This is the fourth and final entry in my series of posts offering the verbatim Human Rights Watch report on CAA,or Civilian Active Auxiliary abuses under the protection of the AFP, or, Armed Forces of the Philippines. The CAAs, of which the CAFGU, or Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Units were the first created, serve in the AFP COIN, or Counterinsurgency programme as a geographically fixed armed reserve manned by the population the unit is protecting. They serve in the second step, or "Hold Phase," after the AFP has "cleared" a sector.
As I have noted, I don't particularly respect Human Rights Watch, or HRW, but this report- actually by Asia Watcg which later was subsumed by HRW- happens to provide a lot of great factual data about the CAA programme circa 1990.
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pp29
Militia Abuses in Areas of Sporadic Conflict
In areas of Northern Mindanao where the insurgency was no longer a major threat in 1991 and early 1992, the continued deployment of the CAFGU raised serious human rights concerns. Human Rights Watch findings suggest the presence of CAFGU over time may have led to heightened violence in the communities in which they are based. After combat units withdraw, military supervision of the CAFGU appears to weaken. CAFGU members remain armed, but without a clear target. In communities where the CAFGU remain without a visible enemy, poverty, fear, petty feuding, and the replacement of traditional legal systems by arbitrary force have made the militia, like civil patrols in Guatemala, "a dangerous conduit for vigilante justice and the abuse of power" ("Civil Patrols in Guatemala," pp11, Americas Watch, NY: August 1986).
This trend is evident in news reports. Between April and September 1991, Northern Mindanao's largest circulation newspaper, "The Goldstar Daily," published an average of two reports per month on CAFGU members' involvement in violent crimes in the four neighboring provinces of Northern Mindanao:
-An April 11, 1991 report described the manhunt for a CAFGU member in nearby Surigao del Norte Province accused of raping a 14 year old girl.
-A May 31, 1991 report detailed the arrest of a CAFGU member suspected of a hold up in Bukindon Province.
-A July 3, 1991 story reported that a CAFGU member in Misamis Oriental Province was declared guilty of Murder and Rape.
-On July 4, 1991, three CAFGU members in Surigao del Norte Province were arrested in a robbery.
-On July 25, 1991, charges were brought against three CAFGU members in Misamis Oriental for threats against a resident.
-A July 30, 1991 report pointed to CAFGU members as the main suspects in the ambush killings of a parish worker and her son in Misamis Oriental.
-On July 31, 1991, a CAFGU member was shot by another in Agusan del Norte Province.
-On August 12, 1991 the paper reported that a CAFGU member was the main suspect in the killing of a motorcycle driver in Misamis Oriental Province.
-On August 22, 1991, a CAFGU member was reported to have shot and killed a local resident in Surigao del Norte Province.
-On August 27, 1991, a CAFGU member was blamed for shooting a local resident and wounding his wife in Misamis Oriental.
-On September 25, 1991, three persons were killed in Bukidnon Province in a shootout between a CAFGU member and a policeman.
Human Rights Watch documented 14 killings by CAFGU or suspected CAFGU in Agusan del Norte and Bukidnon Provinces in 1991. Members of militant farners' organizations were the main victims of political violence.
In addition, Human Right Watch findings that the Military gives a cash bounty to militia and vigilante group members for the killing of suspected NPA rebels raises concerns that Military policy encourages arbitrary and uncontrolled acts of violence. The bounties for capture of suspected NPA are listed in documents known as the Order of Battle.
pp30
In Bukidnon, this provision served as a virtual go ahead for armed groups, some outside the ordinary chain of discipline or command, to take part in violent attacks on suspected rebels. Execution, and not merely capture, of the suspects was rewarded.
CAFGU and Military Killings in Agusan del Norte
Agusan del Norte, perched on the north coast of Mindanao at the mouth of the Agusan River, was not the site of major military operations in Mindanao in 1991. The infantry battalion located near Butuan City, the provincial capital, played a defensive role generally, and relatively few encounters were reported in the local press. CAFGU forces remained in place, some under the supervision of police security forces rather than military.
Despite the lack of military activity in the province, security, and CAFGU forces were implicated in several attacks on suspected NPA sympathizers and poor peasants, particularly members of local farmers' organizations. In 1991, in the province of Agusan del Norte, Human Rights Watch investigated four unprovoked killings of farmers, three of them leaders UMAN, the provincial affiliate of the Left Wing farmers' organization, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas.
Killing of a Peasant Community Leader by CAFGU
A witness to the killing of Jose Bongcoza in the village of Kabalalahan, in the town of Sangay, said she believed Bongcaza was killed because of his refusal to join the Bantay Bayan. She said he was visited three times by the same armed men before his shooting death.
On September 26, 1991, a Military man accompanied by three CAFGUs went to look for Bongcoza at his house. Noone was home, so the men went to the neighbor, who identified the Military officer as "Boy" Cascara and one CAFGU, a certain Rigo.
Bongciza had refused to join the volunteer village patrol, so when he learned about the visit, he said he was afraid. A neighbor, whose brother had been sought and killed by the Military, advised him to go into hiding, but Boncoza decided to wait for the men to return, and then go with them to speak with the local Military commander.
The same thre visited Bongcoza's house the next day, but left before Bongcoza returned. Neighbors told the family about the visit. The next day, the family went up to the farm to slaughter a pig for the Sunday Fiesta. When they returned, they found the door kicked in, with boot marks on it. The family was frightened and went to the home of a relative. The next day, Bongcoza went with his aunt to see a town council official in Sangay, the municipal center, to find out why the men were after him, "especially since this Cascara and Rigo are known to liquidate suspected NPAs," the source said. The official told them he could do nothing, because it was a Sunday, but advised Bongcoza to hide out until the next day.
Bongcoza, however, appeared upset and instead went looking for Cascara and Rigo. He later related to his family that he found the two at is house. They told him they were looking for him because they wanted to talk to him about the Bantay Bayan. They taunted him and asked him if he was afraid of them, which he asmitted. Later that evening, according to family members, Bongcoza appeared anxious and depressed, and spoke as if he expected he would die. At about 830PM, he went out to smoke a cigarette on the step ladder leading to the front entrance of his daughter's house. At that moment, he was shot once in the head, and died instantly. His daughter, wgo was inside the house, saw the flash of a shot blast in the dark, but did not see the gunmen. Neighbors reported hearing the footfalls of two or three individuals running away from the house.
Family members believed that the Military man, Cascara, abd the CAFGU man, Rigo, were responsible for the killing. As of January 1992, the family had not filed charges because of fear of reprisal. They believed the Military continued to keep them under surveillance because one of Bongcoza's sons was an NPA member. Rigo, the CAFGU member, continued to move freely about the community of Kabalalahan. Cascara was disarmed after he confessed to the killing of another CAFGU, in a neighboring town a few months after the killing of Bongcoza. However, he had still not been prosecuted and was reportedly often seen at the local cockfighting gallery in the municipal center.
pp31
Killing in Custody
A neighbor and local official described the killing of Virgilio Bongcales, a 35 year old resident in an outlying village of the provincial capital of Butuan City, by a combined group of two CAFGU members and a locak Philippine Constabulary seargent charged with supervising them. Bongcales' brother, Carmelo Bongcales, witnessed the events that resulted in his brother's killing.
On January 2, 1991 at around 2PM two CAFGU members identified as Melchor Jovita and Lando Trinidad went to Bongcales' home in the village of Salvacion and asked Bongcales to accompany them back to the 411th PC Company barracks to settle a longstanding dispute between Bongcales and another local resident. Bongcales' brother Carmelo joined the three. The detachment is located by the side of the Agusan River.
Jovita and Reinidad were among the CAFGU recruited and trained by the 30th IB in 1988, but the battalion was withdrawn after residents complained of abuses by the soldiers. The CAFGU, some of whom are said to be former CHDF, remained under the 411th PC Company.
At the barracks, the two CAFGU did not permit Carmelo to enter with Bongcales. After 15 minutes, Carmelo suddenly heard gunshots coming from the riverbank. He ran to a cliff overlooking the river and, from a distance of about 300 feet, watched as the PC officer, idemtified as Sgt.Britania, standing on the bank with his M16 rifle aimed at Bongcales who was thrashing about in the middle of the river. Britania aimed and fired his rifle at the water near Bongcales, laughing and shouting at him to swim back. But Bongcales could not swim, amd he screamed that he would never be able to swim back. Slowly, he was swept downstream by the current.
Bongcales' relatives reported the incident to the main PC Headquarters in Butuan City, but said their complaint was ignored and they were told to go home. Bongcales' body was recovered two days later at a village a few miles downstream. A photograph taken at the time showed obvious bruises on his right forearm and ribs, and a cut to his right eye. Additionaly, an autopsy performed by a Government medical officer found three front teeth missing, and a fracture to the rear of the skull, indicating that he had been struck with a heavy object.
A few weeks later, the PC Sergeant Britania approached the Bongcales family and offered them 12,000 Pesos ($500) to "keep quiet." The family, although poor peasant farmers, refused the money. In March, rumors began circulating that they might be "Kuotkuot," or killed by smothering. Six members of the family immediately fled to Manila to a relative's home.
The family was particularly afraid that the CAFGU would kill them in reprisal if they testified against Sergeant Britania. The local official explained, "They had heard from people in a neighboring village that the Government troops threatened members of the family of a victim. And they do that to you by charging you as an NPA sympathizer."
In October, a brother of Bongcales who had been actively pushing for filing the case was stabbed and killed in Davao City. The family believed the killing was related to Bongcales' death, but no additional details of that case were currently available. As of January 1992, despite a Government autopsy, the Government had not investigated or filed charges in the case.
Killings While in Unacknowledged Military Custody
Two prominent members of the farmers' organization, UMAN, were found dead after unidentified Military men picked them up just outside of the provincial capital on February 24, 1991. Information from witnesses' affadavits and locak human rights monitors ubdicate that the two...
pp32
...Bernardo Lagurin and Miguel Calso,may have been killed for their high profile involvement with UMAN. The organization has been openly and repeatedly branded as a zlfront" organization. Lagurin, 41, a resident of the neighboring province of Agusan del Sur, was an agricultural engineer who had been working as a consultant to UMAN; Calso, 29, a farmer, was the General Sevretary of UMAN in Butuan City.
A witness, Desederia Pabas, also a staff member of UMAN, was riding with the two on the same passenger jeep when the two were abducted. In her affadavit filed with the Provincial Prosecutor, she said that the abduction occurred at about 4PM that afternoon, while the three were making the regular commute from Ampayan, where the main UMAN office is located, back to the city center.
At that time, Pabas noticed a private jeep tailing their vehicle. Then the jeep passed the vehicle and stopped in front of it, forcing the jeep that Pabas and the others were riding in to stop as well. The jeep had no liscence plate. Three men jumped out and approached the passenger vehicle. Two of the men carried pistols, and one an Armalite rifle. One wore a fatigue uniform with no nameplate. The three looked inside the rear of the passenger jeep and ordered Lagurin and Calso to get out. They asked all of the other passengers if there were any more companions of Calso and Lagurin in the jeep. Pabas believed she was spared because a passenger responded that the two had been traveling alome. Then the men took Calso and Lagurin and led them at gunpoint into the waiting jeep.
The following day, the relatives of both victims went to the Police Headquarters and Central Police Station in Butuan City to inquire about the two mens' whereabouts, but police officials said that Calso and Lagurin were not in their custody. That same day, residents of a neighborhood in Cagayan del Oro City, three hours distant from Butuan City, found the two bodies at dawn in an empty field. According to local news reports, three hours before, at around 2AM, residents recalled hearing a succession of gunbursts coming from the field, amd seeing a vehicle speeding away from the scene.
Three days later, relatives identified the the dead as Calso and Lagurin. Color photographs and police reports confirmed that both had been shot in the forehead- Calso twice- and several times in the chest at close range.
CAFGU Killings in Bukidnon
The province of Bukidnon is no longer home to an active insurgency. In December 1991, the last remaining political detainees in the province were rleased. A local Military Commander estimated that only roughly 70 fully armed rebels exist in the province, mostly in the still forested hills above the municipality of Valencia. Military and Church leaders said the NPA is weak in Bukidnon because it has less civilian support or sympathy than in other provinces. In the 1970s and early 1980s, much of Central Bukidnon was controlled by the NPA. But in contrast with Eastern, where abuses by Government forces drove many to support the NPA, abuses by NPA forces in Bukidnon caused the insurgency to self destruct. Between 1982 and 1984, Church Leaders said, hundreds of people died in brutal "purging" campaigns by the rebels. The rebel forces weakened, and have not recovered their strength to the present.
Guinoyoran and Lourdes are two neighboring farming settlements roughly 8 miles southwest of the municipal center of Valencia, at the foot of a partially forested mountain ranger. Most residents engage in subsistence farming, but in upland communities, residents engage in small scale logging , called "Tablon-Tablon." Since 1989, all logging has been illegal in the province, but this has not stopped logging in the western most communities in Guioyoran.
pp33
Perhaps because of its remoteness and proximity to forest cover, rebel forces are more active in the area than in other parts of Bukidnon. In 1986, the military battalion stayioned in Valencia began recruiting a team of CHDF forces. The core of their recruits was a group of former rebels. In 1988, many of them joined a Right Wing armed fanatic cult, led by a local tribal Higaonon leader, Datu Bantu Domia. The group, knows as the "Tadtad," is said to be responsible for a series of killings and forced evictions in the settlement (the "Tadtad," translated "Chopchop," are so known because of the group's preference for use of long knives, or "bolos," in hacking enemies).
Even the Church could not quell the violence in Guinoyoran and Lourdes. In 1989, Father Arsenio Rubio was withdrawn from the parish after receiving nu$erous death threata and harassment from the gang. In 1990, the subsequent parish priest, Father Diosdado Tabios, also had to be transferred because of threats. In 1991, a priest newly stationed in the parish, Father Neri Satur, also received threats, but chose to continue work in the parish. In October, he was shot and bludgeoned by members of the grouP, some of whom were CAFGU members.
Killing of an Environmentalist Priest by CAFGU and Paramilitary
Extensive court testimony by witnesses and interviews with local officials painted a complex picture of the planning and assassination of Father Satur. Perpetrators were said to be a group of CAFGU and Tadtad members under the orders of a Military Intelligence officer.
At noon on October 14, 1991, Satur and a Church worker, Lacqueline Lunzaga, were making their way home by motorbike on a dusty, rugged road after saying Mass in a remote community of Guinoyoran. Suddenly, three men, two of them masked, lunged into the road ahead and opened fire. After emptying seven bullets into the priest, one of the gunmen crushed the prone victim's head with three blows of his rifle butt, breaking the rifle in two. Lunzaga was struck by one bullet and escaped death.
Several days later, two men, both CAFGU and Tadtad members, fled to the Provincial Bishop's Residence, for unclear reasons. The two men, Guillermo Ipanag and Carliti Baraquil, filed affidavits confessing their involvement in the planning of the killing, but not in its execution. The two men said the priest was killed because of gis strident opposition to illegal logging in his parish. They also said the Tadtad leader considered the priest a nuisance because of his efforts to prosecute a local vigilante member, Allan Cesar Abests, for the killing of a Guinoyoran resident earlier that year.
In their sworn testimony, the two men named three others, a CAFGU member and two members of the Tadtad, as the triggerman; and they asserted that a Military Intelligence officer was the mastermind behind the killing.
By January, 1992, the Provincial Prosecutor had filed charges against the three, Datu Bantu Domia, Allan Cesar Abesta and Crispin Onor, and the military officer, Sgt.Catalino Gabison. The Military, in retaliation, filed murder charges against the two original confessors, and denied involvement of Gabison and the others.
The killing of the priest led to an unprecedented level of international attention to human rights concerns in the area. Satur was one of the first of 46 parish priests deputized by the Government to confiscate illegal shipments of lumber and to apprehend illegal loggers. The action was taken after the Diocese of Malaybalay protested that the logging was continuing despite a total ban since December 1988. The Church had been involved in environmental campaigns against logging for several years.
Several other priests interviewed by Human Rights Watch had also received threats threats since they began their campaigns against logging, Father Cirilo "Loloy" Sajelan, parish ptiest of the municipal center of Valencia received threats three times in 1991 after confiscating shipments of lumber. Father Rino Bargola, Parish Priest of Barangay of San Jose...
pp34
...Sinayawan, had been threatened twice. Both priests said soldiers, CAFGU, and prominent local buisnessmen were involved in the illegal logging rings. Local news reports also pointed to official involvement in illegal logging. In order to protect themselves from being killed, priests in early 1992 travelled to confiscation sites accompanied by local police officers and parishoners.
CAFGU or Military Mercenaries?
Interviews with local government, military, and Church officials revealed that the six suspects in Father Satur's killing, Sgt.Catalino Gabison, Datu Bantu Domia, Crispin Onor, Allan Cesar Abesta, Guillermo Inpanag, and Carlio Baraquil, had a long and productive association with each other in local counterinsurgency campaigns,0In exchange for leading ambushes of nearly two dozen ambushes of nearby NPQ hideouts and guiding Military patrols, members of the gang received large cash "prizes" from the Military and engaged in extortion and killings without punishment.
In 19911, for example, the local Tadtad and rebel-returnees-turned-CAFGU led a detachment led by Sgt.Gabison of the 26th Infantry Battalion in a sucessful ambush killing of six New People's Army rebels. For leading the ambush, the group eas given P100,000 ($2,500). In his sworn testimony before the provincial trial court, ine of the co-accused, Guillermo Ipamag, an Active Duty CAFGU member and member of the Tadtad gang, referred to this exchange at a meeting with a large group of Tadtaf members, CAFGU, and Militsry men.
"I was informed that the checks or prize for the killing of the NPA rebels were ready encashed and turned over to the Military Brigade in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and... were ready for distribution to us who participated in the killing if these NPAs."
Despite repeated calls by the diocese, local residents, and human rights groups, the Military have chosen not to disarm the group. When asked why the Military have not discharged the CAFGU in Guinoyoran despite their notoriety. Colonel Rodolfo Rocamora completely denied that the CAFGU was responsible for killings and terror in the community. Those responsible were a few whom he said were as "Assets." The "people in the area were satisfied with the CAFGU there," he asserted. If there were any residents carrying arms who were not CAFGU, "they would be arrested and disarmed."
Other Killings by CAFGU and Paramilitart
Numerous other killings in Lourdes and Guinoyoran received little exposure, and some of the CAFGU and. Vigilante members responsible remained at large in January 1992.
The group of CAFGU and Tadtad members accused in Satur's death have also been implicated in numerous killings of local residentdzm Some of the victims were suspected supporters of the NPA. Other victims appeared to be targetted randomly, or because of a personal feud. Residents interviewed by local human rights monitors said they had been forced to provide food to both rebel forces and the local vigilante and CAFGU members since 1988. They said they were afraid to complain to local officials, since they were themselves suspect under the broad brush of the military's counterinsurgency campaign there.
By January 1992, twelve killings by the group had been documented by local human rights groups.
pp35
The Commission on Human Rights regional office
in Cagayan del Oro City estimated that 15 had been killed, but its lawyers had only investigated three of the more recent incidents. In two of the cases, perpetrators had been convicted of murder charges. However, most of the perpetrators are thought to remain armed and at large. Cases for which documentation exists include the following:
-The bodies of Martin Cabusas and Warlito Paraiso were found shot, hacked, and stabbed on March 28, 1987. Family members said the two had been under surveillance of the local CHDF members since they were labeled as NPA by Romeo Abesta, a former rebel turned CHDF, turned CAFGU, who as of January 1992 was in prison for a subsequent murderm
-Felipe Camarillo, a farmer in the community of Magsal, in the village of Guinoyoran, was shot to death on December 7, 1988. The killers were believed to be Tadtad members from the village of Lourdes.
-George Bahian, a farmer also in Magsal, was shot and killed and another resident, Francisco Tadiamon was injured on December 30, 1988 by Romeo Abesta, Enrico Domia, and Andrew Largo, all Tadtad and concurrent CAFGU members under Datu Bantu Domia. After the shooting, the flesh of Bahia's thighs and legs were sliced off.
Sabeniano Borres, a farmer and Church worker in the village of Cawasan was shot on Febuary 3, 1989, while standing in front of the market. The assailants were members of the CHDF who suspected Borres as an NPA supporter. One suspect, the CAFGU member Romeo Abesta, turned himself in and was sentenced to six years in prison.
-Joel Eras, a farmer, was shot to death in Magsal on October 15, 1990, allegedly by CAFGU members identified as Judy Gamayon and one known only as Lito. The motive was unclear. The case was investigated by the CHR but was later closed without explanation.
Juliana Tadiamon- a resident of the village of Magsal, was shot and killed when her house was sprayed with bullets on November 22, 1990. Tadiamon was married to a farmer suspected of being an NPA. Witnesses refused to testify to local authorites because of fear of reprisals.
-Nasario Burlas, was shot and killed by a cousin of Romeo Abesta's, another CAFGU member known as "Boyet" Abesta, on Januart 13, 1991. The motive is unclear, although local human rights groups said Burias was suspected as an NPA. Abesta is still at large and the family has not bought charges. Two months later, he was implicated in a shooting of a young woman and a girl in the village of Magsal. The family did not file charges.
pp36
(Synopsis)
Showing posts with label 30IB. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 30IB. Show all posts
Monday, November 21, 2011
Thursday, November 17, 2011
NPA Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part XII: Once Again, the Zapanta Valley Goes Up in Flames
In my entry, "NPA Armed Contacts for the Second Quarter of 2011, Part VI," I discussed the sad predicament of a band of Mamanwa Tribesmen that had somehow made their way to Surigao City, in Surigao del Norte Province in June of 2011, where they had ended up living under a set of huge blue plastic tarps that had been rendered into a gigantic tent in that city's Barangay Luna. The Mamanwa are Negritos and as such constitute the poorest of the poor on Mindanao. This particular band, under the leadership of Datu Rolando "Lando" Anlagan, also known as "Datu Mahuribok," had encamped on a private lot in Sitio Bacud that had been generously donated by Provincial Councilor Leonilo Aldonza.
Likewise, I covered the tribe's happy return to their homes in the adjacent province of Agusan del Norte, on June 26th. Happy to return to their modest thatched homes where they eeked out a hardscrabble existence in the municipality of Kitcharao. Their small settlement in the Zapanta Valley's Sitio Mahaba, in the upland barangay of Bangayan was shared with Manobo Tribesmen and a tiny minority of Bisaya, Cebuano-speakers, most of whom had inter-married into both tribes. Though the Manobo and Mamanwa tended separate communal plots the community was bereft of any ethnic communal strife with the biggest worry being wild boars who would uproot their crops of dry rice, corn, and ginger...that is until the Armed Forces of the Philippines classified their valley as an NPA Sentro de Grabidad, or Centre of Gravity.
As I have explained in other posts, the phrase "Centre of Gravity" is a generic term that denotes an oppositional force's strongest sector, the geographical in which the opposition, in this case the NPA, holds the strongest amount of influence and finds most of its support. In another recent NPA entry, "NPA Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter, Part XI," I discuss the NPA's methodology of first conquering a small area at a provincial border nexus, and how it uses that border convergence to outwit both the PNP and AFP (Philippine National Police and Armed Forces of the Philippines) by simply basing themselves on one side of a border and attacking across the provincial line. So it is for this far end of the NPA's Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee, or NEMRC.
As true as that is, the Zapanta Valley is far from a Centre of Gravity. It is only within the last six months that the single NPA Front operating on both sides of the Agusan del Norte and Surigao del Norte provincial borders, Front 19A, has re-emerged after nearly a year long hiatus during which the AFP's 4ID (Infantry Division) declared the entire province of Surigao del Norte to be "pacified." Indeed, even as the former Division Commander, Major General Mario Chang, was making that asinine claim, his 30IB (Infantry Battalion) was using the Zapanta Valley as its personal punching bag.
The "Pacification" was declared in the Spring of 2010. In June of that same year the 30IB launched a massive push on that provincial border, aimed at curtailing Front activities in and around the municipality of Kitcharao.
Then, in 2011, the 30IB did this again in May, as noted in that aforementioned Second Quarter entry, and then once again at the end of August, and now once again beginning on November 6th. On the day in question, at 10AM, villagers were startled as 105MM Howitzer shells began pockmarking the ground around their tiny settlement. By the end of the second Howitzer salvo a pair of MG520 helicopter gunships were showering the valley's heavily wooded slopes with 70MM rockets, seven per salvo. The 2.75 inch shells ripped apart everything they touched and while they failed to connect with a single NPA guerilla, they did manage to ruin the Abaca (Manila Hemp) crops of several Manobo families in the village.
As the copters began emptying their 250 round 50 caliber guns the villagers once again packed their most important possessions and began running for their lives. As distraught tribesmen jogged down the rutted dirt trail that serves as the only conduit into and out of the Zapanta Valley, they passed 6 x 6 trucks full of Scout Rangers from the 5th and 6th Companies who were spearheading the ground portion of the operation. This time the 30IB was relegated to flag waving at checkpoints established in the more populated environs of that same barangay, Bangayan, and another in the adjacent barangay of Mara-iging, as if the NPA would now drive out of the Zapanta Valley on the region's single road.
In any event, the PNP also took part in this shindig with the two Public Safety Companies* from PRO-13, or Police Regional Office for Region #13, establishing secondary blocking forces and checkpoints in Barangays Haliobong and Kanaway, which were closer to the town proper on National Hiway, as well as in the municipality of Tubay, an alternative route for anyone lucky enough to have made their way out onto the hiway (*Public Safety Companies, or PSCs, are simply the modernised Philippine Constabulary. When the Constabulary, or PC was de-mobilised, many PC companies were converted into PMGs, or Police Mobile Groups. At the end of 2009 the PNP Director General re-named them "Public Safety Companies" to negate a lot of the baggage associated with their history as counterinsurgency tools).
Back in Zapanta Valley the 6 x 6 trucks disgorged their passengers. The 6th Company, under Lieutenants Marco and Sara-sara was tasked with clearing Sitio Mahaba . At 1115AM they walked into an NPA ambush in which three soldiers were critically wounded:
1) Private First Class (Pfc.) Josel P.Sedrome
2) Pfc.Henry M.Simba
3) Corporal Mabel Sacay
After the NPA broke contact and withdrew the 6th Company set up a security perimeter as they awaited the lone Huey (UH-H1 helicopter) to Medivac the three wounded men to Camp Bancasi, the 4ID annex camp in Butuan City.
The 5th Company meanwhile, under Captain Cimini, began clearing the Mamanwa portion of the valley, Sitio Maribuhok, and were ambushed by a second NPA detachment. The Company Commander, Captain Mark Steve T.Cimini was wounded straight away while one of his men, Pfc.Ninoto C.Gulani was killed. At just before 1130AM both MG520s broke off and headed back to Camp Bancasi for refueling, only to return with the HUEY at just before 1PM. Captain Cimini and the body of Pfc.Gulani were evacuated back to Butuan as both companies of Scout Rangers continued clearing the valley without resistance.
As of today, November 17th, 2011, the push is still taking place. The AFP has killed ZERO, wounded ZERO, and captured ZERO guerillas, ZERO camps, and has otherwise failed to make one iota of progress. The only thing this third major operation in six months has managed to do is create a recruitment pool FOR the NPA. Amazingly, indeed, stupefyingly, the 30IB admits to "Hamletting" the valley. For those unfamiliar with the term, it involves a tight military cordon around a designated settlement. Nothing moves in or out of the cordon without explicit authorisation of the military hierarchy in that particular sector.
When I was in school we were taught that the British perfected the method during the Malayan Emergency of the late 1950s and early 1960s when dealing with the primarily ethnic Chinese Maoist insurgency. In reality the methodology is as old as warfare. In fact, in that very same sector the Americans were Hamletting villages both during the "Insurrecto Insurgency" as well as the so called "Colorum Insurgency," both of which caused heavy fighting in those first years of the 20th Century. The AFP's current protocol revolves around heavy-handed census taking under the guise of its PDT, or Peace and Development Teams. In the case of Hamletted settlements the census includes all food and possessions. Every kilogram of rice must be accounted for. Villagers can only work their fields at certain times of day and there is a 10PM to 6AM curfew. The AFP uses this protocol often enough but to my knowledge has never publicly admitted it until now.
Likewise, I covered the tribe's happy return to their homes in the adjacent province of Agusan del Norte, on June 26th. Happy to return to their modest thatched homes where they eeked out a hardscrabble existence in the municipality of Kitcharao. Their small settlement in the Zapanta Valley's Sitio Mahaba, in the upland barangay of Bangayan was shared with Manobo Tribesmen and a tiny minority of Bisaya, Cebuano-speakers, most of whom had inter-married into both tribes. Though the Manobo and Mamanwa tended separate communal plots the community was bereft of any ethnic communal strife with the biggest worry being wild boars who would uproot their crops of dry rice, corn, and ginger...that is until the Armed Forces of the Philippines classified their valley as an NPA Sentro de Grabidad, or Centre of Gravity.
As I have explained in other posts, the phrase "Centre of Gravity" is a generic term that denotes an oppositional force's strongest sector, the geographical in which the opposition, in this case the NPA, holds the strongest amount of influence and finds most of its support. In another recent NPA entry, "NPA Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter, Part XI," I discuss the NPA's methodology of first conquering a small area at a provincial border nexus, and how it uses that border convergence to outwit both the PNP and AFP (Philippine National Police and Armed Forces of the Philippines) by simply basing themselves on one side of a border and attacking across the provincial line. So it is for this far end of the NPA's Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee, or NEMRC.
As true as that is, the Zapanta Valley is far from a Centre of Gravity. It is only within the last six months that the single NPA Front operating on both sides of the Agusan del Norte and Surigao del Norte provincial borders, Front 19A, has re-emerged after nearly a year long hiatus during which the AFP's 4ID (Infantry Division) declared the entire province of Surigao del Norte to be "pacified." Indeed, even as the former Division Commander, Major General Mario Chang, was making that asinine claim, his 30IB (Infantry Battalion) was using the Zapanta Valley as its personal punching bag.
The "Pacification" was declared in the Spring of 2010. In June of that same year the 30IB launched a massive push on that provincial border, aimed at curtailing Front activities in and around the municipality of Kitcharao.
Then, in 2011, the 30IB did this again in May, as noted in that aforementioned Second Quarter entry, and then once again at the end of August, and now once again beginning on November 6th. On the day in question, at 10AM, villagers were startled as 105MM Howitzer shells began pockmarking the ground around their tiny settlement. By the end of the second Howitzer salvo a pair of MG520 helicopter gunships were showering the valley's heavily wooded slopes with 70MM rockets, seven per salvo. The 2.75 inch shells ripped apart everything they touched and while they failed to connect with a single NPA guerilla, they did manage to ruin the Abaca (Manila Hemp) crops of several Manobo families in the village.
As the copters began emptying their 250 round 50 caliber guns the villagers once again packed their most important possessions and began running for their lives. As distraught tribesmen jogged down the rutted dirt trail that serves as the only conduit into and out of the Zapanta Valley, they passed 6 x 6 trucks full of Scout Rangers from the 5th and 6th Companies who were spearheading the ground portion of the operation. This time the 30IB was relegated to flag waving at checkpoints established in the more populated environs of that same barangay, Bangayan, and another in the adjacent barangay of Mara-iging, as if the NPA would now drive out of the Zapanta Valley on the region's single road.
In any event, the PNP also took part in this shindig with the two Public Safety Companies* from PRO-13, or Police Regional Office for Region #13, establishing secondary blocking forces and checkpoints in Barangays Haliobong and Kanaway, which were closer to the town proper on National Hiway, as well as in the municipality of Tubay, an alternative route for anyone lucky enough to have made their way out onto the hiway (*Public Safety Companies, or PSCs, are simply the modernised Philippine Constabulary. When the Constabulary, or PC was de-mobilised, many PC companies were converted into PMGs, or Police Mobile Groups. At the end of 2009 the PNP Director General re-named them "Public Safety Companies" to negate a lot of the baggage associated with their history as counterinsurgency tools).
Back in Zapanta Valley the 6 x 6 trucks disgorged their passengers. The 6th Company, under Lieutenants Marco and Sara-sara was tasked with clearing Sitio Mahaba . At 1115AM they walked into an NPA ambush in which three soldiers were critically wounded:
1) Private First Class (Pfc.) Josel P.Sedrome
2) Pfc.Henry M.Simba
3) Corporal Mabel Sacay
After the NPA broke contact and withdrew the 6th Company set up a security perimeter as they awaited the lone Huey (UH-H1 helicopter) to Medivac the three wounded men to Camp Bancasi, the 4ID annex camp in Butuan City.
The 5th Company meanwhile, under Captain Cimini, began clearing the Mamanwa portion of the valley, Sitio Maribuhok, and were ambushed by a second NPA detachment. The Company Commander, Captain Mark Steve T.Cimini was wounded straight away while one of his men, Pfc.Ninoto C.Gulani was killed. At just before 1130AM both MG520s broke off and headed back to Camp Bancasi for refueling, only to return with the HUEY at just before 1PM. Captain Cimini and the body of Pfc.Gulani were evacuated back to Butuan as both companies of Scout Rangers continued clearing the valley without resistance.
As of today, November 17th, 2011, the push is still taking place. The AFP has killed ZERO, wounded ZERO, and captured ZERO guerillas, ZERO camps, and has otherwise failed to make one iota of progress. The only thing this third major operation in six months has managed to do is create a recruitment pool FOR the NPA. Amazingly, indeed, stupefyingly, the 30IB admits to "Hamletting" the valley. For those unfamiliar with the term, it involves a tight military cordon around a designated settlement. Nothing moves in or out of the cordon without explicit authorisation of the military hierarchy in that particular sector.
When I was in school we were taught that the British perfected the method during the Malayan Emergency of the late 1950s and early 1960s when dealing with the primarily ethnic Chinese Maoist insurgency. In reality the methodology is as old as warfare. In fact, in that very same sector the Americans were Hamletting villages both during the "Insurrecto Insurgency" as well as the so called "Colorum Insurgency," both of which caused heavy fighting in those first years of the 20th Century. The AFP's current protocol revolves around heavy-handed census taking under the guise of its PDT, or Peace and Development Teams. In the case of Hamletted settlements the census includes all food and possessions. Every kilogram of rice must be accounted for. Villagers can only work their fields at certain times of day and there is a 10PM to 6AM curfew. The AFP uses this protocol often enough but to my knowledge has never publicly admitted it until now.
Monday, June 27, 2011
NPA Armed Contacts for the Second Quarter of 2011, Part VI: A Resurgence in Surigao del Norte Province
As I have noted in other recent NPA entries the island of Mindanao has 4 provinces that have been officially pacified:
1) Misamis Oriental
2) Camiguin
3) Dinagat
4) Surigao del Norte
Being declared as such doesn't depend upon any type of established protocol. It is an entirely arbitrary decision made by the nearest ID CO (Infantry Division Commanding Officer). Upon making his decision the CO will formally turn over command and control of counterinsurgency operations to the Provincial Peace and Order Committee, or PPOC. From then on it is the PPO,or Provincial Police Office of the PNP (Philippine National Police) that handles the day to day aspects of what is supposed to be, at that point,a policing operation. Surigao del Norte Province was declared insurgency free in mid-April of 2010 along with the other 3 provinces, all of which lie within the AOR (Area of Responsibilty) of the 4ID (4th Infantry Division). Less than 2 weeks later, as if to thumb its nose at 4ID's then CO (Commanding Officer), Major General Mario Chan, the NPA disarmed a large security contingent escorting a campaigning incumbent mayor and absconded with all the weaponry. As I noted in my entry then, "Famous last words."
Since then the NPA's Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee under NDFP Spokesperson for Mindanao, Jorge "Ka Oris" Madlos, made a strategical decision to marshall its firepower in the more valuable Andap Valley Complex on the Surigao del Sur and Agusan del Sur provincial nexus. Though Surigao del Norte has a bit of chromite and nickel mining it pales in comparison to the gold and timber in Andap. Mining and Logging are two of the major cash cows of the NPA. Multi-national gold mines pay on average P1 Million ($22,000) a month in "Revolutionary Taxes." Everyone from the independent small scale miner to the person owning the ball mill offers up a percentage of their gross to avoid any problems, small trifling things, like a bullet in the face.
The modus operandi of the NPA is extremely basic Maoist in strategy and tactics as well as ideology. Strategically they ebb and flow, gravitating towards the weakest point as long as they have even a minimum base of support. This is why the NPA will ALWAYS break off contact if given the chance, which of course the AFP is always happy to provide. This allows the NPA to determine whether or not it will be unable to meet its well defined tactical objective within 15 to 30 minutes of launching an assault. If not, there is no sense in wasting valuable resources, withdraw, regroup, and live to try another day. With the province having been de-militarised it was only a matter of time before the NPA gravitated back into the province.
In early May of 2011 the NPA's Front 19A of the Northeast Mindanao Regional Commitee (NEMRC) began building momentum in a sector of Agusan del Norte Province very near the Surigao del Norte border, moving through a 50 kilometer radius, centered in Agusan del Norte Province's Zapanta Valley. On May 12th, thirty guerillas from Front 19A infiltrated Surigao City, the capitol of Surigao del Norte Province, via watercraft that landed in Barangay Silop. Moving inland they entered Barangay Luna and just before 10PM entered an unattended quarry. The night watchman, Pastor Apostado Quiban only makes periodic checks most nights. Targeting a Komatsu excavator, a TCM payloader, and an Isuzu dumptruck the guerillas poured gasoline over each piece. The owner of the equipment, Enrique Baguio,had refused to pay his "Revolutionary Taxes" despite recently gaining work as a subcontractor for Tinio Construction. Tinio in turn is a subcontractor for the Gaisano Capitol Group which is constructing a new mall, the Gaisano Capitol in that same barangay, Luna. Mr.Baguio's equipment is employed in excavating sand and gravel for the job. Lighting the gasoline the guerillas quickly exited the quarry and re-traced their route to the shore and left as they had arrived.
On May 25th the same thirty Front 19A guerillas re-entered the city and rendevouzed with a detachment of ten guerillas who had crossed overland by stolen truck. The guerillas quickly removed two dozen tyres from the vehicle and set them in a line across National Hiway in Barangay Bonifacio at two separate positions. Pouring gasoline over them the guerillas then set them on fire just as the sun began setting.Quickly moving they surrounded a compound in between the two burning roadblocks as six men entered through its open gates. Kicking in the frontdoor of Chary T.Mangacop's home, ex-Mayor of Placer in Surigao del Norte Province, they began ransacking the dwelling from top to bottom. Capturing three M16s and one 45 caliber pistol, two bulletproof vests, two ICOM base radios and four ICOM handhelds they then exited the home. Shooting out the left front tyre of Mangacop's SUV they then doused his minivan, straight truck, backhoe and two dumptrucks with gasoline which they then set on fire before exiting the compound and making their way to the shore for an escape by sea.
Mangacop, who was defeated in the May 10th, 2010 Election, claims that the guerillas also stole jewlery and a significant amount of cash. He says the cash was to be used as payroll for a mine he owns in Placer. The burned equipment belonged to his company, CTM Construction. The attack on the Mangacop compound was the second to strike Surigao City in two weeks. Knowing that the NPA element responsible, Front 19A was momentarily centered in the municipality of Kitcharao in neighbouring Agusan del Norte Province, the AFP's (Armed Forces of the Philippines) 30IB (Infantry Battalion) undertook a heavy push into Kitcharao. In fact, the 30IB had been operating in Kitcharao for two days already, even losing a soldier by sniper the afternoon before, or so says the NPA. Now deploying heavily and concentrating on the remote Barangay Bangayan in the Zapanta Valley, the operation commenced just 12 hours after the guerillas left the Mangacop compound. The 30IB began by softening up the ground with several hours of 81MM mortar shelling into the valley.
Of course Front 19A's main force hadn't been able to return to Kitcharao in the interim since its attack the preceding evening. There were 40 odd kilometers between the points but that didn't occur to the 30IB or its overlords in the 4ID (Infantry Division) which signed off on this large operation. So what were those long 81MM mortar shells hitting if there were no NPA guerillas?
The Zapanta Valley is home to a small band of Mamanwa Tribesmen. The Mamanwa are Negritos. Unlike the Lumad, the various Animist Tribes of Malay stock, the Negritos on Mindanao do not involve themselves in conflict in any part of the equation. In fear for their lives the Mamanwa fled to the barangay hall down hill but still they weren't out of the crosshairs. By the end of the month members of multi-sectoral front organisations like the two partist organisations Gabriela and Bayan Muna convinced the Mamanwa to travel 40 odd kilometers into Surigao City where they assured them they would be safe from harm.
In Surigao City's Barangay Luna, in Sitio Bacud, Bayan Muna representatives, assisted by the provincial chapter of the Rotary Club co-ordinated the IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons, a euphanism for "Refugees") arrival with Provincial Board member Leonilo Aldonza who donated the usage of an empty lot he owns. Quickly volunteers erected a tent city and so when the 147 members of thirty-seven Mamanwa families arrived they were able to move right in.
From their arrival on June 1st there was mounting tension between the IDP's supporters and detractors. Among the detractors were the city's Mayor, Enrique Matugas, and such community pillars as the Chairman of the local Chamber of Commerce. Some had the audacity to suggest that the Mamanwa weren't IDPs at all but rather actors in a psychodrama engineered by the aforementioned party list organisations. The Mayor was livid that he hadn't been consulted but unfortunately for him he didn't need to be apprised of anything. The IDPs were staying on a privately owned lot with the owner's full consent.
On June 10th, CAA Isidro L.Sanches was enjoying himself at a cockpit in Barangay Camamonan's Sitio Buya in the municipality of Gigaquit, in Surigao del Norte Province. As Sanches left the cock fight though, five guerillas from Front 16A of the NEMRC approached him and shot him to death with a 45 caliber pistol. CAAs,or Civilian Active Auxiliaries, are men serving in one of four entities that are themselves collectively known as "CAAs" as well. In Mr.Sanches' case he served with the CAFGU, or Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit. CAFGU platoons serve under an AFP NCO (Non-Commissioned Officer), known as a "CAFGU Cadre." Ostensibly under direct supervision of a cadre battalion, in this case the 23IB, in reality they aren't supervised all that much. The CAA serves as the lynchpin in the AFP's counterinsugency strategy.
On June 15th, the 30IB was on patrol in the municipality of Gigaquit's Barangay Lahi, when it stumbled upon six NPA guerillas from Front 16A of the NEMRC and initiated a firefight before allowing the small detachment of NPA to withdraw without casualties.
Later that same day, June 15th, in Surigao City's Barangay Poctoy two of the AFP's KM450 trucks carrying nine soldiers, all from the 30IB en route to a patrol in Barangay Mat-i, were ambushed by IED (Improvised Explosive Device, as in "bomb") which was followed by a cross-fire. The AFP returned fire with the Front 19A guerillas withdrawing without casualties on either side after 15 minutes.
On June 20th everybody's favorite rabid anti-Communist, ANAD Party List Congressman Pastor Jun Alcover jumped into the mix with a letter to CHR (Commission on Human Rights) Commissioner Etta Rosales urging her to"investigate" the IDPs ending up in Surigao City saying that the Government should determine who "forced" the Negritos to travel 40 kilometers into the city. His inference of course is that fellow Party List organisations Bayan Muna and Gabriela should be held liable. Pray tell, does Alcover plan to crucify the Rotary Club as well? For those unfamiliar with that organisation, they are an American-based group that is about Right Wing as it gets. On the same day the 30IB deployed a 6 X 6 truck to the lot housing the IDPs. When questioned on his intentions the 30IB's CO (Commanding Officer) LTC. (Lieutenant Colonel) Rommel P.Lamzon said that his men were only there to serve the terrified tribesmen and vehemently denied any suggestions that he had sent men in full combat array to try and force the 147 shell shocked Mamnwa back across the provincial border.
My favorite LTC.Lamzon quote has got to be his response to claims by the Negritos that his men had been lobbing 81MM mortar rounds into the Mamanwa's thatched huts. What did our gallant Lieutenant Colonel reply? "We always ensure that in all of our operations no civilians will be hurt or worse,k illed. "That's fantastic! The AFP is the only military in history to never incur Collateral Damage! My thought? The AFP is so used to lying through its teeth that the bullshi* just flows naturally. Even if the AFP had GPS mortars, and it does NOT, shells go errant. It is a fact of life. Launching mortars into a village of thatched huts where you haven't deployed spotters or scouts borders on a War Crime but hey, in the Southern Philippines that is a daily occurrence. Remember, this is a world where the AFP claims 6 year old girls carry M16s with grenade launchers, after killing the child of course.
On June 22nd the IDPs climbed aboard 3 dumptrucks and were driven home to Kitcharao, led by their tribal chief, Datu Rolando "Lando" Anlagan whose actual tribal name is "Maribuhok." Finally home in the Zapanta Valley the chief appealed to both the AFP and the NPA and asked them, politely, to take their war elsewhere.
1) Misamis Oriental
2) Camiguin
3) Dinagat
4) Surigao del Norte
Being declared as such doesn't depend upon any type of established protocol. It is an entirely arbitrary decision made by the nearest ID CO (Infantry Division Commanding Officer). Upon making his decision the CO will formally turn over command and control of counterinsurgency operations to the Provincial Peace and Order Committee, or PPOC. From then on it is the PPO,or Provincial Police Office of the PNP (Philippine National Police) that handles the day to day aspects of what is supposed to be, at that point,a policing operation. Surigao del Norte Province was declared insurgency free in mid-April of 2010 along with the other 3 provinces, all of which lie within the AOR (Area of Responsibilty) of the 4ID (4th Infantry Division). Less than 2 weeks later, as if to thumb its nose at 4ID's then CO (Commanding Officer), Major General Mario Chan, the NPA disarmed a large security contingent escorting a campaigning incumbent mayor and absconded with all the weaponry. As I noted in my entry then, "Famous last words."
Since then the NPA's Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee under NDFP Spokesperson for Mindanao, Jorge "Ka Oris" Madlos, made a strategical decision to marshall its firepower in the more valuable Andap Valley Complex on the Surigao del Sur and Agusan del Sur provincial nexus. Though Surigao del Norte has a bit of chromite and nickel mining it pales in comparison to the gold and timber in Andap. Mining and Logging are two of the major cash cows of the NPA. Multi-national gold mines pay on average P1 Million ($22,000) a month in "Revolutionary Taxes." Everyone from the independent small scale miner to the person owning the ball mill offers up a percentage of their gross to avoid any problems, small trifling things, like a bullet in the face.
The modus operandi of the NPA is extremely basic Maoist in strategy and tactics as well as ideology. Strategically they ebb and flow, gravitating towards the weakest point as long as they have even a minimum base of support. This is why the NPA will ALWAYS break off contact if given the chance, which of course the AFP is always happy to provide. This allows the NPA to determine whether or not it will be unable to meet its well defined tactical objective within 15 to 30 minutes of launching an assault. If not, there is no sense in wasting valuable resources, withdraw, regroup, and live to try another day. With the province having been de-militarised it was only a matter of time before the NPA gravitated back into the province.
In early May of 2011 the NPA's Front 19A of the Northeast Mindanao Regional Commitee (NEMRC) began building momentum in a sector of Agusan del Norte Province very near the Surigao del Norte border, moving through a 50 kilometer radius, centered in Agusan del Norte Province's Zapanta Valley. On May 12th, thirty guerillas from Front 19A infiltrated Surigao City, the capitol of Surigao del Norte Province, via watercraft that landed in Barangay Silop. Moving inland they entered Barangay Luna and just before 10PM entered an unattended quarry. The night watchman, Pastor Apostado Quiban only makes periodic checks most nights. Targeting a Komatsu excavator, a TCM payloader, and an Isuzu dumptruck the guerillas poured gasoline over each piece. The owner of the equipment, Enrique Baguio,had refused to pay his "Revolutionary Taxes" despite recently gaining work as a subcontractor for Tinio Construction. Tinio in turn is a subcontractor for the Gaisano Capitol Group which is constructing a new mall, the Gaisano Capitol in that same barangay, Luna. Mr.Baguio's equipment is employed in excavating sand and gravel for the job. Lighting the gasoline the guerillas quickly exited the quarry and re-traced their route to the shore and left as they had arrived.
On May 25th the same thirty Front 19A guerillas re-entered the city and rendevouzed with a detachment of ten guerillas who had crossed overland by stolen truck. The guerillas quickly removed two dozen tyres from the vehicle and set them in a line across National Hiway in Barangay Bonifacio at two separate positions. Pouring gasoline over them the guerillas then set them on fire just as the sun began setting.Quickly moving they surrounded a compound in between the two burning roadblocks as six men entered through its open gates. Kicking in the frontdoor of Chary T.Mangacop's home, ex-Mayor of Placer in Surigao del Norte Province, they began ransacking the dwelling from top to bottom. Capturing three M16s and one 45 caliber pistol, two bulletproof vests, two ICOM base radios and four ICOM handhelds they then exited the home. Shooting out the left front tyre of Mangacop's SUV they then doused his minivan, straight truck, backhoe and two dumptrucks with gasoline which they then set on fire before exiting the compound and making their way to the shore for an escape by sea.
Mangacop, who was defeated in the May 10th, 2010 Election, claims that the guerillas also stole jewlery and a significant amount of cash. He says the cash was to be used as payroll for a mine he owns in Placer. The burned equipment belonged to his company, CTM Construction. The attack on the Mangacop compound was the second to strike Surigao City in two weeks. Knowing that the NPA element responsible, Front 19A was momentarily centered in the municipality of Kitcharao in neighbouring Agusan del Norte Province, the AFP's (Armed Forces of the Philippines) 30IB (Infantry Battalion) undertook a heavy push into Kitcharao. In fact, the 30IB had been operating in Kitcharao for two days already, even losing a soldier by sniper the afternoon before, or so says the NPA. Now deploying heavily and concentrating on the remote Barangay Bangayan in the Zapanta Valley, the operation commenced just 12 hours after the guerillas left the Mangacop compound. The 30IB began by softening up the ground with several hours of 81MM mortar shelling into the valley.
Of course Front 19A's main force hadn't been able to return to Kitcharao in the interim since its attack the preceding evening. There were 40 odd kilometers between the points but that didn't occur to the 30IB or its overlords in the 4ID (Infantry Division) which signed off on this large operation. So what were those long 81MM mortar shells hitting if there were no NPA guerillas?
The Zapanta Valley is home to a small band of Mamanwa Tribesmen. The Mamanwa are Negritos. Unlike the Lumad, the various Animist Tribes of Malay stock, the Negritos on Mindanao do not involve themselves in conflict in any part of the equation. In fear for their lives the Mamanwa fled to the barangay hall down hill but still they weren't out of the crosshairs. By the end of the month members of multi-sectoral front organisations like the two partist organisations Gabriela and Bayan Muna convinced the Mamanwa to travel 40 odd kilometers into Surigao City where they assured them they would be safe from harm.
In Surigao City's Barangay Luna, in Sitio Bacud, Bayan Muna representatives, assisted by the provincial chapter of the Rotary Club co-ordinated the IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons, a euphanism for "Refugees") arrival with Provincial Board member Leonilo Aldonza who donated the usage of an empty lot he owns. Quickly volunteers erected a tent city and so when the 147 members of thirty-seven Mamanwa families arrived they were able to move right in.
From their arrival on June 1st there was mounting tension between the IDP's supporters and detractors. Among the detractors were the city's Mayor, Enrique Matugas, and such community pillars as the Chairman of the local Chamber of Commerce. Some had the audacity to suggest that the Mamanwa weren't IDPs at all but rather actors in a psychodrama engineered by the aforementioned party list organisations. The Mayor was livid that he hadn't been consulted but unfortunately for him he didn't need to be apprised of anything. The IDPs were staying on a privately owned lot with the owner's full consent.
On June 10th, CAA Isidro L.Sanches was enjoying himself at a cockpit in Barangay Camamonan's Sitio Buya in the municipality of Gigaquit, in Surigao del Norte Province. As Sanches left the cock fight though, five guerillas from Front 16A of the NEMRC approached him and shot him to death with a 45 caliber pistol. CAAs,or Civilian Active Auxiliaries, are men serving in one of four entities that are themselves collectively known as "CAAs" as well. In Mr.Sanches' case he served with the CAFGU, or Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit. CAFGU platoons serve under an AFP NCO (Non-Commissioned Officer), known as a "CAFGU Cadre." Ostensibly under direct supervision of a cadre battalion, in this case the 23IB, in reality they aren't supervised all that much. The CAA serves as the lynchpin in the AFP's counterinsugency strategy.
On June 15th, the 30IB was on patrol in the municipality of Gigaquit's Barangay Lahi, when it stumbled upon six NPA guerillas from Front 16A of the NEMRC and initiated a firefight before allowing the small detachment of NPA to withdraw without casualties.
Later that same day, June 15th, in Surigao City's Barangay Poctoy two of the AFP's KM450 trucks carrying nine soldiers, all from the 30IB en route to a patrol in Barangay Mat-i, were ambushed by IED (Improvised Explosive Device, as in "bomb") which was followed by a cross-fire. The AFP returned fire with the Front 19A guerillas withdrawing without casualties on either side after 15 minutes.
On June 20th everybody's favorite rabid anti-Communist, ANAD Party List Congressman Pastor Jun Alcover jumped into the mix with a letter to CHR (Commission on Human Rights) Commissioner Etta Rosales urging her to"investigate" the IDPs ending up in Surigao City saying that the Government should determine who "forced" the Negritos to travel 40 kilometers into the city. His inference of course is that fellow Party List organisations Bayan Muna and Gabriela should be held liable. Pray tell, does Alcover plan to crucify the Rotary Club as well? For those unfamiliar with that organisation, they are an American-based group that is about Right Wing as it gets. On the same day the 30IB deployed a 6 X 6 truck to the lot housing the IDPs. When questioned on his intentions the 30IB's CO (Commanding Officer) LTC. (Lieutenant Colonel) Rommel P.Lamzon said that his men were only there to serve the terrified tribesmen and vehemently denied any suggestions that he had sent men in full combat array to try and force the 147 shell shocked Mamnwa back across the provincial border.
My favorite LTC.Lamzon quote has got to be his response to claims by the Negritos that his men had been lobbing 81MM mortar rounds into the Mamanwa's thatched huts. What did our gallant Lieutenant Colonel reply? "We always ensure that in all of our operations no civilians will be hurt or worse,k illed. "That's fantastic! The AFP is the only military in history to never incur Collateral Damage! My thought? The AFP is so used to lying through its teeth that the bullshi* just flows naturally. Even if the AFP had GPS mortars, and it does NOT, shells go errant. It is a fact of life. Launching mortars into a village of thatched huts where you haven't deployed spotters or scouts borders on a War Crime but hey, in the Southern Philippines that is a daily occurrence. Remember, this is a world where the AFP claims 6 year old girls carry M16s with grenade launchers, after killing the child of course.
On June 22nd the IDPs climbed aboard 3 dumptrucks and were driven home to Kitcharao, led by their tribal chief, Datu Rolando "Lando" Anlagan whose actual tribal name is "Maribuhok." Finally home in the Zapanta Valley the chief appealed to both the AFP and the NPA and asked them, politely, to take their war elsewhere.
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