NPA Armed Contacts for the First Quarter, Part III: NPA Attacks Two CAA Posts im Davao City

As I have often noted, the NPA's Southern Mindanao Regional Committee, or SMRC, long ago entered into a marriage of convnience with local warlord Rodrigo "Roddy" Duterte. The son of a fomer governor of what was then the unified province of Davao, the father of current Davao City Mayor Sarah "Inday" Duterte Carpio, a city he himself currently serves as its Vice Mayor. While working as a City Prosecutor there in the mid-1980s, Duterte naturally ran across a good many members of the NPA, and its political wing, the CPP, or Communist Party of the Philippines.

When Roddy decided to run for Mayor at the tail end of that same decade, he utilized one particular relationship with a high ranking member of the NPA in Davao City, Leonicio Pitao, better known by his nom de guerre, "Ka Parago.".The majority of the city's poorest areas had become battlegrounds between the NPA, its urban assaaination element, the SPARU (Special Armed Red Partisan Units), the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) and its ultra-right wing extremist organizations, like Alsa Masa (Masses Arise). In exchange for relegating all NPA activities to three outlying districts of Davao City, Roddy would offer overt assistance in the form of cash, material, and intelligence. That quid pro quo remains in effect today.

Unlike her father, current Mayor Sarah "Inday" Durerte Carpio, has failed to maintain that same mutually beneficial relationship with the NPA. Things began well enough when Mayor Duterte Carpio entered office in June of 2010. Despite serving as a senior officer in the AFP Reserves, Carpio played hardball with the 69IB (Infantry Battalion), threatening to withdraw Davao City's share of financial support for the 69's COIN (Counterinsurgency) program in the city's outlying Paquibato District, one of the three aforementioned districts that her father, current Vice Mayor Rodrigo "Roddy" Duterte had surrendered-for all intensive purposes-to the NPA. Mayor Duterte Carpio was livid over the 69's kinetic operations which, in her absolutely ignorant opinion, were utilized far too freely. In the waning days of OPlan Bantay Laya II, the irate Mayor decided to take a stand...so what if she single handedly reversed six years of AFP gains made in Paquibato, and by relation-since that district is the lynchpin in the NPA occupation of the three contigious districts-all of Davao City.

For Christmas of 2010 Mayor Duterte Carpio accompanied her father, the Vice Mayor, to Ka Parago's (then) main camp, on a forest covered ridge above Paquibato District. As is always the case, Duterte came without his security detachment. That festive occasion would mark the high point in Mayor Duterte's relationship with the NPA. From
there it was a steady decline although Carpio did get some face time with Parago two months later when she once again accompanied her father in another visit to Paquibato. In this latter meeting Duterte stayed outside a villager's hut where Parago, his Political Secretary Ka Benjamin, and Mayor Carpio hashed out each other's wish lists.

February 6th, 2011 an IED (Improvised Explosive Device) set by the NPA's 1st Pulang Bagani Company detonated in an ambush of a supply convoy serving posts manned by the 69IB (Infantry Battalion). Mayor Carpio had been scheduled
to appear at an outreach program later in the day. Pitao took the extraordinary step of personally issuing a statement on the ambush. He pointed out that the detonation occurred in Purok #5, in Paquibato's Barangay Mapula. In conyrast, Mayor Carpio's planned route was many kilometers from the blast site.

The issue that has best defined Mayor Carpio's interaction with the NPA has neen the outcry ovet the 69IB garrisoning a detachment on the grounds of the Paradise Embac Annex Primary School, in Paquibato District's Barangay Paradise Embac. Three City Councilors, Kaloy Bello, Leah Librado Yap and Jimmy Dureza have championed the demand made by residents of the NPA-controlled barangay, asking that the 69IB remove the post from school grounds. At the tail end of the Summer of 2011, the issue came to a head as the NPA mass front organization, Karapatan-which bills itself as a human rights NGO-galvanized a wider ranging response to a clear breech of International Law, courtesy of the AFP. Given her history of speaking out against over-militirization in that very district, Mayor Carpio might have been expected to at least try and assuage the very real concerns of school staff, students, and the families of those students. Instead, in her ever increasingly haughty tone, Mayor Carpio not only sided with the AFP, she arrogantly dismissed the concerns expressed by the aforementioned stakeholders.

At that point the NPA did its part in burning whatever proverbial bridges remained. Taking part in a co-ordinated stance that began in September of 2011, when the NDFP member orgabization SELDA (Samahan ng Ex-Detainees Labann sa Detensyon at Aresto/Task Force on Ex- Political Prisoners) attacked Carpio in the local media over an interview she had given in which she had had the audacity-and ignorance-to claim that all Political Prisoners are detained for actual crimes. Then, in an official statement released by the NPA's Southern Mindanao Regional Committee, or SMRC, accused Mayor Carpio of letting power go to her head (and that was the nicest thing it said). The statement, released in December of 2011, was an iota away from a death warrant, branding Carpio as having "bordered on being a counterrevolutionary or reactionary." In fact, it segued into a vicious tirade against Carpio with a laundry list of critical grievances. It was interesting in other ways because it noted how her father, Vice Mayor Duterte, had "in some ways recognized and cooperated in the revolutionary struggle," an "admission" that seemed even more pronounced once Duterte was officialy named an "Observer," and later a "Consultant" for the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, or NDFP, the negotiating arm of the CPP/NPA/NDFP Maoist triumverate.


So it was that the customary Christmas slash New Years Truce of the NPA failed to usher in anything new. An uneasy air hanging over Paquibato District left many stakeholders nervously awaiting an armed response by Ka Parago. On January 12th, 2012, the tension broke when Parago's 1st Pulang Bagani Company launched two simeltaneous attacks on a pair of CAA posts. The CAA, or Civilian Active Auxiliaries, are a geographically static armed reserve of the AFP. The CAA element most visible to civilians are the CAFGU, or Civilian Auxiliary Forces Geographical Units. CAFGU posts are manned by residents of the barangay housing that specific post. CAFGU posts are then limited in only being able to operate within the boundries of their specific municipality.

In Paquibato District there is a different type of CAA. Usually listed as CAFGU posts. They are actuallt tribal and clan paramilitaries grandfathered in under the now defunct ISP (Internal Security Plan), "Oplan Alsa Lumad" (Operational Plan Hilltribes Arise). Like CAFGUs they are under the nominal command of am AFP cadre, usually a Corporal. Whereas CAFGU opetate in tandem with an AFP cadre battalion, the tribal paramilitaries often operate independently and as one might imagine, this does at times lead to unhealthy excesses.

On the day in question, at 3AM, two CAA posts in adjoining puroks (a barangay can be sub-divided into five puroks), within Paquibato District's Barangay Malabog, were attacked by two NPA elements. The posts, in Puroks Cababon and Golden Shower (no jokes please, it is an actual purok though for the life of me, I have no idea why it was bequathed that name), were both able to repel the Maoists but with two CAAs being wounded in the process.

CAA Loreto Lireta of Purok Golden Shower, was wounded in his left hand and left side of his chest by shrapnel from a rifle grenade. CAA Anthony Camansi of Purok Cabonbon, was wounded in his right hand.

NPA Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part XIII: Front Feliciano Proves it is Not Extinct

The Front Feliciano, Wilson Feliciano Command is the single front of the weakest of the five CPP/NPA Regional Commands on the island, the Western Mindanao Regional Committee, or WMRC. With an AOR, or, Area of Responsibility (as in Area of Operation), controlling most of Misamis Occidental Province, a tiny part of Lanao del Norte Province, and the entire Zamboanga Peninsula with its three provinces:

1) Zamboanga del Norte

2) Zamboanga del Sur

3) Zamboanga Sibugay

and theoretically at least, all the islands south of Mainland Mindanao, in the three provinces of Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi Tawi. Of course, in real life there are no Communists in Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi Tawi Provinces, or, there are, they wisely keep their mouths shut (like Mujiv Hataman but that is another sordid tale).

The single Front is sub-divided into five Section Committees and Commands, known as "SECOMs":

1) Joji, centered on Mount Malindang on the Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga Border

2) Sendong, covering the bulk of the WMRC's AOR in Misamis Occidental Province

3) Kara, covering all of the Zamboanga Peninsula

4) Traka, covering five municipalities in Lanao del Norte Province, closest to the border of the Zamboanga Peninsula, now defunct

5) White, known to AFP and PNP Intelligence as "Special Sub-Section," covers all White Areas within the WMRC's AOR. To the CPP/NPA, and agencies dealing with them, NPA AORs are divided into "White Areas" and "Red Areas." Red covers those areas under which the NPA operates in what, to it, constitutes an ideal environment, rural, firm mass base of support, and a fairly to well developed structure. "White Areas" are primarily urban, and while there is a mass base of support, it isn't geographically contigous as well as it often lingering in the grey netherworld between legal and illegal. White Area Operations are primarily concerned with urban Revolutionary Taxes (i.e. "Extortion") and SPARU Operations. "SPARUs," or Special Armed Partisan Units, are the NPA assassination teams that publicly execute informers, defectors, and other targets of retribution. The term is often misstated as "Sparrow," as in the bird. This SECOM is likewise defunct. Aside from the AOR not being powerful enough to make such public "examples," its Secretary, or, commander, was taken down at the end of 2008 after being inactive since 2006.

WMRC has fallen quite a few pegs from its formerly self assured slot as the third most powerful of the Regional Committees. Although the CPP/NPA first arrived on Mindanao before Martial Law was declared at the end of 1972, it wasn't until 1977 that the cadres began migrating out of the two cities in which the movement originally landed, Davao City and Cagayan del Oro City. By that time, only Davao City remained active. That year, the movement began expanding northward out of Davao City at an exponential rate. It thrust upwards into the southern reaches of the Caraga Region, and in 1979, finally settled in North Cotabato Province. North Cotabato's demographical divide of Muslim and non-Muslim runs more or less along the borders of that province's First and Second Congressional Districts. The Second District is the region in which the Ilonggo and other Chrsitian Filipino tribes and ethnicities hold sway.

Christianity, especially Catholicism, came under the Leftist orbit in the early 1960s, and by 1979, Liberation Theology had taken control of the Catholic Church, and to a slightly lesser extent, leading Protestant Denominations within that general area as well. There was no parallel liberalisation anywhere in the Islamic World, least of all in Central Mindanao. Yet, in communities where Christians and Muslims co-existed, the CPP/NPA made moderate gains with Muslims. The now extinct Central Mindanao Committee of the CPP/NPA had a significant Muslim minority within its ranks, and not long after,the Western Mindanao Committee (now the WMRC) could claim the samething.

With the physical, and then ideological purges that stressed the CPP/NPA on Mindanao (and later, nationwide), from 1983 to 1994, that minority would all but disappear. Whatever Muslim cadres remained active almost all jumped ship to the RPM-P/RPA (Rebolusyonaryong Partido Manggagawa-Pilipinas, aka, Worker's Party of the Philippines, and its military wing, the Revolutionary Proletariat Army, or RPA), later known as the RPM-M/RPA, after the organisation broke with the mother organisation over disagreements over the RMP-P's 1999 engagement of the Estrada Government in a Peace Process.

With the RPM-P, the Central Mindanao Committee ceased functioning. Its remaining cadres, and there weren't many, joined the Northern Mindanao Comittee which was then remade into the Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee, or NCMRC, and the Northeast Mindanao Regional Commiittee, or NEMRC. The Muslim cadres ended up in NCMRC, which absolutely vacated Central Mindanao in concentrating on Misamis Oriental and Bukidnon Provinces (its AOR also includes slivers of Agusan del Sur, Agusan del Norte, and Misamis Occidental Provinces). Muslim cadres were so isolated culturally that most simply dropped out of the organisation as a whole.

In the WMRC, the secession into the RPM-P/RPA was also a mass exodus but enough of the Committee and its guerilla Fronts remained so that the Committee remained viable, even if "just barely." Its remaining guerilla Fronts were consolidated into a single Front, as noted earlier, "Front Feliciano," with an AOR that for the most part remained as it had been, the one difference being a significant reduction in its Lanao del Norte AOR, which had been subsumed by the RPM-P (later re-named RPM-M) and RPA's SR 2. WMRC's single Front was then sub-divided into "Sections" with smaller AORs in hopes of eventually regaining what had heretofore been a considerable and well developed apparatus. Sadly for the NPA, it never worked out. Until today, the WMRC remains the weakest of the five Regional Committees, which concurrently serve as Regional NPA Commands as well. Only Front Feliciano remains and until a month ago, had pretty much been on the verge of collapse.

The destruction began at the end of 2004 with the death of WMRC's Secretary, Mario "Ka Jolly" Bagundol (also known by earlier noms de guerre Ka Dorek and Ka Orlan). Bagundol had been the driving force that re-charted the organosation's presence in that large AOR. After the exodus I mentioned, the Committee stood tottering on the abyss. By force of personality and great strategical planning Bundol managed to correct what had been a precipitous decline. However, central figures in any Cult of Personality become lax, too self-assured. Stupidly, Ka Jolly had personally led the armed engagements of what had become a very lean but nevertheless lethally effective Front in a series of TACOPs (Tactical Operations). They were going well until the morning of October 27th, 2004. That morning, Jolly led nearly two dozen guerillas on an assault of an AFP, or, Armed Forces of the Philippines patrol base in the municipality of Sindangan, in Zamboanga del Norte Province. The post, in Barangay Datagan, held two squads (fourteen men total) from the 44IB (Infantry Battalion). As usual, the goal wasn't ground, buy rather guns. Killing two of the soldiers and critically wounding eight more, the NPA entered the post after the remaining three soldiers surrendered...or so Ka Jolly believed. As they began collecting weapons from the fallen soldiers, the fourteenth man popped up out of a foxhole and dropped Ka Jolly with a three round burst from his M14. As the shots rang out, another guerilla, Ka Marlo, ran over to aid his fallen commander and was himself killed instantly by another three round burst before a third guerilla was able to kill the soldier with rifle grenade.

Withdrawing from the post after collecting all weapons, his guerillas deposited their leader with a nearby peasant family who were instructed to transport Ka Jolly to a local public hospital. With a P500,000 ($11,500) Bounty on his head the peasant family promptly informed the Municipal Police Office instead, which then arrived with two platoons from the local AFP garrison. Taken to that hospital by the AFP, Bagundol slash Jolly died as he was being transferred to a better equipped hospital in Dipolog City. Ka Jolly was buried in his hometown of Plaridel, in Misamis Occidental Province on November 5th. More than a thousand people attended his funeral. For a rural hamlet in the hills of Misamis Occidental that is an astronomical number, all the more so for someone firmly associated with an illegal, underground movement. It serves as just another indication of how popular the man was. Afterwards, it was if what remained of Front Feliciano and WMRC simply melted away...until six weeks ago.

On Saturday, November 5th, 2011, in the municipality of Kabasalan's Barangay Palinta, in Zamboanga Sibugay Province, village children warned their elders that as many as fifty armed men were fast approaching their settlement, in Purok #3. Gathering all villagers in a central area, under gunpoint, guerillas began searching the homes of Barangay Captain Geronimo Dango and his predecessor, Florencio Genese, as well as CAAs and retired soldiers (see the following incident for an explanation about "CAAs"). Looking for weapons, they merely captured three 45 caliber pistols, as well as several CAA and AFP uniforms. Then, they searched the crowd gathered under gunpoint, scanning faces before finally picking out Felix Obordo, a CAA in the local CAFGU garrison (CAFGU is also explained in that aforementioned following incident listed below). The guerillas, from the NPA's SECOM Kara, in Front Feliciano (WMRC), and led by Ka Luis, told the villagers that Obordo had served as an AFP Scout on an attack on two of the Section Committee's camps, including its main camp, in that same town in the late Summer of 2010.


In the first incident, on Sunday, September 12th, 2010, CAA Obordo led the 10IB, under First Lieutenant Franco Salvador Suelto through the bush in that same town's Barangay Tampilisan. What seemed to be a mere goose chase based upon the ramblings of a recent defector from SECOM Kara, Ronald Esic, alias Ka Brix, suddenly turned out much better when the soldiers from the 10IB literally stumbled right into an NPA camp. Easily capable of holding eighty people, by NPA standards, it easily qualified as a large encampment. With the WMRC however, the site would just as easily qualify as the entire Regional Committee's main camp. Unknown to their defector, Ka Brix, Section Committee Kara had vacated that camp exactly one month earlier, on August 12th, having only spent two months there. The guerillas had then moved to a smattering of different isolated camps, one of which was also in that same town of Kabasalan, in Barangay Penaranda, in Sitio Tipangi, near the border of Sitio Logdeck.

Upon returning to their post they relayed their findings to 1ID (Infantry Division) Headquarters. Having been briefed on the existence of that second camp, 1st Infantry Division Headquarters deployed another detachment, this one from the 53IB, who after picking up CAA Obrodo the next day, September 13th, began working its way through the jungle towards Sitios Tipangi and Logdeck. Approaching this second camp the 53IB drew fire from the NPA but managed to remain unscathed as they out maneuvered what had merely been a pair of sentries guarding a thirteen guerilla encampment. While ten escaped, beating a hasty withdrawl with nothing but their weapons, three were left behind after being blocked into a corner. The three:

1) Ronel B.Simacas

2) Elmer A.Flores

3) Jenilyn F.Flores, wife of Elmer

Aside from two rounds of rifle grenades, there were no weapons captured. Although CAA Obrodo was serving as a Scout in both cases, he was utilised only because of his considerable knowledge of the local terrain, not because he knew the location of even one NPA camp. It was Ka Brix feeding the Military its Intelligence. After having a guerilla tie Obordo's hands together and hobbling his legs with more rope, the NPA withdrew, taking their prisoner with them.

Nearly two hours later, after villagers had calmed down enough and reported the incident to the PNP-PPO, or, Philippine National Police- Police Provincial Office, they began following the trail left by the NPA, hoping to zero in on CAA Obordo's location. They never got farther than 400 meters from the site where they had all been held hostage. Walking to the banks of a creek that skirts Purok #3, they found Felix Obordo hogtied, laying face down in the mud. Having been stabbed nine times he had been killed minutes after leaving the village. While executing such people is actually pretty common as far as how the NPA deals with people it perceives as going beyond the bounds of reluctant, tacit co-operation with the AFP, they usually dispose of such people in a much different manner. Stabbings very rarely fit the bill.

On Saturday, December 3rd, 2011, a four man team from the AFP's MIG-9 (Military Intelligence Group for Region 9) departed 1ID (Infantry Division) Headquarters on a mission to assist a multi-national mining corporation who were being targeted by the NPA for "Revolutionary Taxes." The corporation, Canadian based TVIRD (Toronto Ventures Resources and International Development) operates a very profitable venture in the municipality of Siocon's Mount Canatuan, in Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Although that mine is itself embroiled in paramilitary-related violence, it is the company's third test drilling site in the town of Bayog that is currently being targeted by the NPA. Because the WMRC has been on its last legs, neigh, on the verge of extinction, there was a great deal of uncertainty as to whether TVIRD was actually being targeted by the NPA, or simply one of the many local extortion outfits who do- from time to time- target businesses while claiming to represent one of the various insurgent organisations as a pretence. The four man MIG team was joined by two CAAs, one of whom was a retired soldier.

CAAs, or Civilian Active Auxiliaries, are soldiers serving in a hybrid entity of the same name, the CAA, with features of paramilitaries as well as military reserves. Like paramilitaries they are in active duty mode, and like military reserves they are issued AFP serial numbers, are trained by the AFP, and armed by the AFP. There are two CAA entities, the CAFGU (Civilian Active Force Geographical Unit) and SCAA (Special Civilian Active Auxiliaries). CAFGUs serve directly under the AFP's cadre battalions, which deploys non-commisioned officers as detachment commanders. CAFGU can only operate within their own municipality, funded by the AFP. SCAAs are funded by and dedicated towards securing specific private businesses though, in the last five years, LGUs (Local Government Units, as in municipal and provincial governments) have begun employing them as well. Whereas a municipality must go through a somewhat lengthly process before getting a trained CAFGU detachment, an SCAA can be on the ground within sixty days of an initial request, although they often take quite abit longer- unless the funding entity wants it expedited.

The CAAs with MIG-9 were in TVIRD's SCAA, deployed on Mount Canatuan in Siocon, but accompanying all work crews, such as the crews that have been sinking test holes In the municipality of Bayog's Sitio Balahay. TVIRD's presence on the Zamboanga Peninsula is highly contentious with both environmentalists as well as the Subanen, the Lumad (Hilltribe) indigenous to the peninsula. I have actually been trying to piece together a series on the corporation and its nefarious activities since March of this year, 2011. That month, a CAA serving in TVIRD's SCAA blew away a local man during a protest on the Mount Canatuan Mine's access road but alas, like so many entries, it remains a work in progress. Aaaaah, the joy of being anal rententive about fact checking and overall accuracy.

Using a TVIRD pickup truck, the six men, all in civilian attire, but well armed, were heading to Bayog in hopes of catching an expected representative of the extortionists. However, as the truck entered the municipality of Diplahan's, Barangay Guinoman in Zamboanga Sibugay Province, they ran into a PNP, or, Philippine National Police checkpoint in Sitio Mahayahay. Driving a company vehicle, dressed in civilian clothes, Major Ramon Tores, Intelligence Officer for the 102nd Infantry Brigade, and Commanding Officer for that MIG-9 team was aggravated when instructed by the Checkpoint Commander to dismount from the truck and approach the actual checkpoint on foot. As Major Torres began to comply, he noticed that some of the "police officers" manning the checkpoint were actually dressed in the white vest and name tags issued to media representatives on Mindanao.

As Major Torres was putting two and two together he glanced ahead of the checkpoint position and saw approximately thirty NPA guerillas, and realised he was actually at an NPA Checkpoint. When the "police" quickly moved towards the company vehicle and surrouded the pickup truck screaming, Major Torres quickly grabbed the opportunity and ran three meters and into the jungle and dived into a deep flowing creek. Back at the checkpoint the NPA was grabbing the five men as others rushed into the jungle after Major Torres.

After searching both the vehicle and the five remaining prisoners the guerillas from the NPA's SECOM Kara of Front Feliciano divested the AFP and TVRDI of three M16s, one M14, five 45 caliber pistols, and one 9MM pistol. After an hour of interrogation all five were released when the guerillas tracking Major Torres radioed back to the main group that the officer had disappeared- though the five prisoners weren't privy to that communication. The pickup truck was burned and the five men forced to walk to the nearest settlement, 4 kilometers away, but having dodged a career-ruining detention by the NPA they were not entirely in the worst of spirits.

Finally making their way into town, the three soldiers and two CAAs made contact with 1ID and reported their situation. A detachment from the 53IB was scrambled to retrieve them and a Search and Rescue Operation was hatched to try and rescue Major Torres from what the AFP then believed to be, yet another NPA detention of an AFP member. As 1ID worked on sewing that together Major Torres sucessfully evaded capture although he had fractured his wrist ehile diving into the creek. Surfacing down creek he followed the waterway until he was able to ascertain the location of the nearest CAA detachment. Just before midnite, wet, cold, and in intence pain, Major Torres contacted Division Headquarters from the CAA garrison in Barangay Guinoman, the same barangay in which his ordeal had began, early that morning. Again, 53IB was scrambled and transported Major Torres directly to 102nd Infantry Brigade Headquarters in the provincial capital of Ipil. In a way Torees' mission had been sucessful. After all, the AFP AND TVIRD now knew that it was in fact the NPA that was targetting the corporation for extortion.

NPA Armed Contacts for the Third Quarter of 2011, Part VI: Davao Region Turns Hot Again

After a sweet quiet spell, albeit far too brief, the NPA's SMRC, or Southern Mindanao Regional Committee, has once again greased up its rifles and begun making itself heard. On September 17th in Davao City's Barangay Paradise Embac in Paquibato District the NPA's PBC1, or 1st Pulang Bagani Company (1st Red Warrior Company) harried a combat patrol from the AFP's (Armed Forces of the Philippines) 69IB (Infantry Battalion). As the AFP detachment entered Sitio Guinobatan in Purok #7 the NPA targetted it with sniper fire. The AFP denied that any casualties had been incurred but after the NPA released claims that it had managed to kill one soldier the AFP sheepishly admitted that, yes, it had in fact suffered a single casualty but that it was a very minor wound when a single round grazed an extremity...Suuuuuure, don't worry, I won't tell anyone.

Speaking of Barangay Paradise Embac, the outlying settlement recently became the focus of an interesting debate in the Davao City Municipal Council when Councilors Leah Librado Yap and Jimmy Dureza co-authored a Resolution seeking to oust a garrison of the 69IB from a post located nearly 300 meters away from the Paradise Embac Annex Primary Elementary School. The NPA and its puppets, including Councilor Yap who is herself a member of Bayan, a legal above board political party doing the bidding of the NPA and its political arm, the CPP or Communist Party of the Philippines, is of course opposed to any AFP control within the long established, albeit technically unofficial, NPA Territory in that district, Paquibato, along with two adjoining districts. The garrison has been on site since 2002 and yet this past Spring, 2011, the NPA and its coterie of multi-sectoral front organisations got a gigantic bee in their bonnet about its existence, as if they had gone to bed the night before only to discover an AFP post smack dab in the middle of "their" territory.

According to the Resolution, which passed its first of three Readings on August 16th, it hopes to take aim at the emplacement and its checkpoint on the road in front of the school because it is placing both students and their teachers in grave danger. Vice Mayor Rodrigo "Roddy" Duterte has interestingly defended the emplacement saying that his friends, the NPA, do not attack schools NOR children and so the garrison endangers nobody. I suppose Big Daddy Duterte failed in Logic 101 on his way into Law School because those rationalisations mean absolutely nothing. By placing armed men in proximity to small children you are automatically placing the children in danger. How much more so when there are two competing armed groups in that area? Even more interestingly, his daughter, the MAYOR, Sarah "Inday" Duterte Carpio has ALSO come out in support of the military post. Though Vice Mayor Duterte has long enabled the NPA to play house in three of his city's districts Mayor Carpio had gone much further and actually tried to have the military, aside from the anti-terrorism Task Force Davao, pulled out of the city. This nearly 360 degree turn is quite marked and all the more so when one realises that she had had to sign off on the military operation that captured the NPA's main camp in the Davao Region, but alas THAT sordid tale must be relegated to a subsequent entry.


At about the same time as the NPA began sniping in Davao City another NPA element in the municipality of Malita in that same province as Davao City, Davao del Sur, another of the AFP's "security patrols" stumbled upon 20 NPA guerillas in that town's Barangay Datu Danwata's Sitio Tambolang. The 30 minute firefight that ensued led to the AFP capturing one M1 rifle and 4 IEDs, or Improvised Explosive Devices (as in "bombs"). Interestingly the military is claiming that two of the devices aren't IEDs at all but rather Claymore Mines. Claymores, or M18s in American speak, are still controlled detonation devices as opposed to pressure plate mines that detonate when something steps on, or rolls over the device. This distinction is extremely important because the AFP engages in ignorant propaganda attacks against the NPA in which it claims that the Maoist guerillas are breaking International Law by utilising landmines.

First, even if the NPA engaged in non-controlled detonation devices, it still would not be contravening any part of LOAC, or the Laws of Armed Conflict, the genre within International Law that applies to warfare. There are widely adhered to treaties, Ottawa for example, in which nations that have ratified the treaty are then bound by International Law not to use such devices. I definitely view such treaties as positive to the nth degree but with controlled detonation there is no discernible chance of "accidentally" killing a group of children as they walk to school or even a peasant family's caraboa (Philippine water buffalo) because in a controlled detonation a person detonates the device from a close distance almost always within the detonation's line of sight. Ergo, even if the NPA had some acquired Claymores, and I highly doubt it since they haven't externally sourced weaponry since the mid-1970s (and never, ever in Mindanao), they wouldn't be illegal. The use of the word "landmine" in and of itself lends definite connotations to laymen. They naturally envision pressure detonated devices. This is why the AFP spin meisters cling to that ignorant phrasing. It is a shame because just in its day to day actions the NPA is guilty enough of many things. Yet, when you disseminate FALSE PROPAGANDA and people see through it you then lose all credibility.

The AFP has entered the age of Political Correctness where combat patrols have become "security patrols in support of PDTs." PDTs, or Peace and Development Teams, are the cornerstone of the AFP's new gameplan, OPlan Bayanihan, or Operational Plan Bayanihan (Operational Plan Helping Hand), which turned the traditional AFP ethos on its head. Whereas in the past, under the preceding OPlan Bantay Laya II (Operational Plan Guarding the Nation II) and all preceding OPlans, the COIN, or Counterinsurgency strategy has always been an 80:20 combination of Tactical Engagement:Hearts and Minds Engagement, Bayanihan has the 80:20 skewed into a converse dynamic as Hearts and Minds:Tactical Engagement. For the uninitiated, "Hearts and Minds" refers to actions and programmes designed to win over the "hearts and minds" of civilians in CAAs, or Conflict Affected Areas (not to be confused with the AFP COIN Tactical cornerstone, Civilian Active Auxiliaries like CAFGU, et cetera).

The idea is to defeat the NPA on its strongest facet, its Mass Base of Support. Mass Base of Support refers to peasants and others on the bottom part of the Philippine socio-economic totem pole who offer the NPA support both emotionally as well as materialy. For example, the farming family who happily hands over a half kilo of rice because he or she sympathises with the NPA's goals and outlook. Usually the NPA finds it easy to win such people over because the Maoists are the first outsiders who have ever taken even a scant interest in their needs or concerns. The state cannot be said to have "failed" such people because in almost all cases the state has never even stopped to consider such people exist EXCEPT when divvying up their lands for mineral and timber extraction. There is an old adage in COIN, "Insurgency begins where good roads end."

So, in Hearts and Minds Operations the Government wishes to win over these heretofore ignored citizens by providing marked improvements in their lives. This is done via MEDCAPs, DENCAPs, and VETCAPs, where the military, either by itself or by teaming up with charitable institutions, organisations, and individuals provides no-cost medical, dental and vetinary care for the peasants and their livestock. Schools are built or otherwise rehabilitated and/or expanded if extant. Farm to Market Roads and in the case with offshore islands, Circumfrential Roads which link communities by land where heretofore they have been 100% reliant upon seatravel are constructed and so communities do see their lives vastly improved.

Sounds fine but one needs to understand that the Government is not operating out of altruism but rather with a medium range plan that offers no real supportive infrastructure to make these improvements sustainable over the long haul. You are told that the military's engineering battalions have built a new Farm to Market Road but a few locals may see it very differently. A tribal leader may see that his tribe is now threatened by the consumerist materiel-centred culture that has defined much of the modern Philippines. Villagers may see it as the Access Road it so often is, helping to spped up the Development Aggression that has destroyed so much of Mindanao's once pristine environment.

In the autumnn of 2010 the AFP launched its first PDT. With three weeks of training nine man teams are deployed into targetted communities. They usually garrison themselves in schools, houses of worship or even private homes. They blanket a barangay and engage in a very intrusive surveying process in what amounts to a naked grab for intelligence though the military, lying through its teeth swears it is to zero in on a given community's needs. Often the questioning even focuses on the average amount of food consumed by a given family in any random month so that just as in Hamleting sustenance is measured so as to control diversion to the NPA.

This Summer, 2011, the AFP expanded its PDP programme to include the villagers themselves working side by side. On August 21st 118 civilians graduated from a three day seminar on their role(s) within the PDT programme. The ceremony in the municipality of Mati's municipal gymnasium in Davao Oriental Province featured that province's Governor del Rosario giving the keynote speech. The PDT programme, which began in Davao Region in the Autumn of 2010 has now gone nationwide after becoming the key protocol within OPlan Bayanihan.

NPA Armed Contacts for the Third Quarter of 2011, Part VI: The NPA Mistakenly Kills Three Men and Terrorises Six Others

In my recent "NPA Armed Contacts for the Third Quarter of 2011" entry I chronicled the NPA's attack on Nano Trading and Mining Corporation in the municipality of Impasug-ong in Bukidnon Province. Nano, as I noted, is an Indian-based multi-national corporation that at this particular site, located in Barangay Kapitan Bayong's Purok #5, acts as the transport and loading agent for locally owned chromite mines. On August 6th, 2011 guerillas from Front 88 of the Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee, or NCMRC, approached the mine compound and when a group of labourers were leaving after their shift and turned heel trying to warn others, they were fired upon by the NPA.

Eleven men were hit, with one, Jose Castro, dying immediately. The other ten were rushed to the nearest hospital but unfortunately, by the time they arrived two more of the victims:

1) Raymond Castro

2) Victor Aparilla

were dead as well. The other eight:

1) Rodelio Cabaring

2) Marvine Pinera

3) Alfie Sobison

4) Rey Soriano

5) Glenn Hernandez

6) Allan Barandanes

7) Brindo Buagan

8) Jermael Magno

were admitted and are recovering.

Of course Nano was targeted for its failure to pay "Revolutionary Taxes," a codeword for extortion. The NPA cited destruction of the environment, which given the NPA's lack of action against paying "customers" just makes the Communist guerillas look even sillier than they usually appear. They also cited the firms operation manger, Paul Magto, for his supposed failure to pay his labourers in a timely fashion.

On Monday, September 19th, 2011 however the NCMRC admitted that its guerillas had been operating on outdated intelligence that had the firm's basecamp housing an arsenal of automatic rifles and rifle grenades. During the attack the NPA captured a single 45 caliber pistol, an airsoft (fires plastic pellets) rifle and a chainsaw but was also accused of stealing a valuable watch and two cellphones as well. NCMRC says that it will be returning the phones and watch which it admits taking and also admits that there was P400 ($9) stuffed inside of a compartment of the airsoft piece. Why the confession? Because the NPA was forced to admit that its guerillas committed several grave errors in attacking unarmed labourers. It asked the families of the dead and wounded labourers to forgive its "errors" and to accrpt the NPA's "apologies."

Also worth noting, if just for the sheer stupidity it reflects, NCMRC claims that it was primarily targeting the company because Operations Supervisor Paul Magto, the man it initially accused of not paying his workers, would "indiscriminately" fire his pistol, "intimidating" local villagers. Right, because murdering three labourers with M16s makes villagers happy? The NPA hopes to right their stupendous wrong by offering the families of the dead and wounded labourers cash and medical assistance. Ironically, when the Government offers to do the same to rectify ITS mistakes the NPA spin meisters belittle the offer(s), saying that cash cannot make up for negligence and outright abuse. Ironic indeed.

On August 10th six young men from the municipality of Initao in Misamis Oriental Province travelled to the town of San Fernando in Bukidnon Province. As door to door salesmen of "banig," or sleeping mats, the men travelled quite a bit but when none had called home over the course of some days their families in Initao became increasingly worried, fearing that the men might have been abducted by one of the KFR, or Kidnap for Ransom organisations infesting Mindanao.

As the NCMRC was boohooing over that senseless carnage at Nano it also admitted that Front 88 had "arrested" the aforementioned missing men. The reason? According to NCMRC all six were "spies" for the AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP. Although intelligence assets DO assume such covers they do as individuals or as teams of two men. Six men do not blend in easily and as such are never utilised. It seems that the NPA is beginning to grow paranoid once again. Several months ago the SMRC, or Southern Mindanao Regional Committee, abducted an ice cream vendor in Davao City's Paquibato District and likewise accused him of "spying." He was killed as is often the case with civilian assets. Ironically it was the forerunner of the NCMRC, the NMRC, or Nothern Mindanao Regional Committee that launched the first of the nationwide purges, the infamous Kampanyang Aho (Garlic Campaign) that ended up killing well over 1,000 innocent men, women, and even children who were deemed to be "spies." Sadly, most were NPA members who truly believed in their cause. Some things never change.

Political Developments for the Third Quarter of 2011, Part IV: Former Mayor of Kibawe Ernesto Villalon

On the corner of Cagayan del Oro City's Tiano and Del Pilar Streets a band of Higaon-on Lumad ("Lumad" being the generic one size fits all label for Animist Hilltribes of Malayan stock on Mindanao) encamped on Thursday, September 1st, 2011. Leaving their homes in Bukidnon Province they travelled all the way to Misamis Oriental Province to hold a vigil outside the premises of NCIP-10, or the National Commission for Indigenous People Office for Region #10 in order to protest what they adamantly maintain is a bogus FIPC by Ernesto Villalon, ex-Mayor of Kibawe, a small municipality in Bukidnon Province and among other things, a cattle rancher in the neighbouring municipality of Malmag. FIPC, or Free and Informed Priar Consent is a pre-requisite before a lease, or tenement is given for the exploitation of natural resources. Overseen by the NCIP who in theory acts as the advocate for the Lumads who obstensibly hold the power to give, or withold, their signature to any perspective FPIC.

According to a Leftist peasant organisation, Panalsalan Dagumba'an Tribal Association, or PADATA in shorthand, that FPIC had been rendered by a group having nothing to do with the land in question. PADATA's 500-odd members are all Higaon-on and Ta'alandig Tribesmen whereas the signatories to the FPIC, the Barangay Captains of Barangays Dagumba'an and Panalsalan and a female chief, Bae Victoria Jakosalem Pangahin are Manobo Tribesmen and therefore, "not of that place." According to PADATA the Manobo are not originally from that immediate area although Bae Pangahin is the daughter of a reknowned and infamous Manobo chieftain, the late Datu Antonio "Salem" Jackosalem whose clan has farmed the immediate area at least since the first Bisaya settlement was founded in the 1840s. PADATA meanwhile can only prove a presence there dating from the 1990s with a direct connection to the Villalon Tenement merely dating to the Summer of 2008 when the organisation sponsored one hundred of its members in an infiltration of the ranch.

Using "grave hunger" as its raison d'etre the hundred farmers staked out a clearing atop a rocky promontory in the middle of the 480 hectare ranch. Quickly pitching plastic tarps as "homes" and sharing a single carabao (water buffalo) as a beast of burden to plow a 5 hectare plot in which they intended to raise corn the farmers attempted to re-write history, a common pursuit on this strife torn island. As their primary rationale for "taking possesion" of the ENTIRE ranch they arrogantly told anyone who would listen that because the Villalon Tenement, FGLMA #1816, of Forest Grazing Land Management Agreement #1816, expired in 1997, and because Villalon had failed to promptly renew his agreement, the land within that tenement had reverted to Public Lands. Moreover, as Indigenous People they are given automatic preference in any competitive application process so that EVEN IF Villalon subsequently decided to apply for an agreement renewal PADATA's applications for that land would be given first priority. However, PADATA was a bit slow on the uplink...

Ernesto Villalon is perhaps best known as the politician who sat in the centre of a legal precedent concerning Electoral Fraud. In the 1967 Elections Villalon ran against the incumbent, Mayor Arturo Serina in the municipality of Kibawe, immediately adjacent to the town of Malmag, wherein lies the tenement I am discussing. Villalon had bribed the Municipal Treasurer who was doing double duty as the town's Municipal Election Officer. As Election Officer this gentleman was given sealed ballot boxes from all of the municipality's voting precincts. Opening the ballot boxes he would then tally each vote and record it on an official form from which the higher officials within the electoral system would declare the winner. An alert town official however noticed that the Election Officer of Kibawe had already filled in the tally for Precinct #20, despite the fact that that ballot box had not even been picked up yet, much less delivered.

In those dark lonely days before the advent of affordable computers the written word held much more sway. The Election Officer had signed off on the overall tally with the endgame having been succesful in getting Villalon into office as the new Mayor of Kibawe. Naturally outgoing Mayor Serina didn't take this news lightly and wasted no time at all in petitioning the Courts to have the election results from Kibawe vacated and Villalon removed from office. The two politicians wasted each others' time and that of the Philippine Courts up until the mid-1970s and while Villalon managed to win re-election the rivalry turned Kibawe into yet another Mindanowan cliche, a pissant backwater town beset by politically inspired paramilitary violence.

Like most such rilvaries it ended up fading into obscurity as a new generation of greedy and bloodthirsty politicians came of age and strong armed themselves onto the Philippine political stage (I can even blog in verse! Perhaps I should try Haiku?). For his part, ex-Mayor Villalon concentrated on his farming interests which of course brings us back to the present and the "disputed" Villalon Tenement.

PADATA is but one of an umpteenth number of like minded peasant organisations who together form the "Alyansa Bukidon," or the Bukidon Alliance. The Alliance serves as an umbrella group directly reporting to Task Force Malapad, an organisation billing itself as an NGO devoted to advocating for landless peasants. In truth TF Malapad is a constituent organisation of the NDFP, or National Democratic Front of the Philippines, itself an umbrella organisation created by the Communist Party of the Philippines, or as it is commonly referred to, the CPP. Founded in 1974 the NDFP was designed to help the CPP retain its premier role in the Philippine Left as the CPP had been declared illegal at the end of the last decade by then-Dictator Fredinand Marcos who saw the CPP and its armed wing the NPA or New Peoples Army, as the nation's pre-eminent threat.

At the turn of the 21st Century the NPA's Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee, or NCMRC sought to expand and solidify its mass base of support and concentrated on southern Bukidnon Province as the key sector in which to concentrate this effort, enter PADATA, stage left. With the group's infiltration of the tenement in 2008 an inevitable confrontation had been set in motion. Practically no tenement on Mindanao, whether for agri-business as with Mr.Villalon, logging, or even mining is entirely bereft of "Informal Settlers," the Philippine Government's Politically Correct label for rank squatters, thieves of land, resources, and in the end initiative and energy that may have been invested in any paricular tract. Usually though a Tenement holder will come to a mutually beneficial agreement if not ignoring them outright.

The 2008 infiltration didn't take place without a lot of forethought and posturing taking place with regard to a winnable strategy. Therefore Villalon was generally aware of PADATA's ill intentions and so was jolted out of his complacency and finally re-filed his application for renewal of the tenement. After his initial FGLMA lapsed in 1998 Villalon carried on unperturbed in the least. It wasn't until 2002 that Villalon began breaking out of his inertia as the Alyansa Bukidnon began concentrating on tenement holders in the Kulkul Mountains. In 2003 Villalon filed for his re-newal only to have it fall through the cracks as is so often the case on Mindanao. Satisfied that he had met the legal onus Villalon then concentrated on his cattle operation.

By 2007 PADATA was on his doorstep and with more than a modicum of urgency Villalon re-filed his application for renewal. It was months later that Padata sponsored the aforementioned infiltration and significantly upped the ante. In 2008 PADATA itself applied for a CBFMA, or Community Based Forest Management Agreement for an 800-odd hectare tract that encompassed all of the Villalon Tenement. Citing the causes I touched upon earlier in this entry, severe hunger and the farmers' status as Indigenous People. Just as with all permiting, liscencing and Governmant involved contracting PADATA's application lethargicaly began its long climb through the Philippine bureaucracy but Villalon had had a considerable headstart. In early 2010 Villalon Ranch received its new FGLMA, good until 2035.

Now desperate PADATA filed for a CAD, or Certificate of Ancestral Domain, the first step in a process that would, if sucessful, offer PADATA, via a member acting as a claimant, Title over a tract of land that would- just as with their CBFMA- encompass the Villalon Ranch Tenement. However it is of little import to Villalon since the now elderly rancher cannot be forced out of the Tenement until 2035 and because its issued to his privately held corporation, Villalon Ranch, the Tenement will remain in his family's control after his death.

Knowing that they have little or no chance of gaining total control of the land, PADATA has taken its fight to the media and as shoddy as the Philippine Media is it has served them very well. There is no pretence of objectivity in the Philippines. Journalists here either do as their publishers instruct then or, as is usually the case, seek out a soundbite and concentrate on who says the most. In this case the Villalon Clan will say absolutely nothing. PADATA however is an efficient cog in an extremely well oiled machine. The parent organisation, TF Mapalad, Left of Lenin (or in this case Mao) is quite adept at propaganda bordering on histronics.

Bukidnon, especially the southern portion of the province bordering on North Cotabato Province is largely un-Titled, full of Public Land entirely devoid of tenements such as the FGLMA at the centre of this land dispute. It is an under populated area so that in reality a group representing "landless peasants" whould have no difficulty whatsoever in finding arable land sufficiently suited for any demographic. To try and shove their way into an existing tenement is nothing more than a headline grabbing stunt. As noted, Ernesto Villalon is no angel but that is neither here nor there. I mean, if we are going to be absolutely factual the NPA has mass graves all over the island and its Kampayang Aho (Garlic Campaign, discussed in my recent "NPA Armed Contacts for the Third Quarter" entry covering the resurgence of Front 4B discussed it in detail) was concentrated in THIS part of the island. All the shtick about "big compradores" (landlords) and "enemies of the people" and "counter revolutionaries living off the lifeblood of the people" is nonsense. The Left is just as corrupt as the Right and has done just as much harm to people on BOTH sides. In fact, THAT can't even be said of the Right who only target the Left...

The 2010 Push concentrated on a mixed bag of "class enemies." By infiltrating a tenement held by the Del Monte Corporation the "Alyansa Bukidnon" was able to exercise a neat sleight of hand that had people concentrating on "evil multi-national corporations" while local businessman were extored to the nth degree in order to avoid being targetted by the CPP/NPA's multi-sectoral front lapdogs, like PADATA. Villalon was of course targeted during the Push with "Indigenous farmers at risk of losing their land" coming under gunfire from "goons" who for my two centavos must be the worst shots in the world to miss each and every one of the "peasants" crowding into a tiny tent city that is supposed to represent an "established settlement" inside the Villalon Tenement.

Indeed, these "persecuted" farmers were able to farm corn in a fenced in section of what is legally supposed to be a cattle ranch. In fact, PADATA was so successful in this endeavour that by August of 2011 a third corn crop was ready for harvest. Villalon engaged PADATA in a series of public dialogues, "Forums" as they are commonly called in the Philippines, to try and minimise friction and prevent any violent confrontations, knowing that "peasants harvesting corn to feed their starving families" could only lead to a propaganda nightmare IF Villalon and his men even attempted to prevent it.

Fast forward to Agust 24th, 2011 and the forum in question, where PADATA members were politely asked to leave all weapons and bags at a central point away from the actual meeting site. The media reported the shooting death of Welcie Gica as yet another poor landless peasant murdered by goons in the employ of landed gentry. Facts however, as I hope I have shown, paint a very different picture. Perhaps the larger tragedy is Mr.Gica having died in vain. His death changes nothingon either side. PADATA and by relation the CPP/NPA/NDFP are just as predatory and just as callous as they ever were. Mr.Villalon and his family STILL control 480 hectares (well 475 when one subtracts the 5 hectares consigned to the PADATA thugs) and will do so until at least 2035. What a waste.

NPA Armed Contacts for the Third Quarter, Part V: Attack on Medina Police Station

In my last NPA entry, "NPA Armed Attacks for the Second Quarter of 2011, Part VII" I discussed the supposed "Pacification" of Misamis Oriental Province and the resurgence of the North Central Mindanao Regional Committee, or NCMRC of the NPA. Central to that entry was the municipality of Balingasag in the Balitucan Mountains, home to the NPA's Front 4B. This particular Front has a storied past, one which I touched upon in that aforementioned recent Second Quarter entry.

The ressurection of Front 4B is now undeniable with its spearheading of a major tactical operation on Thursday, August 25th, 2011. Early in the morning on the day in question a female guerilla from Front 16A of the NEMRC, or Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee chartered a van in Surigao City, in the province of Surigao del Norte. The young lady said that she and her siblings would be travelling for a family get together to take place that afternoon in the municipality of Medina, two provinces away in Misamis Oriental. Leaving Surigao City at 930AM the van carrying 10 NPA guerillas began the long drive along Mindanao's northern coast.

Arriving on the outskirts of Medina at 3PM the young female guerilla directed the unsuspecting driver to her "cousin's" home, actually an empty lot where two other rented vans awaited them. Pulling up to the other two vans the driver looked quizicaly at his fare only to be told that he had been commandeered by the NPA and that if he complied without resistance he would live to tell about his exciting day. The other two vans had been chartered that very afternoon, there in Medina, by members of the NPA's Front 4B of the NCMRC, or Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee. Removing assault rifles from boxes and rice sacks that had been transported aboard the three vans, the guerillas then waited until 430PM before ordering the three drivers to proceed into the town centre, Barangay Poblacion, after first co-ordinating positions with a small Blocking Force at two key positions on the only routes in and out of the town centre:

1) A checkpoint on National Hiway

2) In between the Public Market and the entrance into the town's main drag

Driving slowly through the small municipality the three vans, travelling together, mangaged to avoid arousing suspicion as they made their way to the municipal compound. At 515PM the vans stopped several meters from the compound entrance. Instructing the drivers to quickly walk away, 2 well armed guerillas were left to guard the idling vans while the other 28 put their plan into motion. As guerillas poured out of the vans horrified townspeople quickly began running for cover knowing all too well what was about to transpire. Firing rifles as they flooded the compound, SPO1 Edito Bayhon was immediately shot in the head and killed. The 25 year veteran of the Medina MPO, or Municipal Police Office and a resident of the town's Barangay Tupop, had been manning the station's desk, situated just inside the building's doorway. A detachment of 10 guerillas then attempted to infiltrate the town hall situated next to the MPO building.

Sitting inside his office in the town hall Mayor Pacifico Pupos was deep in conversation with two barangay captains and a town councilor when the staccato blasts from rifles, punctuated by detonations of rifle grenades immediately caught his attention. Proceeding to an inner office that was far more secure he and his three guests did their best to ride out the attack.

Alerted to the attack and knowing he had only 7 officers inside the MPO, the Chief of Police rushed past the Public Market only to run headlong into the second Blocking Force position. The result was a quick but intense firefight that prevented the Chief from aiding his men. The first Blocking Force position, the checkpoint on National Hiway, quickly closed up shoppe upon learning from a Spotter that a massive amount of re-inforcements were en route to Medina from neighbouring Gingoog City.

Outside the town hall the 10 man detachment met unexpected resistance in the front foyer and quickly backpedaled into the compound to join in on the assault's main target, the MPO and its modest stock of weaponry. At the 45 minute mark, having failed to infiltrate either objective the guerillas withdrew in orderly fashion and climbed aboard the idling vans before speeding out of Barangay Poblacion and into Barangay San Isidro where they abandoned all three vans before dispersing on foot in different directions, later rendevouzing over the border in the adjacent province of Bukidnon. From there the combined forces of Front 16A and 4B made their way overland to the mountainous border of Bukidnon and Agusan del Norte Provinces in a hard push that ended very late Friday night, August 26th.

The NPA had lost one guerilla, from Front 4B, whose identity remains unknown despite early information that he might have been a Team Leader (detachment commanding officer) known by the nom de guerre "Ka Hakim." The Government casualties, aside from the deceased SPO1, Edito Bayhon, were two critically wounded officers:

1) SPO2 Renie Galera Rombo

2) SPO1 Diosdado Salas Sendiong

The next day while scouring Medina the 8IB (Infantry Battalion) discovered all three vans in Barangay San Isidro, the only progress made by the AFP during its "hot pursuit" of the guerillas. The incident is note worthy in and above it being yet another NPA attack. It followed the blueprint used in the SMRC, or Southern Mindanao Regional Committee's attack on the Panabo City CPO (City Police Office), in Davao del Norte Province back on March 19th of 2011. Employing a non-threatening female guerilla to charter vans for a "family gathering," and then retaining the vans for stage one of their withdrawal...Likewise, one should pay attention to the high degree of co-operation not only between Fronts (not unusual) but between Regional Committees as well (very unusual). In the end the NPA lost a guerilla but did capture an additional M16 off of one of the wounded police officers. Still, the operation, one of an astounding 64 tactical operations by the NPA, in 4ID (Infantry Division) AOR, or Area of Responsibility (as in "Area of Operation") in just the Third Quarter, put Front 4B firmly back into play, even if they did need Front 19A in order to do it.

NPA Armed Contacts for the Second Quarter of 2011, Part VII: Pacification of Misamis Oriental Province and the Attack on Lantad CAFGU

Misamis Oriental Province on Mindanao's northern coast is one of two Mindanaowan provinces declared "Pacified" by the AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines in the fourth quarter of 2010. Pacification simply requires the signature of the ID CO, or Infantry Division Commanding Officer, under whose AOR, or Area of Responsibility the province lies, in this case the 4ID. There is no quantified process requiring a minimum of armed contacts, etc. Once the ID CO makes what is purely judgement call, the armed response to the insurgency within that province is officialy turned over to the PPOC, or Provincial Peace and Order Committee for management and is perceived to then be a Law and Order issue, or in Philippine speak, a Peace and Order issue, to be dealt with by the PNP, or Philippine National Police on the ground.

Misamis Oriental had come a long way in a very short time to even be considered for a security downgrade. Indeed one of its municipalities, the town of Balingasag had just 4 years before been under virtual control of the NPA. Sitio Lantad, a Higaon-on Tribal settlement in the municipality's Barangay Kibanban was declared "Liberated Territory" by the NPA which had implemented a full parallel government there in 1987. While parallel NPA Governments are in no way unique, then OR now, the "Government" in Sitio Lantad exerted 100% control even to the point of issuing land deeds and recording births and deaths.

The standard narrative is that the big turn around is single handedly due to Misamis Oriental's Governor, Oscar Moreno. Elected in 2004 he turned his attention to the sitio, believing in the standard COIN, or Counterinsurgency mantra that "Insurgencies begin where good roads end." That adage sums up the orthadox take on the main impetus behind insurgency; namely, that organisations like the NPA flourish in places where governments fail to provide basic services. Of course there is truth in that but like most anything else, it involves a whole lot more.

If a lack of attention and services is the root cause of the NPA's strength in Sitio Lantad, Governor Moreno sought to effectively deal with that in a common sensical manner. The first step, from that orthadox perspective, is to have the AFP clear the sitio of NPA regulars, or full time guerillas. To that end the 8IB (Infantry Battalion) saturated the sitio and cleared it. Upon clearing the second step is to "hold" the community, to prevent re-infiltration by the insurgency. Therefore the 8IB established a garrison on a hill overlooking the 200 house sitio, manned by the battalions Company C. Finally, the 8IB supervised the recruitment of a CAFGU platoon from the sitio. CAFGU, or Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit is the cornerstone of the CAA, or Civilian Active Auxiliary programme, itself the cornerstone of the AFP's COIN blueprint. Since I have discussed the CAA in more than a couple of my recent NPA entries, for the sake of brevity I will merely offer that the CAFGU are a geographically specific armed reserve of the AFP (via J5, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations). Its personnel are residents of the community in which they serve and they may not operate outside of their parent municipality.

After the "holding" stage is reached, it is time to re-establish, or in most cases establish for the first time ever a visible and meaningful Governmental presence. Sitio Lantad sits in a valley in the Balatucan Mountains. Located 18km upland from the more populated sections of its parent barangay, Kibanban, the only way to reach Lantad was by a footpath that was usually impassable along an 11km stretch. The valley's rather high elevation means that it isn't subject to the two Monsoons that drive most of Mindanao's weather systems. Instead it receives a short but torrential rainfall on most every afternoon of the year, relegating that one footpath to almost marsh-like consistency. The impassability of the trail narrowed down travel options to either horse or buffalo (carabao), and kept the people of Lantad in dire povery and perpetual isolation. Governor Moreno then embarked upon the construction of a gravel track that when completed in July of 2006 allowed habal-habal (motorcycle taxi) travel on a permanent basis.

Next, Governor Moreno constructed a solar dryer, basically a concrete patio with concave furrows that allow easier sun drying of the dry rice grown in the valley. The Governor then secured the assistance of various NGOs to help provide solar panels that allowed electrification of most sitio homes along with health and educational initiatives. By 2007 Sitio Lantad itself was declared Pacified and the Governor vowed to use the experience gained there as a template for pacification for the rest of the province.

Of course the Government's re-taking of Sitio Lantad, if indeed that is what it really was, had little to do with the improvements given to the villagers. In the late 1980s to early 1990s Lantad became a logistical hub for the NPA's Northern Mindanao Region, or NMR as well as the CMR, or Central Mindanao Region and the NMR, or Northern Mindanao Region, the Region to which Lantad was attached. With NPA founder and leader Jose Maria Sison's release from prison in 1986 the NPA underwent an ideological shakeup that precipitated a major organisational crisis. With Sison locked away in prison since 1977 the group's Maoist foundation began to support other ideological lines. The shift began in the organisation's Manila-Rizal Committee on Luzon, under its Secretary, Felimon "Ka Popoy" Lagman. Maoism is built upon the premise that the rural masses, the peasantry, are the backbone of the nation and therefore must drive any far reaching social and/or political change. More to the point, the armed struggle must remain a rural-based campaign until the insurgency's final stages. NPA members living in Metro Manila naturally felt that the urban masses forming the bulk of their membership and 100% of their mass base of support also had alot to offer the armed struggle and under Lagman's custodianship the Manila-Rizal Committee further entrenched itself in this divergent position. There were a host of hard ideological issues and other underlying organisationally based issues dividing Lagman and the CPP, or Communist Party of the Philippines (the NPA is but an armed wing of the CPP) dating back to the 1978 Congressional and Senatorial Elections when Lagman eschewed the standard CPP/NPA boycott of elections and agitated for participation. Still, the crux of the divide centered upon the perspective that Maoism was tailored for the China of the 1930s and 40s, not the Philippines of the mid-1980s. That last point was especially popular in strong Regional Committees in all three of the major Philippine Regions, the entire top tier of leadership in KOMVIS, or Visayas Committee (Komiteng Visayas) the Visayas Region and in Central Mindanao, Far South Mindanao, and Western Mindanao in the Southern Philippines as well.

With Sison's re-emergence and the huge ideological misstep taken with the same CPP/NPA adherance to boycotting of all state elections...even when THE "election" happens to be the first post-Marcos Presidential Election, set the stage for a major showdown precipitated by the NPA over-reacted to these ideological variations. Ka Popoy and Manila-Rizal were at the forefront of the brewing storm. With Sison's re-entry came the need, as he and his organisational allies saw it, to separate the chaff and let it fall where it would. All the more pressing were a host of external forces driving this dynamic. While Sison almost gleefully pointed to the collapse of the Soviet Union as proof positive of Maoism's advantages Lagman, et al correctly pointed out that China was no longer the land of Mao caps and cookie cutter bicycles. It was quickly backsliding into capitalism. Lagman then made it a personal issue with thre widely distributed manifestos collectively known within the CPP/NPA as "Counter-Thesis I."

Lagman then upped it a notch, spurred on by high ranking allies in KOMVIS, he withdrew Manila-Rizal from the CPP/NPA and publicly distributed the resignation letter. Meanwhile, here on Mindanao, the Central Mindanao Region, or CMR, only in existence for less than 4 years (created from a merging of Moro Region, MR, and North Western Region, NWR) had begun chafing under Sison's "my way or the hiway" heavy handedness. The concern on Mindanao could never be "urbanist insurrectionism" as it had been with Lagman and his supporters. Instead, the issues at play were of a totally different sort, albeit just as divisive - if not more- than Lagman's disillusionment with Chairman Mao.

Mindanao had started later than most other regions as far as the Communist struggle is concerned. Its first cadres didn't arrive until 1973 and it wasn't until 1977 that the movement could support a tactical strike on the island. Then, in 1978 the movement suddenly caught on like wildfire and spread throughout Mindanao, even making headway into Muslim-dominated areas like Maguindanao Province by the dawn of the 1980s. The rest of the 1980s saw increasing momentum that had the NPA snowballing in all corners of the island. However all was not well. The CPP had never been well developed on Mindanao and now that the armed wing, the NPA, was expanding exponentially it was impossible to close the gap between the military and political wings. People were recruited directly into the NPA without an ounce of political underpinning and so at critical mass, in 1985, the organisation on Mindanao was set to implode.

The Kampanyang Aho, or "Garlic Campaign" began with a terrified but well intentioned investigation into the AFP and PC, or Philippine Constulbary (now defunct) DPAs, or Deep Penetration Agents. Dating back to the Philippine's immediate post WWII Communist Insurgency in Central Luzon, the so called "Huk Rebellion," the Philippine Military establishment had run deeply buried sleepers in all Leftist slash subversive organisations. The concern on Mindanao was entirely mis-placed. What few DPAs were in play were entirely under deployment on Luzon. Undoubtedly recently trained local youth may have been deployed but were in no way serving as DPAs whose modus operandi had been to climb the ranks of Leftist organisations in order to provide worthwhile intel worth of the substantial investment their deploment represented.

Centered in what was then NMR, or Northern Mindanao Region, in and around the municipality of Opol in Misamis Oriental Province, Aho ended up killing nearly 900 NPA guerillas, or 20% of all NPA regulars on Mindanao during the campaign's duration, 1985 to 1986. Then, largely because of the missteps taken during the purge, there was a total restructuring of the NPA on the island. To say that the situation was precarious even before Sison was released from prison and began trying to realign the CPP/NPA would be absolutely correct. The most power Front in NMR, Front 12, was also the entity spearheading the purge and so out with the old, in with the new. CMR was born as a direct reaction to Aho, in 1987.

eadership of CMR along with a portion of the leadership in FSR (Far South) and WMR (Western) felt that Sison's "one size fits all" approach was a piss poor fit for Mindanao's unique cultural and social landscape. Together the leadership of the three Regions, together comprising 60% of the NPA leadership on Mindanao signed a manifesto in which they expressed dissatisfaction with the CPP's lack of tendency and the increasingly despotic decision making process. They asked that the CPP allow for a Congress in which to sort out these divergent perspectives.

When, at the CPP's 10th Party Plenum in 1993, FSR and WMR stepped away from the aforementioned critique of Sison, CMR remained steadfast and by the end of 1993 found itself unceremoniously expelled from the CPP/NPA, joining Manila-Rizal and virtually the entire Central Visayas structure along with its parent structure, VISKOM, in trying to forge a new path independently of the Sison organisation. The three elements then parlezed and by the second organisational meeting in September of 1995 had formed the PCP, or Peoples Communist Party and its armed wing, the RPA, or Revolutionary Proletariat Army. This loosely structured organisation was militarily speaking, fairly active. Politically though there was no unified direction unless "away from Maoism" counts as a "direction." In mid-1998 the three separate strands within the PCP:

1) Manila-Rizal

2) KOMVIS

3) Central Mindanao Region

formed a much more cohesive and much better politically grounded organisation, the RPM-P, or Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa -Pilipinas. Usually referred to by its English translation, Revolutionary Workers Party of the Philippines, with the military component remaining the RPA. There was a second military organisation as well, ABB or the Alex Boncayo Brigade. Formed out of Manila-Rizal's SPARU, or Special Partisan Armed Revolutionary Unit. SPARU were and of course remain the NPA's assassination squads. The love affair wouldn't last though, when the RMP-P/RPA/ABB entered into a Peace Process with the Estrada Government the following year. As RMP-P etc reached a Final Peace Agreement in 2001 the Mindanowan branch broke away and formed the RPM-M/RPA. The "M" standing for Mindanao of course and the "P" in RPA changed to "Peoples," as in "Revolutionary Peoples Army."

So, not only was the NPA in Misamis Oriental Province, like all other areas, suffering from infighting but its logistics were decimated. Sitio Lantad had served as a logistical hub for two Regional NPA formations, besides the formation that would eventually come to be labelled, NCMRC, or Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee :

1) NEMRC or Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee

2) WMRC or Western Mindanao Regional Committee

All this led to the NPA losing its unquestioned hold upon Sitio Lantad in 1992. The truth of the matter is, pacification was assured even without Governor Moreno's intervention. The people MOST responsible for the dislodgement of the NPA in Sitio Lantad was the NPA itself.


By 2010 the NPA was re-establishing a foothold in Sitio Lantad's parent municipality, Balingasag, with a show of force at that town's Barangay Napaliran. On the day in question, at the barangay's fiesta, a yearly celebration devoted to the patron saint held near and dear by every Christian community in the Philippines, the NPA deployed a SPARU team for a public assassination. With the depleted resources of the Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee not being able to support its own SPARU element, the Southern Mindanao Regional Committee, or SMRC graciously "lent" the services of its more than capable Eking Balacuit Command. The SPARU team chose to make a point by blowing off the face of Staff Seargent Elmo G.Penar of the AFP's 8IB. Unfortunately they chose to do so as he stood next to his friend, Alexander Pabualan of that town's Barangay Uno. Both men died immediately. SSgt.Penar was targetted for two specific actions he had taken part in:

1) Capture of Front 4-B's main camp in December of 2003

2) Capture of two NPA guerillas on Janurary 14th, 2006

of course both incidents had nothing to do with the targetting of SSgt.Penar. If the NPA were to kill every member of the AFP who takes part in a Tactical Operation against it there would be bodies all over Mindanao...WAIT! There ARE bodies all over Mindanao! Anyway, I am sure that most readers will get the point. The killing merely served as a wake up call that the NPA was not out of the picture in the town of Balingasag. Front 4-B was utilised in the rationale because it is the Front that was supposedly destroyed in the clearing of Sitio Lantad.

Since the SPARU action Front 4-B has been steadily re-couping ground and support. It is ironic that the Pacification of Misamis Oriental Province took place just 80-odd days after that assassination. All the more so when Pacification entails a re-deployment of IBs (Infantry Battalions) out of cleared communities. 8IB's garrisons have remained as is. Maybe their CO, Lieutenant Colonel Pascua os psychic because on April 15th, 2011 Front 4-B attempted to overrun the CAFGU post in none other than Sitio Lantad. At just before midnite 20 guerillas launched an attack and though they failed to capture the post did end up critically wounding three CAAs from the 223rd CAA Company with shrapnel from a couple of rifle grenades:

1) Jimmy Lindahay

2) Nino Luga

3) Apolinario Luga

The recent ratcheting up of hostilities inspired William Castillio, a resident of Lantad and General Manager of the LMPC, or Lantad Multi-Purpose Co-operative to author a proclamation being billed as the "Lantad Manifesto" by some dimwitted local pseudo-journalists who seem to think the sitio's past as an NPA showpiece relegates everything in and about it to Communist cliches. Most notably perhaps was the proclamation's primary author being William Castillo. Castillo's father Conrado was a mid-level NPA guerilla who was "elected" as the NPA Mayor of Lantad during its NPA heyday. In the mid-90s Conrado Castillo became a Surrenderee to the Government only to receive his come uppance from the NPA in 1999 when he was killed by his ex-"Comrades."

The proclamation was handed to Father Albert "Paring Bert" Alejo, a Jeruit priest. Serving on the GPH portion of the RCW-SER, or Reciprocal Working Committee on the Socio-Economic Component of the GPH-NDFP (Government of the Philippines-National Democratic Front of the Philippines, the latter representing the NPA) Peace Process as well as to the joint PPOC of Agusan del Norte and Misamis Oriental Provinces where it was recited in session in late May of 2011.

NPA Armed Contacts for the Third Quarter of 2011, Part IV: Davao Region, Quiet but NOT Sleeping

Up until the Spring of 2011 the Davao Region, or the Southern Mindanao Regional Committee was the most active of the NPA's five Regional Committees on Mindanao. Towards the end of spring, midway through the year's second quarter, Davao Region switched up its furious pace as NEMRC, or Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee and NCMRC, or Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee both grabbed the baton and quickly picked up the pace. Building their own momentum both Regional Committtees re-established themselves in pacified areas. For NEMRC they have once again firmly established themselves in Surigao del Norte Province. NCMRC has done the same in Misamis Oriental Province.

Still, Davao Region isn't exactly sitting on the bench.

On August 14th, 2011 a blue compact automobile slowed down as it approached Task Force Davao's Sitio Mahayahay Checkpoint in Davao City's Barangay Mawab. Located in that city's Paquibato District the checkpoint is ground zero for the NPA Insurgency in that municipality. As I have well noted time and again Davao City's local warlord, Vice Mayor Rodrigo "Roddy" Duterte had long ago formed a mutually beneficial arrangement with local NPA leader Leonicio "Ka Parago" Pitao. In exchange for Parago's agreeing to keep the rest of Davao City insurgency free Duterte has graciously offered the NPA carte blanche in four of the city's poorest, outlying districts:

1) Calinan

2) Toril

3) Marilog

and of course

4) Paquibato

Duterte has honored the gentleman's agreement to a tee and with a couple of very notable exceptions (usually confined to adjacent Baguio District), so has Ka Parago. Task Force Davao was created in the Spring of 2004 after a pair of high profile bombings by ASG, or the Abu Sayyaf Group and its closely allied but now defunct RSM, or Rajah Solaiman Movement. The two bombings:

1) Davao International Airport, where the Arrivals Kiosk, a crude cinder block structure across the service road from the actual terminal where friends and family of arriving passengers congregate to wait was targetted by a very powerful IED, or Improvised Explosive Device (as in "bomb") that killed 21 people and wounded an astounding 145 more. The powerful device was concealed inside a common black backpack that was placed under a row of cheap aluminum framed seats for added shrapnel.

2) Sasa Wharf, Davao City's ferry wharf which like most ports in the Philippines is almost a city unto itself. Two young men ordered some barbecue chicken from a take away stall. As the stall workers were preoccupied with filling their order the youngmen deposited another black backpack under the stall's front counter and left with their chicken. The explosion killed 17 people and wounded 56.

In the aftermath Duterte, then serving as Mayor and fearing that the island's Islamic Insurgencies had brought their violence into Davao City had the AFP create a dedicated force to serve as the city's first line of defence against the envisioned threat by Islamic insurgents. The nascent Task Force, or TF as they are most commonly referred to, began life with some very notable Human Rights abuses against Davao City's Muslim minority. Initially Mayor Duterte blamed the two bombings on al Qaeda. The PNP, or Philippine National Police maintained that they were committed by JI, or Jemmah Islammiyah. After all, the Indonesian Islamo-fascist organisation had recently undertaken the equaly vile Bali bombing of a discoteque frequented by Australians. The group was the flavour de jour and so, JI it was. The AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines however were non plussed with all the grand theorising about Bin Laden and Indonesians swimming from Bali to Mindanao. They were absolutely sure that none other than Mindanao's very own MILF was responsible. For all his al Qaeda fantasies Mayor Duterte must have put stock in the AFP's version of events because he authorised raids amounting to little more than low intensity warfare against known functionaries of the MILF and BIAF, or Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, the MILF military arm, who were unlucky enough to be residing in Davao City.

By the summer more rational thinking had returned, at least locally, since Manila was pushing through with the Department of Justice charging of MILF Founder slash Chairman Hashim Salamat and a number of his underlings for the two bombings. Though the charges wouldn't last long, just like the certainty of MILF involvement, TF Davao remained a part of the local landscape ever after.

The round fired by an occupant of the aforementioned blue automobile very narrowly missed striking the head of the AFP Corporal commanding the checkpoint and sending nearby food stalls and their customers into a state of pandemonium as the auto burned rubber speeding out of the city and into the adjacent municipality of Santa Cruz.

In the adjoining district of Paquibato's Barangay Paradise Embac is once again becoming the focus of the AFP's 69IB (Infantry Battalion) in its drive against the NPA. In early July of 2011 the 69th ensconced a detachment in one the barangay's two elementary schools, Paradise Embac Annex, under Second Lieutenant Tamayo with Seargent Garcia as his second in command. The barangay, like three fourths of its parent district Paquibato is under a parallel NPA Government so that an AFP garrison isn't well liked even if it wasn't living in an elementary school.

23 year old Redan Sumaria from the adjoining barangay, Paquibato Poblacion, claims that 2LT.Tamayo himself personally beat him when he was stopped at a 69IB checkpoint, after being told he "looked like NPA materiel." Likewise, 26 year old Dodong de Jesus of Barangay Paradise Embac's Sitio Upper Pandaitan claims it was Tamayo who pummeled his chest for no apparent reason at a checkpoint at that barangay's Crossing Guinobatan (Guinobatan Bridge in the sitio bearing that same name). On August 6th Tamayao and Sgt.Garcia allegedly beat Arim Maygon into unconsciousness for no apparent reason at the checkpoint immediately outside the school garrison. Others, like brothers Rudy and Cerilo Corbito complain that soldiers from the garrison have forbade them from working their own farms based upon allegations of support for the NPA.

In most NPA influenced areas these are run of the mill occurrences. On one hand the AFP and to a lesser extent the PNP harrasses and even tortures people it suspects of collusion with the NPA (those absolutely known to be in bed with the Maoists face a much worse fate). Yet the same holds true for those refusing to aid the NPA. Said to be agents of the state the NPA treats them even worse, usually expelling them from their own communities at the very least. The result being that one is damned if they do, damned if they don't.

Vis a vis the school garrison in Paquibato District, the Davao City Council has come out on the side of the villagers though one may also posit that they have come out on the side of the NPA, in which case, to be frank, it would be par for the course. Councillors Jimmy Dureza and Leah Librado Yap have co-authored a Resolution to bar the AFP from ensconcing itself within civilian institutions with a proviso expelling them from their garrison in Paradise Embac Annex. On August 25th Vice Mayor Duterte, on his television show "Ato ni Bay," (one of two weekly TV shows) urged the pair to follow through with their fight to neutralise the 69IB. Of course there is no suprise there, friend of the NPA that he is with nearly 35 years of scratching Ka Parago's back.

Duterte said that despite the Resolution passing unopposed on its first of three City Council Readings just that week, that they should still appeal directly to the Mayor, who of course is none other than Sarah "Inday" Duterte Carpio, his daughter. Duterte however tempered his support for the Resolution by noting that IF the underlying motive is to protect the well being of the students in the school slash garrison, the NPA would never attack a school even if full of AFP so that even in trying to appear fair and balanced Duterte ended up coming off like the NPA cheerleader he is, amazing, absolutely amazing.

Meanwhile, numerous residents of Barangay Paradise Embac's Puroks #6, 7, and 8 have filed yet another complaint with the City Council alleging that the 69IB's Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Patarata personally went door to door and menacingly pressured them into signing newly formulated "waivers" allowing his battalion to ensconce themselves in schools and other public buildings. Anyone who wavered or dared to resist was then told that they would be considered to be in support of the NPA. Considering the gasoline enema administered to a suspected ASG member in Basilan Province just weeks prior, and well publicised on Mindanao because of the unusual prosecution of the soldiers responsible, I am sure that LTC.Patarata got exactly what he wanted.

Panabo City, in Davao del Norte Province sits immediately adjacent to Davao City and lies within the city's SMRC, or Southern Mindanao Regional Committee AOR, or Area of Responsibility (as in "Area of Operations"). The NPA's SMRC last targetted Panabo this past spring with the ballsy tactical strike on the municipality's CPO, or City Police Office. On Friday, August 26th, 2011 in the city's Barangay Tibungol, a powerful IED detonated at the rear of Sibubon Elementary School. The powerful blast took place before daybreak, just 10 meters from a stage spanning the rear of the school. The blast is a bit mysterious since nothing was scheduled to take place on the stage, let alone anything having to do with the AFP or PNP, the usual targets of NPA Tactical Operations. However, 50 meters of detonation cord was found near the blast site leaving little question as to whether or not the NPA was involved.

Despite AFP propaganda claims the NPA does NOT utilise landmines. A typical NPA ambush DOES utilise IEDs but ALWAYS command controlled. In other words, the IED is directly detonated by an NPA guerilla via an electrical cable extending from the IED. This allows a carefully controlled detonation and prevents inadvertant detonation by other, non-legal targets. In fact, the NPA is the only organisation in Mindanao utilising command controlled detonation. The MILF/BIAF swears it no longer employs IEDs but when it did they were detonated by cordless remote, and prior to 2002 had utilised VDIEDs, Victim Detonated IEDs, a fancy acronym for what essentially amounts to a self-manufactured landmine, pressure detonated devices of varying strengths. So, this was an NPA detonation, but why there and why then remain a mystery.

Two men were sighted running from the blast site and into a rice paddy before disappearing into the jungle. Upon responding the 10ID (Infantry Division) EOD, or Explosives Ordanance Detachment discovered four other primed IEDs in the general vicinity. If I wanted to play armchair theorist I would reckon that the two men seen exiting the scene after the blast were members of an NPA IED detachment in the vicinity to secrete a number of IEDs for three ambushes, present and future. With a novice member of the detachment aboard the detachment leader took the opportunity to teach the novice how to to prime an IED for detonation. The site, behind the school was out of the way and shielded from the road upon which the IED probably would have been placed. An inadvertant detonation spooked them and they quickly escaped without retrieving their four other primed IEDs. Anyway, just a theory.

NPA Armed Contacts for the Third Quarter of 2011, Part V: Open Season on Mining Companies

In terms of exploitable natural resources, no Philippine island even comes close to Mindanao. Indeed, the island holds the world's second richest gold deposit and it may in fact be deemed THE richest before all is said and done. It goes without saying then that such an abundance of natural resources goes hand in hand with some of life's most troubling aspects; organised crime, rank corruption, degradation of entire communities as greedy carpetbaggers, domestic and foreign, run roughshod over the island's lansdcape - physically as well as culturally.

With astronomical amounts of revenue at stake mining on Mindanao also attracts insurgent organisations who prey upon all involved in the dynamic. Both small scale, so called artisnal miners AND huge foreign based multi-national corporate outfits are sucked into the vortex, forced into financing bloody political struggles they barely understand and care about even less about. Representatives from the various armed groups make the rounds, collecting steep fees which are then used to fund the continuous bloodletting. While all politically organised armed groups extort in this manner, the NPA has turned its strong armed robbery into a fine art, a template used not only all over the island of Mindanao of course but throughout the Philippines as a whole. Known by a much more Politically Correct euphanism, "Revolutionary Taxes," even participants in the service economies springing up around the smallest scale artisinal operations are targetted. A habal-habal driver, as off road motorcyclists for hire who serve as the only form of public transportation in some far flung mining communities are known, are "taxed" at P500 ($11) per month, roughly 10% of gross monthly earnings. If a driver is unable to pay he must be able to offer three small bags of unmilled rice or one small bag milled. Noone is exempt and noone is overlooked.

Of course the NPA's rationale is that all "governments" tax their constituents. However, the NPA's constituents, willing or otherwise, are still bound by the Philippine Government's rules of taxation so that the NPA, to its constituency, is having them shoulder an extremely unfair burden by essentially double dipping, at least from the taxpayers' perspective. What does a taxpayer to the NPA receive in return? The payor is entitled to understand that they PROBABLY won't be troubled by the NPA for another 4 weeks. Essentially the payor is no different from a victim in a mafia extortion scheme. While it is very true that the Government provides precious little to the dirt poor peasantry composing the bulk of Mindanao's, neigh, the Philippine's overall population, does the same hold true for the multi-national corporations who are paying up to 20% of their gross revenue each month?

Multi-national corporations already pay the Government a fair share of taxes, although there are exemptions in the pre-production phase of mining agreements. Once revenue trickles in though, the Philippine Government rarely misses a centavo. This by the way is on top of the already tendered bribes that secured and expedited such agreements in the first place. Unlike the nation's vast underclass that receives practically no services for its tax burden corporations, foreign or otherwise receive the best the nation offers (granted, that isn't saying much): security, expedited bureaucratic processes in a nation where, for example, it can take literally 6 months for the post office to send a letter from Manila to Mindanao, and are provided with at least one "Fixer" to serve at said company's beck and call. Again, it really isn't saying much but at least it is a whole lot more than the average Filipino ever enjoys.

What if a corporation simply said no to paying its "Revolutionary Taxes?" Unlike the nation's poor who cannot even imagine that option, corporations doing business on Mindanao are always well armed. Those operating outside of the island's two largest population centres, Davao City in Davao del Sur Province and Cagayan del Oro City in Misamis Oriental Province, tend to organise and employ their own paramilitaries, albeit via the AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines SCAA programme. SCAA, or Special Citizens Active Auxiliary is a component within the AFP's CAA module. Aaaaah, the Filipino penchant for acronyms, this acronym, CAA, stands for Citizen Active Auxiliary, though most laypeople simply refer to it as CAFGU, or Citizens Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit, the CAA's most visible component. The CAA is the cornerstone of the AFP's Counterinsurgency apparatus, despite the song and dance about the touchy-feely Hearts and Minds ideation at the root of the military's OPlan Bayanihan. Bayanihan, by its simplest definition is an 80:20 Programme, with the 20% being devoted towards Tac Ops (Tactical Operations, as in "Combat") and the other 80% dedicated to a non-violent strategy rooted in community based intervention at the grass roots level. That sounds grand, doesn't it? The problem though is that EVEN IF the AFP is sincere in this shift of policy, and for the most part it isn't, you cannot unveil your new Counterinsurgency strategy at a press conference in Manila and expect linemen on Mindanao to shift gears 39 years into the game. Re-training is absolutely necessary and yet even when brigades are re-trained, as they periodically are, they aren't getting more than a single afternoon of lectures to try and re-orient them.

With that understood, the SCAAs are given very little training and absolutely none of it is of a non-tactical nature. SCAAs are not groomed to smile at children and paint the bamboo hovel serving as the village schoolhouse. They are very simply tasked with protecting their employer's business (and all too often "business interests" as well) by any means necessary. They kill and are killed and though they are obstensibly under the command structure, if not the actual command of an AFP cadre battalion, they generally are given carte blanche to do as they please. Their employer recruits them and they then become employees of a given corporation upon enlistment, ergo their loyalty isn't to the state but to that particular corporation. With between a single platoon (27 to 35 men) and a single COY, or company (100 to 120 soldiers) all armed with M4s, M14s or M16s (as opposed to the 30 caliber Garands typically distributed to CAFGU CAAs) corporations naturally begin to feel that they are immune to threats given by the NPA. What happens when corporations turn off the Peso spigot?


The Third Quarter of 2011 began with the consequences of such a decision having led to a marked reaction by the Maoists. Twenty guerillas from Front 14 (NEMRC,or Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee) in a detachment led by Renato "Ka Friday" Saysay stormed Quarry #9 in the municipality of Rosario's Barangay Bayugan #3, in Agusan del Sur Province. Their goal was oh so simple, to instruct Rosario resident Roger Sawe on the need to pay one's share of "Revolutionary Taxes." Mr.Sawe is the owne of DBEC, or Datu Bulawanon Exploration Company. This past April, 2011, DBEC entered into a rather lucrative partnership with multi-national Belvedere Asset Inc. According to Philippine Law a foreign owned corporation is limited to a 40% share in mining concessions. Known as a "60:40," a foreign owned company wishing to set out a shingle anywhere in the Philippies must first enter into a minority share partnership with a Philippine based company OR else buy into such a company as long as that buy in doesn't surpass a 40% share.

Belvedere is a shell corporation for the Mali-based TTEC, or Think Environmental Company Limited. Datu Bulawanon on the other hand already holds the rights to a 846 hectare gold operation via a Special Extraction Permit issued in November of 2009. A Philippine version of a match made in heaven.

Upon entering Quarry #9 the NPA burned one excavator and three dump trucks after divesting a caretaker of a 45 caliber pistol for good measure. Afterwards the guerillas withdrew to the Surigao del Sur Provincial border on the other side of the Diwata Mountain Range. The incident was the first NPA action in the barangay since Janurary past (2011) when Front 14 overran AY 76 Security Agency, a firm employing private guards for small scale mines and low volume goldmills. Owned by retired AFP, or Armed Forces of the Phillipines Brigadier General Alexander "Alex" Yapching, in an incident I covered in an "NPA Armed Contacts for the First Quarter of 2011" entry.


On Saturday afternoon, August 6th, 2011, the employees of Nano Mines Trading were milling about the company compound in the municipality of Impasug-ong's Barangay Kapitan Bayong, having finished with yet another long week's worth of drudgerry preparing chromite for shipping. Nano is one of two foreign-owned corporations in Impasug-ong serving as middlemen to the four chromite mining operations in that town. Bukidnon Province isn't particularly keen on foreign-owned corporations raping the environment but the two firms fill a niche that supports the aforementioned mining operations, all Lumad owned. Lumad, or Animist Hill Tribesmen, are the most marginalised of Mindanowan demographics. Bukidnon's Provincial Government sees the four chromite mines as a way in which Lumads can achieve self sufficiency. More than 500 nuclear families are supported by the 4 mines, each 20 hectares in size and adjacent to one another. Hiring mining companies, usually multi-national corporations to engage in the actual minieral extraction so that for simply allowing the mining to proceed the particular Lumad band collects 60% of the profit without investing a centavo.

Chromite is a bulk ore, with tonnage as the basic increment. In addition the ore must be processed before shipping and so there is a vital niche. Nano Mines Trading fills part of that niche, handling the output from two of the four mining operations. Centered in Barangay Bayong's Purok #5, Nano's controlling owner, Kumar Jainini, is known as a man who is serious about his business. An Indian national, Mr.Jainini spends most of his nights in the company compound despite his leasing a condominium in Cagayan del Oro City, in the adjoining province of Misamis Oriental. The afternoon of August 6th found him hard at work at his office within the compound. As Mr.Jainani sat and examined his shipping records he was distracted by screaming coming from the compound yard.

At just after 2PM 40 NPA guerillas from Front 4A (NCMRC or Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee) quickly approached the compound on foot. Encountering a group of four company labourers just leaving the yard the employees quickly recognised that the NPA was in the midst of an assault on their workplace. The four labourers turned heel and attemped to warn their co-workers. Before any of them could do so however the NPA guerillas nearest them opened fire hitting all four:

1) Raymond Castro, 19 years old, killed immediately

2) Jose Castro, his brother, aged 21 and crtically wounded

3) Victor Aparellas, aged 23 and also critically wounded

4) The fourth man, identity not released, was also critically wounded but was quickly pulled out of the line of fire by a pair of NPA gunmen.


During the next couple of minutes seven other employees were wounded as well in varying degees. After grabbing two cell phones and a chainsaw the NPA withdrew, having failed to captured the primary owner of the company, Mr.Jainani who was able to make his way safely out of a hole in the compound wall as the initial assault took place and the commotion caught his attention. The NPA force fractured into smaller detachments who peeled off in separate directions before rendevouzing on the border of the nearby municipalities of Quezon and Kisolon. Meanwhile, some of the wounded employees were rushed to Kisolon Emergency Hospital in the nearby town of Sumilao. There both Jose Castro and Victor Aparellas were both declared Dead on Arrival. The fourth man who had been pulled out of the line of fire was found to have also have died during the attack. The rest of the wounded personnel were taken to other area hospitals without any further tragedies taking place.

Much later that same day, August 6th, PRO-10, or Police Regional Office for Region 10, via its RSOG, or Regional Special Operations Group, was able to nab prison escapee Rustic Brandia of Malaybalay City in that same province, Bukidnon, whom they accuse of being both an NPA guerilla as well as having served as a "Spotter" on that particular tactical operation. When NPA launch an assault on a static target like a CAA garrison or a mining company base camp there will be three elements:

1) Strike Force, attacks the target

2) Blocking Force, blocks any re-inforcements, as well as in some cases the withdrawal of an opposition force

3) Spotting Force, scouts certain positions both as an advance force for the Striking Force as well as to warn the Blocking Force of any movement along routes of re-inforcement

Bradia's elder brother Moises Bradia was a mid-ranking guerilla in the NPA's NCMRC, or North Central Mindanao Regional Committee. During a heated firefight in late August, 2007 Moises threw a hand grenade at a detachment of PNP, or Philippine National Police from the Malaybalay City MPO, or Municipal Police Office, killing PO2 Roy Francisco and wounding four of his fellow police officers in the process. The attack took place in the Brandia family home in Malaybalay City's Barangay #9, Purok #5 when five MPO officers came to serve a warrant for Rape, having had no idea that Moises Brandia was a moderately high ranking guerilla. Mid-Level and High Level NPA members always carry a hand grenade when out of the bush to be used in such situations. Brandia was then able to escape though he had also critically wounded his own mother inadvertantly in the blast. In the end she recovered.


It is worth noting that August 6th, 2011 was also the day upon which the Mayor of Lingig, Henry Santos Dano was captured by the NPA Front 20 (Conrado Heredia Command, SMRC, or Southern Mindanao Regional Committee) along with his two military bodyguards from the 75IB (Infantry Battalion). All three remain in captivity as of this posting, August 28th, 2011.