History of Mindanao, Part XX: "Bad Blood" HRW Report on AFP Sponsored Paramilitaries in Caraga, 1991, Part 1

The following "History" entry is quite different from my previous entries for a couple of reasons. First, it isn't an axcerpt but an entire publication, albeit one with substantially less content than most books. Secondly, it is of a much more recent vintage having been published almost 20 years ago. I also need to point out that the publisher, HRW, or Human Rights Watch, is one that I often find quite suspect. Recently I posted a three part series on HRW's report on the so called "Davao Death Squadl although found no serious factual errors, the report smacked of amateurish innuendo and nothing was corroborated. It was all subjective nonsense. Still, it drew international attention to the dynamic and did provide character sketches of 28 alleged victims. Likewise with this report. The jist of the work is that the AFP-sponsored armed reserves like the now defunct Integrated Civil Home Defense (ICHDF) or its succesor, today's Civilian Auxiliary Geographical Force Unit (CAFGU) as well as the Lumad (Animist Hilltribesmen) paramilitaries that were folded into the nascent CAFGU, just as they had been with the ICHDF.

Unlike the aforementioned Davao Death Squad report, "You Can Die at Anytim," this report, "Bad Blood: Militia Abuses in Mindanao, the Philippines," resulted in a very intencive investigation. For five weeks in January and February of 1992 HRW staffers covered the bloody violence in Mindanao's Caraga Region, specifically the borderlands of Agusan del Sur and Suriago del Sur Provinces, close to what was then the northern reaches of Davao del Norte Province, but what has since become Compostela Valley, or ComVal Province. The saddest thing is how nothing at all has changed in the nearly two decades since.

It is a thirty-six paged report but like so many of its ilk, the first several pages are tables, and report overviews, etc., so that I begin on page seven. This will be a three part entry.

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Bad Blood: Militia Abuses in Mindanao, the Philippines

pp7

The Military, the Paramilitary, and the NPA

From CHDF to CAFGU

Since its inception the Philippine Military has served primarily as an internal security force, directed to quell indigenous insurgencies rather than to fight external aggressors. Paramilitary auxiliaries, both official and unofficial, have been central to these internal operations. Paramilitary groups have allowed the military to circumvent the more costly alternative- large increases in the regular territorial foces- and have functioned as the military's grassroots "eyes and ears" in communities suspected of harboring subversives. Historically, the Government has had a poor record of convicting members of paramilitary groups on human rights grounds.

During the Japanese Occupation, the Philippine Constabulary (PC) , then the leading internal security force, worked closely with a paramilitary group known as the Civil Guards, which were armed by the PC and paid by landholder's collaborating with the Japanese. After World War II, Civil Guards were used in a brutal and successful war to crush a peasant uprising in Luzon known as the Huk Rebellion. Local fanatic cult groups were also deployed in terror campaigns in a strategy masterminded by the CIA's head Edward Lansdale. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Military continued to use civilian paramilitary organizations under various names under successive administrations.

In the mid-1970s, existing paramilitary organizations were absorbed into the new Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force, or ICHDF. In Mindanao, the IHCDF, or CHDF, was originally deployed together with Cristian armed fanatic groups against an uprising in the Muslim population. The CHDF often operated in independent teams, outside the chain of command. Under the supervision of Constabulary forces, the CHDF soon grew to more than 73,000 members, and gained international notoriety for brutality. Virtually every major international human rights organization working in the Philippines documented its abuses.

Beginning in 1974, the CHDF were also increasingly deployed against the New Peoples Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. By 1985, NPA forces , driven by worsening poverty and unprecedented levels of corruption in government, had grown to an estimated 25,000 armed insurgents. Most of the CHDF were deployed in Mindanao, which helped the NPA expand in that region, because "in addition to being incompetent , the CHDF were brutal" ("Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines" Richard Kessler [New Haven,Conn.:Yale University Press] [1989] pp121). In one particularly grisly example reported to the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, a mother described what the CHDF had done to her daughter:

"Last December 23, 1984, I was working at our farm in Sitio Bagacay, while my daughter Virginia was inside our nipa house. At about 4PM, I heard gunshots coming from the hill directly above where our house was located...I recognized the men as four members of the Civilian Home Defense Force...the four CHDF members approached Virginia, took her to our (farm) plot. Once there, they removed the dress, bra, and panties of Virginia...

pp8

...laid her on the ground and the four took turns having sexual intercourse with her. Virginia shouted for help twice and after her second appeal for help, (one of the CHDF) stabbed her with a dagger above her breast and below her navel, after which he shot her with his rifle. After looting the hut, the four CHDF members burned it down, fired several more shots in the air and left" (LCHR "Salvaging Democracy) pp33).

Because of many abuses like this one, the dissolution of the CHDF became a constant refrain of human rights groups and the political opposition to Marcos in the early 1980s. Opposition candidate Corazon Aquino made the end of the CHDF a key promise during her presidential campaign, and when she took office, she vowed to make good on her campaign pledge. The new Constitution, ratified in February 1987, provided that "all paramilitary forces including the CHDF...shall be dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force," but permitted the creation of a "citizens armed force" (Constitution Article XVII, Section 24).

The CHDF and other paramilitary units were officially dissolved six months later. Just ten days later, however, Aquino signed an Executive Irder creating the new Citizens Armed Forces- Geographical Unit (CAFGU) (Executive Order #275 dissolved the CHDF on 7/15/87 and Executive Order #264 created CAFGU on July 25, 1987). Initially, according to various Military estimates, between 30 and 70% of CAFGU recruits were former CHDF members.

Recognizing the brutality of the CHDF, military leaders made efforts to distinguish the CAFGU from the CHDF. The CAFGU, they said, was not a paramilitary force, which was now outlawed. It was rather a "reservist army" or militia, to be deployed solely in their home communities to defend against incursions by rebel forces. Guidelines assured that only "qualified" individuals would be admitted in a careful screening process, a process supervised by civil, as well as military authorities. Recruits with criminal, or "derogatory" records would be excluded. Ideally CAFGU recruits were to be drawn from the pool of roughly "one million idle Reservists, highschool graduates or ROTC or Civil Military Training courses or of summer military courses. In cases where there were insufficient numbers of eligible candidates, the Armed Forces may screen all able bodied male citizens and train them" (from Executive Order #264, line #240 under "Implementing Rules and Regulations").

In reality, the guidelines used in screening potential recruits are inadequate to prevent abusive individuals from being accepted. Given the poor record of prosecutions against human rights violators, many former CHDF and vigilante group members may be legally accepted. More worrisome, national and internation human rights groups have complained that even the limited screening safeguards are routinely ignored or purposely circumvented.

Training for CAFGU also appears to be inadequate. While the military points to the fact that the six week training for CAFGU includes several hours training on concepts of human rights. Human Rights Watch learned of several instances where training personnel (who after training became the unit's commanding officers) are themselves known to be abusive.

Guidelines drafted by the Department of National Defense provided that the CAFGU, unlike the CHDF, would be subject to the same discipline and chain of command as the regular armed forces. Each armed forces detachment would be liable for abuses committed by CAFGU members operating under its command. However, Human Rights Watch found that military officers often denied that especially abusive CAFGU members were under their command, despite evidence to the contrary.

pp9

In early 1992, some 89,000 CAFGU had been deployed, and plans were underway to increase the CAFGU by another 10,000. In rural areas, CAFGU forces were increasingly eclipsing local civilian government and police functions. Because of their superior knowledge of local territory and history, the CAFGUs were employed by the military in all aspects of military operations, from informants and guides to frontline forces in search and destroy operations against rebel hideouts.

Human Rights Watch documented dozens of grave human rights abuses, ranging from Extra-Judicial Killings to maltreatment while in custody, committed by CAFGU members in Mindanao. Little, it seems, had changed. The findings echo several earlier reports by international human rights organizations, which documented an alarming rise in cases of abuse by the militia in 1989.

Human Rights Watch findings cast serious doubt on the rigorousness of the CAFGU screening process and on the ability of regular forces to control and discipline units in Mindanao. Lists available through military and civil authorities revealed that a majority of recruits formerly belonged to the CHDF. In other cases, CAFGU members were known to belong to local fanatical cults or tribal armies, and still others reportedly had criminal records. The idea of drawing reservists from college level ROTC graduates was impossible to achieve in outlying areas, where the vast majority of residents have only a few years schooling. In cases where CAFGU abuses were reported to authorities, few militiamen were disarmed, discharged, tried, and convicted (in Agusan del Sur Province only 35% finished primary school and only 10% were graduates of any formal military training).

Worse, in a few documented cases where CAFGU members were officially discharged, the individuals continued to be employed in military operations against insurgents.

Human Rights Reforms

Few military, paramilitary, or militia members have ever been prosecuted by the courts. The problem is not one of laws, but one of enforcement. The Philippines is signatory to many of the principle human rights treaties, and the Philippine Constitution contains a comprehensive Bill of Rights.

Several Governmental bodies concerned with human rights exist. A Government Commision on Human Rights (CHR) laid down in the Constitution, is charged with investigating human rights abuses by both the Government and the NPA, and recommending cases for prosecution. It has no power to prosecute.

However, even within its limited mandate, the CHR has had little success in investigating abuses. Critics both within and outside the agency say the CHR has attempted to investigate too wide a variety of civil and criminal matters...

pp10

...and complain that its resources are too centralized in the capital. Of 679 staff on January 1992, 300 were in Manila. While the Manila office produced glossy brochures and detailed performance reports, investigators in the countryside complained about being short of staff and funds. Each regional office had the use of just one vehicle for investigators across an average of seven provinces; and budgets were so tight that investigators routinely paid for Xerox copying out of their own pocket. In Surigao del Sur Province, where numerous cases of abuse were reported, the field investigator said he had use of neither a type writer nor a Government vehicle.

The CHR is also hindered by its reputation for being ineffectual as an avenue for justice. Of 3,414 complaints filed with the CHR in 1991, only 836 were filed in the courts or in other agencies. The CHR was unable to point to any discharge or jail sentence of military as a result. Human rights groups also complained that CHR was too passive, failing to investigate reported abuses unless the complaintant filed a formal complaint, which the victims of abuse were often reluctant to do.

To its credit, the CHR appears to have showed some boldness in employing its new powers to delay schueduled promotions of military officers on the basis of existing human rights complaints. Human Rights Watch found evidence to suggest that this is having a strong psychological impact on higher ranks in the military. In Mindanao, for instance, Human Rights Watch was told by military sources that the promotion of a brigade commander in Bukidnon was held up because of complaints filed against a subordinate, a lieutenant colonel; two other colonels, one in Agusan del Sur and one in Bukidnon, were also not promoted because of complaints filed with the Commission on Human Rights going back to the mid-1980s. A major in Tupi, South Cotabato also said his promotion had been held up, and local human rights monitors said he has been consulting with them on human rights issues more frequently since then (the "major" in South Cotabato was Major Bermudez, interviewed by HRW on 1/21/92 and the "colonel in Bukidnon was Col.Rodolfo Rocamora interviewed by HRW at Camp Osito Bahian on 1/21/92).

The Presidential Human Rights Committee, a cabinet-level task force which includes representatives of the military, CHR, Departent of Justice and non-governmental human rights organizations, has pushed a member of human rights cases to the spotlight since 1989, but it remains to be seen whether any prosecutions can be attained. Under the leadership of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon and his successor, Silvestre N.Bello III, the PHRC launched several investigations. In November 1991, a Task Force was actively prosecuting several cases of political killings, including a case of multiple murder and arson against a military sergeant in the massacare of the Peralta family in Pangasinan. The PHRC also enacted several new directives, but implementation appeared to be a problem. For example, the PHRC drafted legislation instituting an important, critical program for protecting witnesses and their families. However, a year after the legislation had become law, and despite a hefty $1 Million budget, the program had still not been utilized in a single instance.

Officials in PHRC blamed the non-implementation of the program on the increasing political paralysis in the months leading up to the 1992 Elections.

pp11

There was an increasing sense of lawlessness during the election period. Three candidates were assassinated in February and early March. Government officials complained that the Armed Forces were "outgunned" by the estimated 143 private armies across the country. In fact, many of the "private" armies were manned by offduty soldiers and militia. The local and national press provided a daily litany of scandals describing soldiers and militiamen's involvement in illegal logging, extortion, kidnapping rings, and guns-for-hire rings.

Police commanders publicly expressed fears that CAFGU groups might be used by wealthy politicians to intimidate voters during the elections. In Central Mindanao, a police official announced that the CAFGU and vigilante forces were being mobilized by politicians as private armies. This prompted President Aquino to request that CAFGU deployed in areas where insurgency no longer posed a threat be disarmed. A week later, however, the Commissioner on Elections said the 89.000 CAFGU could keep their arms following a request by the Defense Secretary Renato de Villa that the CAFGU serve as official "poll watchers' and promised "clean and fair' elections.

The Military and Human Rights

The Philippine Military has long been characterized by excessive politicization and abusiveness. It has also been tainted by the image of illegitimacy. Historically it has served as a collaborator with foreign occupying powers, and as an instrument of elite repression. Even though the military had taken pains to clean up its tarnished image. At the highest levels, the military had cooperated with efforts by the legislature, the Department of Justice, and the Commission on Human Rights to strengthen civilian authority. In late 1990, the legislature passed a law dissolving the PC, a security force which was responsible for serious human rights abuses during the Marcos and Aquino Administrations, and instituted a new national police under civilian control. In June 1991, Aquino signed legislation which returned to civil courts jurisdiction over human rights and criminal offenses filed against members of the military.

However, for reasons not entirely clear, human rights reforms appeared to have successfully "trickled down" to the intermediate and rank and file level. In 1991, evidence of human rights abuses by soldiers and militia continued to be reported, although on a lesser scale. There appeared to be a serious lack of political will in combating remaining obstruction among military ranks. The military's commitment to enforcing the Government's legal commitments to preserving human rights appeared questionable.

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Parts 2, 3, and 4 to follow...

The Davao Death Squad, Through the Eyes of HRW, Part 3

Whethere they use pistols, knives...and now super hero costumes and whips, Vice Mayor Rodrigo "Roddy" Duterte of Davao City is always on the job and always sure that his minions are terrorising the "scum" of society. Glue sniffing twelve year olds and men who dare to walk the dangerous path of marijuana addiction better watch out cause Righteous Roddy is waiting and ready to smite them in all their inequity. Having watched a bootleg copy of "The Star Chamber" a bit too often Daffy Duterte decided that smacking jeepney drivers and dropping political opponents head firts out of helicopters over Davao Bay just wasn't cutting it and so he decided to dress up as "McGruff the Crime Dog" and take a bite of crime.

Since at least the late 1990s Vice Mayor Duterte has been stading idly by as literally hundreds of constituents have been murdered on his city streets, in broad daylight and yet Duterte is portrayed as being rabidly effective at cutting crime. Those that laud him ignore these hundreds of murders while placing Davao City's mad dog mayor on a pedestal. Standing idly by is all Duterte can do because he is neck deep in blood since he plays a central role in many of these killings. Indeed Duterte makes no secret that the buck stops with him. Whether on his Sunday morning ego-laden extravaganza, "Gikan sa Masa, Para sa Masa" (From the Masses to the Massed) or his Tuesday, not quite ready for prime time, "Ato ni Bay" ( Duterte readily admits to killing kidnappers, "terrorists," drug dealers and so on.

Unfortunately the Human Rights Watch report that I am posting verbatim in this three part series of entries, "You Can Die at Anytime: The Davao Death Squad," (Human Rights Watch, April, 2009) does a terrible job at investigating this dynamic. Focusing on twenty-eight killings that mostly took place in Davao City (several occurred in Digos City and General Santos City, aka GenSan), it veers into lunacy when it purports to link the stabbings of gang members to Duterte's 45 caliber pistole wielding thugs. Never the less, it is worth posting if only to draw a modicum of light unto this rarely discussed side of Davao City.

In this, the third and last part of my posting I stop midwat through page 11, out of 15 pages, because at the point at which I stop the investigation, if one can even call it that, ends and HRW's explanation about the roles that the police, prosecutors, Ombudsman's Office, and the Commission on Human Rights are SUPPOSED to play according to Philippine Law. Also, it includes HRW recommendations to those entities, such intellectually stimulating tidbbits like, "should do their job" repeated several times over. I don't feel that inclusion of that materiel will add anything, now would omitting it reduce the substance of what really ends up being nothing but fluff, above and beyond factoids such as names and dates which are always helpful.

I begin here midway thru page 10. A reminder, the word "Amo" used in the report signifies a "handler," or "supervisor."

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pp10 (continued)

Confirming eyewitness accounts to killings and the statistics gathered by CASE, Ramon said that, in recent years, the DDS started using knives more often. He said that his friend showed him two knives that he received after joining the DDS- one was a so-called Rambo Knife (a mid size, double bladed saw tooth knife) and the other was a long knife, approximately 4Cm (about 16 inches) in length. He said that the DDS started using knives more extensively because they are cheaper and attract less attention. Moreover, stab wounds make it easier for the police to claim that the victim has been killed by gang members or ordinary criminals.

The motorcycles provided to death squad members often do not have liscence plates, which is a traffic law violation in Davao City. According to Ramos, the police do not stop drivers of such motorcycles because "they have connections to the police." Fernando said that DDS members sometimes use red "governmental" liscence plates, which allow unimpeded movement through checkpoints and road police posts, and then members "simply take them off before the hit."

According to Ramon, while the group does not have any uniform, they usually wear jackets (even during hot weather) or buttoned shirts, to hide firearms or knives underneath, as well as baseball caps. Ramon said that masks are rare, and usually worn when a hitman operates alone, driving a motorcycle himself.

"Maria," who said an uncle of hers was a DDS member, told Human Rights Watch:

"My uncle owned two guns, one of which appeared to be a 45-caliber gun. He carried them hidden inside his jacket or inside a compartment underneath his XRM motorcycle seat. When he went outside at night, he would wear a black basebal cap, a black or khaki camouflage jacket, and often sunglasses. He would go out two or three times per week, and when he came back home, he would have cash."

Recruitment and Training

Individuals whose friends or relatives were allegedly members of the DDS told Human Rights Watch that people they knew had joined the group to make easy money, but they did not seem to feel any remorse about the victims, claiming that those killed were the "scum of society anyway."

Apparently, some also believed that the execution of criminals is the only solution when the legal system is unable to prosecute them. Ramon told Human Rights Watch:

"My friend (the DDS member) used to say that while the police sometimes arrest drug dealers or rugby sniffers, eventually they release them, and they go back to their usual business and way of life. They are repeat offenders- so this is simply the 'final solution' for them."

Older recruits who come to the DDS with what is considered relevant experience apparently do not receive any additional training. But young recruits, according to Ramon, go through an initiation ritual and training upon joining the DDS, just like school fraternities and military academies. He described the initiation ritual to Human Rights Watch:

"Memebers who have been with the group for awhile beat you and ask you, 'Why do you want to join the group? What are you going to do with the money you get?' You are supposed to say, 'I want to help my family and I want to help Davao City get rid of criminals'."

The training for new recruits, according to Ramon, takes place in a "DDS compound." Ramon said he visited the compound once, in January 2008, along with a friend of his and several other DDS members. They drove there on two motorcycles, one of which did not have a liscence plate.

At the compound they joined another group of DDS members who arrived there on two motorcycles and two cars. The group's amo was also there- Ramon described him as a short man with "big tummy" who arrived at the compound in his Toyota pickup truck.

The compound is located in a secluded section in the Calinan area, south of Davao City. Ramon described a big house, which he said he did not enter, and a small hut where they were having a drinking session. The compound was surrounded by a concrete fence with a steel gate. Ramon said he did not notice any sign on the gate.

At the compound, Ramon saw a makeshift shooting range with some wooden installations, soda cans, and coconuts that were being used as targets for shooting practice. Ramon told Human Rights Watch what he knew about the training process:

"(The) amo and older recruits conducted the training. The amo explained the goals of the group- to get rid of the criminals in the city- but the training mostly focused on how to stab and how to shoot...For the stabbing instruction, the amo had a poster with a picture of the human body projected on the wall. He showed the vital points on the human body, which have to be targeted to cause fatal wounds- The amo also showed how to hold the knife and how to strike to ensure most impact. There was also a stuffed dummy there to practice on."

Ramon's account was accompanied by expressive gestures that imitated the process of instruction. He showed the "right" and "wrong" ways to hold the knife, and pointed to different parts of the body where the strikes had to be directed.

Identifying the Targets

In many of the cases reported to Human Rights Watch, victims' families had learned one way or another that their relatives had been on a "list," or an "order of battle" or OB, before they were murdered.

Accounts of persons familiar with current operations of the DDS confirm that police and barangay officials still take the initiative to compile the "lists."

One DDS insider told Human Rights Watch that he currently works as an informant for the barangay police chief who is also a DDS member. He said that his job was to inform the police chief about "suspicious individuals" in the barangay, some of whom would be then added to the "order of battle."

Another insider, a local official, said he used to receive the "order of battle" from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Hisjob was to convince the people on the list to surrender, and those who did not later fell victim to killings. Before the 2007 general election in the Philippines, barangay officials requested that he compile and submit a list of drug users and other individuals involved in criminal activities.

Accounts of other insiders confirmed the existence of these lists, which are ultimately used to determine the targets for the DDS. A well respected man in his barangay told Human Rights Watch:

"Once, my motorcycle got stolen. A barangay intelligence official quickly contacted me, saying they have found the guy who stole it. He said that the man has been on the DDS list already and barangay officials suggested that now they should 'get him.' The intelligence official, however, advised them against it, knowing that I wouldn't approve of the killing. He said they would arrest the guy, but eventually he managed to flee."

Several other insiders also believe that, in recent years, death squad handlers have started to demonstrate more initiative in determining targets, rather than just going through the lists compiled by police or barangay officials. Knowing the general categories of persons sought, (drug dealers, thieves, repeat offenders, gang members, and the like), the handlers now more actively identify specific individuals as targets.

Ramon said that handlers use an "errand runner" in each group to collect information from the police and barangay officials on individuals involved in criminal activities.

The amo then calls for a meeting where he assigns the targets to different cells. Such meetings usually take place in unofficial "safe houses." Human Rights Watch obtained a description of one such safe house in Davao City. According to "Grace," in October 2007, her father visited a DDS safe house to deliver certain items for the DDS members. Some of her family members had fallen victim to DDS killinga, and her father had genuine interest in finding out as much as possible about the DDS, Grace said:

"He saw lists with photos posted on the wall, some with 'X' marks, others with future dates marked. He also stumbled on a list that contained names of victims, killers, and the amount of money paid for each killing. He wrote down the information about (his relatives)- it said, for one of them, 30,000 Pesos (about US265) were paid. For the other- 10,000 Pesos (about US208). Outside the hideout, there were quite a few motorcycles of different kinds, including XRM and DT-types, mostly without liscence plates."

According to Ramon, each cell usually gets three nanes every "quincina" (15 days). That does not mean, however, that all three would be killed in this period of time. First, Ramon explained, "you have to work like a policeman- gather intelligence, ask around, conduct surveillance, and maybe even pay an informant in the community if you don't know the target."

Other insiders indicated that the targets are assigned through a "bidding" process. During the meeting, an amo announces names of targets and corresponding prices for each, and the cells "bid" to determine who gets to carry out which operation. Usually, the cell that already knows the target, or at least has access to the community, gets "the job." Fernando described the "bidding" process to Human Rights Watch:

"The handler calls a meeting for the group- usually, one representative from each cell. The handler announces the names and the bidding price, and then a cell offers its services. If several cells want the job, they would discuss which cell can do it better- for example, based on their knowledge of the area or familiarity with the target."

Anthony provided a similar account:

"When choosing a hitman for a particular operation, the handler does that based on the classification of the target, determining what kind of skills the operation would require. If the subject is a low level criminal, thet don't really care, they can do it openly, and the hitman can be less experienced. But if the target is high profile, maybe has bodyguards- it becomes more complicated and covert, and requires more people and better skil.

Fernando said that when the target has a long record of criminal activity, the cell is instructed to carry out the killing immediately. However, if it is a first time offender, they communicate a warning to the target or the family first.

Operations

According to Ramon, upon assigning an operation to one of the cells, the amo gives them the name of the target, sometimes the address or other available intelligence, and even a photo. He said that during his visit to the DDS compound he saw one of these photos- which happened to be, to his horror, one of his friends who had been killed sometme before. Ramon said that the photo was a standard police mugshot with his friend's name and the crime for which he was accused.

Anthony also confirmed that his friends' amo "gives them names, some intelligemce, and partial payment."

An "operation" or a "hit" is usually carried out by three people. According to Ramon, one person drives the motorcycle and acts as a lookout, while the other two carry out the killing. Anthony said:

"It depends on the classification of the target. If it is a 'big fish,' there will be more support- a lookout, or sometimes, several of them. If it's a 'small fish' it can be two people, a driver and a hitman, or even one person who would drive a motorcycle and carry out the hit."

Angela, whose uncle was allegedly a DDS member, described to Human Rights Watch how her uncle usually left for "operations":

"Everytime they had an operation, they would pick him up from our house or my aunt's store at the market. That was usually twice a month. My father and uncle used to drink together and then some men would arrive on a big motorcycle. They were armed with 45-caliber pistols. My father used to ask, 'Where are you going?' And in response my uncle would make a throat cutting gesture with his hand."

According to Ramon, once the group arrives at their destination on their motorcycle, they try to make themselves visible to police mobile units patrolling the area. This serves as a signal that the operation is about to begin and the police should leave the area, which they do.

Ramon said that cells tend to rotate from one area to another, trying to avoid carrying out two consecutive hits in the same place. Most operations take place in Davao City, although, according to Ramon, they also reach other locations, including Digos City, General Santos City, and Tagum City, and locations in Davao Oriental Province. Ramon mentioned that these cities now have their own death squads, so the DDS members only go there in pursuit of a target who has left Davao City for one of those places, especially if the target is a "big fish."

The insiders believe that most of the killings in General Santos City and Digos City are carried out by local groups using the Davao Death Squad as a model. One of the insiders in Digos City noted that the DDS used to come to Digos City to carry out killings, but then a local death squad was formed with training provided by the gunmen from the DDS.

Financing

According to various insiders, the payment for each "successful" operation ranges from 5,000 to 50,000 Pesos (about US104 to US1,041) and may go as high as 100,000 Pesos (about US2,082). The money is divided between members of the cell who carry out the operation. One of the journalists interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that, according to his sources, the price for an "operation" depends on the target, with larger rewards promised for more serious criminals, known gangsters, and leaders of drug distribution networks.

For working class Filipinos, the payment offered to DDS members is a huge amount of money, which, according to several insiders, is one of the main reasons why people join the DDS.

Ramon for example, believes that it was the money that made his friend join the DDS. He said that the friend, a car washer, used to make 70 to 200 Pesos (about US 1.50 to 4.00) a day, while his work with the DDS paid him almost ten times that. Ramon, who also worked as a car washer, admitted tat when the DDS tried to recruit him, he found the offer very tempting, but decided to "continue earning an honest living."

Angela said that her uncle also joined the DDS to make money. She explained:

"They made, I think, 50,000 Pesos (about US1,042) per operation, split between those involved. I know because my uncle once asked my brother to drive the motorcycle, so that they could split the money just between them, without having to share with someone else. But my brother refused. My uncle knew he was doing the wrong thing, but he said he had no other job."

Killings of Death Squad Members

Death Squad members themselves fall victim to targeted killings. Several persons familiar with DDS operations said that the members are sometimes killed by their own men "when they make a mistake and target a wrong person, fail to carry out an operation, or when they get to know too much.

A local journalist told Human Rights Watch that he interviewed many relatives of the early recruits to the DDS- former NPA rebels who surrendered to the Government- who had been killed because they "have been with the group for awhile and knew too much." He added that some DDS members move to another area or leave Davao City altogether after six or so hits to avoid being killed.

Ramon also said that the fear of being eventually executed was one of the reasons he decided to refuse the DDS recruitment offer. He explained:

"I heard that after you work there for some time, you also get executed. That is because you know too much, and the amo doesn't want to be implicated later on, in case you get caught or decide to quit. There are lots of stories about hitmen being executed."

Human Rights Watch documented at least two cases of Death Squad killings where the victims- according to their families, were members of the DDS. One such case was that of Rolando Jimenes, 50, a retired member of CAFGU who lived in Davao City. According to a family member, shortly after his release from prison on a murder conviction in July 2007, Jimenes joined the DDS and took part in killings. He did not try to hide his affiliation with the DDS from his family. On June 15, 2008, he was shot dead by another DDS member, who apparently knew him.
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X.Failure to Investigate and Prosecute the Perpetrators

"When the police arrived at the scene, they didn't try to find any witnesses. They just kept asking me, 'What happened? Who killed your son?' I was hysterical, and kept telling them, 'Why are you asking me? You are the policemen- ask witnesses around here!' "

-Clarita Alia, Davao City, July 19, 2008

Human Rights Watch's investigation in Davao City, General Santos City, and Digos City found that local police are not conducting serious investigations into the killings. Many families of victims told Human Rights Watch that the police always arrived at the scene of the crime too late to arrest the perpetrators, even when the killings took place very close to a police station.

The police often did not talk to eyewitnesses of the killings, neglected to collect the most obvious pieces of evidence, such as spent bullet casings, and later failed to inform the families of victims of any progress in their investigation. Instead, they often pressured the families of victims to identify the perpetrators, but when they offered leads, the police ignored such information.

In none of the 28 killings documented by Human Rights Watch were families of victims aware of any arrests or prosecutions of perpetrators.

The Davao Death Squad Through the Eyes of HRW, Part I

On April 6th, 2009, the NGO Human Rights Watch, or HRW, published a scathing (with HRW everything is "scathing") report on my pretty little punching bag and everybody's favourite hypocrite, Rodrigo "Roddy" Duterte, then the Mayor of Davao City, now serving as its Vice Mayor as daughter Sarah "Inday" Duterte Carpio plays "Seat Warmer" since big daddy reached his nine year term limit in 2010.


HRW is far from objective and should truth be told (and let us hope it always should) they are far from a factual source. Be that as it may this particular report would be worth posting simply as a political curio except that in having scrutinised it VERY carefully I can safely say that THIS particular report has no serious factual errors although it is chock full of innuendo, inferences in THIS case that I happen to agree with 100%. While Rodrigo Duterte has never been charged in any court of law over the so called "Davao Death Squad," he has no problem saying everything BUT the simple "I did it." He actually is so full of himself that he comes just a hair's breadth from doing just that.

For those readers who may have no idea what the "Davao Death Squad" is, or is supposed to be, it is reputed to be an organised force of people created by Duterte, or else simply condoned by him, that engages in Extra-Judicial Executions in order to rid Davao City of petty criminals and other social undesirables. Believing that this issue is important enough to warrant a verbatim rendering of this report I have taken the time and effort to post it. The original report is comprised of fifteen pages including maps, addendums, and indexes therefore I will be dividing it between two entries, Parts I and II. Page 1 of the report is merely a table of contents and so I will begin on page 2.

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pp2

"You Can Die Anytime"

I) Summary

"If you are doing an illegal activity in my city, if you are a criminal or part of a syndicate that preys on the innocent people of the city, for as long as I am the Mayor, you are a legitimate target for assassination."

- Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, February 2009

At around 6PM on July 17, 2008, 20 year-old Jaypee Larosa left his home in Lanang, a quiet residential neighborhood in Davao City, to go to a nearby internet cafe. An hour later his family heard six successive gunshots. A neighbor rushed into their house to say one of their sons had been shot in front of the cafe. Jaypee was taken to a hospital, but was declared dead on arrival.

Eyewitnesses said that Larosa had been shot by three men in dark jackets who had arrived on a motorcycle. After they shot him, one of them removed the baseball cap Larosa was wearing and said, "Son of a bitch. This is not the one," and they immediately left the scene. It appears that the assailants were seeking to kill another man, a suspected robber. Noone has been arrested for Larosa's murder. His family is unaware of the police having taken any meaningful action in this case.

Jaypee Larosa is just one of hundreds of victims of unresolved targeted killings commited over the past decade in Davao City and elsewhere in the Philippines. Dozens of family members have described to Human Rights Watch the murder of their loved ones, all killed in similar fashion. Most victims are alleged drug dealers, petty criminals, and street children, some of which are members of street gangs. Impunity for such crimes is nearly total- few such cases have been seriously investigated by the police, let alone prosecuted.

Although reports of targeted killings in the Philippines, particularly in Mindanao, are not new, the number of victims has seen a steady rise over many years. In Davao City, the number has risen from two in 1998 to ninety-eight in 2003 to one hundred and twenty-four in 2008. In 2009, thirty-three killings were reported in Janurary alone. In recent years the geographical scope of such killings has expanded far beyond Davao City and other cities on the southern island of Mindanai to Cebu City, the Philippines' second largest metropolis. An already serious problem is becoming much worse.

This report provides an anatomy of death squad operations based on our investigations of twenty-eight killings, eighteen of which took place in 2007 and 2008. The victims include children as young as fourteen. In researching this report we found evidence of complicity and at times of direct involvement of government officials and members of the police in killings by the so-called Davao Death Squad (DDS). We obtained detailed and consistent information on the DDS from relatives and friends of death squad members with direct knowledge of death squad operations, as well as journalists, community activists, and government officials who provided detailed corroborating evidence.

According to these "insiders," most members of the DDS are either former Communist New People's Army insurgents who surrendered to the Government or young men who themselves were death squad targets themselves who joined the group to avoid being killed. Most can make far more money with the DDS than in other available occupations. Their handlers, called "Amo" (Boss), are usually police officers or ex-police officers. They provide them with training, weapons, and ammunition, motorcycles, and information on the targets. Death squad members often use 45-caliber handguns, a weapon commonly used by the police but normally prohibitively expensive for gang members and criminals.

The insiders told Human Rights Watch that the Amo obtains information about targets from police or barangay officials, who compile lists of targets. The Amo provides members of a death squad team with as little as the name of the targets, and sometimes an address and a photograph. Police stations are then notified to ensure that police officers are slow to respond, enabling the death squad members to escape the crime scene, even when they commit killimgs near a police station.

The consistent failure of the Philippine National Police to seriously investigate apparent targetted killings is striking. Witnesses to the killings told Human Rights Watch that the police routiinly arrive at the scene long after the assailants leave, even if the nearest police station is minutes away. Police often fail to collect obvious evidence such as spent bullet casings, or question witnesses or suspects, but instead pressure the families of victims to identify the killers.

Our research found that the killings follow a pattern. The assailants usually arrive in twos or threes on a motorcycle without a lisence plate. They wear baseball caps and buttoned shirts or jackets, apparently to conceal their weapons underneath. They shoot or, increasingly, stab their victims without warning, often in broad daylight and in the presencw of multiple eyewitnesses, for whom they show little regard. And as quickly as they arrive, they ride off- but almost always before the police appear

The killings probably have not generated the public outrage that would be expected because most of the victims have been young men known in their neighborhood for involvement in small-scale drug dealing or minor crimes such as petty theft and drug use. Other victims have been gang members and street children.

Frequently, the victims had been earlier warned that their names were on a "list" of people to be killed unless they stopped engaging in criminal activities. The warnings were delivered by barangay officials, police officers, and sometimes even city government officials. In other cases the victims were killed immediately after their release from police custody or prison, or shortly after they returned from hiding.

Human Rights Watch investigated a number of cases in which those killed were seemingly unintended targets- victins of mistaken identity, unfortunate bystanders, and relatives and friends of the apparent target. Death squad members have also been victims of death squad killings, possibly because they "knew too much," failed to perform their tasks, or became too exposed. Some Davao City residents also expressed the belief that some death squad members have become guns- for- hire.

Witnesses and family members who provide information to police on the killings, including the names of suspects, say that police either fail to follow up on the leads, whether they have started a criminal investigation, or if they have made any progress in their investigation. In many cases witnesses are too afraid to come forward with information, as they believe they could become death squad targets by doing so.

The words and actions of long-time Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, some of which were quoted at the start of this report, indicate his support for targeted killings of criminal suspects. Over the years, he has made numerous statements attempting to justify the killing of suspected criminals. In 2001-2002, Duterte would announce the names of "criminals" on local television and radio- and some of those he named would later become victims of death squad killings.

Duterte claims that Davao City has achieved peace under his rule. But with killers roaming the streets with the comfort of state-protected impunity, the city remains a very unsafe place. Available information points to an increasing number of death squad killings, including of persons such as Jaypee Larosa who appeared to have been in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Duterte and other local officials continue to deny the existence of any death squad. But in recent years, mayors and other local officials of other cities have made statements attempting to justify similar killings in their own cities. Sadky, Davao City is seen by some as a model for fighting crime.

Just as disappointing, there is almost a complete lack of political will by the Government at both local and national levels to address targeted killings and take action against the perpetrators. Based on consistent, detailed, and compelling accounts from families and friends of victims, eyewitnesses of targetted killings, barangay officials, journalists, community activists, and "insiders," Human Rights Watch has concluded that a death squad and lists of people targeted for killings exist in Davao City. We also conclude that at least some police officers and barangay officials are either involved or are complicit in death squad killings. Human Rights Watch believes that such killings continue and the perpetrators enjoy impunity largely because of the tolerance of, and in some cases, outright support from local authorities.

The failure to dismantle the Davao Death Squad and other similar groups, prosecute those responsible, and bring justice to the families of victims lies not only with local authorities. The administration of Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has largely turned a blind eye to the killing spree in Davao City and elsewhere, The Philippine National Police have not sought to confront the problem and the inaction of the national institutions responsible for accountability, namely the Department of Justice, the Ombudsman's Office, and the Commission on Humam Rights, has fueled widespread impunity.

The continued death squad operation reflects an official mindset in which the ends are seen as justifying the means. The motive appears to be simple expedience: courts are viewed as slow or inept. The murder of criminal suspects is seen as easier and faster than proper law enforcement. Official tolerance and support of targeted killing of suspected criminals promotes rather than curbs the culture of violence that has long plagued Davao City and other places where such killings occur.

Until national authorities take decisive action to disband the Davao Death Squad and all other similar groups that may be operating in other citues, and prosecute perpetrators and complicit officials, the pledges of President Arroyo and other Government officials to respect basic human rights and uphold the rule of law will remain hollow.

Key Recommendations:

The Philippine Government and local authorities in Davao City, General Santos City, Digos City, and Tagum City, as well as other cities believed to be using or tolerating death squads should urgently take measures to stop the killings and hold perpetrators accountable. More specifically, Human Rights Watch urges that:

• President Arroyo should publicly denounce Extra-Judicial Killings and local anti-crime campaigns that promote or encourage the unlawful use of force. She should order the Philippine National Police, the Ombudsman's Office, and the National Bureau of Investigation to investigate the targeted killings of alleged drug dealers, petty criminals, and street children, and pledge that state employees who are found to be involved or complicit in such killings will be prosecuted in accordance with the law.

• The Philippine National Police should connect through investigations into targeted killings of alleged drug dealers, petty criminals, and street children in Davao City, General Santos City, Digos City, and Tagum City and investigate the alleged involvement and complicity of police officers in such killings, including their failure to investigate the killings rigorously and prepare cases for prosecution.

• The Commission on Human Rights should investigate and report publicly and promptly on the Davao Death Squad and other similar groups and the involvement of the PNP and City Governments in Davao City and other cities where death squad activity has been reported.

• As part of its inquiry into the targeted killings of alleged drug dealers, petty criminals, and street children, the Commission on Human Rights should investigate whether Rodrigo Duterte, Mayor of Davao City, and other mayors and governors in the Philippines ave been involved or complicit in death squad killings, or whether statements by Government Officials may have incited violence.

• The Mayor of Davao City and other local oficials should cease all support, verbal or otherwise, for anti crime campaign that entail violation of the law, including targeted killings of alleged drug dealers, petty criminals, and street children. They should arrest and prosecute perpetrators of the killings and state employees, including law enforcement officers, who are found to be involved or complicit in death squad operations.

• The Philippine Congress should conduct hearings on the Davao Death Squad and other similar groups in the Philippines, with special attention paid as to whether local officials and police officers are involved or complicit in such killings.

• The United States, European Union, Japan, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank should keep their pledges on Human Rights, the rule of law, and good governance, press the Philippine Government to initiate investigations into alleged targeted killings in cities, and to publicize the results of its investigation and plans to dismantle the Davao Death Squad and other similar groups.

pp3

II. Note on Methodology

In July, 2008 Human Rights Watch investigated 28 killings in Davao City, General Santos City, and Digos City, focusing on cases where circumstances suggested a death squad might have been involved. Most of the killings we investigated occurred in 2007 and 2008, although a small handful had taken place as long ago as 2001. Human Rights Watch interviewed about 40 family members and friends of victims, as well as eyewitnesses of apparent targeted killings.


Human Rights Watch also interviewed nine people who had inside knowledge of the structure and functioning of the "Davao Death Squad," because they had family, friends, or neighbors who were members of the DDS, had talked directly to DDS members, or had dealings with them. We also spoke with local Human Rights activists, laywers, and journalists, who have been looking into the killings for years and who, in many cases, were able to provide detailed, corroborating evidence.

We conducted interviews in English and Cebuano (the predominant local language) with the aid of interpreters. We have witheld the names of many of the people we interviewed for security reasons, using pseudonyms for those we repeatedly quoted (we note suce use in the relevant notations). Wherever possible and in the majority of cases, interviews were conducted on a one-on-one basis.

In September, 2008, Human Rights Watch sent letters to the Philippine officials listed below to obtain data and solicit views on the killings of alleged drug dealers, petty criminals, and street children in Davao City, General Santos City, Digos City, Tagum City, and Cebu City. We sent follow-up letters a month later to those who did not reply.

Human Rights Watch wrote the following officials:

Rodrigo R.Duterte, Mayor, Davao City

Pedro B.Acharon, Mayor, General Santos City

Arsenio Latasa, Mayor, Digos City

Rey Uy, Mayor, Tagum City

Tomas R.Osmena, Mayor, Cebu City

Rodolfo R.Rosario, Governor, Province of Davao del Norte

Douglas R.Cagas, Governor, Province of Davao del Sur

Andres G.Caro II, Regional Director, PNP Regional Office XI

Ramon C.Apolonario, City Director, PNP, Davao City

Alberto P.Sipaco Jr., Regional Director, Commission on Human Rights, Davao City

Humphrey Monteroso, Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao

Antonio B.Arellano, Regional State Prosecutor, Region XI

Raul D.Bendigo, State Prosecutor, Davao City

At this writing in February, 2009, Raul D.Bendigo, Davao City Prosecutor, Tomas R.Osmena, Mayor of Cebu City, and Pedro B.Acharon Jr., Mayor of General Santos City, had responded. The other officials listed above did not respond or asked Human Rights Watch to contact other Government agencies or officials. Some of Human Rights Watch letters and Philippine officials' responses are attached in this report's appendix. The rest of the letters are posted on the Philippine oage of the Human Rights Watch website:

www.hrs.org

pp4

[ III. Map of Mindanao]

pp5

IV. Background

Legacy of Violence

Mindanao, the largest of the Philippine's southern islands, has been a focal point for insurgencies and conflict for decades. Militant Muslim groups, Communist insurgents, Government-backed militias and "vigilante groups" have all been responsible for numerous human rights abuses- including abductions, torture and killings- against suspected adversaries and ordinary civilians.

Since 1969 the New People's Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, has been fighting to topple the Philippine Government. The Communist insurgency reached its greatest strength in the mid-1980s, prior to the "People Power" revolution of 1986 that removed then-President Ferdinand Marcos from power. During that period, Mindanao was one of the hotbeds of the NPA insurgency. NPA forces have been responsible for numerous abuses, including targeted killings of persons whom they identify as "enemies," and the use of violencw to extort businesses and individuals. So called "Sparrow Units" have summarily executed those cited for "crimes against people," such as criminals, military informants, and abusive police officers.

Since the early 1970s, the Philippine Government has also been engaged in an intermittent armed conflict with Muslim separatist groups in Mindanao. The conflict has resulted in the death of an estimated 120,000 people, mostly civilians, and displacement of some two million more. A shaky peace currently exists. More radical groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group emerged in the 1990s and have been responsible for numerous bombings and other attacks on civilians, primarily in Mindanao and other southern islands.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) have for many years been implicated in insurgency-related Human Rights violations. In a June 2007 report, "Scared Silent: Impunity for Extra-Judicual Killings in the Philippines," Human Rights Watch documented the involvement of Government security forces in the Extra-Judicial Killing of Leftist politicians, and activists, journalists, outspoken clergy, anti-mining activists, and agricultural reform activists. Only a handful of the perpetrators have ever been convicted.

To fight the NPA insurgents, the Government has long relied on the use of poorly trained paramilitary forces such as the Civilian Home Defense Force and its successor, the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU). These armed militias have tortured and murdered people they believed support or sympathize with the NPA. By operating outside the military chain of commandzn they have also given the armed forces a level of "deniability" for serious abuses they commit.

The Government has also actively enlisted so-called vigilante groups to fight the NPA. By popular legend, the birth, the birth of modern vigilantism in the Philippines traces back to Davao City. In April 1987, in a slum in Davao City, three former rebels shot to death a notorious NPA assasin. This group, called Alsa Masa ("Masses Arise") propspered thanks to deep public resentment against the NPA, which had killed numerous people, many in error, in a violent internal purge starting in late 1985 and alienated once supportive populations.

With the endorsement of then-President Corazon Aquino and under the patronage of a local military commander, Lieutenant Colonel Franco Calida, Alsa Masa rapidly expanded, using coercive recruiting methods and extortion. They required each household to provide a member for their nightly patrols, and painted homes of those who didn't comply with an "X." Jun Pala, a radio broadcaster who was an early supporter of Alsa Masa, routinely threatened Alsa Masa critics with retribution.

In many areas throughout the Philippines, local military commanders created and provided arms to vigilante groups, hoping to emulate Davao City's counterinsurgency experiment with Alsa Masa. A wide variety of vigilante groups were reported in the provinces of North Cotabato, Misamis Occidental, and Zamboanga del Sur in Mindanao and on the islands of Negros, Cebu, and Leyte, among other areas. When these groups invariably became involved in serious abuses, enthusiasm steadily waned and they disappeared in the 1990s.

Problem of Illicit Drugs

The Philippine Government has been battling drug syndicates for decades. The country has the highest estimated methamphetamine prevalence in the world, and continues to be a producer, consumer, and transhipment point for methamphetamine. Illict drug laboratories, which used to be found in or near Metropolitan Manila, are now found in various parts of the country, including Mindanao. In one such discovery, the authorities found a laboratory in Zamboanga City in Mindanao in February 2008 that reportedly had the capacity to produce 1,000 kilograms of methamphetamine each month.

In 2007, the last year for which statistics are available, the authorities identified 149 local drug groups and 8 trans-national groups operating in the country, up sharply from the 149 local and 7 trans-national groups identified in 2006. There was no reason given for the surge. They also cited "intelligence reports" as indicating that illegal drugs from foreign countries were entering through coastal areas in central and southern Philippines. At the same time, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency reported a decreasing number of patients treated at various drug-rehabilitation facilities, again without offering explanation or analysis.

A 2007 US State Department report concluded that "corruption, low morale, inadequate resources and salaries, and lack of co-operation between police and prosecutors" were hampering drug prosecution in the Philippines. It noted that the slow process of prosecuting cases demoralizes law enforcement personnel and permits drug dealers to continue their drug business while awaiting court dates. It said the leading cause for dismissal of cases os the non-appearance of prosecution witnesses, including police officers. Davao City, an urban center of Mindanao, is a major market for illicit drugs.

Davao City

In the 1970s and 1980s Davao City was known as the "murder capital" of the Philippines. Communist insurgents and Government security forces killed each other in the daytime on Davao City streets. NPA assasins killed corrupt police officers, suspected informants, and drug dealers. The Agdao district if Davao City became a Communist bastion knowm as "Nicaragdao" (after Sandinista- led Nicaragua), where the NPA routinely commited targeted killings.

The NPA was largely driven out of Davao City by the late-1980s. The Government claimed that Alsa Masa and other vigilante groups were chiefly responsible, but the NPA's demise also has been explained as due to a bloody internal purge in the NPA that left its ranks shattered. The NPA's decline in Davao City was repeated throughout the Philippines in the ensuing decade. In the words of Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the NPA today remains a low-level threat.

In recent years. Davao City has developed into a sprawling urban metropolis of 1.44 million residents, and a business, investment, and tourism hub for the Southern Philippines. It has attracted a large number of economic migrants from all over Mindanao and elsewhere in the Philippines. Hundreds of thousands are unable ti find stable jobs and end in crowded slum areas. They include an estimated 3,000 street children- 40 to 50 percent of whom are girls- who roam the streets of Davao City to make money and avoid physical abuse at home. Many join youth gangs for bonding and survival.

A resurgency of violence by Islamist groups in Mindanao has left its mark on Davao City. On March 4, 2003, a bomb exploded in a waiting shelter just outside Davao International Airport, killing 22 people and injuring 143 others. Within days, an Abu Sayyaf Group commander claimed responsibility for the attack. On April 2, 2003, a bomb hit the Davao Sasa Wharf, the main dock for Davao City, killing 17 and injuring 56. Several alleged members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group were soon arrested.

Southern Mindanao, which includes Davao City, has also seen a resurgence in Extra-Judicial Killings by members of the armed forces and the police against leftist activists, journalists, and others deemed to be NPA supporters, part of a larger nationwide increase in such killings. As elsewhere in the Philippines, impunity for such crimes is the norm: rarely do the authorities prosecute members of the militart or police for Extra-Judical Killings, and few cases result in arrests, even fewer in convictions.

Davao's Mayor Rodrigo Duterte

Rodrigo Duterte was first elected Mayor in 1988 on a campaign to reinstate peace and order in Davao City. Before running for office, Duterte had built his reputation as a City Prosecutor by targeting military and rebel abuses with equal fervor. The son of a former provincial governor, Duterte said his father taught him that elected officials must serve the greater good no matter what it takes, like a father protecting and disciplining his family. Duterte's rise as a prominent political figure coincided with a significant change in the dynamic between local officials and police in the Philippines. As discussed in Chapter X, two laws enacted in 1990-91 provided city mayors and provincial governors greater operational control over their police forces. Under Duterte's rule, crime rates in the city dropped to among the lowest in the country. According to the Davao City official website:

"From a 3-digit crime rate per 10,000 people in 1985, Davao has reached an almost Utopian [sic] environment with a monthly crime volume of 0.8 cases per 10,000 persons from 1999 up to 2005. Digging through the records, it would reveal that about 90 percent of the cases reported are petty crimes that do not in any way threaten the over-all peace and order condition of the city."

These descriptions attempt to conceal a rampant crime wave-namely, the murder of hundreds of alleged drug dealers, petty criminals, and street children. More importantly, by averaging out years of statistics and omitting most recent years, they belie the city's sharp upward trend in crime rates over the last decade. According to statistics from the police, between 1999 and 2008, the population in Davao City grew from 1.2 million to 1.44 million, or by 29 percent. Meanwhile, the number of annual crime incidents during this period rose from 975 to 3,391, or by 248 percent. These numbers show that, contrary to the city government's self-proclaimed success, its tough anti-crime campaign has failed to curve crime rates. An increasing number of death squad killings appears to have contributed to worsening crime rates in the city.

Social activists say death squad killings if alleged drug dealers, petty criminals, and street children in Davao City started sometime in the mid-1990s, during Duterte's second term as Mayor. The group that claimed to be responsible for the killings was called "Suluguon sa Katawhan" or "Servants of the People," among other names, but soon the media in Davao City began referring to it as the "Davao Death Squad" (DDS).

By mid-1977, local media already had attributed more than 60 unsolved murders to the group, observing that the death squad had adopted to urban warfare tactics used in the 1980s by the NPA "Sparrow Squad" hit teams. One source said revealed that the death squad then had at least ten members, mostly former NPA who had surrendered to the Government. The death squad grew dramatically since-one insider estimates the number of current members at about 500 (see Chapter VIII).

These Killings have not been unpopular. According to a local Human Rights organisation, fear and public frustration at "the arduous and ineffective justice system" have made summary executions seem a "practical resort" to suppress crime in Davao City.

Duterte, who has been mayor for two decades, with a short interval as a Congressman, has been given endearing nicknames by the media like "The Punisher," "The Enforcer," and "Dirty Harry" for his anti-crime campaign. His policies have garnered public support in Davao City. It is thus perhaps no suprise that iin recent years, reports of targeted killings of alleged drug dealers, petty criminals, and street children have emerged in the nearby cities of General Santos City, Digos City, and Tagum City in Mindanao as well as Cebu City on the central island of Cebu.

To be concluded in "Part II"