising in Luzon known as the Huk Rebellion. Local fanatic cult groups were also deployed in terror campaigns in a strategy masterminded by the CIA's head Edward Lansdale. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Military continued to use civilian paramilitary organizations under various names under successive administrations.
In the mid-1970s, existing paramilitary organizations were absorbed into the new Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force, or ICHDF. In Mindanao, the IHCDF, or CHDF, was originally deployed together with Cristian armed fanatic groups against an uprising in the Muslim population. The CHDF often operated in independent teams, outside the chain of command. Under the supervision of Constabulary forces, the CHDF soon grew to more than 73,000 members, and gained international notoriety for brutality. Virtually every major international human rights organization working in the Philippines documented its abuses.
Beginning in 1974, the CHDF were also increasingly deployed against the New Peoples Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. By 1985, NPA forces , driven by worsening poverty and unprecedented levels of corruption in government, had grown to an estimated 25,000 armed insurgents. Most of the CHDF were deployed in Mindanao, which helped the NPA expand in that region, because "in addition to being incompetent , the CHDF were brutal" ("Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines" Richard Kessler [New Haven,Conn.:Yale University Press] [1989] pp121). In one particularly grisly example reported to the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, a mother described what the CHDF had done to her daughter:
"Last December 23, 1984, I was working at our farm in Sitio Bagacay, while my daughter Virginia was inside our nipa house. At about 4PM, I heard gunshots coming from the hill directly above where our house was located...I recognized the men as four members of the Civilian Home Defense Force...the four CHDF members approached Virginia, took her to our (farm) plot. Once there, they removed the dress, bra, and panties of Virginia...
pp8
...laid her on the ground and the four took turns having sexual intercourse with her. Virginia shouted for help twice and after her second appeal for help, (one of the CHDF) stabbed her with a dagger above her breast and below her navel, after which he shot her with his rifle. After looting the hut, the four CHDF members burned it down, fired several more shots in the air and left" (LCHR "Salvaging Democracy) pp33).
Because of many abuses like this one, the dissolution of the CHDF became a constant refrain of human rights groups and the political opposition to Marcos in the early 1980s. Opposition candidate Corazon Aquino made the end of the CHDF a key promise during her presidential campaign, and when she took office, she vowed to make good on her campaign pledge. The new Constitution, ratified in February 1987, provided that "all paramilitary forces including the CHDF...shall be dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force," but permitted the creation of a "citizens armed force" (Constitution Article XVII, Section 24).
The CHDF and other paramilitary units were officially dissolved six months later. Just ten days later, however, Aquino signed an Executive Irder creating the new Citizens Armed Forces- Geographical Unit (CAFGU) (Executive Order #275 dissolved the CHDF on 7/15/87 and Executive Order #264 created CAFGU on July 25, 1987). Initially, according to various Military estimates, between 30 and 70% of CAFGU recruits were former CHDF members.
Recognizing the brutality of the CHDF, military leaders made efforts to distinguish the CAFGU from the CHDF. The CAFGU, they said, was not a paramilitary force, which was now outlawed. It was rather a "reservist army" or militia, to be deployed solely in their home communities to defend against incursions by rebel forces. Guidelines assured that only "qualified" individuals would be admitted in a careful screening process, a process supervised by civil, as well as military authorities. Recruits with criminal, or "derogatory" records would be excluded. Ideally CAFGU recruits were to be drawn from the pool of roughly "one million idle Reservists, highschool graduates or ROTC or Civil Military Training courses or of summer military courses. In cases where there were insufficient numbers of eligible candidates, the Armed Forces may screen all able bodied male citizens and train them" (from Executive Order #264, line #240 under "Implementing Rules and Regulations").
In reality, the guidelines used in screening potential recruits are inadequate to prevent abusive individuals from being accepted. Given the poor record of prosecutions against human rights violators, many former CHDF and vigilante group members may be legally accepted. More worrisome, national and internation human rights groups have complained that even the limited screening safeguards are routinely ignored or purposely circumvented.
Training for CAFGU also appears to be inadequate. While the military points to the fact that the six week training for CAFGU includes several hours training on concepts of human rights. Human Rights Watch learned of several instances where training personnel (who after training became the unit's commanding officers) are themselves known to be abusive.
Guidelines drafted by the Department of National Defense provided that the CAFGU, unlike the CHDF, would be subject to the same discipline and chain of command as the regular armed forces. Each armed forces detachment would be liable for abuses committed by CAFGU members operating under its command. However, Human Rights Watch found that military officers often denied that especially abusive CAFGU members were under their command, despite evidence to the contrary.
pp9
In early 1992, some 89,000 CAFGU had been deployed, and plans were underway to increase the CAFGU by another 10,000. In rural areas, CAFGU forces were increasingly eclipsing local civilian government and police functions. Because of their superior knowledge of local territory and history, the CAFGUs were employed by the military in all aspects of military operations, from informants and guides to frontline forces in search and destroy operations against rebel hideouts.
Human Rights Watch documented dozens of grave human rights abuses, ranging from Extra-Judicial Killings to maltreatment while in custody, committed by CAFGU members in Mindanao. Little, it seems, had changed. The findings echo several earlier reports by international human rights organizations, which documented an alarming rise in cases of abuse by the militia in 1989.
Human Rights Watch findings cast serious doubt on the rigorousness of the CAFGU screening process and on the ability of regular forces to control and discipline units in Mindanao. Lists available through military and civil authorities revealed that a majority of recruits formerly belonged to the CHDF. In other cases, CAFGU members were known to belong to local fanatical cults or tribal armies, and still others reportedly had criminal records. The idea of drawing reservists from college level ROTC graduates was impossible to achieve in outlying areas, where the vast majority of residents have only a few years schooling. In cases where CAFGU abuses were reported to authorities, few militiamen were disarmed, discharged, tried, and convicted (in Agusan del Sur Province only 35% finished primary school and only 10% were graduates of any formal military training).
Worse, in a few documented cases where CAFGU members were officially discharged, the individuals continued to be employed in military operations against insurgents.
Human Rights Reforms
Few military, paramilitary, or militia members have ever been prosecuted by the courts. The problem is not one of laws, but one of enforcement. The Philippines is signatory to many of the principle human rights treaties, and the Philippine Constitution contains a comprehensive Bill of Rights.
Several Governmental bodies concerned with human rights exist. A Government Commision on Human Rights (CHR) laid down in the Constitution, is charged with investigating human rights abuses by both the Government and the NPA, and recommending cases for prosecution. It has no power to prosecute.
However, even within its limited mandate, the CHR has had little success in investigating abuses. Critics both within and outside the agency say the CHR has attempted to investigate too wide a variety of civil and criminal matters...
pp10
...and complain that its resources are too centralized in the capital. Of 679 staff on January 1992, 300 were in Manila. While the Manila office produced glossy brochures and detailed performance reports, investigators in the countryside complained about being short of staff and funds. Each regional office had the use of just one vehicle for investigators across an average of seven provinces; and budgets were so tight that investigators routinely paid for Xerox copying out of their own pocket. In Surigao del Sur Province, where numerous cases of abuse were reported, the field investigator said he had use of neither a type writer nor a Government vehicle.
The CHR is also hindered by its reputation for being ineffectual as an avenue for justice. Of 3,414 complaints filed with the CHR in 1991, only 836 were filed in the courts or in other agencies. The CHR was unable to point to any discharge or jail sentence of military as a result. Human rights groups also complained that CHR was too passive, failing to investigate reported abuses unless the complaintant filed a formal complaint, which the victims of abuse were often reluctant to do.
To its credit, the CHR appears to have showed some boldness in employing its new powers to delay schueduled promotions of military officers on the basis of existing human rights complaints. Human Rights Watch found evidence to suggest that this is having a strong psychological impact on higher ranks in the military. In Mindanao, for instance, Human Rights Watch was told by military sources that the promotion of a brigade commander in Bukidnon was held up because of complaints filed against a subordinate, a lieutenant colonel; two other colonels, one in Agusan del Sur and one in Bukidnon, were also not promoted because of complaints filed with the Commission on Human Rights going back to the mid-1980s. A major in Tupi, South Cotabato also said his promotion had been held up, and local human rights monitors said he has been consulting with them on human rights issues more frequently since then (the "major" in South Cotabato was Major Bermudez, interviewed by HRW on 1/21/92 and the "colonel in Bukidnon was Col.Rodolfo Rocamora interviewed by HRW at Camp Osito Bahian on 1/21/92).
The Presidential Human Rights Committee, a cabinet-level task force which includes representatives of the military, CHR, Departent of Justice and non-governmental human rights organizations, has pushed a member of human rights cases to the spotlight since 1989, but it remains to be seen whether any prosecutions can be attained. Under the leadership of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon and his successor, Silvestre N.Bello III, the PHRC launched several investigations. In November 1991, a Task Force was actively prosecuting several cases of political killings, including a case of multiple murder and arson against a military sergeant in the massacare of the Peralta family in Pangasinan. The PHRC also enacted several new directives, but implementation appeared to be a problem. For example, the PHRC drafted legislation instituting an important, critical program for protecting witnesses and their families. However, a year after the legislation had become law, and despite a hefty $1 Million budget, the program had still not been utilized in a single instance.
Officials in PHRC blamed the non-implementation of the program on the increasing political paralysis in the months leading up to the 1992 Elections.
pp11
There was an increasing sense of lawlessness during the election period. Three candidates were assassinated in February and early March. Government officials complained that the Armed Forces were "outgunned" by the estimated 143 private armies across the country. In fact, many of the "private" armies were manned by offduty soldiers and militia. The local and national press provided a daily litany of scandals describing soldiers and militiamen's involvement in illegal logging, extortion, kidnapping rings, and guns-for-hire rings.
Police commanders publicly expressed fears that CAFGU groups might be used by wealthy politicians to intimidate voters during the elections. In Central Mindanao, a police official announced that the CAFGU and vigilante forces were being mobilized by politicians as private armies. This prompted President Aquino to request that CAFGU deployed in areas where insurgency no longer posed a threat be disarmed. A week later, however, the Commissioner on Elections said the 89.000 CAFGU could keep their arms following a request by the Defense Secretary Renato de Villa that the CAFGU serve as official "poll watchers' and promised "clean and fair' elections.
The Military and Human Rights
The Philippine Military has long been characterized by excessive politicization and abusiveness. It has also been tainted by the image of illegitimacy. Historically it has served as a collaborator with foreign occupying powers, and as an instrument of elite repression. Even though the military had taken pains to clean up its tarnished image. At the highest levels, the military had cooperated with efforts by the legislature, the Department of Justice, and the Commission on Human Rights to strengthen civilian authority. In late 1990, the legislature passed a law dissolving the PC, a security force which was responsible for serious human rights abuses during the Marcos and Aquino Administrations, and instituted a new national police under civilian control. In June 1991, Aquino signed legislation which returned to civil courts jurisdiction over human rights and criminal offenses filed against members of the military.
However, for reasons not entirely clear, human rights reforms appeared to have successfully "trickled down" to the intermediate and rank and file level. In 1991, evidence of human rights abuses by soldiers and militia continued to be reported, although on a lesser scale. There appeared to be a serious lack of political will in combating remaining obstruction among military ranks. The military's commitment to enforcing the Government's legal commitments to preserving human rights appeared questionable.
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Parts 2, 3, and 4 to follow...
Showing posts with label Surigao del Norte Province. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Surigao del Norte Province. Show all posts
Wednesday, November 2, 2011
Wednesday, August 31, 2011
NPA Armed Contacts for the Third Quarter, Part V: Attack on Medina Police Station
In my last NPA entry, "NPA Armed Attacks for the Second Quarter of 2011, Part VII" I discussed the supposed "Pacification" of Misamis Oriental Province and the resurgence of the North Central Mindanao Regional Committee, or NCMRC of the NPA. Central to that entry was the municipality of Balingasag in the Balitucan Mountains, home to the NPA's Front 4B. This particular Front has a storied past, one which I touched upon in that aforementioned recent Second Quarter entry.
The ressurection of Front 4B is now undeniable with its spearheading of a major tactical operation on Thursday, August 25th, 2011. Early in the morning on the day in question a female guerilla from Front 16A of the NEMRC, or Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee chartered a van in Surigao City, in the province of Surigao del Norte. The young lady said that she and her siblings would be travelling for a family get together to take place that afternoon in the municipality of Medina, two provinces away in Misamis Oriental. Leaving Surigao City at 930AM the van carrying 10 NPA guerillas began the long drive along Mindanao's northern coast.
Arriving on the outskirts of Medina at 3PM the young female guerilla directed the unsuspecting driver to her "cousin's" home, actually an empty lot where two other rented vans awaited them. Pulling up to the other two vans the driver looked quizicaly at his fare only to be told that he had been commandeered by the NPA and that if he complied without resistance he would live to tell about his exciting day. The other two vans had been chartered that very afternoon, there in Medina, by members of the NPA's Front 4B of the NCMRC, or Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee. Removing assault rifles from boxes and rice sacks that had been transported aboard the three vans, the guerillas then waited until 430PM before ordering the three drivers to proceed into the town centre, Barangay Poblacion, after first co-ordinating positions with a small Blocking Force at two key positions on the only routes in and out of the town centre:
1) A checkpoint on National Hiway
2) In between the Public Market and the entrance into the town's main drag
Driving slowly through the small municipality the three vans, travelling together, mangaged to avoid arousing suspicion as they made their way to the municipal compound. At 515PM the vans stopped several meters from the compound entrance. Instructing the drivers to quickly walk away, 2 well armed guerillas were left to guard the idling vans while the other 28 put their plan into motion. As guerillas poured out of the vans horrified townspeople quickly began running for cover knowing all too well what was about to transpire. Firing rifles as they flooded the compound, SPO1 Edito Bayhon was immediately shot in the head and killed. The 25 year veteran of the Medina MPO, or Municipal Police Office and a resident of the town's Barangay Tupop, had been manning the station's desk, situated just inside the building's doorway. A detachment of 10 guerillas then attempted to infiltrate the town hall situated next to the MPO building.
Sitting inside his office in the town hall Mayor Pacifico Pupos was deep in conversation with two barangay captains and a town councilor when the staccato blasts from rifles, punctuated by detonations of rifle grenades immediately caught his attention. Proceeding to an inner office that was far more secure he and his three guests did their best to ride out the attack.
Alerted to the attack and knowing he had only 7 officers inside the MPO, the Chief of Police rushed past the Public Market only to run headlong into the second Blocking Force position. The result was a quick but intense firefight that prevented the Chief from aiding his men. The first Blocking Force position, the checkpoint on National Hiway, quickly closed up shoppe upon learning from a Spotter that a massive amount of re-inforcements were en route to Medina from neighbouring Gingoog City.
Outside the town hall the 10 man detachment met unexpected resistance in the front foyer and quickly backpedaled into the compound to join in on the assault's main target, the MPO and its modest stock of weaponry. At the 45 minute mark, having failed to infiltrate either objective the guerillas withdrew in orderly fashion and climbed aboard the idling vans before speeding out of Barangay Poblacion and into Barangay San Isidro where they abandoned all three vans before dispersing on foot in different directions, later rendevouzing over the border in the adjacent province of Bukidnon. From there the combined forces of Front 16A and 4B made their way overland to the mountainous border of Bukidnon and Agusan del Norte Provinces in a hard push that ended very late Friday night, August 26th.
The NPA had lost one guerilla, from Front 4B, whose identity remains unknown despite early information that he might have been a Team Leader (detachment commanding officer) known by the nom de guerre "Ka Hakim." The Government casualties, aside from the deceased SPO1, Edito Bayhon, were two critically wounded officers:
1) SPO2 Renie Galera Rombo
2) SPO1 Diosdado Salas Sendiong
The next day while scouring Medina the 8IB (Infantry Battalion) discovered all three vans in Barangay San Isidro, the only progress made by the AFP during its "hot pursuit" of the guerillas. The incident is note worthy in and above it being yet another NPA attack. It followed the blueprint used in the SMRC, or Southern Mindanao Regional Committee's attack on the Panabo City CPO (City Police Office), in Davao del Norte Province back on March 19th of 2011. Employing a non-threatening female guerilla to charter vans for a "family gathering," and then retaining the vans for stage one of their withdrawal...Likewise, one should pay attention to the high degree of co-operation not only between Fronts (not unusual) but between Regional Committees as well (very unusual). In the end the NPA lost a guerilla but did capture an additional M16 off of one of the wounded police officers. Still, the operation, one of an astounding 64 tactical operations by the NPA, in 4ID (Infantry Division) AOR, or Area of Responsibility (as in "Area of Operation") in just the Third Quarter, put Front 4B firmly back into play, even if they did need Front 19A in order to do it.
The ressurection of Front 4B is now undeniable with its spearheading of a major tactical operation on Thursday, August 25th, 2011. Early in the morning on the day in question a female guerilla from Front 16A of the NEMRC, or Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee chartered a van in Surigao City, in the province of Surigao del Norte. The young lady said that she and her siblings would be travelling for a family get together to take place that afternoon in the municipality of Medina, two provinces away in Misamis Oriental. Leaving Surigao City at 930AM the van carrying 10 NPA guerillas began the long drive along Mindanao's northern coast.
Arriving on the outskirts of Medina at 3PM the young female guerilla directed the unsuspecting driver to her "cousin's" home, actually an empty lot where two other rented vans awaited them. Pulling up to the other two vans the driver looked quizicaly at his fare only to be told that he had been commandeered by the NPA and that if he complied without resistance he would live to tell about his exciting day. The other two vans had been chartered that very afternoon, there in Medina, by members of the NPA's Front 4B of the NCMRC, or Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee. Removing assault rifles from boxes and rice sacks that had been transported aboard the three vans, the guerillas then waited until 430PM before ordering the three drivers to proceed into the town centre, Barangay Poblacion, after first co-ordinating positions with a small Blocking Force at two key positions on the only routes in and out of the town centre:
1) A checkpoint on National Hiway
2) In between the Public Market and the entrance into the town's main drag
Driving slowly through the small municipality the three vans, travelling together, mangaged to avoid arousing suspicion as they made their way to the municipal compound. At 515PM the vans stopped several meters from the compound entrance. Instructing the drivers to quickly walk away, 2 well armed guerillas were left to guard the idling vans while the other 28 put their plan into motion. As guerillas poured out of the vans horrified townspeople quickly began running for cover knowing all too well what was about to transpire. Firing rifles as they flooded the compound, SPO1 Edito Bayhon was immediately shot in the head and killed. The 25 year veteran of the Medina MPO, or Municipal Police Office and a resident of the town's Barangay Tupop, had been manning the station's desk, situated just inside the building's doorway. A detachment of 10 guerillas then attempted to infiltrate the town hall situated next to the MPO building.
Sitting inside his office in the town hall Mayor Pacifico Pupos was deep in conversation with two barangay captains and a town councilor when the staccato blasts from rifles, punctuated by detonations of rifle grenades immediately caught his attention. Proceeding to an inner office that was far more secure he and his three guests did their best to ride out the attack.
Alerted to the attack and knowing he had only 7 officers inside the MPO, the Chief of Police rushed past the Public Market only to run headlong into the second Blocking Force position. The result was a quick but intense firefight that prevented the Chief from aiding his men. The first Blocking Force position, the checkpoint on National Hiway, quickly closed up shoppe upon learning from a Spotter that a massive amount of re-inforcements were en route to Medina from neighbouring Gingoog City.
Outside the town hall the 10 man detachment met unexpected resistance in the front foyer and quickly backpedaled into the compound to join in on the assault's main target, the MPO and its modest stock of weaponry. At the 45 minute mark, having failed to infiltrate either objective the guerillas withdrew in orderly fashion and climbed aboard the idling vans before speeding out of Barangay Poblacion and into Barangay San Isidro where they abandoned all three vans before dispersing on foot in different directions, later rendevouzing over the border in the adjacent province of Bukidnon. From there the combined forces of Front 16A and 4B made their way overland to the mountainous border of Bukidnon and Agusan del Norte Provinces in a hard push that ended very late Friday night, August 26th.
The NPA had lost one guerilla, from Front 4B, whose identity remains unknown despite early information that he might have been a Team Leader (detachment commanding officer) known by the nom de guerre "Ka Hakim." The Government casualties, aside from the deceased SPO1, Edito Bayhon, were two critically wounded officers:
1) SPO2 Renie Galera Rombo
2) SPO1 Diosdado Salas Sendiong
The next day while scouring Medina the 8IB (Infantry Battalion) discovered all three vans in Barangay San Isidro, the only progress made by the AFP during its "hot pursuit" of the guerillas. The incident is note worthy in and above it being yet another NPA attack. It followed the blueprint used in the SMRC, or Southern Mindanao Regional Committee's attack on the Panabo City CPO (City Police Office), in Davao del Norte Province back on March 19th of 2011. Employing a non-threatening female guerilla to charter vans for a "family gathering," and then retaining the vans for stage one of their withdrawal...Likewise, one should pay attention to the high degree of co-operation not only between Fronts (not unusual) but between Regional Committees as well (very unusual). In the end the NPA lost a guerilla but did capture an additional M16 off of one of the wounded police officers. Still, the operation, one of an astounding 64 tactical operations by the NPA, in 4ID (Infantry Division) AOR, or Area of Responsibility (as in "Area of Operation") in just the Third Quarter, put Front 4B firmly back into play, even if they did need Front 19A in order to do it.
Monday, June 27, 2011
NPA Armed Contacts for the Second Quarter of 2011, Part VI: A Resurgence in Surigao del Norte Province
As I have noted in other recent NPA entries the island of Mindanao has 4 provinces that have been officially pacified:
1) Misamis Oriental
2) Camiguin
3) Dinagat
4) Surigao del Norte
Being declared as such doesn't depend upon any type of established protocol. It is an entirely arbitrary decision made by the nearest ID CO (Infantry Division Commanding Officer). Upon making his decision the CO will formally turn over command and control of counterinsurgency operations to the Provincial Peace and Order Committee, or PPOC. From then on it is the PPO,or Provincial Police Office of the PNP (Philippine National Police) that handles the day to day aspects of what is supposed to be, at that point,a policing operation. Surigao del Norte Province was declared insurgency free in mid-April of 2010 along with the other 3 provinces, all of which lie within the AOR (Area of Responsibilty) of the 4ID (4th Infantry Division). Less than 2 weeks later, as if to thumb its nose at 4ID's then CO (Commanding Officer), Major General Mario Chan, the NPA disarmed a large security contingent escorting a campaigning incumbent mayor and absconded with all the weaponry. As I noted in my entry then, "Famous last words."
Since then the NPA's Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee under NDFP Spokesperson for Mindanao, Jorge "Ka Oris" Madlos, made a strategical decision to marshall its firepower in the more valuable Andap Valley Complex on the Surigao del Sur and Agusan del Sur provincial nexus. Though Surigao del Norte has a bit of chromite and nickel mining it pales in comparison to the gold and timber in Andap. Mining and Logging are two of the major cash cows of the NPA. Multi-national gold mines pay on average P1 Million ($22,000) a month in "Revolutionary Taxes." Everyone from the independent small scale miner to the person owning the ball mill offers up a percentage of their gross to avoid any problems, small trifling things, like a bullet in the face.
The modus operandi of the NPA is extremely basic Maoist in strategy and tactics as well as ideology. Strategically they ebb and flow, gravitating towards the weakest point as long as they have even a minimum base of support. This is why the NPA will ALWAYS break off contact if given the chance, which of course the AFP is always happy to provide. This allows the NPA to determine whether or not it will be unable to meet its well defined tactical objective within 15 to 30 minutes of launching an assault. If not, there is no sense in wasting valuable resources, withdraw, regroup, and live to try another day. With the province having been de-militarised it was only a matter of time before the NPA gravitated back into the province.
In early May of 2011 the NPA's Front 19A of the Northeast Mindanao Regional Commitee (NEMRC) began building momentum in a sector of Agusan del Norte Province very near the Surigao del Norte border, moving through a 50 kilometer radius, centered in Agusan del Norte Province's Zapanta Valley. On May 12th, thirty guerillas from Front 19A infiltrated Surigao City, the capitol of Surigao del Norte Province, via watercraft that landed in Barangay Silop. Moving inland they entered Barangay Luna and just before 10PM entered an unattended quarry. The night watchman, Pastor Apostado Quiban only makes periodic checks most nights. Targeting a Komatsu excavator, a TCM payloader, and an Isuzu dumptruck the guerillas poured gasoline over each piece. The owner of the equipment, Enrique Baguio,had refused to pay his "Revolutionary Taxes" despite recently gaining work as a subcontractor for Tinio Construction. Tinio in turn is a subcontractor for the Gaisano Capitol Group which is constructing a new mall, the Gaisano Capitol in that same barangay, Luna. Mr.Baguio's equipment is employed in excavating sand and gravel for the job. Lighting the gasoline the guerillas quickly exited the quarry and re-traced their route to the shore and left as they had arrived.
On May 25th the same thirty Front 19A guerillas re-entered the city and rendevouzed with a detachment of ten guerillas who had crossed overland by stolen truck. The guerillas quickly removed two dozen tyres from the vehicle and set them in a line across National Hiway in Barangay Bonifacio at two separate positions. Pouring gasoline over them the guerillas then set them on fire just as the sun began setting.Quickly moving they surrounded a compound in between the two burning roadblocks as six men entered through its open gates. Kicking in the frontdoor of Chary T.Mangacop's home, ex-Mayor of Placer in Surigao del Norte Province, they began ransacking the dwelling from top to bottom. Capturing three M16s and one 45 caliber pistol, two bulletproof vests, two ICOM base radios and four ICOM handhelds they then exited the home. Shooting out the left front tyre of Mangacop's SUV they then doused his minivan, straight truck, backhoe and two dumptrucks with gasoline which they then set on fire before exiting the compound and making their way to the shore for an escape by sea.
Mangacop, who was defeated in the May 10th, 2010 Election, claims that the guerillas also stole jewlery and a significant amount of cash. He says the cash was to be used as payroll for a mine he owns in Placer. The burned equipment belonged to his company, CTM Construction. The attack on the Mangacop compound was the second to strike Surigao City in two weeks. Knowing that the NPA element responsible, Front 19A was momentarily centered in the municipality of Kitcharao in neighbouring Agusan del Norte Province, the AFP's (Armed Forces of the Philippines) 30IB (Infantry Battalion) undertook a heavy push into Kitcharao. In fact, the 30IB had been operating in Kitcharao for two days already, even losing a soldier by sniper the afternoon before, or so says the NPA. Now deploying heavily and concentrating on the remote Barangay Bangayan in the Zapanta Valley, the operation commenced just 12 hours after the guerillas left the Mangacop compound. The 30IB began by softening up the ground with several hours of 81MM mortar shelling into the valley.
Of course Front 19A's main force hadn't been able to return to Kitcharao in the interim since its attack the preceding evening. There were 40 odd kilometers between the points but that didn't occur to the 30IB or its overlords in the 4ID (Infantry Division) which signed off on this large operation. So what were those long 81MM mortar shells hitting if there were no NPA guerillas?
The Zapanta Valley is home to a small band of Mamanwa Tribesmen. The Mamanwa are Negritos. Unlike the Lumad, the various Animist Tribes of Malay stock, the Negritos on Mindanao do not involve themselves in conflict in any part of the equation. In fear for their lives the Mamanwa fled to the barangay hall down hill but still they weren't out of the crosshairs. By the end of the month members of multi-sectoral front organisations like the two partist organisations Gabriela and Bayan Muna convinced the Mamanwa to travel 40 odd kilometers into Surigao City where they assured them they would be safe from harm.
In Surigao City's Barangay Luna, in Sitio Bacud, Bayan Muna representatives, assisted by the provincial chapter of the Rotary Club co-ordinated the IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons, a euphanism for "Refugees") arrival with Provincial Board member Leonilo Aldonza who donated the usage of an empty lot he owns. Quickly volunteers erected a tent city and so when the 147 members of thirty-seven Mamanwa families arrived they were able to move right in.
From their arrival on June 1st there was mounting tension between the IDP's supporters and detractors. Among the detractors were the city's Mayor, Enrique Matugas, and such community pillars as the Chairman of the local Chamber of Commerce. Some had the audacity to suggest that the Mamanwa weren't IDPs at all but rather actors in a psychodrama engineered by the aforementioned party list organisations. The Mayor was livid that he hadn't been consulted but unfortunately for him he didn't need to be apprised of anything. The IDPs were staying on a privately owned lot with the owner's full consent.
On June 10th, CAA Isidro L.Sanches was enjoying himself at a cockpit in Barangay Camamonan's Sitio Buya in the municipality of Gigaquit, in Surigao del Norte Province. As Sanches left the cock fight though, five guerillas from Front 16A of the NEMRC approached him and shot him to death with a 45 caliber pistol. CAAs,or Civilian Active Auxiliaries, are men serving in one of four entities that are themselves collectively known as "CAAs" as well. In Mr.Sanches' case he served with the CAFGU, or Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit. CAFGU platoons serve under an AFP NCO (Non-Commissioned Officer), known as a "CAFGU Cadre." Ostensibly under direct supervision of a cadre battalion, in this case the 23IB, in reality they aren't supervised all that much. The CAA serves as the lynchpin in the AFP's counterinsugency strategy.
On June 15th, the 30IB was on patrol in the municipality of Gigaquit's Barangay Lahi, when it stumbled upon six NPA guerillas from Front 16A of the NEMRC and initiated a firefight before allowing the small detachment of NPA to withdraw without casualties.
Later that same day, June 15th, in Surigao City's Barangay Poctoy two of the AFP's KM450 trucks carrying nine soldiers, all from the 30IB en route to a patrol in Barangay Mat-i, were ambushed by IED (Improvised Explosive Device, as in "bomb") which was followed by a cross-fire. The AFP returned fire with the Front 19A guerillas withdrawing without casualties on either side after 15 minutes.
On June 20th everybody's favorite rabid anti-Communist, ANAD Party List Congressman Pastor Jun Alcover jumped into the mix with a letter to CHR (Commission on Human Rights) Commissioner Etta Rosales urging her to"investigate" the IDPs ending up in Surigao City saying that the Government should determine who "forced" the Negritos to travel 40 kilometers into the city. His inference of course is that fellow Party List organisations Bayan Muna and Gabriela should be held liable. Pray tell, does Alcover plan to crucify the Rotary Club as well? For those unfamiliar with that organisation, they are an American-based group that is about Right Wing as it gets. On the same day the 30IB deployed a 6 X 6 truck to the lot housing the IDPs. When questioned on his intentions the 30IB's CO (Commanding Officer) LTC. (Lieutenant Colonel) Rommel P.Lamzon said that his men were only there to serve the terrified tribesmen and vehemently denied any suggestions that he had sent men in full combat array to try and force the 147 shell shocked Mamnwa back across the provincial border.
My favorite LTC.Lamzon quote has got to be his response to claims by the Negritos that his men had been lobbing 81MM mortar rounds into the Mamanwa's thatched huts. What did our gallant Lieutenant Colonel reply? "We always ensure that in all of our operations no civilians will be hurt or worse,k illed. "That's fantastic! The AFP is the only military in history to never incur Collateral Damage! My thought? The AFP is so used to lying through its teeth that the bullshi* just flows naturally. Even if the AFP had GPS mortars, and it does NOT, shells go errant. It is a fact of life. Launching mortars into a village of thatched huts where you haven't deployed spotters or scouts borders on a War Crime but hey, in the Southern Philippines that is a daily occurrence. Remember, this is a world where the AFP claims 6 year old girls carry M16s with grenade launchers, after killing the child of course.
On June 22nd the IDPs climbed aboard 3 dumptrucks and were driven home to Kitcharao, led by their tribal chief, Datu Rolando "Lando" Anlagan whose actual tribal name is "Maribuhok." Finally home in the Zapanta Valley the chief appealed to both the AFP and the NPA and asked them, politely, to take their war elsewhere.
1) Misamis Oriental
2) Camiguin
3) Dinagat
4) Surigao del Norte
Being declared as such doesn't depend upon any type of established protocol. It is an entirely arbitrary decision made by the nearest ID CO (Infantry Division Commanding Officer). Upon making his decision the CO will formally turn over command and control of counterinsurgency operations to the Provincial Peace and Order Committee, or PPOC. From then on it is the PPO,or Provincial Police Office of the PNP (Philippine National Police) that handles the day to day aspects of what is supposed to be, at that point,a policing operation. Surigao del Norte Province was declared insurgency free in mid-April of 2010 along with the other 3 provinces, all of which lie within the AOR (Area of Responsibilty) of the 4ID (4th Infantry Division). Less than 2 weeks later, as if to thumb its nose at 4ID's then CO (Commanding Officer), Major General Mario Chan, the NPA disarmed a large security contingent escorting a campaigning incumbent mayor and absconded with all the weaponry. As I noted in my entry then, "Famous last words."
Since then the NPA's Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee under NDFP Spokesperson for Mindanao, Jorge "Ka Oris" Madlos, made a strategical decision to marshall its firepower in the more valuable Andap Valley Complex on the Surigao del Sur and Agusan del Sur provincial nexus. Though Surigao del Norte has a bit of chromite and nickel mining it pales in comparison to the gold and timber in Andap. Mining and Logging are two of the major cash cows of the NPA. Multi-national gold mines pay on average P1 Million ($22,000) a month in "Revolutionary Taxes." Everyone from the independent small scale miner to the person owning the ball mill offers up a percentage of their gross to avoid any problems, small trifling things, like a bullet in the face.
The modus operandi of the NPA is extremely basic Maoist in strategy and tactics as well as ideology. Strategically they ebb and flow, gravitating towards the weakest point as long as they have even a minimum base of support. This is why the NPA will ALWAYS break off contact if given the chance, which of course the AFP is always happy to provide. This allows the NPA to determine whether or not it will be unable to meet its well defined tactical objective within 15 to 30 minutes of launching an assault. If not, there is no sense in wasting valuable resources, withdraw, regroup, and live to try another day. With the province having been de-militarised it was only a matter of time before the NPA gravitated back into the province.
In early May of 2011 the NPA's Front 19A of the Northeast Mindanao Regional Commitee (NEMRC) began building momentum in a sector of Agusan del Norte Province very near the Surigao del Norte border, moving through a 50 kilometer radius, centered in Agusan del Norte Province's Zapanta Valley. On May 12th, thirty guerillas from Front 19A infiltrated Surigao City, the capitol of Surigao del Norte Province, via watercraft that landed in Barangay Silop. Moving inland they entered Barangay Luna and just before 10PM entered an unattended quarry. The night watchman, Pastor Apostado Quiban only makes periodic checks most nights. Targeting a Komatsu excavator, a TCM payloader, and an Isuzu dumptruck the guerillas poured gasoline over each piece. The owner of the equipment, Enrique Baguio,had refused to pay his "Revolutionary Taxes" despite recently gaining work as a subcontractor for Tinio Construction. Tinio in turn is a subcontractor for the Gaisano Capitol Group which is constructing a new mall, the Gaisano Capitol in that same barangay, Luna. Mr.Baguio's equipment is employed in excavating sand and gravel for the job. Lighting the gasoline the guerillas quickly exited the quarry and re-traced their route to the shore and left as they had arrived.
On May 25th the same thirty Front 19A guerillas re-entered the city and rendevouzed with a detachment of ten guerillas who had crossed overland by stolen truck. The guerillas quickly removed two dozen tyres from the vehicle and set them in a line across National Hiway in Barangay Bonifacio at two separate positions. Pouring gasoline over them the guerillas then set them on fire just as the sun began setting.Quickly moving they surrounded a compound in between the two burning roadblocks as six men entered through its open gates. Kicking in the frontdoor of Chary T.Mangacop's home, ex-Mayor of Placer in Surigao del Norte Province, they began ransacking the dwelling from top to bottom. Capturing three M16s and one 45 caliber pistol, two bulletproof vests, two ICOM base radios and four ICOM handhelds they then exited the home. Shooting out the left front tyre of Mangacop's SUV they then doused his minivan, straight truck, backhoe and two dumptrucks with gasoline which they then set on fire before exiting the compound and making their way to the shore for an escape by sea.
Mangacop, who was defeated in the May 10th, 2010 Election, claims that the guerillas also stole jewlery and a significant amount of cash. He says the cash was to be used as payroll for a mine he owns in Placer. The burned equipment belonged to his company, CTM Construction. The attack on the Mangacop compound was the second to strike Surigao City in two weeks. Knowing that the NPA element responsible, Front 19A was momentarily centered in the municipality of Kitcharao in neighbouring Agusan del Norte Province, the AFP's (Armed Forces of the Philippines) 30IB (Infantry Battalion) undertook a heavy push into Kitcharao. In fact, the 30IB had been operating in Kitcharao for two days already, even losing a soldier by sniper the afternoon before, or so says the NPA. Now deploying heavily and concentrating on the remote Barangay Bangayan in the Zapanta Valley, the operation commenced just 12 hours after the guerillas left the Mangacop compound. The 30IB began by softening up the ground with several hours of 81MM mortar shelling into the valley.
Of course Front 19A's main force hadn't been able to return to Kitcharao in the interim since its attack the preceding evening. There were 40 odd kilometers between the points but that didn't occur to the 30IB or its overlords in the 4ID (Infantry Division) which signed off on this large operation. So what were those long 81MM mortar shells hitting if there were no NPA guerillas?
The Zapanta Valley is home to a small band of Mamanwa Tribesmen. The Mamanwa are Negritos. Unlike the Lumad, the various Animist Tribes of Malay stock, the Negritos on Mindanao do not involve themselves in conflict in any part of the equation. In fear for their lives the Mamanwa fled to the barangay hall down hill but still they weren't out of the crosshairs. By the end of the month members of multi-sectoral front organisations like the two partist organisations Gabriela and Bayan Muna convinced the Mamanwa to travel 40 odd kilometers into Surigao City where they assured them they would be safe from harm.
In Surigao City's Barangay Luna, in Sitio Bacud, Bayan Muna representatives, assisted by the provincial chapter of the Rotary Club co-ordinated the IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons, a euphanism for "Refugees") arrival with Provincial Board member Leonilo Aldonza who donated the usage of an empty lot he owns. Quickly volunteers erected a tent city and so when the 147 members of thirty-seven Mamanwa families arrived they were able to move right in.
From their arrival on June 1st there was mounting tension between the IDP's supporters and detractors. Among the detractors were the city's Mayor, Enrique Matugas, and such community pillars as the Chairman of the local Chamber of Commerce. Some had the audacity to suggest that the Mamanwa weren't IDPs at all but rather actors in a psychodrama engineered by the aforementioned party list organisations. The Mayor was livid that he hadn't been consulted but unfortunately for him he didn't need to be apprised of anything. The IDPs were staying on a privately owned lot with the owner's full consent.
On June 10th, CAA Isidro L.Sanches was enjoying himself at a cockpit in Barangay Camamonan's Sitio Buya in the municipality of Gigaquit, in Surigao del Norte Province. As Sanches left the cock fight though, five guerillas from Front 16A of the NEMRC approached him and shot him to death with a 45 caliber pistol. CAAs,or Civilian Active Auxiliaries, are men serving in one of four entities that are themselves collectively known as "CAAs" as well. In Mr.Sanches' case he served with the CAFGU, or Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit. CAFGU platoons serve under an AFP NCO (Non-Commissioned Officer), known as a "CAFGU Cadre." Ostensibly under direct supervision of a cadre battalion, in this case the 23IB, in reality they aren't supervised all that much. The CAA serves as the lynchpin in the AFP's counterinsugency strategy.
On June 15th, the 30IB was on patrol in the municipality of Gigaquit's Barangay Lahi, when it stumbled upon six NPA guerillas from Front 16A of the NEMRC and initiated a firefight before allowing the small detachment of NPA to withdraw without casualties.
Later that same day, June 15th, in Surigao City's Barangay Poctoy two of the AFP's KM450 trucks carrying nine soldiers, all from the 30IB en route to a patrol in Barangay Mat-i, were ambushed by IED (Improvised Explosive Device, as in "bomb") which was followed by a cross-fire. The AFP returned fire with the Front 19A guerillas withdrawing without casualties on either side after 15 minutes.
On June 20th everybody's favorite rabid anti-Communist, ANAD Party List Congressman Pastor Jun Alcover jumped into the mix with a letter to CHR (Commission on Human Rights) Commissioner Etta Rosales urging her to"investigate" the IDPs ending up in Surigao City saying that the Government should determine who "forced" the Negritos to travel 40 kilometers into the city. His inference of course is that fellow Party List organisations Bayan Muna and Gabriela should be held liable. Pray tell, does Alcover plan to crucify the Rotary Club as well? For those unfamiliar with that organisation, they are an American-based group that is about Right Wing as it gets. On the same day the 30IB deployed a 6 X 6 truck to the lot housing the IDPs. When questioned on his intentions the 30IB's CO (Commanding Officer) LTC. (Lieutenant Colonel) Rommel P.Lamzon said that his men were only there to serve the terrified tribesmen and vehemently denied any suggestions that he had sent men in full combat array to try and force the 147 shell shocked Mamnwa back across the provincial border.
My favorite LTC.Lamzon quote has got to be his response to claims by the Negritos that his men had been lobbing 81MM mortar rounds into the Mamanwa's thatched huts. What did our gallant Lieutenant Colonel reply? "We always ensure that in all of our operations no civilians will be hurt or worse,k illed. "That's fantastic! The AFP is the only military in history to never incur Collateral Damage! My thought? The AFP is so used to lying through its teeth that the bullshi* just flows naturally. Even if the AFP had GPS mortars, and it does NOT, shells go errant. It is a fact of life. Launching mortars into a village of thatched huts where you haven't deployed spotters or scouts borders on a War Crime but hey, in the Southern Philippines that is a daily occurrence. Remember, this is a world where the AFP claims 6 year old girls carry M16s with grenade launchers, after killing the child of course.
On June 22nd the IDPs climbed aboard 3 dumptrucks and were driven home to Kitcharao, led by their tribal chief, Datu Rolando "Lando" Anlagan whose actual tribal name is "Maribuhok." Finally home in the Zapanta Valley the chief appealed to both the AFP and the NPA and asked them, politely, to take their war elsewhere.
Sunday, June 19, 2011
Political Developments,First Quarter of 2011,Part I:Redrawing the Map of Mindanao
In my entry,"Portrait of a Warlord,Part II:Romeo Jalosjos Sr."I briefly discussed the primary motivation for creating new provinces.As I noted,the new province receives its own IRA,or Internal Revenue Allocation as well as PDAF,or Priority Development Assistance Fund,or as even the Presidents call it,"Pork Barrel Funds."The majority of Philippine Politicians having entered politics soley to enrich themselves and their families,the desire to create new ways in which to siphon off money from the Government is always close to the surface.The other side of the coin,the silver lining if you will,is that in doing this the politicians are also inadvertently spurring Economic and Social Development within their new AOR (Area of Responsibility).This is all the more so when politicians succeed in creating a new Congressional District.
One recent,ongoing attempt at creating a new province has been bandied about by the Supreme Court;the Dinagat Islands sit catacorner to the northeast shore of Mainland Mindanao,in the Leyte Gulf.A quiet,unassuming place it 1 of 4 Mindanowan provinces that have been declared Pacified and as such have been de-militarised.The other three provinces are:
1) Surigao del Norte,the province from whence Dinagat seceded
2) Misamis Oriental,another northern province,to the west of Agusan del Norte Province
3) Camiguin,another island province,this one having been created from Misamis Oriental Province
Upon Pacification the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) formally turns over Peace and Order Operations to the LGU,or Local Government Unit (municipal and provincial government).To date,since their much ballyhooed Pacification,both Misamis Oriental and Suriago del Norte have seen the predictable re-surgence of NPA activity.So much for last words.Though the two island provinces,Camiguin and Dinagat have remained insurgency free,the actual fact of the matter is that neither ever harboured any guerillas.When attacks took place there,as a spectuacular company sized assault did on Dinagat in 2008,it was always from elements situated on the mainland who ferried themselves over in watercraft.
Dinagat is primarily know for two things:
1) Chromite mining
2) The headquarters of a messianic religious cult and its very large and well armed paramilitary:The Philippines Benevolent Missionaries Association,or PBMA,centered in the municipality of San Jose.
Founded in the very early-1960s the cult controls virtually every aspect of a follower's life and since the vast majority of people living on Dinagat are PBMA members it is a surreal and somewhat forbidding place,though on the surface it appears to be anything but.The PBMA is led by Ruben Ecleo Jr.who holds the grandiose title,"Supreme Master"in addition to his other title,Representative of the Lone District of Dinagat in the 15th Congress.Ecleo is quite an interesting person,having murdered his wife in 2002 and chopped her into bits and pieces but that is fodder for yet another,"Portrait of a Warlord"entry.
In this entry I want to explore the recent battles over provincial lines,congressional districts,and cityhood status.
In December of 2006 by virtue of RA (Republic Act) #9355,"An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands,"the Dinagat Islands seceded from Surigao del Norte Province and became a province of its own.As is ALWAYS the case opponents of the move,mostly LGU officials from Surigao del Norte whose IRAs and PDAF shares would now decrease significantly,challenged this development.Petitioning the Supreme Court the plaintiffs,3 residents of Surigao del Norte proper:
1) Rodolfo G.Navarro,lead Plaintiff
2) Victor F.Bernal
3) Rene O.Medina,
describing themselves as"Taxpayers"argued that RA #9355 was Un-constitutional,citing Article X,Section 10 of 1987 Constitution which specifies that all LGUs (Local Government Units,as in towns,cities and provinces) must adhere to RA #7160,the Local Government Code of 1991 when creating new juridicial entities.They argued that the Respondents,the Provincial Government of Dinagat,did not adhere to the Code because within the Code there is a specific pre-requisite with regard to a minimum area of any potential province.Article 9,Section 1 specifies a minimum area of 2,000 square kilometers.Dinagat however,collectively (over the entire group of islands) merely amounts to a total area of 802.12 square kilometers.They also cited the Code's requirement of contigious provincial borders.On February,10th,2010 the Supreme Court ruled on the Petition,overturning RA #9355 in a 9 to 6 vote and nullifying the creation of Dinagat Province.
Associate Justice Diosdado Peralta for the Majority agreed with the Petitioner(s) in that the 1987 Constitution mandates LGU adherance to the Local Government Code of 1991 when creating new juridicial entities (LGU units).Associate Justice Peralta also sought to negate the primary rationale offered for circumventing the pre-requisite minimum area clause,Article 9,Section 2 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which allows an exemption to the 2,000 square kilometer watermark in stating that provinces composed of one or more islands are exempt from having to meet that onus.Not so said Associate Justice Peralta.
With regards to Article 9,Section 2 Peralta opined,"(It) cannot be considered an executive construction of the criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code of 1991.It is an extraneous provision not intended by the Local Government Code and,therefore is null and void."With that Associate Justice Peralta found Dinagat lacking on minimum area.I am not a jurist so it may simply be an elementary judicial matter of which I am under-equipped to notice much less evaluate BUT for the life of me it seems as if Peralta arbitrarily decreed a statute within the Code null and void simply to support his otherwise untenable position,thus his lack of citations and/or explanations.The Constitution mandates adherance to the Code.While the Code DOES clearly state the watermark for minimum area it ALSO allows the aforementioned exemption.So,forgive me if I am oblivious here,but it appears to me that the Code hasn't been rejected at all by the proponents of Dinagat Province.In his Opinion Peralta deemed Article 9,Section 2 to NOT be an"executive construct."Are we to infer then that the exemption was inserted into the code surreptitiously?That is the clear inference I am taking away from here.
However,the preceding becomes much less earth shattering when one realises that Associate Justice Peralta ALSO cited the watermark for population.The Code specifies a minimum population of 250,000 within the proposed provincial borders as tallied by the NSO,or National Statistics Office.The 2000 Census gives a population of 106,951 for the Dinagat Islands.Unlike the issue of minimum area there is no exemption offered on this issue.
Almost immediately after the February 2010 Ruling Dinagat Governor Geraldin Ecleo Villaroman,Congressman Ecleo's sister,filed a Motion for Reconsideration.The Solicitor General followed suit and filed its own Motion for Reconsideration as well,both asking the Supreme Court to re-consider its 2010 ruling on the matter.On May 12th,2010 the Court denied both Motions on Lack of Merit and on May 18th the Ruling was deemed Final,entered into the so called,"Book of Judgements"and that SHOULD HAVE BEEN the end of it.Amazingly,and perhaps desperately,on May 26th Governor Ecleo Villaroman filed a second Motion for Reconsideration.Monkey see,monkey do,on May 28th the Solicitor General filed ITS second Motion for Reconsideration as well.Their decision to do so is quite curious because of an incredibly basic axiom of the Philippine Justice System;Rules of Court,Section 2,Rule 52 plainly states,"No second Motion for Reconsideration of a Judgement or Final Resolution by the same party shall be entertained."
Where as before the LGU officials from Surigao del Norte Province were dead set against the secession of Dinagat they now moved to the diametric opposite end of the issue and themselves filed a"Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12,2010."This long winded document was asking the Court's indulgence to enter the fray as concerned stakeholders.The synchronised Local and National Elections had just taken place on May 10th,2010 and LGU officials of Surigao del Norte Province were seeking to preserve their just desserts.Where as before the provincial officials had merely been trying to get a greater share of Government funds,now they were trying to merely retain their newly elected positions.Should Dinagat remain nullified it would then be re-folded back into Surigao del Norte Province.IF THAT happened many of Surigao del Norte's LGU officials would be out of a job.
The Motion,filed by:
1) Congressman Francisco T.Matugas
2) Governor Sol T.Matugas
3) Vice Governor Arturo Carlos A.Egay
4) Provincial Councilor Simeon Vicente G.Castrence
5) Provincial Councilor Mamerto D.Galanida
6) Provincial Councilor Margarito M.Longos
7) Provincial Councilor Cesar M.Bagundol
was Denied on July 20th,2010,with the Court citing Section 2,Rule 19 of the Rules of Court which bars any Motion for Intervention after Final Judgement has been rendered.
On October 22nd,2010 Dinagat's Governor Ecleo Villaroman filed an"Urgent Omnibus Motion,"which was notated as,"to Resolve Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration and to Set Aside Entry of Judgement."Some may see Villaroman's Motion as an example of tenacity.Me?I simply see it as obnoxious.On October 29th the aforementioned LGU officials from Surigao del Norte Province,collectively labeled by the Court as the"Intervenors"filed yet another Motion in the case,"Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgement."In his Minority Opinion on the March 29th,2011 Ruling,which I will discuss shortly,Associate Justice Brion stated that he saw the 2 closely timed Motions as evidence of connivance between Governor Ecleo Villaroman and the Intervenors.
On March 29th,2011 the Supreme Court ruled,but only in response to the Intervenors' Motion of October 29th.Noting that despite the Intervenors lacking personality (meaning direct connection to the case),that in fact the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court,Section 3,Rule 15 does allow the filing of a Second Motion for Reconsideration"in the higher interest of justice."However no mention was made of the glaring contradiction between the"Rules of the Court",vis a vis its Section 5,Rule 37 which bars a Second Motion and the aforementioned"Internal Rules of the Supreme Court"which DOES.Yet another glaring contradiction within Philippine Governance in action.In the Ruling,in a vote mirroring the original Ruling of February,2010,the Court voted 9 to 6.For the Minority Associate Justice Arturo D.Brion wrote that the Majority,authored by Associate Justice Eduardo Nachura is a travesty and an embarassment.This highly unusual example of incredible dissent within the Supreme Court only came to the surface because of Brions revulsion at the Court's latest example of"flip-flopping."It is worth pointing outthat in the original Ruling of February,2010 Associate Justice Nachura was the author of the Minority Opinion where as in this last Ruling he authored the Majority,the epitome of a"flip flop."
So...Dinagat remains a province.
One recent,ongoing attempt at creating a new province has been bandied about by the Supreme Court;the Dinagat Islands sit catacorner to the northeast shore of Mainland Mindanao,in the Leyte Gulf.A quiet,unassuming place it 1 of 4 Mindanowan provinces that have been declared Pacified and as such have been de-militarised.The other three provinces are:
1) Surigao del Norte,the province from whence Dinagat seceded
2) Misamis Oriental,another northern province,to the west of Agusan del Norte Province
3) Camiguin,another island province,this one having been created from Misamis Oriental Province
Upon Pacification the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) formally turns over Peace and Order Operations to the LGU,or Local Government Unit (municipal and provincial government).To date,since their much ballyhooed Pacification,both Misamis Oriental and Suriago del Norte have seen the predictable re-surgence of NPA activity.So much for last words.Though the two island provinces,Camiguin and Dinagat have remained insurgency free,the actual fact of the matter is that neither ever harboured any guerillas.When attacks took place there,as a spectuacular company sized assault did on Dinagat in 2008,it was always from elements situated on the mainland who ferried themselves over in watercraft.
Dinagat is primarily know for two things:
1) Chromite mining
2) The headquarters of a messianic religious cult and its very large and well armed paramilitary:The Philippines Benevolent Missionaries Association,or PBMA,centered in the municipality of San Jose.
Founded in the very early-1960s the cult controls virtually every aspect of a follower's life and since the vast majority of people living on Dinagat are PBMA members it is a surreal and somewhat forbidding place,though on the surface it appears to be anything but.The PBMA is led by Ruben Ecleo Jr.who holds the grandiose title,"Supreme Master"in addition to his other title,Representative of the Lone District of Dinagat in the 15th Congress.Ecleo is quite an interesting person,having murdered his wife in 2002 and chopped her into bits and pieces but that is fodder for yet another,"Portrait of a Warlord"entry.
In this entry I want to explore the recent battles over provincial lines,congressional districts,and cityhood status.
In December of 2006 by virtue of RA (Republic Act) #9355,"An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands,"the Dinagat Islands seceded from Surigao del Norte Province and became a province of its own.As is ALWAYS the case opponents of the move,mostly LGU officials from Surigao del Norte whose IRAs and PDAF shares would now decrease significantly,challenged this development.Petitioning the Supreme Court the plaintiffs,3 residents of Surigao del Norte proper:
1) Rodolfo G.Navarro,lead Plaintiff
2) Victor F.Bernal
3) Rene O.Medina,
describing themselves as"Taxpayers"argued that RA #9355 was Un-constitutional,citing Article X,Section 10 of 1987 Constitution which specifies that all LGUs (Local Government Units,as in towns,cities and provinces) must adhere to RA #7160,the Local Government Code of 1991 when creating new juridicial entities.They argued that the Respondents,the Provincial Government of Dinagat,did not adhere to the Code because within the Code there is a specific pre-requisite with regard to a minimum area of any potential province.Article 9,Section 1 specifies a minimum area of 2,000 square kilometers.Dinagat however,collectively (over the entire group of islands) merely amounts to a total area of 802.12 square kilometers.They also cited the Code's requirement of contigious provincial borders.On February,10th,2010 the Supreme Court ruled on the Petition,overturning RA #9355 in a 9 to 6 vote and nullifying the creation of Dinagat Province.
Associate Justice Diosdado Peralta for the Majority agreed with the Petitioner(s) in that the 1987 Constitution mandates LGU adherance to the Local Government Code of 1991 when creating new juridicial entities (LGU units).Associate Justice Peralta also sought to negate the primary rationale offered for circumventing the pre-requisite minimum area clause,Article 9,Section 2 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which allows an exemption to the 2,000 square kilometer watermark in stating that provinces composed of one or more islands are exempt from having to meet that onus.Not so said Associate Justice Peralta.
With regards to Article 9,Section 2 Peralta opined,"(It) cannot be considered an executive construction of the criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code of 1991.It is an extraneous provision not intended by the Local Government Code and,therefore is null and void."With that Associate Justice Peralta found Dinagat lacking on minimum area.I am not a jurist so it may simply be an elementary judicial matter of which I am under-equipped to notice much less evaluate BUT for the life of me it seems as if Peralta arbitrarily decreed a statute within the Code null and void simply to support his otherwise untenable position,thus his lack of citations and/or explanations.The Constitution mandates adherance to the Code.While the Code DOES clearly state the watermark for minimum area it ALSO allows the aforementioned exemption.So,forgive me if I am oblivious here,but it appears to me that the Code hasn't been rejected at all by the proponents of Dinagat Province.In his Opinion Peralta deemed Article 9,Section 2 to NOT be an"executive construct."Are we to infer then that the exemption was inserted into the code surreptitiously?That is the clear inference I am taking away from here.
However,the preceding becomes much less earth shattering when one realises that Associate Justice Peralta ALSO cited the watermark for population.The Code specifies a minimum population of 250,000 within the proposed provincial borders as tallied by the NSO,or National Statistics Office.The 2000 Census gives a population of 106,951 for the Dinagat Islands.Unlike the issue of minimum area there is no exemption offered on this issue.
Almost immediately after the February 2010 Ruling Dinagat Governor Geraldin Ecleo Villaroman,Congressman Ecleo's sister,filed a Motion for Reconsideration.The Solicitor General followed suit and filed its own Motion for Reconsideration as well,both asking the Supreme Court to re-consider its 2010 ruling on the matter.On May 12th,2010 the Court denied both Motions on Lack of Merit and on May 18th the Ruling was deemed Final,entered into the so called,"Book of Judgements"and that SHOULD HAVE BEEN the end of it.Amazingly,and perhaps desperately,on May 26th Governor Ecleo Villaroman filed a second Motion for Reconsideration.Monkey see,monkey do,on May 28th the Solicitor General filed ITS second Motion for Reconsideration as well.Their decision to do so is quite curious because of an incredibly basic axiom of the Philippine Justice System;Rules of Court,Section 2,Rule 52 plainly states,"No second Motion for Reconsideration of a Judgement or Final Resolution by the same party shall be entertained."
Where as before the LGU officials from Surigao del Norte Province were dead set against the secession of Dinagat they now moved to the diametric opposite end of the issue and themselves filed a"Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12,2010."This long winded document was asking the Court's indulgence to enter the fray as concerned stakeholders.The synchronised Local and National Elections had just taken place on May 10th,2010 and LGU officials of Surigao del Norte Province were seeking to preserve their just desserts.Where as before the provincial officials had merely been trying to get a greater share of Government funds,now they were trying to merely retain their newly elected positions.Should Dinagat remain nullified it would then be re-folded back into Surigao del Norte Province.IF THAT happened many of Surigao del Norte's LGU officials would be out of a job.
The Motion,filed by:
1) Congressman Francisco T.Matugas
2) Governor Sol T.Matugas
3) Vice Governor Arturo Carlos A.Egay
4) Provincial Councilor Simeon Vicente G.Castrence
5) Provincial Councilor Mamerto D.Galanida
6) Provincial Councilor Margarito M.Longos
7) Provincial Councilor Cesar M.Bagundol
was Denied on July 20th,2010,with the Court citing Section 2,Rule 19 of the Rules of Court which bars any Motion for Intervention after Final Judgement has been rendered.
On October 22nd,2010 Dinagat's Governor Ecleo Villaroman filed an"Urgent Omnibus Motion,"which was notated as,"to Resolve Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration and to Set Aside Entry of Judgement."Some may see Villaroman's Motion as an example of tenacity.Me?I simply see it as obnoxious.On October 29th the aforementioned LGU officials from Surigao del Norte Province,collectively labeled by the Court as the"Intervenors"filed yet another Motion in the case,"Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgement."In his Minority Opinion on the March 29th,2011 Ruling,which I will discuss shortly,Associate Justice Brion stated that he saw the 2 closely timed Motions as evidence of connivance between Governor Ecleo Villaroman and the Intervenors.
On March 29th,2011 the Supreme Court ruled,but only in response to the Intervenors' Motion of October 29th.Noting that despite the Intervenors lacking personality (meaning direct connection to the case),that in fact the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court,Section 3,Rule 15 does allow the filing of a Second Motion for Reconsideration"in the higher interest of justice."However no mention was made of the glaring contradiction between the"Rules of the Court",vis a vis its Section 5,Rule 37 which bars a Second Motion and the aforementioned"Internal Rules of the Supreme Court"which DOES.Yet another glaring contradiction within Philippine Governance in action.In the Ruling,in a vote mirroring the original Ruling of February,2010,the Court voted 9 to 6.For the Minority Associate Justice Arturo D.Brion wrote that the Majority,authored by Associate Justice Eduardo Nachura is a travesty and an embarassment.This highly unusual example of incredible dissent within the Supreme Court only came to the surface because of Brions revulsion at the Court's latest example of"flip-flopping."It is worth pointing outthat in the original Ruling of February,2010 Associate Justice Nachura was the author of the Minority Opinion where as in this last Ruling he authored the Majority,the epitome of a"flip flop."
So...Dinagat remains a province.
Monday, August 16, 2010
Caraga Campaign Mayhem
"Caraga" is the region covering the north eastern corner of Mindanao. Specifically it consists of 4 Provinces: Agusan del Sur, Agusan del Norte, Suriago del Sur,Surigao del Norte along with the island province of Dinagat. There are very few Muslims, in fact 2 of its provinces, Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Sur both have less than 1,000 each. They do have large populations of Lumads, the non-Muslim and non-Christian Tribes usually called,"Hill Tribes" in most other nations.
Being the most heavily forested region on the island it has a huge amount of logging and since it is abutting ComVal (Compostela Valley Province) it also is moderately involved with mining. The biggest security issue however is the NPA, the Maoist Insurgency. Indeed, it is the most NPA innundated region in the nation, especially when taken in combination with ComVal that abuts Agusan del Sur. Though 2 provinces are deemed "Pacified," Surigao del Norte and Dinagat both still posess sizable numbers of synpathisers (i.e. Base of Mass Support), Sectoral Front Organisations as well as a fair number of inactive guerillas so that it remains to be seen whether those provinces will indeed remain so. Though the region saw alot of confrontations between the NPA and candidates who refused to pay the obligatory (in NPA "Influenced" areas) PTC (Pay to Campaign) "permits." These confrontations were relatively peaceful (though weapons were used in all instances none was ever fired even in warning).
Overt political violence is rare in this part of Mindanao even though the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) perpetually placing dozens of regional municipalities on the "Watch List" would seem to make that happening counter-intuitive. Still, incidents DO happen, and so here we are...but first...
Perhaps the biggest news in Caraga this Election Season was the fall of the Barbers Dynasty. The Barbers Clan has ruled Surigao del Norte for nearly 2 decades, the duration of the post-Marcos Era. Gov.Robert"Ace"Barbers, the current patriarch of the family was swept out of office by a paltry margin of 2,214 votes. The victor? Former Department of Education Regional Director Sol Forcadilla Matugas. Madame Matugas is the wife of Francisco"Lalo"Tinio Matugas who coincidentally won his race for the Surigao del Norte 1st District Congressional Seat.
Francisco Matugas, an attorney and long time political activist with PPS (Partido Padajon Surigao) now becomes the regining partiarch of the region's newest dynasty. He had been running against a felow attorney, Constantino"Banjo"Navarro III, the scion of another local dynasty, the Navarro Clan (also well known to those that pay attention to the insurgency due to black sheep Father Navarro,aka the "Barefoot Priest," who became the ranking NPA CO for a decent amount of time), long allied with the Barbers. His victory could almost be considered a landslide given the steep margin of roughly 9,800 votes.
Fracnsico's brother, Ernesto"Mitoy"Matugas has become the new mayor of the province's largest city, Surigao City with his victory over ex-Governor Robert Lyndon Barbers Jr, namesake of the original partiarch, the late Senator Robert Lyndon Barbers Sr.
Perhaps most note worthy of all, the Matugas Party, PPS, swept the entire province with every town now being led by a PPS member. The closest comparison would be Lanao del Norte Province where all but 1 community is led by a single party, but of course the operative difference being that Surigao del Norte is TOTALLY in control of PPS. This doesn't bode well for the people of Surigao del Norte despite the former dynasty's alleged penchant for corruption and ineptitude. Given the personal struggle of Madame Matugas against an allegation of corruption when she was in charge of Region 13, in her former position (she retired from another region after transferring out of Region 13 because of that allegation, an allegation from which she was cleared), one hopes that the Matugas Clan will not become further proof of the ancient maxim, "Power corrupts absolutely..."
On Janurary 28, 2010 on Langihan Road in Barangay Upper Doongan, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte Province, 28 year old Roldan P.Curalde was riding his motorcycle when shot to death with a 45. Mr.Curalde who was self employed as a miner/prospector was a Campaign Organiser for MPM (Mabuting Pilipino Movement).
On May 08, 2010 in Loreto, Agusan del Sur, COMELEC had dropped off "flash cards" for the PCOS (Precinct Optical Scanners) machines to local representative Jay Actub Salinas earlier that day and Mr.Salinas had spent the better part of that day at the municipal elections office. He had just returned home that evening and was standing in front of his door when shot with a 45 caliber pistol.
Loreto, sitting on the Agusan River is isolated in terms of approaches by land so Mr.Salinas was bundled into a speed boat and transported up river to the provincial capitol, Prosperidad where he received treatment for a wound to his abdomen. Later transfered to a hospital in Tagum City in Davao del Norte Province he was able to make a recovery, albeit after a long convalescence.
Election Day, May 10, 2010, unknown parties in Bayugan, Agusan del Sur Province manufactured fake Arrest Warrants against particular candidates that sought to impeach their character in the eyes of voters.
Reversing chronologically, there were some important goings on in Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, as well as a case in Surigao City in Surigao del Norte Province.
On June 25, 2009 in at Rotunda Circumfrential Park in Barangay Poblacion, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Barangay Councilor and radio jounalist Jonathan "Athan"Lisondra Petalvero, 43, of Bayugan was shot to death as he stood talking with members of the BASVODA (Bayugan Association of Hired Van Operators and Drivers) having given a keynote speech inside a nearby resturant, by invitation of BASVODA President Sammy Mendoza.
Mr.Petalvero was a staunch supporter of Vice Mayor Genesis Efren, running for Mayor in 2010. Genesis Efren also owns the radio station where Mr.Petalvero worked, DXFM Frenster, in Bayugan.Efren's rival, Kim Lope Asis is the son of the (then) Mayor Magdalena Lope Asis as well as being both a Barangay Captain AND the Chairman of the ABC (Association of Barangay Captains).
Earlier that month, June of 2009, a Barangay Councilor for Barangay Ipil in Bayugan was also shot to death and like Petalvero he was a supporter of Vice Mayor Efren.
On July 28, 2009 at the Municipal Health Center[sic] in ComVal Province, 39 year old Crispin Lenaban was arrested in a joint apprehension by ComVal Provincial PNP (Philippine National Police), PNP RID (Regional Intelligence Division and PRO (Police Regional Office) #13. His Warrant was issued by RTC (Regional Trial Court) #30, Branch #32 in surigao City, for Double Murder, Hiway Robbery and Posession of Firearms. Some may recall that Lenaban was wanted in the murders of COMELEC Officer Wenifreda Taer, her son who was a serving Provincial Board Councilor for Surigao del Norte Province, Rodulfo Taer and fellow Board Councilor Dominador Dandan, all of Alegria, Surigao del Norte. He was 1 of 2 gunmen, 1 with a 45, the other with a 9MM pistol. The 2nd gunman remains unknown.
Being the most heavily forested region on the island it has a huge amount of logging and since it is abutting ComVal (Compostela Valley Province) it also is moderately involved with mining. The biggest security issue however is the NPA, the Maoist Insurgency. Indeed, it is the most NPA innundated region in the nation, especially when taken in combination with ComVal that abuts Agusan del Sur. Though 2 provinces are deemed "Pacified," Surigao del Norte and Dinagat both still posess sizable numbers of synpathisers (i.e. Base of Mass Support), Sectoral Front Organisations as well as a fair number of inactive guerillas so that it remains to be seen whether those provinces will indeed remain so. Though the region saw alot of confrontations between the NPA and candidates who refused to pay the obligatory (in NPA "Influenced" areas) PTC (Pay to Campaign) "permits." These confrontations were relatively peaceful (though weapons were used in all instances none was ever fired even in warning).
Overt political violence is rare in this part of Mindanao even though the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) perpetually placing dozens of regional municipalities on the "Watch List" would seem to make that happening counter-intuitive. Still, incidents DO happen, and so here we are...but first...
Perhaps the biggest news in Caraga this Election Season was the fall of the Barbers Dynasty. The Barbers Clan has ruled Surigao del Norte for nearly 2 decades, the duration of the post-Marcos Era. Gov.Robert"Ace"Barbers, the current patriarch of the family was swept out of office by a paltry margin of 2,214 votes. The victor? Former Department of Education Regional Director Sol Forcadilla Matugas. Madame Matugas is the wife of Francisco"Lalo"Tinio Matugas who coincidentally won his race for the Surigao del Norte 1st District Congressional Seat.
Francisco Matugas, an attorney and long time political activist with PPS (Partido Padajon Surigao) now becomes the regining partiarch of the region's newest dynasty. He had been running against a felow attorney, Constantino"Banjo"Navarro III, the scion of another local dynasty, the Navarro Clan (also well known to those that pay attention to the insurgency due to black sheep Father Navarro,aka the "Barefoot Priest," who became the ranking NPA CO for a decent amount of time), long allied with the Barbers. His victory could almost be considered a landslide given the steep margin of roughly 9,800 votes.
Fracnsico's brother, Ernesto"Mitoy"Matugas has become the new mayor of the province's largest city, Surigao City with his victory over ex-Governor Robert Lyndon Barbers Jr, namesake of the original partiarch, the late Senator Robert Lyndon Barbers Sr.
Perhaps most note worthy of all, the Matugas Party, PPS, swept the entire province with every town now being led by a PPS member. The closest comparison would be Lanao del Norte Province where all but 1 community is led by a single party, but of course the operative difference being that Surigao del Norte is TOTALLY in control of PPS. This doesn't bode well for the people of Surigao del Norte despite the former dynasty's alleged penchant for corruption and ineptitude. Given the personal struggle of Madame Matugas against an allegation of corruption when she was in charge of Region 13, in her former position (she retired from another region after transferring out of Region 13 because of that allegation, an allegation from which she was cleared), one hopes that the Matugas Clan will not become further proof of the ancient maxim, "Power corrupts absolutely..."
On Janurary 28, 2010 on Langihan Road in Barangay Upper Doongan, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte Province, 28 year old Roldan P.Curalde was riding his motorcycle when shot to death with a 45. Mr.Curalde who was self employed as a miner/prospector was a Campaign Organiser for MPM (Mabuting Pilipino Movement).
On May 08, 2010 in Loreto, Agusan del Sur, COMELEC had dropped off "flash cards" for the PCOS (Precinct Optical Scanners) machines to local representative Jay Actub Salinas earlier that day and Mr.Salinas had spent the better part of that day at the municipal elections office. He had just returned home that evening and was standing in front of his door when shot with a 45 caliber pistol.
Loreto, sitting on the Agusan River is isolated in terms of approaches by land so Mr.Salinas was bundled into a speed boat and transported up river to the provincial capitol, Prosperidad where he received treatment for a wound to his abdomen. Later transfered to a hospital in Tagum City in Davao del Norte Province he was able to make a recovery, albeit after a long convalescence.
Election Day, May 10, 2010, unknown parties in Bayugan, Agusan del Sur Province manufactured fake Arrest Warrants against particular candidates that sought to impeach their character in the eyes of voters.
Reversing chronologically, there were some important goings on in Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, as well as a case in Surigao City in Surigao del Norte Province.
On June 25, 2009 in at Rotunda Circumfrential Park in Barangay Poblacion, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Barangay Councilor and radio jounalist Jonathan "Athan"Lisondra Petalvero, 43, of Bayugan was shot to death as he stood talking with members of the BASVODA (Bayugan Association of Hired Van Operators and Drivers) having given a keynote speech inside a nearby resturant, by invitation of BASVODA President Sammy Mendoza.
Mr.Petalvero was a staunch supporter of Vice Mayor Genesis Efren, running for Mayor in 2010. Genesis Efren also owns the radio station where Mr.Petalvero worked, DXFM Frenster, in Bayugan.Efren's rival, Kim Lope Asis is the son of the (then) Mayor Magdalena Lope Asis as well as being both a Barangay Captain AND the Chairman of the ABC (Association of Barangay Captains).
Earlier that month, June of 2009, a Barangay Councilor for Barangay Ipil in Bayugan was also shot to death and like Petalvero he was a supporter of Vice Mayor Efren.
On July 28, 2009 at the Municipal Health Center[sic] in ComVal Province, 39 year old Crispin Lenaban was arrested in a joint apprehension by ComVal Provincial PNP (Philippine National Police), PNP RID (Regional Intelligence Division and PRO (Police Regional Office) #13. His Warrant was issued by RTC (Regional Trial Court) #30, Branch #32 in surigao City, for Double Murder, Hiway Robbery and Posession of Firearms. Some may recall that Lenaban was wanted in the murders of COMELEC Officer Wenifreda Taer, her son who was a serving Provincial Board Councilor for Surigao del Norte Province, Rodulfo Taer and fellow Board Councilor Dominador Dandan, all of Alegria, Surigao del Norte. He was 1 of 2 gunmen, 1 with a 45, the other with a 9MM pistol. The 2nd gunman remains unknown.
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