In my last NPA entry, "NPA Armed Attacks for the Second Quarter of 2011, Part VII" I discussed the supposed "Pacification" of Misamis Oriental Province and the resurgence of the North Central Mindanao Regional Committee, or NCMRC of the NPA. Central to that entry was the municipality of Balingasag in the Balitucan Mountains, home to the NPA's Front 4B. This particular Front has a storied past, one which I touched upon in that aforementioned recent Second Quarter entry.
The ressurection of Front 4B is now undeniable with its spearheading of a major tactical operation on Thursday, August 25th, 2011. Early in the morning on the day in question a female guerilla from Front 16A of the NEMRC, or Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee chartered a van in Surigao City, in the province of Surigao del Norte. The young lady said that she and her siblings would be travelling for a family get together to take place that afternoon in the municipality of Medina, two provinces away in Misamis Oriental. Leaving Surigao City at 930AM the van carrying 10 NPA guerillas began the long drive along Mindanao's northern coast.
Arriving on the outskirts of Medina at 3PM the young female guerilla directed the unsuspecting driver to her "cousin's" home, actually an empty lot where two other rented vans awaited them. Pulling up to the other two vans the driver looked quizicaly at his fare only to be told that he had been commandeered by the NPA and that if he complied without resistance he would live to tell about his exciting day. The other two vans had been chartered that very afternoon, there in Medina, by members of the NPA's Front 4B of the NCMRC, or Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee. Removing assault rifles from boxes and rice sacks that had been transported aboard the three vans, the guerillas then waited until 430PM before ordering the three drivers to proceed into the town centre, Barangay Poblacion, after first co-ordinating positions with a small Blocking Force at two key positions on the only routes in and out of the town centre:
1) A checkpoint on National Hiway
2) In between the Public Market and the entrance into the town's main drag
Driving slowly through the small municipality the three vans, travelling together, mangaged to avoid arousing suspicion as they made their way to the municipal compound. At 515PM the vans stopped several meters from the compound entrance. Instructing the drivers to quickly walk away, 2 well armed guerillas were left to guard the idling vans while the other 28 put their plan into motion. As guerillas poured out of the vans horrified townspeople quickly began running for cover knowing all too well what was about to transpire. Firing rifles as they flooded the compound, SPO1 Edito Bayhon was immediately shot in the head and killed. The 25 year veteran of the Medina MPO, or Municipal Police Office and a resident of the town's Barangay Tupop, had been manning the station's desk, situated just inside the building's doorway. A detachment of 10 guerillas then attempted to infiltrate the town hall situated next to the MPO building.
Sitting inside his office in the town hall Mayor Pacifico Pupos was deep in conversation with two barangay captains and a town councilor when the staccato blasts from rifles, punctuated by detonations of rifle grenades immediately caught his attention. Proceeding to an inner office that was far more secure he and his three guests did their best to ride out the attack.
Alerted to the attack and knowing he had only 7 officers inside the MPO, the Chief of Police rushed past the Public Market only to run headlong into the second Blocking Force position. The result was a quick but intense firefight that prevented the Chief from aiding his men. The first Blocking Force position, the checkpoint on National Hiway, quickly closed up shoppe upon learning from a Spotter that a massive amount of re-inforcements were en route to Medina from neighbouring Gingoog City.
Outside the town hall the 10 man detachment met unexpected resistance in the front foyer and quickly backpedaled into the compound to join in on the assault's main target, the MPO and its modest stock of weaponry. At the 45 minute mark, having failed to infiltrate either objective the guerillas withdrew in orderly fashion and climbed aboard the idling vans before speeding out of Barangay Poblacion and into Barangay San Isidro where they abandoned all three vans before dispersing on foot in different directions, later rendevouzing over the border in the adjacent province of Bukidnon. From there the combined forces of Front 16A and 4B made their way overland to the mountainous border of Bukidnon and Agusan del Norte Provinces in a hard push that ended very late Friday night, August 26th.
The NPA had lost one guerilla, from Front 4B, whose identity remains unknown despite early information that he might have been a Team Leader (detachment commanding officer) known by the nom de guerre "Ka Hakim." The Government casualties, aside from the deceased SPO1, Edito Bayhon, were two critically wounded officers:
1) SPO2 Renie Galera Rombo
2) SPO1 Diosdado Salas Sendiong
The next day while scouring Medina the 8IB (Infantry Battalion) discovered all three vans in Barangay San Isidro, the only progress made by the AFP during its "hot pursuit" of the guerillas. The incident is note worthy in and above it being yet another NPA attack. It followed the blueprint used in the SMRC, or Southern Mindanao Regional Committee's attack on the Panabo City CPO (City Police Office), in Davao del Norte Province back on March 19th of 2011. Employing a non-threatening female guerilla to charter vans for a "family gathering," and then retaining the vans for stage one of their withdrawal...Likewise, one should pay attention to the high degree of co-operation not only between Fronts (not unusual) but between Regional Committees as well (very unusual). In the end the NPA lost a guerilla but did capture an additional M16 off of one of the wounded police officers. Still, the operation, one of an astounding 64 tactical operations by the NPA, in 4ID (Infantry Division) AOR, or Area of Responsibility (as in "Area of Operation") in just the Third Quarter, put Front 4B firmly back into play, even if they did need Front 19A in order to do it.
Showing posts with label Front 4B. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Front 4B. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 31, 2011
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
NPA Armed Contacts for the Second Quarter of 2011, Part VII: Pacification of Misamis Oriental Province and the Attack on Lantad CAFGU
Misamis Oriental Province on Mindanao's northern coast is one of two Mindanaowan provinces declared "Pacified" by the AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines in the fourth quarter of 2010. Pacification simply requires the signature of the ID CO, or Infantry Division Commanding Officer, under whose AOR, or Area of Responsibility the province lies, in this case the 4ID. There is no quantified process requiring a minimum of armed contacts, etc. Once the ID CO makes what is purely judgement call, the armed response to the insurgency within that province is officialy turned over to the PPOC, or Provincial Peace and Order Committee for management and is perceived to then be a Law and Order issue, or in Philippine speak, a Peace and Order issue, to be dealt with by the PNP, or Philippine National Police on the ground.
Misamis Oriental had come a long way in a very short time to even be considered for a security downgrade. Indeed one of its municipalities, the town of Balingasag had just 4 years before been under virtual control of the NPA. Sitio Lantad, a Higaon-on Tribal settlement in the municipality's Barangay Kibanban was declared "Liberated Territory" by the NPA which had implemented a full parallel government there in 1987. While parallel NPA Governments are in no way unique, then OR now, the "Government" in Sitio Lantad exerted 100% control even to the point of issuing land deeds and recording births and deaths.
The standard narrative is that the big turn around is single handedly due to Misamis Oriental's Governor, Oscar Moreno. Elected in 2004 he turned his attention to the sitio, believing in the standard COIN, or Counterinsurgency mantra that "Insurgencies begin where good roads end." That adage sums up the orthadox take on the main impetus behind insurgency; namely, that organisations like the NPA flourish in places where governments fail to provide basic services. Of course there is truth in that but like most anything else, it involves a whole lot more.
If a lack of attention and services is the root cause of the NPA's strength in Sitio Lantad, Governor Moreno sought to effectively deal with that in a common sensical manner. The first step, from that orthadox perspective, is to have the AFP clear the sitio of NPA regulars, or full time guerillas. To that end the 8IB (Infantry Battalion) saturated the sitio and cleared it. Upon clearing the second step is to "hold" the community, to prevent re-infiltration by the insurgency. Therefore the 8IB established a garrison on a hill overlooking the 200 house sitio, manned by the battalions Company C. Finally, the 8IB supervised the recruitment of a CAFGU platoon from the sitio. CAFGU, or Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit is the cornerstone of the CAA, or Civilian Active Auxiliary programme, itself the cornerstone of the AFP's COIN blueprint. Since I have discussed the CAA in more than a couple of my recent NPA entries, for the sake of brevity I will merely offer that the CAFGU are a geographically specific armed reserve of the AFP (via J5, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations). Its personnel are residents of the community in which they serve and they may not operate outside of their parent municipality.
After the "holding" stage is reached, it is time to re-establish, or in most cases establish for the first time ever a visible and meaningful Governmental presence. Sitio Lantad sits in a valley in the Balatucan Mountains. Located 18km upland from the more populated sections of its parent barangay, Kibanban, the only way to reach Lantad was by a footpath that was usually impassable along an 11km stretch. The valley's rather high elevation means that it isn't subject to the two Monsoons that drive most of Mindanao's weather systems. Instead it receives a short but torrential rainfall on most every afternoon of the year, relegating that one footpath to almost marsh-like consistency. The impassability of the trail narrowed down travel options to either horse or buffalo (carabao), and kept the people of Lantad in dire povery and perpetual isolation. Governor Moreno then embarked upon the construction of a gravel track that when completed in July of 2006 allowed habal-habal (motorcycle taxi) travel on a permanent basis.
Next, Governor Moreno constructed a solar dryer, basically a concrete patio with concave furrows that allow easier sun drying of the dry rice grown in the valley. The Governor then secured the assistance of various NGOs to help provide solar panels that allowed electrification of most sitio homes along with health and educational initiatives. By 2007 Sitio Lantad itself was declared Pacified and the Governor vowed to use the experience gained there as a template for pacification for the rest of the province.
Of course the Government's re-taking of Sitio Lantad, if indeed that is what it really was, had little to do with the improvements given to the villagers. In the late 1980s to early 1990s Lantad became a logistical hub for the NPA's Northern Mindanao Region, or NMR as well as the CMR, or Central Mindanao Region and the NMR, or Northern Mindanao Region, the Region to which Lantad was attached. With NPA founder and leader Jose Maria Sison's release from prison in 1986 the NPA underwent an ideological shakeup that precipitated a major organisational crisis. With Sison locked away in prison since 1977 the group's Maoist foundation began to support other ideological lines. The shift began in the organisation's Manila-Rizal Committee on Luzon, under its Secretary, Felimon "Ka Popoy" Lagman. Maoism is built upon the premise that the rural masses, the peasantry, are the backbone of the nation and therefore must drive any far reaching social and/or political change. More to the point, the armed struggle must remain a rural-based campaign until the insurgency's final stages. NPA members living in Metro Manila naturally felt that the urban masses forming the bulk of their membership and 100% of their mass base of support also had alot to offer the armed struggle and under Lagman's custodianship the Manila-Rizal Committee further entrenched itself in this divergent position. There were a host of hard ideological issues and other underlying organisationally based issues dividing Lagman and the CPP, or Communist Party of the Philippines (the NPA is but an armed wing of the CPP) dating back to the 1978 Congressional and Senatorial Elections when Lagman eschewed the standard CPP/NPA boycott of elections and agitated for participation. Still, the crux of the divide centered upon the perspective that Maoism was tailored for the China of the 1930s and 40s, not the Philippines of the mid-1980s. That last point was especially popular in strong Regional Committees in all three of the major Philippine Regions, the entire top tier of leadership in KOMVIS, or Visayas Committee (Komiteng Visayas) the Visayas Region and in Central Mindanao, Far South Mindanao, and Western Mindanao in the Southern Philippines as well.
With Sison's re-emergence and the huge ideological misstep taken with the same CPP/NPA adherance to boycotting of all state elections...even when THE "election" happens to be the first post-Marcos Presidential Election, set the stage for a major showdown precipitated by the NPA over-reacted to these ideological variations. Ka Popoy and Manila-Rizal were at the forefront of the brewing storm. With Sison's re-entry came the need, as he and his organisational allies saw it, to separate the chaff and let it fall where it would. All the more pressing were a host of external forces driving this dynamic. While Sison almost gleefully pointed to the collapse of the Soviet Union as proof positive of Maoism's advantages Lagman, et al correctly pointed out that China was no longer the land of Mao caps and cookie cutter bicycles. It was quickly backsliding into capitalism. Lagman then made it a personal issue with thre widely distributed manifestos collectively known within the CPP/NPA as "Counter-Thesis I."
Lagman then upped it a notch, spurred on by high ranking allies in KOMVIS, he withdrew Manila-Rizal from the CPP/NPA and publicly distributed the resignation letter. Meanwhile, here on Mindanao, the Central Mindanao Region, or CMR, only in existence for less than 4 years (created from a merging of Moro Region, MR, and North Western Region, NWR) had begun chafing under Sison's "my way or the hiway" heavy handedness. The concern on Mindanao could never be "urbanist insurrectionism" as it had been with Lagman and his supporters. Instead, the issues at play were of a totally different sort, albeit just as divisive - if not more- than Lagman's disillusionment with Chairman Mao.
Mindanao had started later than most other regions as far as the Communist struggle is concerned. Its first cadres didn't arrive until 1973 and it wasn't until 1977 that the movement could support a tactical strike on the island. Then, in 1978 the movement suddenly caught on like wildfire and spread throughout Mindanao, even making headway into Muslim-dominated areas like Maguindanao Province by the dawn of the 1980s. The rest of the 1980s saw increasing momentum that had the NPA snowballing in all corners of the island. However all was not well. The CPP had never been well developed on Mindanao and now that the armed wing, the NPA, was expanding exponentially it was impossible to close the gap between the military and political wings. People were recruited directly into the NPA without an ounce of political underpinning and so at critical mass, in 1985, the organisation on Mindanao was set to implode.
The Kampanyang Aho, or "Garlic Campaign" began with a terrified but well intentioned investigation into the AFP and PC, or Philippine Constulbary (now defunct) DPAs, or Deep Penetration Agents. Dating back to the Philippine's immediate post WWII Communist Insurgency in Central Luzon, the so called "Huk Rebellion," the Philippine Military establishment had run deeply buried sleepers in all Leftist slash subversive organisations. The concern on Mindanao was entirely mis-placed. What few DPAs were in play were entirely under deployment on Luzon. Undoubtedly recently trained local youth may have been deployed but were in no way serving as DPAs whose modus operandi had been to climb the ranks of Leftist organisations in order to provide worthwhile intel worth of the substantial investment their deploment represented.
Centered in what was then NMR, or Northern Mindanao Region, in and around the municipality of Opol in Misamis Oriental Province, Aho ended up killing nearly 900 NPA guerillas, or 20% of all NPA regulars on Mindanao during the campaign's duration, 1985 to 1986. Then, largely because of the missteps taken during the purge, there was a total restructuring of the NPA on the island. To say that the situation was precarious even before Sison was released from prison and began trying to realign the CPP/NPA would be absolutely correct. The most power Front in NMR, Front 12, was also the entity spearheading the purge and so out with the old, in with the new. CMR was born as a direct reaction to Aho, in 1987.
eadership of CMR along with a portion of the leadership in FSR (Far South) and WMR (Western) felt that Sison's "one size fits all" approach was a piss poor fit for Mindanao's unique cultural and social landscape. Together the leadership of the three Regions, together comprising 60% of the NPA leadership on Mindanao signed a manifesto in which they expressed dissatisfaction with the CPP's lack of tendency and the increasingly despotic decision making process. They asked that the CPP allow for a Congress in which to sort out these divergent perspectives.
When, at the CPP's 10th Party Plenum in 1993, FSR and WMR stepped away from the aforementioned critique of Sison, CMR remained steadfast and by the end of 1993 found itself unceremoniously expelled from the CPP/NPA, joining Manila-Rizal and virtually the entire Central Visayas structure along with its parent structure, VISKOM, in trying to forge a new path independently of the Sison organisation. The three elements then parlezed and by the second organisational meeting in September of 1995 had formed the PCP, or Peoples Communist Party and its armed wing, the RPA, or Revolutionary Proletariat Army. This loosely structured organisation was militarily speaking, fairly active. Politically though there was no unified direction unless "away from Maoism" counts as a "direction." In mid-1998 the three separate strands within the PCP:
1) Manila-Rizal
2) KOMVIS
3) Central Mindanao Region
formed a much more cohesive and much better politically grounded organisation, the RPM-P, or Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa -Pilipinas. Usually referred to by its English translation, Revolutionary Workers Party of the Philippines, with the military component remaining the RPA. There was a second military organisation as well, ABB or the Alex Boncayo Brigade. Formed out of Manila-Rizal's SPARU, or Special Partisan Armed Revolutionary Unit. SPARU were and of course remain the NPA's assassination squads. The love affair wouldn't last though, when the RMP-P/RPA/ABB entered into a Peace Process with the Estrada Government the following year. As RMP-P etc reached a Final Peace Agreement in 2001 the Mindanowan branch broke away and formed the RPM-M/RPA. The "M" standing for Mindanao of course and the "P" in RPA changed to "Peoples," as in "Revolutionary Peoples Army."
So, not only was the NPA in Misamis Oriental Province, like all other areas, suffering from infighting but its logistics were decimated. Sitio Lantad had served as a logistical hub for two Regional NPA formations, besides the formation that would eventually come to be labelled, NCMRC, or Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee :
1) NEMRC or Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee
2) WMRC or Western Mindanao Regional Committee
All this led to the NPA losing its unquestioned hold upon Sitio Lantad in 1992. The truth of the matter is, pacification was assured even without Governor Moreno's intervention. The people MOST responsible for the dislodgement of the NPA in Sitio Lantad was the NPA itself.
By 2010 the NPA was re-establishing a foothold in Sitio Lantad's parent municipality, Balingasag, with a show of force at that town's Barangay Napaliran. On the day in question, at the barangay's fiesta, a yearly celebration devoted to the patron saint held near and dear by every Christian community in the Philippines, the NPA deployed a SPARU team for a public assassination. With the depleted resources of the Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee not being able to support its own SPARU element, the Southern Mindanao Regional Committee, or SMRC graciously "lent" the services of its more than capable Eking Balacuit Command. The SPARU team chose to make a point by blowing off the face of Staff Seargent Elmo G.Penar of the AFP's 8IB. Unfortunately they chose to do so as he stood next to his friend, Alexander Pabualan of that town's Barangay Uno. Both men died immediately. SSgt.Penar was targetted for two specific actions he had taken part in:
1) Capture of Front 4-B's main camp in December of 2003
2) Capture of two NPA guerillas on Janurary 14th, 2006
of course both incidents had nothing to do with the targetting of SSgt.Penar. If the NPA were to kill every member of the AFP who takes part in a Tactical Operation against it there would be bodies all over Mindanao...WAIT! There ARE bodies all over Mindanao! Anyway, I am sure that most readers will get the point. The killing merely served as a wake up call that the NPA was not out of the picture in the town of Balingasag. Front 4-B was utilised in the rationale because it is the Front that was supposedly destroyed in the clearing of Sitio Lantad.
Since the SPARU action Front 4-B has been steadily re-couping ground and support. It is ironic that the Pacification of Misamis Oriental Province took place just 80-odd days after that assassination. All the more so when Pacification entails a re-deployment of IBs (Infantry Battalions) out of cleared communities. 8IB's garrisons have remained as is. Maybe their CO, Lieutenant Colonel Pascua os psychic because on April 15th, 2011 Front 4-B attempted to overrun the CAFGU post in none other than Sitio Lantad. At just before midnite 20 guerillas launched an attack and though they failed to capture the post did end up critically wounding three CAAs from the 223rd CAA Company with shrapnel from a couple of rifle grenades:
1) Jimmy Lindahay
2) Nino Luga
3) Apolinario Luga
The recent ratcheting up of hostilities inspired William Castillio, a resident of Lantad and General Manager of the LMPC, or Lantad Multi-Purpose Co-operative to author a proclamation being billed as the "Lantad Manifesto" by some dimwitted local pseudo-journalists who seem to think the sitio's past as an NPA showpiece relegates everything in and about it to Communist cliches. Most notably perhaps was the proclamation's primary author being William Castillo. Castillo's father Conrado was a mid-level NPA guerilla who was "elected" as the NPA Mayor of Lantad during its NPA heyday. In the mid-90s Conrado Castillo became a Surrenderee to the Government only to receive his come uppance from the NPA in 1999 when he was killed by his ex-"Comrades."
The proclamation was handed to Father Albert "Paring Bert" Alejo, a Jeruit priest. Serving on the GPH portion of the RCW-SER, or Reciprocal Working Committee on the Socio-Economic Component of the GPH-NDFP (Government of the Philippines-National Democratic Front of the Philippines, the latter representing the NPA) Peace Process as well as to the joint PPOC of Agusan del Norte and Misamis Oriental Provinces where it was recited in session in late May of 2011.
Misamis Oriental had come a long way in a very short time to even be considered for a security downgrade. Indeed one of its municipalities, the town of Balingasag had just 4 years before been under virtual control of the NPA. Sitio Lantad, a Higaon-on Tribal settlement in the municipality's Barangay Kibanban was declared "Liberated Territory" by the NPA which had implemented a full parallel government there in 1987. While parallel NPA Governments are in no way unique, then OR now, the "Government" in Sitio Lantad exerted 100% control even to the point of issuing land deeds and recording births and deaths.
The standard narrative is that the big turn around is single handedly due to Misamis Oriental's Governor, Oscar Moreno. Elected in 2004 he turned his attention to the sitio, believing in the standard COIN, or Counterinsurgency mantra that "Insurgencies begin where good roads end." That adage sums up the orthadox take on the main impetus behind insurgency; namely, that organisations like the NPA flourish in places where governments fail to provide basic services. Of course there is truth in that but like most anything else, it involves a whole lot more.
If a lack of attention and services is the root cause of the NPA's strength in Sitio Lantad, Governor Moreno sought to effectively deal with that in a common sensical manner. The first step, from that orthadox perspective, is to have the AFP clear the sitio of NPA regulars, or full time guerillas. To that end the 8IB (Infantry Battalion) saturated the sitio and cleared it. Upon clearing the second step is to "hold" the community, to prevent re-infiltration by the insurgency. Therefore the 8IB established a garrison on a hill overlooking the 200 house sitio, manned by the battalions Company C. Finally, the 8IB supervised the recruitment of a CAFGU platoon from the sitio. CAFGU, or Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit is the cornerstone of the CAA, or Civilian Active Auxiliary programme, itself the cornerstone of the AFP's COIN blueprint. Since I have discussed the CAA in more than a couple of my recent NPA entries, for the sake of brevity I will merely offer that the CAFGU are a geographically specific armed reserve of the AFP (via J5, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations). Its personnel are residents of the community in which they serve and they may not operate outside of their parent municipality.
After the "holding" stage is reached, it is time to re-establish, or in most cases establish for the first time ever a visible and meaningful Governmental presence. Sitio Lantad sits in a valley in the Balatucan Mountains. Located 18km upland from the more populated sections of its parent barangay, Kibanban, the only way to reach Lantad was by a footpath that was usually impassable along an 11km stretch. The valley's rather high elevation means that it isn't subject to the two Monsoons that drive most of Mindanao's weather systems. Instead it receives a short but torrential rainfall on most every afternoon of the year, relegating that one footpath to almost marsh-like consistency. The impassability of the trail narrowed down travel options to either horse or buffalo (carabao), and kept the people of Lantad in dire povery and perpetual isolation. Governor Moreno then embarked upon the construction of a gravel track that when completed in July of 2006 allowed habal-habal (motorcycle taxi) travel on a permanent basis.
Next, Governor Moreno constructed a solar dryer, basically a concrete patio with concave furrows that allow easier sun drying of the dry rice grown in the valley. The Governor then secured the assistance of various NGOs to help provide solar panels that allowed electrification of most sitio homes along with health and educational initiatives. By 2007 Sitio Lantad itself was declared Pacified and the Governor vowed to use the experience gained there as a template for pacification for the rest of the province.
Of course the Government's re-taking of Sitio Lantad, if indeed that is what it really was, had little to do with the improvements given to the villagers. In the late 1980s to early 1990s Lantad became a logistical hub for the NPA's Northern Mindanao Region, or NMR as well as the CMR, or Central Mindanao Region and the NMR, or Northern Mindanao Region, the Region to which Lantad was attached. With NPA founder and leader Jose Maria Sison's release from prison in 1986 the NPA underwent an ideological shakeup that precipitated a major organisational crisis. With Sison locked away in prison since 1977 the group's Maoist foundation began to support other ideological lines. The shift began in the organisation's Manila-Rizal Committee on Luzon, under its Secretary, Felimon "Ka Popoy" Lagman. Maoism is built upon the premise that the rural masses, the peasantry, are the backbone of the nation and therefore must drive any far reaching social and/or political change. More to the point, the armed struggle must remain a rural-based campaign until the insurgency's final stages. NPA members living in Metro Manila naturally felt that the urban masses forming the bulk of their membership and 100% of their mass base of support also had alot to offer the armed struggle and under Lagman's custodianship the Manila-Rizal Committee further entrenched itself in this divergent position. There were a host of hard ideological issues and other underlying organisationally based issues dividing Lagman and the CPP, or Communist Party of the Philippines (the NPA is but an armed wing of the CPP) dating back to the 1978 Congressional and Senatorial Elections when Lagman eschewed the standard CPP/NPA boycott of elections and agitated for participation. Still, the crux of the divide centered upon the perspective that Maoism was tailored for the China of the 1930s and 40s, not the Philippines of the mid-1980s. That last point was especially popular in strong Regional Committees in all three of the major Philippine Regions, the entire top tier of leadership in KOMVIS, or Visayas Committee (Komiteng Visayas) the Visayas Region and in Central Mindanao, Far South Mindanao, and Western Mindanao in the Southern Philippines as well.
With Sison's re-emergence and the huge ideological misstep taken with the same CPP/NPA adherance to boycotting of all state elections...even when THE "election" happens to be the first post-Marcos Presidential Election, set the stage for a major showdown precipitated by the NPA over-reacted to these ideological variations. Ka Popoy and Manila-Rizal were at the forefront of the brewing storm. With Sison's re-entry came the need, as he and his organisational allies saw it, to separate the chaff and let it fall where it would. All the more pressing were a host of external forces driving this dynamic. While Sison almost gleefully pointed to the collapse of the Soviet Union as proof positive of Maoism's advantages Lagman, et al correctly pointed out that China was no longer the land of Mao caps and cookie cutter bicycles. It was quickly backsliding into capitalism. Lagman then made it a personal issue with thre widely distributed manifestos collectively known within the CPP/NPA as "Counter-Thesis I."
Lagman then upped it a notch, spurred on by high ranking allies in KOMVIS, he withdrew Manila-Rizal from the CPP/NPA and publicly distributed the resignation letter. Meanwhile, here on Mindanao, the Central Mindanao Region, or CMR, only in existence for less than 4 years (created from a merging of Moro Region, MR, and North Western Region, NWR) had begun chafing under Sison's "my way or the hiway" heavy handedness. The concern on Mindanao could never be "urbanist insurrectionism" as it had been with Lagman and his supporters. Instead, the issues at play were of a totally different sort, albeit just as divisive - if not more- than Lagman's disillusionment with Chairman Mao.
Mindanao had started later than most other regions as far as the Communist struggle is concerned. Its first cadres didn't arrive until 1973 and it wasn't until 1977 that the movement could support a tactical strike on the island. Then, in 1978 the movement suddenly caught on like wildfire and spread throughout Mindanao, even making headway into Muslim-dominated areas like Maguindanao Province by the dawn of the 1980s. The rest of the 1980s saw increasing momentum that had the NPA snowballing in all corners of the island. However all was not well. The CPP had never been well developed on Mindanao and now that the armed wing, the NPA, was expanding exponentially it was impossible to close the gap between the military and political wings. People were recruited directly into the NPA without an ounce of political underpinning and so at critical mass, in 1985, the organisation on Mindanao was set to implode.
The Kampanyang Aho, or "Garlic Campaign" began with a terrified but well intentioned investigation into the AFP and PC, or Philippine Constulbary (now defunct) DPAs, or Deep Penetration Agents. Dating back to the Philippine's immediate post WWII Communist Insurgency in Central Luzon, the so called "Huk Rebellion," the Philippine Military establishment had run deeply buried sleepers in all Leftist slash subversive organisations. The concern on Mindanao was entirely mis-placed. What few DPAs were in play were entirely under deployment on Luzon. Undoubtedly recently trained local youth may have been deployed but were in no way serving as DPAs whose modus operandi had been to climb the ranks of Leftist organisations in order to provide worthwhile intel worth of the substantial investment their deploment represented.
Centered in what was then NMR, or Northern Mindanao Region, in and around the municipality of Opol in Misamis Oriental Province, Aho ended up killing nearly 900 NPA guerillas, or 20% of all NPA regulars on Mindanao during the campaign's duration, 1985 to 1986. Then, largely because of the missteps taken during the purge, there was a total restructuring of the NPA on the island. To say that the situation was precarious even before Sison was released from prison and began trying to realign the CPP/NPA would be absolutely correct. The most power Front in NMR, Front 12, was also the entity spearheading the purge and so out with the old, in with the new. CMR was born as a direct reaction to Aho, in 1987.
eadership of CMR along with a portion of the leadership in FSR (Far South) and WMR (Western) felt that Sison's "one size fits all" approach was a piss poor fit for Mindanao's unique cultural and social landscape. Together the leadership of the three Regions, together comprising 60% of the NPA leadership on Mindanao signed a manifesto in which they expressed dissatisfaction with the CPP's lack of tendency and the increasingly despotic decision making process. They asked that the CPP allow for a Congress in which to sort out these divergent perspectives.
When, at the CPP's 10th Party Plenum in 1993, FSR and WMR stepped away from the aforementioned critique of Sison, CMR remained steadfast and by the end of 1993 found itself unceremoniously expelled from the CPP/NPA, joining Manila-Rizal and virtually the entire Central Visayas structure along with its parent structure, VISKOM, in trying to forge a new path independently of the Sison organisation. The three elements then parlezed and by the second organisational meeting in September of 1995 had formed the PCP, or Peoples Communist Party and its armed wing, the RPA, or Revolutionary Proletariat Army. This loosely structured organisation was militarily speaking, fairly active. Politically though there was no unified direction unless "away from Maoism" counts as a "direction." In mid-1998 the three separate strands within the PCP:
1) Manila-Rizal
2) KOMVIS
3) Central Mindanao Region
formed a much more cohesive and much better politically grounded organisation, the RPM-P, or Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa -Pilipinas. Usually referred to by its English translation, Revolutionary Workers Party of the Philippines, with the military component remaining the RPA. There was a second military organisation as well, ABB or the Alex Boncayo Brigade. Formed out of Manila-Rizal's SPARU, or Special Partisan Armed Revolutionary Unit. SPARU were and of course remain the NPA's assassination squads. The love affair wouldn't last though, when the RMP-P/RPA/ABB entered into a Peace Process with the Estrada Government the following year. As RMP-P etc reached a Final Peace Agreement in 2001 the Mindanowan branch broke away and formed the RPM-M/RPA. The "M" standing for Mindanao of course and the "P" in RPA changed to "Peoples," as in "Revolutionary Peoples Army."
So, not only was the NPA in Misamis Oriental Province, like all other areas, suffering from infighting but its logistics were decimated. Sitio Lantad had served as a logistical hub for two Regional NPA formations, besides the formation that would eventually come to be labelled, NCMRC, or Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee :
1) NEMRC or Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee
2) WMRC or Western Mindanao Regional Committee
All this led to the NPA losing its unquestioned hold upon Sitio Lantad in 1992. The truth of the matter is, pacification was assured even without Governor Moreno's intervention. The people MOST responsible for the dislodgement of the NPA in Sitio Lantad was the NPA itself.
By 2010 the NPA was re-establishing a foothold in Sitio Lantad's parent municipality, Balingasag, with a show of force at that town's Barangay Napaliran. On the day in question, at the barangay's fiesta, a yearly celebration devoted to the patron saint held near and dear by every Christian community in the Philippines, the NPA deployed a SPARU team for a public assassination. With the depleted resources of the Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee not being able to support its own SPARU element, the Southern Mindanao Regional Committee, or SMRC graciously "lent" the services of its more than capable Eking Balacuit Command. The SPARU team chose to make a point by blowing off the face of Staff Seargent Elmo G.Penar of the AFP's 8IB. Unfortunately they chose to do so as he stood next to his friend, Alexander Pabualan of that town's Barangay Uno. Both men died immediately. SSgt.Penar was targetted for two specific actions he had taken part in:
1) Capture of Front 4-B's main camp in December of 2003
2) Capture of two NPA guerillas on Janurary 14th, 2006
of course both incidents had nothing to do with the targetting of SSgt.Penar. If the NPA were to kill every member of the AFP who takes part in a Tactical Operation against it there would be bodies all over Mindanao...WAIT! There ARE bodies all over Mindanao! Anyway, I am sure that most readers will get the point. The killing merely served as a wake up call that the NPA was not out of the picture in the town of Balingasag. Front 4-B was utilised in the rationale because it is the Front that was supposedly destroyed in the clearing of Sitio Lantad.
Since the SPARU action Front 4-B has been steadily re-couping ground and support. It is ironic that the Pacification of Misamis Oriental Province took place just 80-odd days after that assassination. All the more so when Pacification entails a re-deployment of IBs (Infantry Battalions) out of cleared communities. 8IB's garrisons have remained as is. Maybe their CO, Lieutenant Colonel Pascua os psychic because on April 15th, 2011 Front 4-B attempted to overrun the CAFGU post in none other than Sitio Lantad. At just before midnite 20 guerillas launched an attack and though they failed to capture the post did end up critically wounding three CAAs from the 223rd CAA Company with shrapnel from a couple of rifle grenades:
1) Jimmy Lindahay
2) Nino Luga
3) Apolinario Luga
The recent ratcheting up of hostilities inspired William Castillio, a resident of Lantad and General Manager of the LMPC, or Lantad Multi-Purpose Co-operative to author a proclamation being billed as the "Lantad Manifesto" by some dimwitted local pseudo-journalists who seem to think the sitio's past as an NPA showpiece relegates everything in and about it to Communist cliches. Most notably perhaps was the proclamation's primary author being William Castillo. Castillo's father Conrado was a mid-level NPA guerilla who was "elected" as the NPA Mayor of Lantad during its NPA heyday. In the mid-90s Conrado Castillo became a Surrenderee to the Government only to receive his come uppance from the NPA in 1999 when he was killed by his ex-"Comrades."
The proclamation was handed to Father Albert "Paring Bert" Alejo, a Jeruit priest. Serving on the GPH portion of the RCW-SER, or Reciprocal Working Committee on the Socio-Economic Component of the GPH-NDFP (Government of the Philippines-National Democratic Front of the Philippines, the latter representing the NPA) Peace Process as well as to the joint PPOC of Agusan del Norte and Misamis Oriental Provinces where it was recited in session in late May of 2011.
Friday, May 6, 2011
NPA Armed Contacts,Second Quarter of 2011,Part I:2 PNP Stations Attacked,1 Captured
As I have noted time and again, the NPA on Mindanao is very well known for wearing PNP (Philippine National Police) or AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) uniforms to infiltrate official security installations. Municipal PNP stations are a favourite target for this type of subterfuge. After that Panabo City attack in Davao del Norte Province on March 19th this year in which 1 PNP officer and 1 Police Auxiliary were killed by NPA guerillas in military uniforms, PNP Director General Raul Bacalzo issued a stern and very explicit memorandum to all PNP installations warning all personnel to be absolutely alert and maintain a defencive stance at all times. Some of the nation's PNP officers have comprehended the message, others obviously have not.
On Thursday, April 28, 2011 in Lianga, Surigao del Sur Province most of the staion's personnel were fast asleep but 1 man was busy with his daily routine. 25 year old Rodel Aquilam is the station mascot. Though he doesn't get paid the young man cleans, cooks and runs errands for the officers in the station. In return Rodel is allowed to live there but more than that, his "job" has given him a sense of purpose and has made his life seem more meaningful. Often, after serving meals he cleans and washes dishes all by himself. If dinner is served late Rodel will often leave the dishes until the early morning hours when he awakens to prepare breakfast.
So it was that on that day, at 430AM Rodel was at the sink in the rear of the police station, tired but watching out the window when something caught his eye. At first he wasn't sure that he had really seen something but even as these thoughts were forming the shapes came closer and Rodel couldn't help but recognise the rifles. Immediately dropping to his knees Rodel crawled to the station's sleeping quarters and very quietly woke the duty officer. The officer in turn woke the others and just as the first officers were grabbing their M16s guerillas from the NPA's Front 19-A burst through the station entrance and announced their presence.
In what is now a routine the guerilla in charge announced that nobody would be hurt as long as all present complied. All they wanted the man said, were the station's weapons. Before the guerilla could finish his sentence a PNP officer fired his M16 hitting the wall near the lead guerilla. Quickly the NPA left the station foyer and took positions throughout the City Government compound. The 15 PNP, and 2 AFP soldiers, from 29IB (Infantry Battalion) augmenting the station not only held their own, they managed to effectively pin the guerillas down outside in the large compound. Twice guerillas tried infiltrating the Municipal Hall located in that same compound but were repelled under the heavy fire emanating from the PNP station.
Meanwhile, having been notified of the attack the 29IB deployed and implemented 2 Blocking Force positions along the only two avenues of escape, allowing the PNP's 13th Regional Public Safety Management Battalion (aka "RPSM" which recently replaced the PNP's "PMG," or "Police Mobile Group" structure) to reinforce the outmanned station personnel. Hearing of the deployments on a captured ICOM the NPA knew that its own Blocking Force would only add, at most, 15 minutes to their Safe Exit Time. Radioing to that Blocking Force the lead guerilla confirmed that they had set capable barricades along National Hiway, consisting of huge bonfires constructed out of tyres doused in kerosene. While that stopped any AFP from making it into the town proper, the PNP's 13th PSMG Battalion was rapidly approaching from the opposite direction and so it was time to withdraw. At 645AM, leaving the compound the guerillas rushed to their escape vehicles. As the assailants were scrambling NPA guerilla Eunilio "Ka Dindo" Pison took a shot to the back of the head. The resident of Barangay Pong-on in the municipality of San Agustin in Agusan del Sur Province was critically injured and was left where he fell along with a second guerilla who had been killed. Their loyal comrades drove off at a rapid pace, tyres screeching.
It needs to be mentioned that Pison was being billed by the Government, AFP and PNP as the "Vice Commander" of Front 19-A. In reality the man is an Assistant Team Leader. Within the NPA "Teams" are equivalent to conventional "squads." In other words, he helped command a group of 7 to 10 guerillas. As usual AFP propaganda falls way short of the watermark.
As the NPA's Tactical Element was driving away from the compound their Blocking Force on National Hiway, in the town's Barangay Ganayon got spooked and took a shot at a passing Hyundai Starex van. Unfortunately its driver, 35 year old Herminia Lozada was a civilian and what is even more unfortunate is that one of the bullets fired at her van ended up wounding her in the left foot. As unfortunate as that really is, her three young children who were also in that van are all unscathed, at least physically.
That Saturday, April 30th, DILG (Department of the Interior and Local Government, the entity which oversees the PNP) Secretary Jesse Robredo joined PNP National Director Raul Bacalzo in a personal visit to the station. There the 15 PNP who defended the station were each given the "Medalya ng Katapangan" (Medal for Bravery), cash awards and on the spot promotions to the next incremental rank. The 15 awardees:
1) Deputy Chief, SPO3 Dante Basada Obenza
2) PO3 Armand Baniagaso Juarbal
3) PO3 Antonieto Pesical Sarsale
4) PO2 Simporiano Camino Quevedo
5) PO2 Ronald Jarina de Castro
6) PO2 Roy Cano Sabellano
7) PO2 Ariel Osorio Aribal
8) PO1 Vergil Gomez Curada
9) PO1 Susano Egypto Vitanzos
10) SPO1 Ruben Pedrozo Gomez
11) SPO1 Cerelino Alicante Pedrozo
12) SPO1 Virgilio Jusayan Orbeta
13) SPO2 Florencio Pineda Hernandez
14) SPO3 Moreto Edera Gemao
15) (No Rank Available) Rogelio Tejero Balason
In a very nice touch, Rodel Aquilam, the station mascot was also given a medal and cash award. Secretary Robredo is recommending that the AFP consider rewarding the two soldiers from the 29IB:
1) Corporal Alnasur A.Samsuri
2) PFC. Melfer B.Yabo
The Government was especially pleased because this was the second NPA attack thwarted in that municipality within the last 6 months. In fact it was that same NPA element, Front 19-A that was repelled in that other attack as well. On October 2,2010 in Purok #5, Barangay San Isidro, that barangay's CAFGU (Civilian Auxiliary Geographical Force Unit, a Force Multiplication element manned by residents of a given barangay and its operations relegated to that same barangay, commanded by an AFP Non Comissioned Officer from a cadre battalion) post fended off a large NPA assault. Under the direction of its cadre, Cpl.Singson of 23IB's D Company, the CAFGU soldiers caused the guerillas to withdraw at the 15 minute mark.
The happiness Secretary Robredo and Director General Bacalzo felt surely dissipated on Tuesday, May 3rd. At 430PM that day a man in an AFP uniform entered the Municipal PNP Station in the town of Malitbog, in Bukidnon Province and said he wanted to file a criminal complaint. The station, in Purok #2, Barangay Poblacion was manned by 6 officers. The desk officer went to get the complaint form and as he did so 19 NPA guerillas rushed into the station, weapons drawn. At this point the AFP "soldier" revealed that he too was an NPA guerilla and ordered the desk officer to handcuff 3 of the 5 other police officers.
The guerillas, from Front 4-B, warned the officers to comply, they only wanted the weapons. All 6 surrendered. The NPA then removed their side arms as well as the station's complement of weaponry. Capturing eight M16s, three 9MM pistols, one 45 caliber pistol, one 38 caliber revolver and one 22 caliber pistol along with the station's ICOM (2 way radio with military and PNP frequencies), walkie-talkies, two computer towers, one computer monitor and spare uniforms before departing with the three handcuffed police officers as prisoners the NPA was in and out in less than 10 minutes without a single shot having been fired. Led by Lino "Ka Dahon" Namatidong the withdrawing force jogged 200 meters to a waiting Toyota Lite Ace and an orange panel truck that they had left idling in adjacent Barangay Kalingking's Sitio Manga, they uncuffed and released the prisoners before speeding off towards Barangay Mindagat. Passing from Barangay Mindagat to Barangay Kiabo and then crossing the provincial border into the municipality of Claveria in Misamis Oriental Province the guerillas were able to make a clean get away.
Ironically, back in October of 2010 I had posted in my entry entitled, "NPA Armed Engagements, Last Quarter of 2010: NPA Merry Go Round" that a Brigade Commander in 4ID (Infantry Division), Colonel Romeo Gapuz had bragged about eliminating Front 4-B. He said the Front was dead and buried. I noted then that these were "famous last words." In Col.Gapuz's defence he had barely had 60 days in the 4ID and just come out of a desk job though the attitude he expressed is all to often par for the course throughout the Philippine Military. He had made that ignorant comment at a Turn Over Ceremony at the Misamis Oriental Provincial Capitol, where 4ID turned over Local Security oversight to the provincial government. This takes place whenever a province is declared "pacified." On Mindanao only 4 provinces are pacified, well 3 depending upon the day you examine the situation since the Dinagat Islands keep flip-flopping their status thanks to a fickle Supreme Court (yet another subject I plan to post about).
The 3 other Pacified Provinces on Mindanao:
1) Surigao del Norte (Dinagat was cleaved off of this province and may belong to it again if current Supreme Court petitions are considered kindly)
2) Misamis Oriental (as I mentioned)
3) Camiguin (another Island Province, this one cleaved off of Misamis Oriental Province)
When a province has been declared "pacified" it doesn't mean that the insurgency is extinct there, only that the local government unit is able to deal with it on its own.
On Thursday, April 28, 2011 in Lianga, Surigao del Sur Province most of the staion's personnel were fast asleep but 1 man was busy with his daily routine. 25 year old Rodel Aquilam is the station mascot. Though he doesn't get paid the young man cleans, cooks and runs errands for the officers in the station. In return Rodel is allowed to live there but more than that, his "job" has given him a sense of purpose and has made his life seem more meaningful. Often, after serving meals he cleans and washes dishes all by himself. If dinner is served late Rodel will often leave the dishes until the early morning hours when he awakens to prepare breakfast.
So it was that on that day, at 430AM Rodel was at the sink in the rear of the police station, tired but watching out the window when something caught his eye. At first he wasn't sure that he had really seen something but even as these thoughts were forming the shapes came closer and Rodel couldn't help but recognise the rifles. Immediately dropping to his knees Rodel crawled to the station's sleeping quarters and very quietly woke the duty officer. The officer in turn woke the others and just as the first officers were grabbing their M16s guerillas from the NPA's Front 19-A burst through the station entrance and announced their presence.
In what is now a routine the guerilla in charge announced that nobody would be hurt as long as all present complied. All they wanted the man said, were the station's weapons. Before the guerilla could finish his sentence a PNP officer fired his M16 hitting the wall near the lead guerilla. Quickly the NPA left the station foyer and took positions throughout the City Government compound. The 15 PNP, and 2 AFP soldiers, from 29IB (Infantry Battalion) augmenting the station not only held their own, they managed to effectively pin the guerillas down outside in the large compound. Twice guerillas tried infiltrating the Municipal Hall located in that same compound but were repelled under the heavy fire emanating from the PNP station.
Meanwhile, having been notified of the attack the 29IB deployed and implemented 2 Blocking Force positions along the only two avenues of escape, allowing the PNP's 13th Regional Public Safety Management Battalion (aka "RPSM" which recently replaced the PNP's "PMG," or "Police Mobile Group" structure) to reinforce the outmanned station personnel. Hearing of the deployments on a captured ICOM the NPA knew that its own Blocking Force would only add, at most, 15 minutes to their Safe Exit Time. Radioing to that Blocking Force the lead guerilla confirmed that they had set capable barricades along National Hiway, consisting of huge bonfires constructed out of tyres doused in kerosene. While that stopped any AFP from making it into the town proper, the PNP's 13th PSMG Battalion was rapidly approaching from the opposite direction and so it was time to withdraw. At 645AM, leaving the compound the guerillas rushed to their escape vehicles. As the assailants were scrambling NPA guerilla Eunilio "Ka Dindo" Pison took a shot to the back of the head. The resident of Barangay Pong-on in the municipality of San Agustin in Agusan del Sur Province was critically injured and was left where he fell along with a second guerilla who had been killed. Their loyal comrades drove off at a rapid pace, tyres screeching.
It needs to be mentioned that Pison was being billed by the Government, AFP and PNP as the "Vice Commander" of Front 19-A. In reality the man is an Assistant Team Leader. Within the NPA "Teams" are equivalent to conventional "squads." In other words, he helped command a group of 7 to 10 guerillas. As usual AFP propaganda falls way short of the watermark.
As the NPA's Tactical Element was driving away from the compound their Blocking Force on National Hiway, in the town's Barangay Ganayon got spooked and took a shot at a passing Hyundai Starex van. Unfortunately its driver, 35 year old Herminia Lozada was a civilian and what is even more unfortunate is that one of the bullets fired at her van ended up wounding her in the left foot. As unfortunate as that really is, her three young children who were also in that van are all unscathed, at least physically.
That Saturday, April 30th, DILG (Department of the Interior and Local Government, the entity which oversees the PNP) Secretary Jesse Robredo joined PNP National Director Raul Bacalzo in a personal visit to the station. There the 15 PNP who defended the station were each given the "Medalya ng Katapangan" (Medal for Bravery), cash awards and on the spot promotions to the next incremental rank. The 15 awardees:
1) Deputy Chief, SPO3 Dante Basada Obenza
2) PO3 Armand Baniagaso Juarbal
3) PO3 Antonieto Pesical Sarsale
4) PO2 Simporiano Camino Quevedo
5) PO2 Ronald Jarina de Castro
6) PO2 Roy Cano Sabellano
7) PO2 Ariel Osorio Aribal
8) PO1 Vergil Gomez Curada
9) PO1 Susano Egypto Vitanzos
10) SPO1 Ruben Pedrozo Gomez
11) SPO1 Cerelino Alicante Pedrozo
12) SPO1 Virgilio Jusayan Orbeta
13) SPO2 Florencio Pineda Hernandez
14) SPO3 Moreto Edera Gemao
15) (No Rank Available) Rogelio Tejero Balason
In a very nice touch, Rodel Aquilam, the station mascot was also given a medal and cash award. Secretary Robredo is recommending that the AFP consider rewarding the two soldiers from the 29IB:
1) Corporal Alnasur A.Samsuri
2) PFC. Melfer B.Yabo
The Government was especially pleased because this was the second NPA attack thwarted in that municipality within the last 6 months. In fact it was that same NPA element, Front 19-A that was repelled in that other attack as well. On October 2,2010 in Purok #5, Barangay San Isidro, that barangay's CAFGU (Civilian Auxiliary Geographical Force Unit, a Force Multiplication element manned by residents of a given barangay and its operations relegated to that same barangay, commanded by an AFP Non Comissioned Officer from a cadre battalion) post fended off a large NPA assault. Under the direction of its cadre, Cpl.Singson of 23IB's D Company, the CAFGU soldiers caused the guerillas to withdraw at the 15 minute mark.
The happiness Secretary Robredo and Director General Bacalzo felt surely dissipated on Tuesday, May 3rd. At 430PM that day a man in an AFP uniform entered the Municipal PNP Station in the town of Malitbog, in Bukidnon Province and said he wanted to file a criminal complaint. The station, in Purok #2, Barangay Poblacion was manned by 6 officers. The desk officer went to get the complaint form and as he did so 19 NPA guerillas rushed into the station, weapons drawn. At this point the AFP "soldier" revealed that he too was an NPA guerilla and ordered the desk officer to handcuff 3 of the 5 other police officers.
The guerillas, from Front 4-B, warned the officers to comply, they only wanted the weapons. All 6 surrendered. The NPA then removed their side arms as well as the station's complement of weaponry. Capturing eight M16s, three 9MM pistols, one 45 caliber pistol, one 38 caliber revolver and one 22 caliber pistol along with the station's ICOM (2 way radio with military and PNP frequencies), walkie-talkies, two computer towers, one computer monitor and spare uniforms before departing with the three handcuffed police officers as prisoners the NPA was in and out in less than 10 minutes without a single shot having been fired. Led by Lino "Ka Dahon" Namatidong the withdrawing force jogged 200 meters to a waiting Toyota Lite Ace and an orange panel truck that they had left idling in adjacent Barangay Kalingking's Sitio Manga, they uncuffed and released the prisoners before speeding off towards Barangay Mindagat. Passing from Barangay Mindagat to Barangay Kiabo and then crossing the provincial border into the municipality of Claveria in Misamis Oriental Province the guerillas were able to make a clean get away.
Ironically, back in October of 2010 I had posted in my entry entitled, "NPA Armed Engagements, Last Quarter of 2010: NPA Merry Go Round" that a Brigade Commander in 4ID (Infantry Division), Colonel Romeo Gapuz had bragged about eliminating Front 4-B. He said the Front was dead and buried. I noted then that these were "famous last words." In Col.Gapuz's defence he had barely had 60 days in the 4ID and just come out of a desk job though the attitude he expressed is all to often par for the course throughout the Philippine Military. He had made that ignorant comment at a Turn Over Ceremony at the Misamis Oriental Provincial Capitol, where 4ID turned over Local Security oversight to the provincial government. This takes place whenever a province is declared "pacified." On Mindanao only 4 provinces are pacified, well 3 depending upon the day you examine the situation since the Dinagat Islands keep flip-flopping their status thanks to a fickle Supreme Court (yet another subject I plan to post about).
The 3 other Pacified Provinces on Mindanao:
1) Surigao del Norte (Dinagat was cleaved off of this province and may belong to it again if current Supreme Court petitions are considered kindly)
2) Misamis Oriental (as I mentioned)
3) Camiguin (another Island Province, this one cleaved off of Misamis Oriental Province)
When a province has been declared "pacified" it doesn't mean that the insurgency is extinct there, only that the local government unit is able to deal with it on its own.
Friday, October 1, 2010
NPA Armed Encounters,Third Quarter of 2010:The Never Ending NPA Merry-Go-Round.
The incessant tit-for-tat of the "Child Warrior" game, a pitiful approximation of PSYOPS (Psychological Warfare) is as strong as ever. As I have outlined in at least one other post concerning the NPA, LOAC/IHL (Laws of Armed Conflict/International Humanitarian Law) allows combatants as young as 14 to legally participate in armed conflict though within the last generation it has become increasingly rare to find any fighters younger than 16. Despite the legal threshold, internationally, being 14 one can regularly find both the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) and the NPA (New Peoples Army) casting stones about 17 year old combatants. The piquant dialect of English spoken here in the Philippines has ordained the label "Child Warriors" as a catchphrase for both the fighters AND the issue itself.
In yet another example provided by the AFP's 10ID (Infantry Division), 73IB's C COY (Company C) captured a 15 year old courier for Front 71. The soldiers, upon entering a mountainside clearing sighted the youth lugging an over packed sack filled with ammo,fatigues and camp equipment. The AFP claims that the young man had recently been in two engagements with the AFP, the first in Janurary of 2009 and the second in Feburary of 2010. He was then turned over to DSWD (Dept. Social Welfare and Development) which then processed him and released him to his parents who, as is always the case, had no idea that their son was with the NPA.
On September 10, 2010 the AFP fired its latest salvo in this propaganda back and forth when the 10ID accused the NPA of recruiting four more minors from among the eleven residents of Barangay Baracatan in Davao City's Toril District. The eleven are currently undergoing the military phase of their training in Mt.Apo National Park with the NPA's Front 54 of the SMRC, or Southern Mindanao Regional Committee. Front 54 of course denies this accusation ,this time pointing to the bi-laterally ratified CARHRIHL (Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Law) from 1998, as well as a new defence, a 1999 directive from the CPP, or Communist Party of the Philippines, of which the NPA is merely the military arm. The Directive is from the CPP Executive Committee, the CPP organ from which the NPA takes its cues. The Directive, entitled, "Memorandum to the Minimum Age Required for NPA Fighters" basically rehashes CARHRHIL which was very recent at that point.
On September 19, 2010 in Sitio Kisoy in Barangay Anggas in the municipality of Alabel in Sarangani Province, the 73IB (Infantry Battalion) on routine patrol sighted what it believed to be two NPA guerillas sitting in a field, apparently taking a much needed break. Encircling the two they were closing in for what they had hoped would be a violence-free capture when one of the suspected guerillas ran towards a clifface and jumped, rolling down a very steep incline into the valley below and escaped. The second guerilla was then captured without firing a shot, apparently too stunned by what had just transpired.
Upon initial interrogation the guerilla in custody revealed that he was only 15 and not a guerilla at all, but a rather a less than willing guide for the actual guerilla, "Ka Arnold," who had jumped off the plateau. Christened "Ka Buboy" by the NPA who had periodically used him as a guide since age 12 he had been recieving a stipend from the NPA and also had apparently, wittingly or unwittingly, served as a courier as well. During his experience serving the NPA he had recently been through two fire fights in Barangay Datal Anggas, his village of residence. Asked what had attracted him to serve the insugent group he quickly answered that the chief benefit was the few pesos with which to help his impovershied family,who apprently had no idea (of course) of their son's involvement with the NPA.
The young man's presence was propagandised by the AFP's Lieutenant Colonel Medel Aguilar, CO, or Commanding Officer of the 10ID's CMOB (Civil-Military Operations Battalion) as a clearcut violation of both...big suprise here...IHL (International Humanitarian Law) and its subsidiary, LOAC (Laws of Armed Conflict). While that is ridiculous to anyone with even cursory knowledge of anything involved in this dynamic, the 73IB's CO, Lieutenant Colonel Edgardo DeLeon did bring up a valid point when he accused the NPA of committing yet another infraction against the bi-laterally ratified CARHRIL.
"Ka Arnold," the guerilla the 15 year old had been guiding, is a member of Team #1, Primera Squad (1st Squad), Platun Mazda (M Platoon), Front 71 of the FSMRC or Far South Mindanao Regional Committee. Front 71 is the only Front currently operating in Sarangani Province and its primary AOR, or Area of Responsibility (as in "Area of Operation") is in the Alabel and Malapatan municipalities and surrounding environs. The 73IB is deployed specifically to counter the Front and despite almost a year and a half of concerted efforts it has made very little headway. This is a problem in many areas where the government pays lip service to Development while merely utilising it as a catchword for dividing up the spoils amongst multi-nationals and bypassing all but a precious handful of locals usually already sitting pretty in positions of power and affluence.
The next day, September 20th, 2010, in Sitio Akbual in Barangay Upper Suyan in the town of Malapatan in Sarangani Province the 73IB was attacked by 10 guerillas from the afore mentioned Front 71. The AFP were acting as Security Escorts as the 10ID's CMOB was conducting an Anti-Dengue drive. For people perhaps unaware, Dengue is a mosquito borne disease that is often fatal and has shown increases into the triple digits in many areas of the island over the last 12 months- not too mention over much of the Southern and Central Philippines as well (actually the reportage protocols have changed and this is the primary mover behind the increase but hey, it keeps the local media busy so lets let them have their fun). Per this increase, three of the four IDs (Infantry Divisions) on mainland Mindanao have deployed their CMOBs in anti-Dengue efforts.
The next day, September 21st, the 4ID, based in Cagayan De Oro City's Camp Edilberto Evangelista turned over ISO (Internal Security Operations, which has evolved into a euphanism for COIN, i.e. "Counterinsurgency") to Misamis Oriental Province's PPOC (Provincial Peace and Order Council, an interface between the AFP and LGUs, i.e."Local Government Units," itself a euphanism for "municipality"), via Misamis Oriental Governor Oscar Moreno. The Sign-Over Ceremony took place on the Provincial Capitol Grounds. Essentially this means that the insurgency is now considered negligible to non-existent and that local law enforcement and LGUs are believed capable enough to handle any residual presence. It is worth noting that the 403Bde's (Brigade) CO (Commanding Officer), Col. Romeo Gapuz boldly stated that the NPA's Front 4B has been defeated. Famous last words...
That same day also within the 4ID's AOR (Area of Operations), in Barangay Valentina in the municipality of Esperanza in Agusan del Sur Province, the 26IB came across 10 guerillas from Front 8 of the NEMRC, or Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee and a 10 minute fire fight ensued. The clash resulted in the death of one guerilla and the capture of two M14s after the NPA withdrew from the scene. Esperanza is one of three spiritual capitals of the Higaon-on Tribe, a Lumad (Hill Tribe) group with branches in Bukidnon Province as well as in another spiritual capital, Claveria in Misamis Oriental Province.
Whole Claveria still has formidable NPA activity, despite the utterings at that afore mentioned ceremony, as well as absolutely no progress on the social and economic environments that breeds the insurgency, Esperanza is still in the thick of war with the NPA running parallel governments in almost all outlying barangays and the tribe is suffering terribly as it splits into (actually split three decades ago) into pro and anti-NPA factions, aggravated immensely by the AFP's Force Multiplication efforts aimed at the tribe. As I have mentioned in previous postings/entries I will delve into those efforts in great detail as soon as time allows.
September 24th, 2010 in Barangay Upper Suyan, again in the town of Malapatan in Sarangani Province, 40 year old Eliseo "Ka Bimbo" Tada of that same town and a Team Leader (most minor of NPA command positions, controls less than a single squad) in the NPA's Front 71 surrendered to the 39IB citing complications from malaria that he caught as a combatant deep in the bush, as well as homesickness for his family and village. He didnt turn in a weapon, as is the usual requirement for acceptance into the government's Social Integration Programme which provides immediate payouts for each weapon via the related "Balik Baril" ("Return a Rifle"), as well as Livlihood and Sustenance payouts, making it a formidable incentive for some. The AFP has claimed that the lack of weapon, which is extremely curious since Tada is said to have been a Team Leader, is due to his CO, "Ka Ronron," having seized his weapon, an M16, before allowing him to leave his detachment on September 12th.
That is the version prepared by the AFP spinmasters. The real story is a bit more understandable. Tada had left his camp on September 12th as he travelled to Davao City to seek treatment for his serious strain of malaria. As he passed thru the municipality of Malita in Davao del Sur Province he was taken into custody by the 39IB at an AFP Checkpoint. He was then paraded through the streets of that small town's Barangay Poblacion before entering the AFP Gulag. Perhaps the emnity of the AFP is also a bit more understandable when one realises that Tada is from the Team that had just engaged the 73IB in a fire fight on September 20th during the afore mentioned anti-Dengue Operation.
September 25th, 2010 in Sitio Taglawig in Barangay Panoraon in the town of Maco in ComVal (Compostela Valley) Province saw a platoon from the 71IB dispatched after intermittent reports or unknown armed men seen in the vicinity over a number of days. Upon scouring (going over a sector meter by meter) the sector the AFP discovered a recently erected camp with two platoons of NPA (roughly 60 guerillas). A 10 minute fire fight erupted with no casualties on either side as the NPA quickly withdrew from their camp. The presence of a camp in that sector bodes ill for the AFP and their intensified efforts in the region since the same battalion had recently launched a Civil-Military (Hearts and Minds, as in the military performing medical and social outreach to develop a rapport with the population) Operation there. Such operations involve a regular presence of a moderately sized detachment and the NPA's decison to encamp there shows that it has little to fear at the moment.
September 29th, 2010 in Barangay Bagampasan in the municipality of Don Victoriano Chiongbian in Misamis Occidental, an AFP detachment on patrol unexpectedly came across a detachment of NPA as the soldiers entered a clearing on a hillside. During the subsequent 1 hour fire fight five soldiers and a staff seargent were wounded by an M203 grenade. What was it that the good Lieutenant Colonel Romeo Gapuz had said about Front 4B?
That same day, September 29th, in Barangay Fatima in Davao City's Paquibato District in Davao del Sur Province, the NPA's 1st Pulang Bagani Company (Red Warriors Company) ambushed an AFP detachment though for once it was an opportunistic endeavour since all planned ambuscades by the Pulang Bagani (there are three companies though its parent formation FSMRC pretends there are five) involve IEDs,which the AFP likes to spin as "landmines" while claiming that they are illegal under IHL/LOAC. Since these IEDs are always command controlled (detonated purposefully by remote) they are absolutely legal in warfare.
On October 1st,2010 in Purok#5 of Barangay San Isidro in the town of Lianga in the Andap Complex of Surigao del Sur Province, 9 guerillas from Front 19A attacked an SCAA post attached to SUDECOR (Surigao Development Corp.), a private logging concern involved in heavy deforestation of Anadap, one of the last remaining large strands of virgin timber in the Mindanowan jungle. Unbeknownst to the guerillas, the post sublimated to the 23IB and led by Corporal Singson, of the 23IB's C COY (Comapny C) was hosting an element from the 75IB so that instead of the usual single AFP NCO ( Non-Commissioned Officer), in charge of unmotivated local tribesmen, the post was swarming with AFP. After 15 minutes of heavy back and forth the NPA withdrew back into the Diwata Mountains.
I have written about the SCAA (Special Civilain Active Auxiliary), akin to CAFGU but entirely funded by private sources,such as large businesses though the AFP now tries to bar large landholders who merely engage in agricultural pursuits since it lends an air of Feudalism and plays directly into the hands of NPA propagandists. The Andap Complex that I mentioned in the preceeding paragraph is the area between the municipalities of Tandag, Tago, Cagwait, San Agustin, Marihatag and Lianga in Surigao del Sur Province directly bordering Agusan del Sur Province. Heavily forested so that it is an objective in many GPH (Govt.of the Philippines) Develpment schemes. At the moment there are 42 MPSAs (Mineral Production Sharing Agreements), 73 MEPs (Mineral Exploration Permits) and heavy Timber and Coal Concessions as well.
An unfortunate dichotomy in COIN (Counterinsurgency Warfare) in that to defeat the political end of the dynamic, by far its largest facet, Infrastructural and Economic Development must take place on a considerable scale. In a Maoist-centric insurgency, such as the one being waged by the NPA, practically the entire struggle takes place in a rural theater of operations. Ergo, to attempt to defeat the insurgency the government must put forth great effort in tranforming the economic, infrastructural and social landscape. The contradiction in objectives enters when one realises that when the government begins undertaking this great endeavour it must enter into "bargains with the devil," the "devil" in this case being unscrupulous private developers who almost always engage in large scale exploitation of the local populace and enviornment thus breeding a new generation of recruits for the insurgency.
Social Development never comes close to even keeping pace with the other forms of development and these social ills that result defeat the government's larger, greater objective of neutralising the insurgency. Round and round it goes so that the actual objective morphs into just trying to keep the violence down to a somewhat manageable pace, where the local populace can grasp some sort of semblance to "normal" life.
October 7th, 2010 in Purok #8 of Barangay Carmen in Davao City's Baguio District in Davao del Sur Province, the 84IB was Clearing the sector when they unexpectedly came across a platoon from the NPA's Front 54. After a rough fire fight the NPA guerillas withdrew to Barangay Tamayong in the adhacent district of Calinan, as a running fire fight then transpired the guerillas split into detachments before regrouping in Sitio Ligabato back in Barangay Carmen where they had first been encountered. Ligabato had been the site of their temporary encampment which they then had to hastily abandon before withdrawing deeper into the mountains outside Davao City limits.
In non-military developments, Jorge "Ka Oris" Madlos, the NDFP (National Democratic Front of the Philippines, the NPA/CPP linked umbrella organisation that comprises all left wing sectoral organisations sympathetic to or directly aligned with NPA/CPP objectives) Spokesman on Mindanao and a Regional NPA Commander to boot issued a statement on September 28th, 2010 on the Port Call made by the US Navy's USS George Washington and three destroyers, in Manila. In a highly true to form piece, Madlos says that the Port Call is only the latest and most blatant in a string of recent US incursions into Philippine territory. He said, correctly, that US troops often masquerade as Humanitarian actors even though they overtly engage both the NPA (that is absolutely false) and the MILF (that is correct in so much as MILF's 114 Base Command on Basilan is inextricably linked to Abu Sayyaf and Abu Sayyaf is the US mandate in the Philippines, an issue I will be discussing in my next MILF entry since the US Ambassador just requalified that issue in a recent statement).
The US involvement against the NPA is relegated to Intel related Operations, primarily by the CIA which operates out of a set of three shipping containers at Camp Navarro in Zamboanga City. There are a couple of uniformed servicemen working with them, in UAV ("Drones," i.e.unmanned aerial craft used to surveil in this case in the pursuit of intel, as well as in SIGNINT, electronic intel). To "overtly engage" the US would have to enter into Combat Operations which it has not despite ridiculous propaganda from the NPA claiming that unifromed US soldiers were involved in a firefight in Visayas Region. the US has no Operational Presence north of mainland Mindanao. Its presence is heaviest on Basilan, but it also has a significant presence on Jolo Island, and maintains 3 man teams as far afield as Tawi Tawi's AFP Naval Station. I am meandering a bit off course and will relegate my posting in this area to these limited comments, and hope to get to it sooner rather than later.
Madlos went on to say, US efforts are directly cadged from its COIN (Counter Insurgency) manual and are part and parcel of America's "Containment and Engagement" policy. Only a very naive, or ignorant person would imagine that the americans hold no ulterior motives in their Philippine endeavour. The so called "South East Asian Front on the War on Terror" is a farce. Whatever tenuous links Middle Eastern Islamo-fascists may have had with Abu Sayyaf had dissipated at least 5 years before the first uniformed American deplaned at Edwin Andrews Airforce Base in Zamboanga City. Abu Sayyaf itself was totally and irrevocably devoid of any substantiative ideology by that time as well, and had been since before its founder was killed in 1998.
The continued US presence is absolutely tied to regional goals but they are not entirely, or even mostly economic in nature.Rather they are tied to hegemony, not allowing China to extend its reach (the Spratly Islands brouhaha excepted), nor allow Japan to gain the heads up as it becomes the third largest donor on humanitarian projects in Mindanao behind America and Australia. So much for the Madlos/NDF/CPP/NPA worldview which was stale even before Mao died.
September 3rd, 2010 saw yet another killing in the Datu Labawan saga,but this issue has quickly evolved from an NPA-centric dynamic to one deserving of its own long winded entry, one I hope to get to shortly. Most if not all civilian killings since August are attributable to the tribal feud ("Pangayaw").
On October 04, 2010, yet another chapter in the AFP versus NPA "Child Warrior" saga closed in Laak ,ComVal (Compostela Valley) Province. The AFP's 3rdSFB (Special Forces aka Airborne Battalion) under Lieutenant Colonel Ferdinand Napuli provided a Security Perimeter as a resident of Barangay Prosperidad in the town of Montevista in that same province sought AFP assistance in the search for his missing son. Maneja Andoyo, a local Lumad (Hill Tribe) man had last seen his son Bobong Andoyo when the young man left home after a short visit, on November 14th, 2009. Four days before his 17th birthday.
Bobong had been home on a short visit, having joined the NPA with his younger brother Rodrigo Andoyo in 2008, when Bobong had just turned 15, and Rodrigo had turned 14. Rodrigo couldnt stomach the lean diet, crude environment and most of all he says, the violence. Bobong stayed on, primarily being motivated by the monthly stipend promised to all NPA Regulars (full time guerillas), seeing it as perhaps the only avenue with which he could help alleviate some of the crushing poverty his family faced. Shortly after he returned to his detachment from that short visit at home, he and fellow recruit Reto "Ka Jeffrey" Mawang, also a teenager, decided to defect.
Leaving one evening when both had sentry duty the two youths took their chance, careful to bring their weapons with them to ensure their acceptance into the AFP's Surrenderee Program, aka Social Integration Program, which offers a generous bounty for each operable weapon surrendered as well as an immediate financial incentive and payouts for livlihood and re-training assistance. When it was apparent that the two had fled the hierarchy in the Front (comparable to an IB in the AFP though with far less personnel) ordered them roped in. It wasnt long before their former comrades caught up to them as they tried to navigate the deep bush in the early moning hours, according to a local farmer cum NPA Irregular (NPA Village Militia) who resides in Sitio Pundasyon, the sitio in Laak where the double grave was uncovered, and was able to witness their apprehension and execution from his home.
Assisted by the Nabunturan Scene of Crime Operations (SOCO),from Nabunturan Municipal Police Office, Maneja Andoyo and his son Rodrigo dug out Bobong's decomposed remains by hand, still wearing the black teeshirt usually worn by NPA Regulars, and the combat fatigues he had also been wearing the last day his father saw him. Having spent P50,000 raised by selling off virtually all his possesions, Maneja said that he was finally at peace and had found a measure of closure. Until this point he had been receiving dreams regularly in which his son cried out for succor. He had expected the discovery ever since he had first questioned locals in that same NPA detachment and the men had been extremely evasive.
October 7th, 2010 saw yet another AFP salvo against the NPA in the never-ending saga of the,"Child Warrior."The 84IB, having had a difficult transfer south from Luzon,and having been decimated in battle against the NPA is finally getting the hang of life down south with its recent Clearing Operation in Purok #8, Barangay Carmen,Baguio District in Davao City.Stumbling over a deserted encampment from NPA Front-54 they found some internal memos dated November 24, 2009 with a neatly composed list of new recruits from Davao AOR including full psycho-social profiles as well as Logistical info such as methods for procurement of medical supplies.It is the recruit list though that is making 10ID brass get all hot and bothered.On the list are 3 males under the age of 18,two of whom are drug users...as if no AFP soldier is but that is just how it is played.The camp was located well within the Klata band of Bagobo Lumad's AD (Ancestral Domain) Claim,despite a long history of opposition from that band's Datu (chief).Front-54's Kumander (CO) Alex"Ka Bobby"Rosete is slacking off apparently.
On Monday October 11th,2010 New Zealand ignorantly added the CPP and NPA along with 4 other organisations to its list of"International Terror Organisations"per its"Terrorism Suppression Act."Who were the NPA lumped together with? HAMAS' miltary wing,the Qassam Brigades and those fun loving bunch of Islamo-fascists, PIJ aka Palestinian Islamic Jihad.PM John Keys amazingly maintains that this move helps his nation meet its onus under UN Security Council Resolution #1373 which was passed to help neutralise the world wide specter of terrorism. How and why the NPA was ever lumped into THAT pile of nonsense defies logic and any kind of adult reasoning but of course the answer is that the Philippine Government,as it claims to be entering into Peace Talk mode with the NPA (via the NPA's umbrella organisation, the NDF, National Democratic Front) pressured hard to get it done...just as it did with the Netherlands when it revoked NPA founder and nominal leader (officialy "Consultant to the NDF") Jose Maria Sison aka JOMA's Residency Status and Social Welfare Benefits.Bravo for New Zealand,I am sure that its people can rest easier knowing that the NPA is now on that list (SARCASM).
October 19, 2010 in Sitio Tumondong,Barangay Basak,Magpet,North Cotabato Province on the Sumifru Banana Plantation roughly 50 NPA swamred the sitio in the early morning hours destroyed 8 Million Pesos (~150,000 US) worth of heavy equipment.Sumifru is owned by the Japanese corporation Sumitomo which farms about 4,000 hectares at locations throughout Southern Mindanao.Normally an action like this wouldnt even be worth mentioning as they are so common and do not involve human casualties but the incident marks a push into slightly new territory for the NPA, or rather a return to territory it hasnt held since the very early 1990s.More over,it created approximately 1200 new IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons aka REfugees) as terrified villagers fearing an escalation fled with the clothes on their backs. IDPs are almost always related to AFP actions taken against various groups within the Islamic Insurgency though every few months there is a moderate wave in Surigao del Sur and Agusan del Sur Province's Andap Complex.As of today,October 21st,the IDPs remain in Evacuation Centres,etc.
The next day, October 20,2010 saw a rare glimmer of hope in the GPH-NPA struggle,now close to its 42nd year of war and bloodshed.The NPA (and CPP) sublimate themselves within an umbrella organisation,the NDFP,or as it is commonly known,the NDF (National Democratic Front of the Philippines).The NDF encompasses a range of Left Wing Sectoral Front Organisations,many of which figure in the AFP's Order of Battle (fair game in war,though usually in the covert, u
Founder JOMA,Jose Maria Sosa,and many other top figures had ensconced themselves comfortably in Utrecht, Netherlands.While many,like Luis Jandaloni had intelligently taken dual Dutch citizenship JOMA had merely become a legal alien while he wound his way through the cumbersome process of claiming Political Asylum. The placement on these 2 Lists caused JOMA's status to be yanked and negated the possibility of travel outside the EU for Jandaloni, et al.The almost imemdiate result was the NDF unilaterally stepping away from the negotiating table.
As ex-President Arroyo's time drew near JOMA and the rest of the crew began putting out feelers to jump start the process.When Aquino took the Election this past May most observers knew that the resumption was a given, after a few very minor wrinkles have been ironed out. Much to President Aquino's credit he has picked 5 extremely able people for the GPH Panel, all of whom I will go into great detail about in m next entry.There is still no date in sight though it most definitely will take place in the first half of 2011.Seven long years of sadness and bloodshed. Unlike the GPH-MILF Peace Process the GPH-NDF Peace Process actually stands a chance of accomplishing soemthing with lasting impact.One can imagine anyway...
Wednesday, October 27, 2010, at 547AM in Purok Basakan,Barangay Alagon,Siay,Zamboanga Sibugay Province,the 53IB claimed to have found an NPA Camp outside the town in question though no NPA activity has been known to take place there over the last 36 months,let alone in the entire 1 ID AOR, and killed 2 men the TF says were armed NPA guerillas. It has to be mentioned that on Monday, October 25 in Barangay Pilay, Ipil, also in that province and well within the ID's AOR ( 1st Infantry Division's Area of Operations),a CAFGU soldier, Oilgario Bucal Jr.turned his army issued weapon on his comrades killing 5 in cold blood.The obvious questions are being floated on this issue. Bucal then escaped into the bush,do the math (maybe),especially when you find out that the 2 dead "guerillas" were 1 male and 1 female and only 1 weapon was recovered, an army issued carbine.
In yet another example provided by the AFP's 10ID (Infantry Division), 73IB's C COY (Company C) captured a 15 year old courier for Front 71. The soldiers, upon entering a mountainside clearing sighted the youth lugging an over packed sack filled with ammo,fatigues and camp equipment. The AFP claims that the young man had recently been in two engagements with the AFP, the first in Janurary of 2009 and the second in Feburary of 2010. He was then turned over to DSWD (Dept. Social Welfare and Development) which then processed him and released him to his parents who, as is always the case, had no idea that their son was with the NPA.
On September 10, 2010 the AFP fired its latest salvo in this propaganda back and forth when the 10ID accused the NPA of recruiting four more minors from among the eleven residents of Barangay Baracatan in Davao City's Toril District. The eleven are currently undergoing the military phase of their training in Mt.Apo National Park with the NPA's Front 54 of the SMRC, or Southern Mindanao Regional Committee. Front 54 of course denies this accusation ,this time pointing to the bi-laterally ratified CARHRIHL (Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Law) from 1998, as well as a new defence, a 1999 directive from the CPP, or Communist Party of the Philippines, of which the NPA is merely the military arm. The Directive is from the CPP Executive Committee, the CPP organ from which the NPA takes its cues. The Directive, entitled, "Memorandum to the Minimum Age Required for NPA Fighters" basically rehashes CARHRHIL which was very recent at that point.
On September 19, 2010 in Sitio Kisoy in Barangay Anggas in the municipality of Alabel in Sarangani Province, the 73IB (Infantry Battalion) on routine patrol sighted what it believed to be two NPA guerillas sitting in a field, apparently taking a much needed break. Encircling the two they were closing in for what they had hoped would be a violence-free capture when one of the suspected guerillas ran towards a clifface and jumped, rolling down a very steep incline into the valley below and escaped. The second guerilla was then captured without firing a shot, apparently too stunned by what had just transpired.
Upon initial interrogation the guerilla in custody revealed that he was only 15 and not a guerilla at all, but a rather a less than willing guide for the actual guerilla, "Ka Arnold," who had jumped off the plateau. Christened "Ka Buboy" by the NPA who had periodically used him as a guide since age 12 he had been recieving a stipend from the NPA and also had apparently, wittingly or unwittingly, served as a courier as well. During his experience serving the NPA he had recently been through two fire fights in Barangay Datal Anggas, his village of residence. Asked what had attracted him to serve the insugent group he quickly answered that the chief benefit was the few pesos with which to help his impovershied family,who apprently had no idea (of course) of their son's involvement with the NPA.
The young man's presence was propagandised by the AFP's Lieutenant Colonel Medel Aguilar, CO, or Commanding Officer of the 10ID's CMOB (Civil-Military Operations Battalion) as a clearcut violation of both...big suprise here...IHL (International Humanitarian Law) and its subsidiary, LOAC (Laws of Armed Conflict). While that is ridiculous to anyone with even cursory knowledge of anything involved in this dynamic, the 73IB's CO, Lieutenant Colonel Edgardo DeLeon did bring up a valid point when he accused the NPA of committing yet another infraction against the bi-laterally ratified CARHRIL.
"Ka Arnold," the guerilla the 15 year old had been guiding, is a member of Team #1, Primera Squad (1st Squad), Platun Mazda (M Platoon), Front 71 of the FSMRC or Far South Mindanao Regional Committee. Front 71 is the only Front currently operating in Sarangani Province and its primary AOR, or Area of Responsibility (as in "Area of Operation") is in the Alabel and Malapatan municipalities and surrounding environs. The 73IB is deployed specifically to counter the Front and despite almost a year and a half of concerted efforts it has made very little headway. This is a problem in many areas where the government pays lip service to Development while merely utilising it as a catchword for dividing up the spoils amongst multi-nationals and bypassing all but a precious handful of locals usually already sitting pretty in positions of power and affluence.
The next day, September 20th, 2010, in Sitio Akbual in Barangay Upper Suyan in the town of Malapatan in Sarangani Province the 73IB was attacked by 10 guerillas from the afore mentioned Front 71. The AFP were acting as Security Escorts as the 10ID's CMOB was conducting an Anti-Dengue drive. For people perhaps unaware, Dengue is a mosquito borne disease that is often fatal and has shown increases into the triple digits in many areas of the island over the last 12 months- not too mention over much of the Southern and Central Philippines as well (actually the reportage protocols have changed and this is the primary mover behind the increase but hey, it keeps the local media busy so lets let them have their fun). Per this increase, three of the four IDs (Infantry Divisions) on mainland Mindanao have deployed their CMOBs in anti-Dengue efforts.
The next day, September 21st, the 4ID, based in Cagayan De Oro City's Camp Edilberto Evangelista turned over ISO (Internal Security Operations, which has evolved into a euphanism for COIN, i.e. "Counterinsurgency") to Misamis Oriental Province's PPOC (Provincial Peace and Order Council, an interface between the AFP and LGUs, i.e."Local Government Units," itself a euphanism for "municipality"), via Misamis Oriental Governor Oscar Moreno. The Sign-Over Ceremony took place on the Provincial Capitol Grounds. Essentially this means that the insurgency is now considered negligible to non-existent and that local law enforcement and LGUs are believed capable enough to handle any residual presence. It is worth noting that the 403Bde's (Brigade) CO (Commanding Officer), Col. Romeo Gapuz boldly stated that the NPA's Front 4B has been defeated. Famous last words...
That same day also within the 4ID's AOR (Area of Operations), in Barangay Valentina in the municipality of Esperanza in Agusan del Sur Province, the 26IB came across 10 guerillas from Front 8 of the NEMRC, or Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee and a 10 minute fire fight ensued. The clash resulted in the death of one guerilla and the capture of two M14s after the NPA withdrew from the scene. Esperanza is one of three spiritual capitals of the Higaon-on Tribe, a Lumad (Hill Tribe) group with branches in Bukidnon Province as well as in another spiritual capital, Claveria in Misamis Oriental Province.
Whole Claveria still has formidable NPA activity, despite the utterings at that afore mentioned ceremony, as well as absolutely no progress on the social and economic environments that breeds the insurgency, Esperanza is still in the thick of war with the NPA running parallel governments in almost all outlying barangays and the tribe is suffering terribly as it splits into (actually split three decades ago) into pro and anti-NPA factions, aggravated immensely by the AFP's Force Multiplication efforts aimed at the tribe. As I have mentioned in previous postings/entries I will delve into those efforts in great detail as soon as time allows.
September 24th, 2010 in Barangay Upper Suyan, again in the town of Malapatan in Sarangani Province, 40 year old Eliseo "Ka Bimbo" Tada of that same town and a Team Leader (most minor of NPA command positions, controls less than a single squad) in the NPA's Front 71 surrendered to the 39IB citing complications from malaria that he caught as a combatant deep in the bush, as well as homesickness for his family and village. He didnt turn in a weapon, as is the usual requirement for acceptance into the government's Social Integration Programme which provides immediate payouts for each weapon via the related "Balik Baril" ("Return a Rifle"), as well as Livlihood and Sustenance payouts, making it a formidable incentive for some. The AFP has claimed that the lack of weapon, which is extremely curious since Tada is said to have been a Team Leader, is due to his CO, "Ka Ronron," having seized his weapon, an M16, before allowing him to leave his detachment on September 12th.
That is the version prepared by the AFP spinmasters. The real story is a bit more understandable. Tada had left his camp on September 12th as he travelled to Davao City to seek treatment for his serious strain of malaria. As he passed thru the municipality of Malita in Davao del Sur Province he was taken into custody by the 39IB at an AFP Checkpoint. He was then paraded through the streets of that small town's Barangay Poblacion before entering the AFP Gulag. Perhaps the emnity of the AFP is also a bit more understandable when one realises that Tada is from the Team that had just engaged the 73IB in a fire fight on September 20th during the afore mentioned anti-Dengue Operation.
September 25th, 2010 in Sitio Taglawig in Barangay Panoraon in the town of Maco in ComVal (Compostela Valley) Province saw a platoon from the 71IB dispatched after intermittent reports or unknown armed men seen in the vicinity over a number of days. Upon scouring (going over a sector meter by meter) the sector the AFP discovered a recently erected camp with two platoons of NPA (roughly 60 guerillas). A 10 minute fire fight erupted with no casualties on either side as the NPA quickly withdrew from their camp. The presence of a camp in that sector bodes ill for the AFP and their intensified efforts in the region since the same battalion had recently launched a Civil-Military (Hearts and Minds, as in the military performing medical and social outreach to develop a rapport with the population) Operation there. Such operations involve a regular presence of a moderately sized detachment and the NPA's decison to encamp there shows that it has little to fear at the moment.
September 29th, 2010 in Barangay Bagampasan in the municipality of Don Victoriano Chiongbian in Misamis Occidental, an AFP detachment on patrol unexpectedly came across a detachment of NPA as the soldiers entered a clearing on a hillside. During the subsequent 1 hour fire fight five soldiers and a staff seargent were wounded by an M203 grenade. What was it that the good Lieutenant Colonel Romeo Gapuz had said about Front 4B?
That same day, September 29th, in Barangay Fatima in Davao City's Paquibato District in Davao del Sur Province, the NPA's 1st Pulang Bagani Company (Red Warriors Company) ambushed an AFP detachment though for once it was an opportunistic endeavour since all planned ambuscades by the Pulang Bagani (there are three companies though its parent formation FSMRC pretends there are five) involve IEDs,which the AFP likes to spin as "landmines" while claiming that they are illegal under IHL/LOAC. Since these IEDs are always command controlled (detonated purposefully by remote) they are absolutely legal in warfare.
On October 1st,2010 in Purok#5 of Barangay San Isidro in the town of Lianga in the Andap Complex of Surigao del Sur Province, 9 guerillas from Front 19A attacked an SCAA post attached to SUDECOR (Surigao Development Corp.), a private logging concern involved in heavy deforestation of Anadap, one of the last remaining large strands of virgin timber in the Mindanowan jungle. Unbeknownst to the guerillas, the post sublimated to the 23IB and led by Corporal Singson, of the 23IB's C COY (Comapny C) was hosting an element from the 75IB so that instead of the usual single AFP NCO ( Non-Commissioned Officer), in charge of unmotivated local tribesmen, the post was swarming with AFP. After 15 minutes of heavy back and forth the NPA withdrew back into the Diwata Mountains.
I have written about the SCAA (Special Civilain Active Auxiliary), akin to CAFGU but entirely funded by private sources,such as large businesses though the AFP now tries to bar large landholders who merely engage in agricultural pursuits since it lends an air of Feudalism and plays directly into the hands of NPA propagandists. The Andap Complex that I mentioned in the preceeding paragraph is the area between the municipalities of Tandag, Tago, Cagwait, San Agustin, Marihatag and Lianga in Surigao del Sur Province directly bordering Agusan del Sur Province. Heavily forested so that it is an objective in many GPH (Govt.of the Philippines) Develpment schemes. At the moment there are 42 MPSAs (Mineral Production Sharing Agreements), 73 MEPs (Mineral Exploration Permits) and heavy Timber and Coal Concessions as well.
An unfortunate dichotomy in COIN (Counterinsurgency Warfare) in that to defeat the political end of the dynamic, by far its largest facet, Infrastructural and Economic Development must take place on a considerable scale. In a Maoist-centric insurgency, such as the one being waged by the NPA, practically the entire struggle takes place in a rural theater of operations. Ergo, to attempt to defeat the insurgency the government must put forth great effort in tranforming the economic, infrastructural and social landscape. The contradiction in objectives enters when one realises that when the government begins undertaking this great endeavour it must enter into "bargains with the devil," the "devil" in this case being unscrupulous private developers who almost always engage in large scale exploitation of the local populace and enviornment thus breeding a new generation of recruits for the insurgency.
Social Development never comes close to even keeping pace with the other forms of development and these social ills that result defeat the government's larger, greater objective of neutralising the insurgency. Round and round it goes so that the actual objective morphs into just trying to keep the violence down to a somewhat manageable pace, where the local populace can grasp some sort of semblance to "normal" life.
October 7th, 2010 in Purok #8 of Barangay Carmen in Davao City's Baguio District in Davao del Sur Province, the 84IB was Clearing the sector when they unexpectedly came across a platoon from the NPA's Front 54. After a rough fire fight the NPA guerillas withdrew to Barangay Tamayong in the adhacent district of Calinan, as a running fire fight then transpired the guerillas split into detachments before regrouping in Sitio Ligabato back in Barangay Carmen where they had first been encountered. Ligabato had been the site of their temporary encampment which they then had to hastily abandon before withdrawing deeper into the mountains outside Davao City limits.
In non-military developments, Jorge "Ka Oris" Madlos, the NDFP (National Democratic Front of the Philippines, the NPA/CPP linked umbrella organisation that comprises all left wing sectoral organisations sympathetic to or directly aligned with NPA/CPP objectives) Spokesman on Mindanao and a Regional NPA Commander to boot issued a statement on September 28th, 2010 on the Port Call made by the US Navy's USS George Washington and three destroyers, in Manila. In a highly true to form piece, Madlos says that the Port Call is only the latest and most blatant in a string of recent US incursions into Philippine territory. He said, correctly, that US troops often masquerade as Humanitarian actors even though they overtly engage both the NPA (that is absolutely false) and the MILF (that is correct in so much as MILF's 114 Base Command on Basilan is inextricably linked to Abu Sayyaf and Abu Sayyaf is the US mandate in the Philippines, an issue I will be discussing in my next MILF entry since the US Ambassador just requalified that issue in a recent statement).
The US involvement against the NPA is relegated to Intel related Operations, primarily by the CIA which operates out of a set of three shipping containers at Camp Navarro in Zamboanga City. There are a couple of uniformed servicemen working with them, in UAV ("Drones," i.e.unmanned aerial craft used to surveil in this case in the pursuit of intel, as well as in SIGNINT, electronic intel). To "overtly engage" the US would have to enter into Combat Operations which it has not despite ridiculous propaganda from the NPA claiming that unifromed US soldiers were involved in a firefight in Visayas Region. the US has no Operational Presence north of mainland Mindanao. Its presence is heaviest on Basilan, but it also has a significant presence on Jolo Island, and maintains 3 man teams as far afield as Tawi Tawi's AFP Naval Station. I am meandering a bit off course and will relegate my posting in this area to these limited comments, and hope to get to it sooner rather than later.
Madlos went on to say, US efforts are directly cadged from its COIN (Counter Insurgency) manual and are part and parcel of America's "Containment and Engagement" policy. Only a very naive, or ignorant person would imagine that the americans hold no ulterior motives in their Philippine endeavour. The so called "South East Asian Front on the War on Terror" is a farce. Whatever tenuous links Middle Eastern Islamo-fascists may have had with Abu Sayyaf had dissipated at least 5 years before the first uniformed American deplaned at Edwin Andrews Airforce Base in Zamboanga City. Abu Sayyaf itself was totally and irrevocably devoid of any substantiative ideology by that time as well, and had been since before its founder was killed in 1998.
The continued US presence is absolutely tied to regional goals but they are not entirely, or even mostly economic in nature.Rather they are tied to hegemony, not allowing China to extend its reach (the Spratly Islands brouhaha excepted), nor allow Japan to gain the heads up as it becomes the third largest donor on humanitarian projects in Mindanao behind America and Australia. So much for the Madlos/NDF/CPP/NPA worldview which was stale even before Mao died.
September 3rd, 2010 saw yet another killing in the Datu Labawan saga,but this issue has quickly evolved from an NPA-centric dynamic to one deserving of its own long winded entry, one I hope to get to shortly. Most if not all civilian killings since August are attributable to the tribal feud ("Pangayaw").
On October 04, 2010, yet another chapter in the AFP versus NPA "Child Warrior" saga closed in Laak ,ComVal (Compostela Valley) Province. The AFP's 3rdSFB (Special Forces aka Airborne Battalion) under Lieutenant Colonel Ferdinand Napuli provided a Security Perimeter as a resident of Barangay Prosperidad in the town of Montevista in that same province sought AFP assistance in the search for his missing son. Maneja Andoyo, a local Lumad (Hill Tribe) man had last seen his son Bobong Andoyo when the young man left home after a short visit, on November 14th, 2009. Four days before his 17th birthday.
Bobong had been home on a short visit, having joined the NPA with his younger brother Rodrigo Andoyo in 2008, when Bobong had just turned 15, and Rodrigo had turned 14. Rodrigo couldnt stomach the lean diet, crude environment and most of all he says, the violence. Bobong stayed on, primarily being motivated by the monthly stipend promised to all NPA Regulars (full time guerillas), seeing it as perhaps the only avenue with which he could help alleviate some of the crushing poverty his family faced. Shortly after he returned to his detachment from that short visit at home, he and fellow recruit Reto "Ka Jeffrey" Mawang, also a teenager, decided to defect.
Leaving one evening when both had sentry duty the two youths took their chance, careful to bring their weapons with them to ensure their acceptance into the AFP's Surrenderee Program, aka Social Integration Program, which offers a generous bounty for each operable weapon surrendered as well as an immediate financial incentive and payouts for livlihood and re-training assistance. When it was apparent that the two had fled the hierarchy in the Front (comparable to an IB in the AFP though with far less personnel) ordered them roped in. It wasnt long before their former comrades caught up to them as they tried to navigate the deep bush in the early moning hours, according to a local farmer cum NPA Irregular (NPA Village Militia) who resides in Sitio Pundasyon, the sitio in Laak where the double grave was uncovered, and was able to witness their apprehension and execution from his home.
Assisted by the Nabunturan Scene of Crime Operations (SOCO),from Nabunturan Municipal Police Office, Maneja Andoyo and his son Rodrigo dug out Bobong's decomposed remains by hand, still wearing the black teeshirt usually worn by NPA Regulars, and the combat fatigues he had also been wearing the last day his father saw him. Having spent P50,000 raised by selling off virtually all his possesions, Maneja said that he was finally at peace and had found a measure of closure. Until this point he had been receiving dreams regularly in which his son cried out for succor. He had expected the discovery ever since he had first questioned locals in that same NPA detachment and the men had been extremely evasive.
October 7th, 2010 saw yet another AFP salvo against the NPA in the never-ending saga of the,"Child Warrior."The 84IB, having had a difficult transfer south from Luzon,and having been decimated in battle against the NPA is finally getting the hang of life down south with its recent Clearing Operation in Purok #8, Barangay Carmen,Baguio District in Davao City.Stumbling over a deserted encampment from NPA Front-54 they found some internal memos dated November 24, 2009 with a neatly composed list of new recruits from Davao AOR including full psycho-social profiles as well as Logistical info such as methods for procurement of medical supplies.It is the recruit list though that is making 10ID brass get all hot and bothered.On the list are 3 males under the age of 18,two of whom are drug users...as if no AFP soldier is but that is just how it is played.The camp was located well within the Klata band of Bagobo Lumad's AD (Ancestral Domain) Claim,despite a long history of opposition from that band's Datu (chief).Front-54's Kumander (CO) Alex"Ka Bobby"Rosete is slacking off apparently.
On Monday October 11th,2010 New Zealand ignorantly added the CPP and NPA along with 4 other organisations to its list of"International Terror Organisations"per its"Terrorism Suppression Act."Who were the NPA lumped together with? HAMAS' miltary wing,the Qassam Brigades and those fun loving bunch of Islamo-fascists, PIJ aka Palestinian Islamic Jihad.PM John Keys amazingly maintains that this move helps his nation meet its onus under UN Security Council Resolution #1373 which was passed to help neutralise the world wide specter of terrorism. How and why the NPA was ever lumped into THAT pile of nonsense defies logic and any kind of adult reasoning but of course the answer is that the Philippine Government,as it claims to be entering into Peace Talk mode with the NPA (via the NPA's umbrella organisation, the NDF, National Democratic Front) pressured hard to get it done...just as it did with the Netherlands when it revoked NPA founder and nominal leader (officialy "Consultant to the NDF") Jose Maria Sison aka JOMA's Residency Status and Social Welfare Benefits.Bravo for New Zealand,I am sure that its people can rest easier knowing that the NPA is now on that list (SARCASM).
October 19, 2010 in Sitio Tumondong,Barangay Basak,Magpet,North Cotabato Province on the Sumifru Banana Plantation roughly 50 NPA swamred the sitio in the early morning hours destroyed 8 Million Pesos (~150,000 US) worth of heavy equipment.Sumifru is owned by the Japanese corporation Sumitomo which farms about 4,000 hectares at locations throughout Southern Mindanao.Normally an action like this wouldnt even be worth mentioning as they are so common and do not involve human casualties but the incident marks a push into slightly new territory for the NPA, or rather a return to territory it hasnt held since the very early 1990s.More over,it created approximately 1200 new IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons aka REfugees) as terrified villagers fearing an escalation fled with the clothes on their backs. IDPs are almost always related to AFP actions taken against various groups within the Islamic Insurgency though every few months there is a moderate wave in Surigao del Sur and Agusan del Sur Province's Andap Complex.As of today,October 21st,the IDPs remain in Evacuation Centres,etc.
The next day, October 20,2010 saw a rare glimmer of hope in the GPH-NPA struggle,now close to its 42nd year of war and bloodshed.The NPA (and CPP) sublimate themselves within an umbrella organisation,the NDFP,or as it is commonly known,the NDF (National Democratic Front of the Philippines).The NDF encompasses a range of Left Wing Sectoral Front Organisations,many of which figure in the AFP's Order of Battle (fair game in war,though usually in the covert, u
Founder JOMA,Jose Maria Sosa,and many other top figures had ensconced themselves comfortably in Utrecht, Netherlands.While many,like Luis Jandaloni had intelligently taken dual Dutch citizenship JOMA had merely become a legal alien while he wound his way through the cumbersome process of claiming Political Asylum. The placement on these 2 Lists caused JOMA's status to be yanked and negated the possibility of travel outside the EU for Jandaloni, et al.The almost imemdiate result was the NDF unilaterally stepping away from the negotiating table.
As ex-President Arroyo's time drew near JOMA and the rest of the crew began putting out feelers to jump start the process.When Aquino took the Election this past May most observers knew that the resumption was a given, after a few very minor wrinkles have been ironed out. Much to President Aquino's credit he has picked 5 extremely able people for the GPH Panel, all of whom I will go into great detail about in m next entry.There is still no date in sight though it most definitely will take place in the first half of 2011.Seven long years of sadness and bloodshed. Unlike the GPH-MILF Peace Process the GPH-NDF Peace Process actually stands a chance of accomplishing soemthing with lasting impact.One can imagine anyway...
Wednesday, October 27, 2010, at 547AM in Purok Basakan,Barangay Alagon,Siay,Zamboanga Sibugay Province,the 53IB claimed to have found an NPA Camp outside the town in question though no NPA activity has been known to take place there over the last 36 months,let alone in the entire 1 ID AOR, and killed 2 men the TF says were armed NPA guerillas. It has to be mentioned that on Monday, October 25 in Barangay Pilay, Ipil, also in that province and well within the ID's AOR ( 1st Infantry Division's Area of Operations),a CAFGU soldier, Oilgario Bucal Jr.turned his army issued weapon on his comrades killing 5 in cold blood.The obvious questions are being floated on this issue. Bucal then escaped into the bush,do the math (maybe),especially when you find out that the 2 dead "guerillas" were 1 male and 1 female and only 1 weapon was recovered, an army issued carbine.
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