History of Mindanao, Part XX: Bad Blood: HRW Report on AFP Sponsored Paramilitaries in Caraga, 1991, Part 3

In this, my third and next to last installment on the Human Rights Watch, or HRW report, "Bad Blood: ," I will finish highlighting a critical part of Mindanaowan History. Covering the start of

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"Abduction and Mistreatment of Civilians by Militart anf CAFGU

Seven cases of maltreatment of civilians during a May 1991 military offensive were documented by Human Rights Watch.

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In each case, CAFGU from Aurora, a village about five miles away from the site of the military operations, accompanied the soldiers from the 36th and 8th IBs, beyond the territory they are restricted to under the guidelines set up by the Government. The three CAFGU members who were positively identified were listed as active-duty CAFGU and were also listed as former CHDF in rosters filed at the Provincial Government offices.

Jose Abing

A farmer, Jose Abing, 29, asserted in a May 20th, 1991 affadavit filed with the Provincial Prosecutor that he was tortured after he was picked up in an area of recent military operationa by a group of CAFGU members and soldiers in the village of New Visayas, in the town of Prosperidad.

At 8AM on May 2nd, 1991, Abing was picked up at his farm by soldiers from the 36th and the 8th IBs accompanied by nine CAFFU members, whom he identified as Felipe Rodriguez, Leonicio Ebanez, Helimon Ebanez, and six known only as Abawan, Rolly, Benben, Tony Carting, and Doloy Guyay. He stated that the CAFGU grabbed him and hung him upside down out of the window of Abing's own house. Then they forced Abing to drink a half-gallon of vinager. Soon afterwards, the CAFGU released him and left, taking his rooster and his neighbour's chickens.

Abduction of Six Residents

Two farmers from the village of New Visayas, witin the municipality of Prosperidad stated in a joint affadavit that they were picked up by a group of CAFGU members and soldiers from the 36th and 8th IBs and tortured on suspicion that they were NPA rebels.

In their May 20th affadavit filed with the Provincial Prosecutor, Jaime Baluyos, 27, and Bonifacio Gabuya, 21, stated that they were forcibly taken out of their homes on May 4th, 1991 at 530AM. They asserted that they were shown no warrant of arresr and that they had not committed any crime (under Philippine Law, warrantless arrests are considered legal if the arresting officer has grounds to believe that the suspect is a member of the Communist Party or the NPA). They stated that they were also repeatedly punched and kicked by nine CAFGU members, identified by name as the same men who apprehended Jose Abing (above). Their Commander, a Sergeant Felasol og the 36th IB, looked on but did not stop the beatingsm

Afterwards, the CAFGU bound their hands and tied a noose around Baluyo's and Gabuya's necks, using nylon rope. In this manner, they were marched overland to the village of Cecilia, in the town of San Luis, about seven miles away. When they arrived, they were given food, but every time they tried to swallow, the soldiers yanked their nooses tight. Then a soldier, a member of the 8th Infantry Battalion, approached the two with a knife and threatened to cut off their ears, but was restrained by the others, who said the two were needed as guides. Later, however, they were released for no apparent reason.

A day later, four residents, a farmer, name withheld, was abducted along with his son, his neighbor, and his neighbor's son by military forces on May 5th, 1991.

The farmer recounted that the four were apprehended at their house, about a mile and a half from the center of the village of Muritula. The site of the incident was only roughly a mile from Cecilia, the village named in the May 4th incident above. Muritula is about six miles north of the municipal center of San Luis.

In the weeks immediately preceding this abduction, troops belonging to the 36th IB based in the village center had been waging an offensive against supposed NPA guerillas in the area. During the offensive, the farmer claimed, the military ransacked their peasant cooperative store. At the time, the farmer and his family had fled their farm for the evacuation center in San Luis town center. But food ran low, so he decided to return with his eldest son Larry on May 5th, 1991 to retreive some corn and mill it with his wooden mill. A neighbor, Cresensio Ando, 38, and his son also returned to receive some of their harvest.

Upon leaving the mill that afternoon at about 440PM, the four suddenly encountered between 45 and 60 military men, a composite team from the 36th Infantry Battalion and the CAFGU detachment. The leaders approached...

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...the farmers and took their sacks of corn. Upon questioning, the four said the corm was for their families, but the military insisted the food was for the NPAs.

"There were so many soldiers that it seemed like wherever I looked, there was the color of uniforms. I was shaking with fear, because they were pointing their firearms at us. I thought to myself, what can I di to stop my being kiLled?" the farmer recalled.

The soldiers accused the men of feeding the NPA, and the four responded that they had done so at times in the past, but had no choice. Then, the farmer watched as four of the soldiers, one with the name patch that read "Cornello," the other "Reyes," began kicking Anda all over his body while accusing him of being an NPA "murderer."

The four were ordered to accompany the troops on their march northwards. Over the next 14 days, they continued to be held in custody. They accompanied the troops by foot for 20 miles, and were used several times as guides in the military's search for rebel hideouts. At the military encampment, they were ordered to do the daily cooking and cleaning.

No charges were presented during their 15 day abduction, in violation of laws limiting detention without charges for 36 hours. On May 19th, after more interrogation, the four were released in Bayugan, a municipality about 30 miles north of San Luis. One of the four, Cresensio Anda, filed an affadavit a week later in San Francisco (San Franz), Agusan del Sur. As of January, 1992, the Provincial Prosecutor haf still not brought charges against the 36th IB. The farmer said he wanted to press charges, but probably would not do so. "I have no experience in filing a case," he said, "and I must admit, I'm scared too because the military aand CAFGU are still there in my neighborhood."

Dante Marevilles

A week later in Muritula, a fifth resident, Dante Marevillas, 25, asserted in a May 25th affadavit that he, too, was picked up by two members if the 36th Infantry Battalion at 6AM on May 14th outside Muritula. He stated that the two accused him of being an NPA sniper responsible for an ambush in their village. He denied the allegation, and the two responded by binding his wrists and ankles with plastic coated wire. Then Marevilles was repeatedly kicked, poked, and humiliated. The soldiers then stapled fliers to his ears. Marevilles was released later the same day. He has since gone into hiding.

CAFGU Abuses in San Miguel

San Miguel is a dusty frontier town located in one of the least populated , wildest corners of Northeast Mindanao. In the 1970s to early 1980s, San Miguel, like much of the province of Surigao del Sur, was largely under the sway of the insurgent "shadow" government, backed by hundreds of armed, barefoot rebels under the command of a former Catholic priest, Father Francisco Navarro.

In late January 1992, the town was in a state of military occupation. In more remote communities, soldiers were lodging in residents' homes; until early January, troops had also been encamped right in front of the central primary school. Military officials pointed to Surigao del Sur as a focal point in the Government's counterinsurgency campaign, and weekly reports of military encounters in San Miguel found their way into regional newspapers, which were not available to local residents, and onto radio, which was. There were also stories describing the elaborately staged "surrender" ceremonies of entire communities, which military officials used to back up claims that they were winning the war.

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Local officials concurred that the NPA had indeed lost ground in San Miguel in 1991, but military officials estimated that there were still between 500 and 700 more rebels in the area; police officials said 60% of villages, or "barangays," were controlled or infiltrated by the Communist Party. In one instance on July 25, 1991, roughly 250 rebels waged simultaneous attacks on a barangay and the municipal hall in downtown San Miguel, resulting in four military and six civilian deaths and the wounding of 19 others.

The military's success in beating back the insurgency, however, had its costs. The continued proximity of active rebel forces had legitimized the military's almost complete dominance over civilian authorities. Village officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told Human Rights Watch they had lost authority over police and civic functions and were afraid of reprisals should they complain. Tainted by long associations withthe rebels, they were unwilling to speak out against abuses by drunken or abusive militia members.

By and large, the victims of assaults, harassment, and other threats continued to be members and leaders of legal peasant cooperatives and their supporters in the Church. In most cases documented by Human Rights Watch, the attackers belonged to the 62 member CAFGU in San Miguel. Meanwhile, the Military had plans to recruit and train an additional 88 members in 1992.

Abuses Against Peasant Organizations

The vast majority of San Miguels 30,000 residents are impoverished tenant farmers and small landholders, who eke out a meager subsistence cultivating rice, corn, and vegetables for family consumption. In early 1992, none of the town's 18 barangays had electricity or running water, and the few dirt roads connecting the farms to the market were often impassable during the six month long rainy season.

Poor peasants, driven by economic expediency and encouraged by an activist church, have organized community based farming cooperatives throughout San Miguel. Roughly ten percent of households had joined cooperatives affiliated with the local peasant organization, KAMAGTONG, which is a local chapter of the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), a national militant peasants' organization. The military had openly labeled these cooperatives as Communist-led or -infiltrated organizations. But the peasants, despite threats, maintaned and even strengthened the cooperatives, insisting that they had brought demonstrable improvements in people's standard of living.

Military and militia threats and harassment continued throughout 1991 and early 1992, despite the fact that several of the cooperatives had gained official legitimacy, obtaining loans from national and international lending organizations. In January 1992, soldiers raided a cooperative storage shed in Apique, San Miguel, seizing 46 sacks of rice. The battalion commander insisted that the rice was set aside as payment- in- kind for interest on a 200,000 Peso ($8,000) loan from the Land Bank, the national lending institution for agricultural development projectd.

Human Rights Watch documented several cases of abuse by militia in 1991, usually in the presence of, if not direct participation of, regular forces in San Miguel.

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Rodrigo Princesa, a 38 year old farmer from the village of Santa Cruz, San Miguel, described how he was threatened and beaten unconscious by a group of CAFGU in the presence of their military commander. He said that at 4PM on December 16, he and a friend, Marcos Avila, went to a local storehouse owned by Ceding Galindo to get diesel fuel for Avila's bulldozer. Upon approaching the house, a neighbor told them that some CAFGU men from the local detachment and their commander from the 29IB were inside drinking.

The owner invited them in for a drink, so the two sat down in the kitchen, the next room away from where the militiamen were seated. All the militiamen were in uniform and armed with Garands, and were evidently drunk. One of the CAFGU members, Romy Cabacas, asked them to join the group for a drink and so Avila ordered a round of beer and joined the militiamen.

Princesa was nervous about joining the CAFGU, since he is a member of KAMAGTONG, and Princesa's neighbors had also told him there were rumors that he was going to be "salvaged," a term in the Philippines for Extra-Judicial Killings. But Princesa joined them around the small table so as not to appear rude. Later on in the evening, the cadre, Sergeant Alejandro "Al" Calooy, put his arm on Princesa's shoulder and drew him towards the door because he wanted to "have a talk." As Princesa approached the door, Jimmy Otera, a CAFGU member, grabbed Princesa by the neck and threw him down on the floor and began kicking Princesa's prone body. The other CAFGU members, identified as Eddie Roluna, Orly Orturo, and Romy Cabacas, immediately joined Otera. Sgt.Calooy stood by. Princesa lost consciousness momentarily.

While Princesa was lying on his back, Otero stomped on his abdomen and chest with enough force to break two ribs and leave bootprint shaped bruises on his chest. His cheeks, head, and legs were also bruised. Two months later, he had trouble breathing and was still unable to do farmwork.

At some point, the son of the resturant owner approached and helped Princesa stand up and get out of the house. Otero followed, laughing, and when Princesa was about 45 feet away from the store, Otera fired two shots in the air, shouting, "You brave man! You lousy NPA!"

The following day, Princesa reported the incident to a village councilman, who advised him to go to the Commission on Human Rights. He then filed an affadavit with the CHR. On November 18, Princesa sought the help of the local human rights monitor, who brought him to the provincial hospital in Tandag for x-rays and treatment.

Princesa and other community members interviewed said several of the attackers- Otera, Orturo, and Cabacas- are known as especially abusive when drunk. Human Rights monitors said Cabacas is implicated in a killing in a community a mile and a half away from Santa Cruz. Two months later, in January 1992, Otera, Cabacas, and Orturo were still listed as active duty CAFGU at the 29IB Headquarters. Calooy, of the 29IB, has himself been implicated in attacks on members of peasant cooperatives in San Miguel in 1990 and 1991.

Despite the fact that Calooy's battalion, the 29IB, had been transferred the month before, Calooy had stayed behind with the CAFGU unit he trained. Calooy was one of four commanders left behind with their CAFGU detachments according to military officials. The 29IB was transferred after its reputation was tarnished by numerous human rights abuses, including the unprovoked killing of two civilians and wounding of five in August 1990 in Libas Sud, a remote community of San Miguel (Multiple Murder charges were pending against the alleged leader of the attack, Lt.Felix Mangyao, after local government and Church investigators issued a report, "A Fact Finding Mission Report on the Massacre Incident in Barangay Libas Sud, San Miguel," Diocese of Tandag Justice and Peace Office, Surigao del Sur, Sept.20, 1990. The report strongly implicated the commanding officer and his company. Sixteen months after the shootings, victims in Libas Sud received Government funds for medical and burial fees from the Commission on Human Rights).

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Abduction and Beating of Two Farmers

The father of a farmer recounted the story of his son's abduction by two CAFGU members in June 26, 1991 in the municipal center of San Miguel. The son was also a member of KAMAGTONG.

A day before the incident, the NPA had waged a full scale attack on the town of San Miguel. One of the main targets of the attack was said to be a CAFGU member, Tony de Guzman, who resides in the town center. De Guzman escaped harm, but 14 were killed in the attack and de Guzman's close associate, CAFGU member Eddie Roluna, was one of 19 wounded.

On the evening of the incident, the man's son and two companions were waiting on a street corner in San Miguel for a ride to take them back to their homes in Bolhoon, about 10 miles away. At that time, they were approached by two armed men; they were CAFGU members Tony de Guzman, and de Guzman's son in law, nicknamed "Bodoy." De Guzman grabbed the young man by his face, and yelled, "You are one of the NPAs in that attack on San Miguel!" The young man denied it, and de Guzman began to punch him, striking his head and ear with his M14 rifle. Then he struck the victim's ribs, so hard that the rifle broke. The young man and his two companions were then forced into a dark alley. At that moment, however, an old woman passed by and looked their way. De Guzman ceased the beating, and let the three go, after warning them not to tell anyone about the incident.

The group recognized de Guzman and Bodoy. The two and a group of CAFGU members had passed through their neighborhood in Bolhoon several times in the past year, asking families if they were giving aid to the NPA. When they came, the man said, they stole things, like chickens. De Guzman always appeared to be the leader. The year before, Bodoy had been among those shot and injured in an NPA ambush in a neighboring community.

The father saw his son the morning after the attack. His head was bloody, and there were bruises on his chest. He had a cut above his right ear. The young man went into hiding soon after, and his whereabouts in January 1992 were unlnown.

Jaime Quieta

Jaime Quieta, 25, chairman of a local farmer's organization, described how a masked CAFGU member pressed a lit cigarette in his face in full view of the soldiers from the 29th IB, in Bolhoon, San Miguel. He and two neighbors said they were used as a shield by the Military's troops after the attack.

At 3AM on August 27, 1991, when the farmer and his wife awoke to the sound of dogs barking. At about 4, they peered out the window and saw that soldiers, about 30 of them, had surrounded their neighbor's house, about 40 feet distant. A few minutes later, soldiers surrounded Quieta's house and ordered the family outside. Quieta said the soldiers were in combat position, lying on the ground with rifles poised to fire on him. Three soldiers approached Quieta, with rifles drawn, and demanded to be shown the firearms and the two NPA rebels they had been told were in his house. Quieta repeatedly denied the claims. After several minutes of interrogation, during which he was not touched, one soldier told him, "If you don't admit these things, you better watch yourself."

Then the soldiers left him alone while they initiated a search of his house. At this point, a man wearing a white hood showing only his eyes approached Quieta. He was smoking a cigarette, "You'd better confess, because we have a reliable report," he told Quieta, and continued pressing him about the whereabouts of the rebels they had been told were in his house. Quieta protested again that he knew nothing and would answer no more questions. The man responded, "So you're good at answering questions," and grabbed his head pressing a lit cigarette into his face. Quieta recognized the voice as that of a CAFGU member, Tony de Guzman, who is familiar as a fish vendor in the neighborhood.

At that moment, a soldier, who Quieta presumed to be the Commanding Officer, ordered all the men in the neighborhood out of their houses. Ten of them were forced to line up in single file. "We were made to understand that we were going to walk with them to San Roque as a ahield because they thought the NPA wouldn't attack them if we were alongside," he said. The men marched with them up to San Roque, a village about two and a half miles away where they were encamped, and then released.

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Quieta's neighbor, name withheld, recalled that, at about 3 that morning, men yelled at him to open his door. He refused because it was still dark and he was afraid. But the soldiers went around back, and, led by a CAFGU member, five of them broke through a hole above the kitchen door. The CAFGU man had a white mask beneath his military helmet but the neighbor recognized him right away as Tony de Guzman.

The witness said the soldiers, who were members of the 29th Infantry Battalion, pointed their firearms at him and asked him to tell them where the NPA rebels were hiding. He couldn't identify them, because he is illiterate and could not read their nameplates. He repeatedly denied having any knowledge of the NPA's whereabouts, and after several minutes the soldiers left and went to Quieta's house. A little while later, soldiers returned and ordered him out of the house. He was pushed into the road, where about eight men in the neighborhood were already gathered. There were between 20 and 50 soldiers, he said. One man was sent to wake the village head. When the head came out, the commanding officer asked "permission" to bring the men along as escorts on their route back to the detachment, adding that none of the men would be hurt. A second neighbor corroborated Quieta's and the first neighbor's story.

The shielding incident clearly violated International Laws of War. Under Protocol I, Article 51, Number 7 of the Optional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions, to which the Philippines is signatory.

"Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations."

Col.Santos Gabison Jr., who was stationed in Bolhoon at the time of the incident, told Human Rights Watch that his troops did not use civilians as a shield.

The incident also illustrated how the local CAFGU- in this case, Tony de Guzman- were used to pinpoint and "rough up" local residents suspected of sympathies for the NPA.

Col.Gabison, however, denied that de Guzman was present during that operation. De Guzman, he said, "was not utilized by us on that occaison. I told my people we should not be utilizing him."

Several community leaders interviewed by Human Rights Watch recalled that during the past three years, Tony de Guzman had physically assaulted several of them, whom he pinpointed as NPA rebels. De Guzman abducted a local resident, Jesus Martinez, in 1986, while de Guzman was with the CHDF. According to a relative of Martinez, the victim was later found floating dead in the Tago River. "But that was before there were human rights investigators," she said.

Local Church council memembers and human rights monitors were also able to identify a dozen separate victims allegedly killed by Tony de Guzman over the past seven years. All of those killed were farmers suspected of being NPA. In most cases described, the victims were taken from their houses, and later found dead by a single shot in the head. In one case in 1986, de Guzman was suspected of setting a hut on fire, incinerating an elderly couple inside.

De Guzman is known throughout the area. He is often seen wearing a red headscarf, and people say he carries a human kneecap as a talisman to make him impenetrable to bullets. His background as a fish peddler and passenger motorbike driver made de Guzman familiar with the remotest settlements, and may explain why he has often been used as a guide in military ambushes of the NPA.

Lack of Accountability

According to Military officials, the CAFGU commanding officer and the local civilian leaders are supposed to share supervision of the CAFGU troops. In San Miguel, it sometimes seemed as if noone was in charge.

When asked about disciplining the CAFGU recruits currently stationed in San Miguel, the commander of the newly posted 67th Infantry Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Jose Barbieto, told Human Rights Watch that he was not authorised to discharge or punish abusive militia; the 29th Infantry Battalion, which had just been transferred to a post 20 miles away, "did not cede to us the discipline of these CAFGUs," he said.

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However, Barbieto's testimony was directly contradicted by that of the commander of the 29th IB in Tandag. Maj.Esperidion Balintag. Balintag said his battalion was no longer in charge of the discipline and punishment of the CAFGUs in San Miguel.

Noone wanted to take responsibility for CAFGU member Tony de Guzman. Military officials told Human Rights Watch that de Guzman was discharged from Active Duty CAFGU service on August 1, 1990, by orders of the Regional Command. However, this contradicted both the eyewitness reports of residents in Bolhoon, as well as the statemnts by the Mayor of the town of San Miguel and other local officials, who asked that their names not be used. Mayor Josite T.Elizalde asserted that de Guzman was one of fourteen CAFGU members posted in the town center. In 1990, he was discharged. But in July 1991, after the NPA staged its attack in San Miguel, he was re-activated. He could recall numerous abuses by de Guzman from his constituents, but he said de Guzman was "out of his hands."

"For the civilians, he's so hostile," explained Elizalde. "But for the Military he's an Asset."

"Forced Surrender," Forced Recruitment of Village Guards

CAFGU abuses in San Miguel took place in a climate of widespread military coercion and intimidation of civilians and challenges to civilian authority. Allegations of population control below appear to suggest that the Military would not tolerate even the slightest dissent in areas of ongoing military operations.

Village Guards

Father Eligio Bianchi, San Miguel Parish Priest, described the forced recruitment of unarmed Vilage Guards, called the "Bantay Bayan." From July to November, 1991, after the NPA attacked the village of Siago and the town center of San Miguel, a 10PM to Dawn Curfew was instituted. All adult male residents in the "Puroks" of San Miguel , each purok representing 20 to 30 households, were enlisted into the local Bantay Bayan. Each purok was obliged to man checkpoints from 5PM to 5AM every night. In some cases, when soldiers found that a checkpoint was not manned, residents were punched, and in other cases, some were forced to work at the army detachment without pay. Those who failed to show up for work were accused of being sympathizers. "While the people were guarding the town, the soldiers were sleeping. It was keeping the people from their work because they were too overtired to work in the fields" Bianch said.

The Parish Council protested the formation of the Bantay Bayan in a press statement published September 12, 1991. A day later, the detachment commander of the 29th IB accused Bianchi of bringing rice to the NPA rebels and of owning a machinegun. Nothing came of the charges, perhaps because the battalion was transferred out in November, and replaced by the 67th IB.

Anti-Communist Seminars

The practice of holding Anti-Communist seminars culminating in a formal "surrender" of entire civilian communities in an explicit part of the Philippines Armed Forces counterinsurgency strategy. In the village of Santa Cruz, San Miguel, three residents, two of whom were members of local peasant cooperative, gave first hand accounts of how residents were forced to "surrender" to the Government in a village meeting, or "pulong-pulong" organized by the 67th IB on January 12, 1992.

The day before, military officers had gone to the local elementary school and told children to tell their parents that anyone over 12 had to come to the school for the pulong-pulong.

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If they did not attend the military would assume that they were NPA. That same evening the soldiers went to the houses of the 15 individuals belonging to the peasant cooperative, which is suspected of being a rebel "front" organization. One 64 year old grandmother said her house was searched while the military interviewed her. Another, a 57 year old farmer and mother of 5, said the military insisted she had a code name and encouraged her and her husband to sign a paper, which, she was led to believe, identified her as a "rebel surrenderee." The soldiers assured the family that nothing would happen to them if they signed the paper, she said.

The chairman of the local peasant cooperative, Samuel Ravelo, 44, was also visited the evening before the meeting. The soldiers told him he was a "Communist" and he was made to believe that he would have "problems" if he failed to "surrender." He said it was the second time the community had been forced to "surrender," the first time being in 1986, when local forces led by Tony de Guzman led raids on local houses of suspected NPA supporters.

At the pulong-pulong, the officer in charge, a certain Corporal Rogelio, told the crowd that their cooperative was a "Communist System," and all were asked to sign "confessions" that they were rebel sympathisers. One person recalled. "The Military told us that we could not deny our support for the NPA, because they said they have a list with all of us in Santa Cruz and Sagbayan (a neighboring community).

Military Harassment

Local village officials of Ubas Sud, a remote settlement of 351 households also in San Miguel, said they had been continuously harassed since they had filed charges against a lieutenant from the 29th IB who allegedly killed 12 townspeople in a midnite raid in June 1990. In January, soldiers from the 67th IB came to each of their houses. The soldiers forced them to sign affadavits asserting that they were members of the NPA and that they were "surrendering" to the Government. The military told them that their community organizations, including a UNICEF sponsored children's program were rebel "front" organizations.

One local council member explained that noone was safe from suspicion. "The Military insists that we are all rebels," he said. "It all started in 1990, when we started filing human rights complaints against them. We really followed up, executing affadavits. If we complain against the war, then we must be rebels."

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Part 4, the final part in this series will be posted shortly.

NPA Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part VI: Andap Complex Still Popping Off

Mindanao's Andap Valley sits at the southern end of the Caraga Region, also known as Region 13. Bounded by the peaks of the Diwata Mountains on the Surigao del Sur and Agusan del Sur provincial borders, this remotest corner of Mindanao has long served as the NPA's Center of Gravity on the island, its "heartland" if you will. Under the experienced leadership of Jorge Madlos, now the NDFP Spokesperson for Mindanao, it has remained unaffected by countless operations by the AFP, the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Since the mid-1980s when the so called "Barefoot Priest" Father Frank Navarro walked into the Andap wilderness and raised an M16, the region has been firmly enmeshed in the Governments COIN, or counterinsurgency programme.

Madlos, better known by his nom de guerre Ka Oris (Comrade Oris), is now a senior citizen who literally wears a diaper due to the catheter threaded through his genitals because of a serious kidney disorder. Still, he shows bo sign of weakening and in fact serves as a symbol of NPA perserverence in the face of daunting opposition. The now 43 year old insurgency, often incorrectly labeled "Asia's longest running insurgency," is still seducing scores of the region's young people into going to heel in the area's thick jungles to risk life and limb in defence of an ideology practically none of them even understand. When you have starving, uneducated youth being promised P15,000 ($330) per month, an upper class salary, it is a given that there will be many takers. Virtually all NPA recruits in the NPA's NEMRC, or, Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee- the Regional Command covering virtually all of Andap- are members of Lumad Tribes, Hilltribesmen who sit on the lowest rung of Mindanao's socio-economic ladder.

A basic axiom in COIN doctrine holds that, "Insurgencies begin where good roads end." That line of thinking, mostly true, holds that a lack of economic development- dependent upon infrastructural outlay- is what pushes people into taking up weapons against their government. Indeed, most Lumad have never seen a single Governmental representative OR representation apart from the AFP and/or the PNP, or, Philippine National Police, and then only when they are being maltrated as suspected subversives- or else simply because they are Lumad and therefore viewed as "primitive" or "backwards."

The leadership, the cadres tasked with going into an un-touched settlement and drawing it into the NPA's influence overwhelmingly tend to be young middle to upper middle class intellectuals indoctrinated by multi-sectoral front organisations while at university. This holds true for the entire nation, not only for the NEMRC here on Mindanao. They, unlike the rank and file cannon fodder, operate out of a naïve and misplaced idealism. As another adage tells us, "A man who hasn't become a Socialist by age 20 has no heart. A man who is still a Socialist by age 40 has no brain." Often mis-attributed to England's Winston Churchill, it actually arose with Francois Guizot of France before Socialism even developed. He had used "Republican" where "Socialist" is now used. Yet, that maxim seems to apply to so many people who become enamoured with Leftist ideologies.

Surely anyone with an iota of compassion would be deeply moved seeing the stomach churning poverty pervading so much of Mindanao. Mindanao is the poorest region in an incredibly poor nation, so much so that people here often eat roadkill, IF they eat at all on a given day. With an inattentive and highly corrupt Government many see the NPA as the only ticket out of such hellishness. Unfortunately, the NPA is just as corrupt and just as perverse.

With that happy intro let us see what those idealistic 15,000 Pesos a month cadres and guerillas are up to...

On Tuesday, October 18th, 2011, Ka Mitchie of Front 19A led fifteen of her guerillas in an attack on a post belonging to the 29IB (Infantry Battalion). The post, in the municipality of Marihatag's Barangay Mahaba, in Surigao del Sur Province, defended itself well and managed to repel the onslaught without incurring a single casualty. Typically, the NPA attacks such soft targets in hopes of divesting them of their weaponry. It isn't about territory nor casualty counts for the Maoists, simply about acquiring the tools to create violence. This is why the insurgency has lasted so long but also why it has never progressed. Typically, if an attack hasn't proved successful within the first fifteen minutes the NPA withdraws in small groups going in different directions, separately making their way to a pre-co-ordinated rendevouz point. Ammunition is precious but moreover, anything over fifteen minutes exposes them to Government re-inforcements and exponentially increases their chances of being overrun themselves by counter-attacking soldiers from their original target.

That same day, October 18th, in the SMRC, or Southern Mindanao Regional Committee area of control, at the far southern end of the Andap Valley, Front 20, the Conrado Heredia Command, once again attacked an AFP column on patrol in the municipality of Trento's Barangay New Visayas. The soldiers, from the 75IB, the perennial target of Front 20, managed to turn the tables and almost over-run the entire NPA force of thirty guerillas. Two guerillas were wounded, and although they were able to escape with the help of their mates, they left their weaponry so that the AFP captured one M16 and one Garand M1. In the process however one soldier was also wounded critically.

The capturing of weaponry from the NPA is very important. The NPA has always had more guerillas than rifles. An un-armed NPA guerilla isn't reaking havoc up and down the countryside. Apart from three boatloads of AK47s from China in the early 1970s- two of which were interdicted- the NPA has never had a foreign weapons conduit. Relying on piecemeal captures from soft targets it slowly accumulates long arms but as we see here, they also lose them. Therefore this ebb and flow keeps the NPA from expanding in any substantiative way and moreover, relegates all of Eastern Mindanao into a killing field.

As for the AFP capturing NPA weaponry...In the past the AFP put such a premium on weaponry that each captured assault rifle earned a promotion in rank. That quickly ended though when overly-ambitious soldiers and Junior Officers began murdering non-combatants believed to own such weapons.

NPA Armed Contacts,Second Quarter of 2011,Part I:2 PNP Stations Attacked,1 Captured

As I have noted time and again, the NPA on Mindanao is very well known for wearing PNP (Philippine National Police) or AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) uniforms to infiltrate official security installations. Municipal PNP stations are a favourite target for this type of subterfuge. After that Panabo City attack in Davao del Norte Province on March 19th this year in which 1 PNP officer and 1 Police Auxiliary were killed by NPA guerillas in military uniforms, PNP Director General Raul Bacalzo issued a stern and very explicit memorandum to all PNP installations warning all personnel to be absolutely alert and maintain a defencive stance at all times. Some of the nation's PNP officers have comprehended the message, others obviously have not.

On Thursday, April 28, 2011 in Lianga, Surigao del Sur Province most of the staion's personnel were fast asleep but 1 man was busy with his daily routine. 25 year old Rodel Aquilam is the station mascot. Though he doesn't get paid the young man cleans, cooks and runs errands for the officers in the station. In return Rodel is allowed to live there but more than that, his "job" has given him a sense of purpose and has made his life seem more meaningful. Often, after serving meals he cleans and washes dishes all by himself. If dinner is served late Rodel will often leave the dishes until the early morning hours when he awakens to prepare breakfast.

So it was that on that day, at 430AM Rodel was at the sink in the rear of the police station, tired but watching out the window when something caught his eye. At first he wasn't sure that he had really seen something but even as these thoughts were forming the shapes came closer and Rodel couldn't help but recognise the rifles. Immediately dropping to his knees Rodel crawled to the station's sleeping quarters and very quietly woke the duty officer. The officer in turn woke the others and just as the first officers were grabbing their M16s guerillas from the NPA's Front 19-A burst through the station entrance and announced their presence.

In what is now a routine the guerilla in charge announced that nobody would be hurt as long as all present complied. All they wanted the man said, were the station's weapons. Before the guerilla could finish his sentence a PNP officer fired his M16 hitting the wall near the lead guerilla. Quickly the NPA left the station foyer and took positions throughout the City Government compound. The 15 PNP, and 2 AFP soldiers, from 29IB (Infantry Battalion) augmenting the station not only held their own, they managed to effectively pin the guerillas down outside in the large compound. Twice guerillas tried infiltrating the Municipal Hall located in that same compound but were repelled under the heavy fire emanating from the PNP station.

Meanwhile, having been notified of the attack the 29IB deployed and implemented 2 Blocking Force positions along the only two avenues of escape, allowing the PNP's 13th Regional Public Safety Management Battalion (aka "RPSM" which recently replaced the PNP's "PMG," or "Police Mobile Group" structure) to reinforce the outmanned station personnel. Hearing of the deployments on a captured ICOM the NPA knew that its own Blocking Force would only add, at most, 15 minutes to their Safe Exit Time. Radioing to that Blocking Force the lead guerilla confirmed that they had set capable barricades along National Hiway, consisting of huge bonfires constructed out of tyres doused in kerosene. While that stopped any AFP from making it into the town proper, the PNP's 13th PSMG Battalion was rapidly approaching from the opposite direction and so it was time to withdraw. At 645AM, leaving the compound the guerillas rushed to their escape vehicles. As the assailants were scrambling NPA guerilla Eunilio "Ka Dindo" Pison took a shot to the back of the head. The resident of Barangay Pong-on in the municipality of San Agustin in Agusan del Sur Province was critically injured and was left where he fell along with a second guerilla who had been killed. Their loyal comrades drove off at a rapid pace, tyres screeching.

It needs to be mentioned that Pison was being billed by the Government, AFP and PNP as the "Vice Commander" of Front 19-A. In reality the man is an Assistant Team Leader. Within the NPA "Teams" are equivalent to conventional "squads." In other words, he helped command a group of 7 to 10 guerillas. As usual AFP propaganda falls way short of the watermark.

As the NPA's Tactical Element was driving away from the compound their Blocking Force on National Hiway, in the town's Barangay Ganayon got spooked and took a shot at a passing Hyundai Starex van. Unfortunately its driver, 35 year old Herminia Lozada was a civilian and what is even more unfortunate is that one of the bullets fired at her van ended up wounding her in the left foot. As unfortunate as that really is, her three young children who were also in that van are all unscathed, at least physically.

That Saturday, April 30th, DILG (Department of the Interior and Local Government, the entity which oversees the PNP) Secretary Jesse Robredo joined PNP National Director Raul Bacalzo in a personal visit to the station. There the 15 PNP who defended the station were each given the "Medalya ng Katapangan" (Medal for Bravery), cash awards and on the spot promotions to the next incremental rank. The 15 awardees:

1) Deputy Chief, SPO3 Dante Basada Obenza

2) PO3 Armand Baniagaso Juarbal

3) PO3 Antonieto Pesical Sarsale

4) PO2 Simporiano Camino Quevedo

5) PO2 Ronald Jarina de Castro

6) PO2 Roy Cano Sabellano

7) PO2 Ariel Osorio Aribal

8) PO1 Vergil Gomez Curada

9) PO1 Susano Egypto Vitanzos

10) SPO1 Ruben Pedrozo Gomez

11) SPO1 Cerelino Alicante Pedrozo

12) SPO1 Virgilio Jusayan Orbeta

13) SPO2 Florencio Pineda Hernandez

14) SPO3 Moreto Edera Gemao

15) (No Rank Available) Rogelio Tejero Balason

In a very nice touch, Rodel Aquilam, the station mascot was also given a medal and cash award. Secretary Robredo is recommending that the AFP consider rewarding the two soldiers from the 29IB:

1) Corporal Alnasur A.Samsuri

2) PFC. Melfer B.Yabo

The Government was especially pleased because this was the second NPA attack thwarted in that municipality within the last 6 months. In fact it was that same NPA element, Front 19-A that was repelled in that other attack as well. On October 2,2010 in Purok #5, Barangay San Isidro, that barangay's CAFGU (Civilian Auxiliary Geographical Force Unit, a Force Multiplication element manned by residents of a given barangay and its operations relegated to that same barangay, commanded by an AFP Non Comissioned Officer from a cadre battalion) post fended off a large NPA assault. Under the direction of its cadre, Cpl.Singson of 23IB's D Company, the CAFGU soldiers caused the guerillas to withdraw at the 15 minute mark.

The happiness Secretary Robredo and Director General Bacalzo felt surely dissipated on Tuesday, May 3rd. At 430PM that day a man in an AFP uniform entered the Municipal PNP Station in the town of Malitbog, in Bukidnon Province and said he wanted to file a criminal complaint. The station, in Purok #2, Barangay Poblacion was manned by 6 officers. The desk officer went to get the complaint form and as he did so 19 NPA guerillas rushed into the station, weapons drawn. At this point the AFP "soldier" revealed that he too was an NPA guerilla and ordered the desk officer to handcuff 3 of the 5 other police officers.

The guerillas, from Front 4-B, warned the officers to comply, they only wanted the weapons. All 6 surrendered. The NPA then removed their side arms as well as the station's complement of weaponry. Capturing eight M16s, three 9MM pistols, one 45 caliber pistol, one 38 caliber revolver and one 22 caliber pistol along with the station's ICOM (2 way radio with military and PNP frequencies), walkie-talkies, two computer towers, one computer monitor and spare uniforms before departing with the three handcuffed police officers as prisoners the NPA was in and out in less than 10 minutes without a single shot having been fired. Led by Lino "Ka Dahon" Namatidong the withdrawing force jogged 200 meters to a waiting Toyota Lite Ace and an orange panel truck that they had left idling in adjacent Barangay Kalingking's Sitio Manga, they uncuffed and released the prisoners before speeding off towards Barangay Mindagat. Passing from Barangay Mindagat to Barangay Kiabo and then crossing the provincial border into the municipality of Claveria in Misamis Oriental Province the guerillas were able to make a clean get away.

Ironically, back in October of 2010 I had posted in my entry entitled, "NPA Armed Engagements, Last Quarter of 2010: NPA Merry Go Round" that a Brigade Commander in 4ID (Infantry Division), Colonel Romeo Gapuz had bragged about eliminating Front 4-B. He said the Front was dead and buried. I noted then that these were "famous last words." In Col.Gapuz's defence he had barely had 60 days in the 4ID and just come out of a desk job though the attitude he expressed is all to often par for the course throughout the Philippine Military. He had made that ignorant comment at a Turn Over Ceremony at the Misamis Oriental Provincial Capitol, where 4ID turned over Local Security oversight to the provincial government. This takes place whenever a province is declared "pacified." On Mindanao only 4 provinces are pacified, well 3 depending upon the day you examine the situation since the Dinagat Islands keep flip-flopping their status thanks to a fickle Supreme Court (yet another subject I plan to post about).

The 3 other Pacified Provinces on Mindanao:

1) Surigao del Norte (Dinagat was cleaved off of this province and may belong to it again if current Supreme Court petitions are considered kindly)

2) Misamis Oriental (as I mentioned)

3) Camiguin (another Island Province, this one cleaved off of Misamis Oriental Province)

When a province has been declared "pacified" it doesn't mean that the insurgency is extinct there, only that the local government unit is able to deal with it on its own.