Peace Processes are a lot like the wars they aim to rectify. As any soldier can tell you, war is a whole lot of boredom and waiting around and just when you think waiting is all that you will do, a fantastic amount of action spins your head right around. The GPH, or the Government of the Philippines, and the NDFP, or the National Democratic Front of the Philippines are together engaged in a Peace Process that is no exception. After a beautiful beginning in February of 2011 when both sides met in Oslo, Norway, the Talks soon teetered on the verge of collapse over the GPH's stalling tactics. The particular issue utilised was a Joint Agreement signed back in 1995 with the Ramos Administration. Known as JASIG, or the Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees, it was meant to protect all NDFP members directly involved in the GPH-NDFP Peace Process and exempt them from both arrest and state sanctioned violence.
JASIG has been manipulated by the Philippine Government for nearly seven years now. In 2004 the NDFP stepped away from the table over then-President Gloria Arroyo's sucessful lobbying of the United States to have the CPP/NPA, or Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the New Peoples Army, blacklisted as a terrorist organisation. When Arroyo began to lobby the European Union as well the NDFP, the entity representing the CPP/NPA in the Peace Process, said "Enough!" and backed out of the Talks. Out of spite as much as from having manipulated the situation to net this very result the Arroyo Government suspended JASIG in September of 2005.
The Arroyo Government then re-implemented JASIG in August of 2009 after both sides agreed to come back to the table, an eventuality that never materialised until the changing of Administrations in 2010. The Government's uni-lateral suspension of JASIG was illegal since it was a bi-lateral Agreement ratified by both sides, ergo one side couldn't legally suspend such an Agreement without concurrence by the other. Aggravating the Government's action was the fact that from that suspension in 2005 all the way up until re-implementation in late 2009 the Government targeted known JASIG-covered personalities so that the suspension of JASIG was not meant merely to intimidate the CPP/NPA/NDFP but instead was designed as a way in which to further complicate an already veritable Gordian Knot of a Peace Process. In fact, the majority of the 26 incarcerated JASIG-covered personalities had been taken into custody during the suspended interim, from 2005 to 2009.
Then, when the NDFP finally did come back to the negotiating table in February of 2011 the Government Peace Panel's Chairman Alexander "Alex" Padilla assured his NDFP counterpart, Luis G.Jalandoni, that he would throw his weight into the issue to help gain the freedom of incarcerated JASIG-covered individuals. In fact, in the Oslo Joint Statement given at that First Round of the new cycle, Padilla actually said, "
On July 26th, 2011 the GPH Peace Panel had emissaries present, as did the Nowegian Government, when the long awaited JASIG Verification Process took place in a Dutch courtroom. As each NDFP member was offered JASIG protection his or her actual name, nom de guerre, and pseudonym especially for the Peace Process was entered onto an encrypted computer disc. Likewise with the photograph of each of those people. After the European Union placed the CPP/NPA onto its list of terrorist organisations the Dutch authorities raided the bank safe deposit box containing these encrypted discs. According to the NDFP, the investigators damaged a good many things. Apparently one such thing was the cipha disc which was to be used to de-code the encrypted photos and particulars of each JASIG-covered individual.
Chairman Padilla did not help things when he rubbed that failed Verification into the faces of the CPP/NPA/NDFP leadership. Said Padilla, "In the first place, they should not have used encrypted diskettes to store the pictures since JASIG called for individual photographs. Then their diskettes could not be opened. The failure of the verification process was entirely the fault of the NDF(P).". As if THAT hadn't been acidic enough Padilla re-hammered that dull nail, "The failure was theirs and theirs alone." Gee Alex, you have just proven exactly why attorneys should never be allowed to handle diplomatic issues. In fact, JASIG DOES call for "photos of each individual" but a diskette is merely a "storage format" and JASIG has absolutely nothing to say about THAT subject.
Still, trying to seem as if the Government is actually applying some elbow grease Padilla played another card ashortly before that July 26th Verification Process knowing full well that he would seek redress no matter HOW well the NDFP managed to link incarcerated individuals to the Peace Process. In June Padilla had arranged to have four more JASIG-covered individuals released, though he carefully choreographed the action. On July 22nd, 2011 Padilla had three of the individuals ordered released and arranged for a fourth to be let go on August 3rd as a way in which to make any complaint by Jalandoni et al on this issue look ridiculous. "How can people accuse the Government of not putting effort into solving the JASIG impasse IF three JASIG-protected individuals were released mere days before the scheduled Verification? Without even waiting for that the Government had three released. Even when the NDFP failed in the Verification Process the Government STILL had ANOTHER JASIG-protected person released!"
The four individuals:
1) Jaime "Jimmy" Soledad, 61 years old and the Secretary of the Southern Leyte Front of the NPA at the time of his arrest as well as the Secretary of the Leyte Committee of the CPP and therefore sat upon the Eastern Visayas Regional Committee of the CPP as did his wife Clarita Luego Soledad, now aged 54. On March 20th, 2008 the couple travelled to Luzon to rendevouz with a cousin of Clarita's, Vilma Madrazo of Cavite Province. Obstensibly Ms.Madrazo had asked them to travel there because she was interested in purchasing a small commercial property owned by the couple (in Clarita's name, never mind the fact that they are closet Capitalists). However, cousin Vilma had sold her services to the AFP and was trying to collect a decent bounty.
As the Soledads walked up to Vilma in front of the 7-11 convenience store in the municipality of Bacoor's Barangay Molino #3, on Daang Hari in front of the Camella Springfield Sub-division, they didn't notice several plainclothes Military Intelligence assets moving slowly towards them. As the Soledads turned to walk towards a waiting "sikad" (Triksiad, motorised taxi composed of an offroad motorcycle fitted into an aluminum shell with vinyl benches for passengers) the three were grabbed and cuffed behind their backs. Three unmarked vehicles raced to the scene of the arrest. Pushed inside an Isuzu Adventure, the middle vehicle, the three had hoods placed over their heads and ordered to remain quiet.
Two hours later the three were ushered into the Headquarters of the 2ID (Infantry Division) and the interrogations began. Vilma's 'arrest" had been for show so as to protect her and so she was released as soon as the Soldades were ushered into a separate interrogation room. Unfortunately for the Soledad's the situation was much more serious in their case. Both husband and wife had been arrested on the basis of warrants issued in 2000 for a mass grave in the municipality of Baybay, on Leyte. Much to their suprise the next day the AFP discovered that the 2000 Warrant had been voided in 2004 as the Government tried to jump start the Peace Process. While that development allowed Clarita to re-gain her freedom Jimmy was still in a lot of trouble with two other warrants. One of those two related to yet another mass grave on Leyte, in the town of Inopacan. Transferred to Leyte Provincial Jail, Jimmy spent the next 40 months not knowing how it would all turn out.
Ordered released on July 22nd, 2011, thanks to Chairman Padilla, it took until July 25th for the Leyte Provincial Government to verify that indeed all charges had been summarily dropped for "Lack of Evidence." Soledad had only been arrested by virtue of Command Responsibility regarding the aforementioned mass grave in Inopacan. A relic from the purges of the mid-1980s, which in the Visayas Region of the Central Philippines was given the rather innocuous label, "OPlan UOD" (Operational Plan UOD). The campaign sprang out of the same rank paranoia that first infested Mindanao (which I will discuss briefly in the case of the third detainee released). "Command Responsibility" is a military doctrine that holds all senior officers responsible for any illegal conduct on the part of their subordinates. Since Soledad was the highest ranking NPA personality in Leyte when those terrible killings took place he was the unlucky camper put upon the hotseat for it. Of course AS the highest ranking NPA commander at the time it was certainly his handiwork.
2) Jovencio "Ka Dawa/Ka Rudy" Balweg Sr., Secretary of Abra Operational Command of the NPA, as well as serving as the Command's Political Secretary, in addition to his holding a seat on the Executive Committee of the Illocos-Cordillera Regional Committee of the CPP, definitely a high value target. A Tingguian Tribesman (akin to the Lumad of Mindanao, Animist Hilltribes) from the municipality of Malibcong in Abra Province, he joined the NPA in 1979 along with his brother, Father Conrado "Ka Ambo" Balweg, a Roman Catholic priest of the SVD Order (Societas Verbi Divini aka Society of the Divine Word, a Dutch/German order sometimes referred to as Steyler). Father Conrado was forced into joining the NPA along with three fellow SVD priests after their protests against the Cellophil Resources Corporation earned them places on the AFP's Order of Battle (a list of military targets). Father Conrado quickly rose to the top after joining by taking part in 29 tactical operations that first year. Killing fourty-six soldiers and six military assets he earned himself a P200,000 bounty in 1980 terms, a fabulous amount.
Ex-communicated not long after earning that steep bounty Father Conrado married a fellow guerilla, Corazon "Ka Azon" Cortel and together the couple broke from the CPP/NPA/CPA (CPA being "Cordillera Peoples Army" the name given to the Tingguian and Igorot NPA elements operating in the Cordilleras) founding the CPLA, or the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army, in March of 1986. an organisation that two months ago, on July 6th, 2011, finally inked a Final Peace Agreement (albeit with only one of several CPLA factions). Unfortunately neither Father Conrado nor his wife lived to see it. Father Conrado was murdered by his brother Jovencio in their parent's home on New Years Eve 1999. Conrado knew that he stood a good chance of catching his brother without bodyguards at the family home in Malibcong's Barangay Buanao. He and one other guerilla made their way to the house and ended another chapter in the Philippine Insurgency.
Corazon died a natural death. En routue to the 5ID Headquarters at Camp Upi in the municipality of Gamu in Isabela Province in 2008 she suffered a massive heart attack and died before arriving at the camp hospital, at age 48. At the time of her death Corazon was the CPLA's Chief of Staff (Balweg Faction) and had been travelling to the 5ID to harrangue its comanding officer over the Government's failure to abide by Livlihood Guarantees that were part and parcel of the Mount Data Agreement, a GPH-CPLA Interim Agreement signed in the town of Mount Data on September 13th, 1987.
Jovencio was arrested on May 18th, 2009 at a PNP checkpoint near his home in Baguio City's Barangay Satellite Market Camp #7 in Mountain Province in the CAR, or Cordillera Autonomous Region. The checkpoint, jointly operated by Baguio City CPO (City Police Office) and PRO-CAR, or Police Regional Office of the Cordillera Autonomous Region, matched his face to a flyer hanging mere meters away. Balweg then produced identification in the name of his cousin, Ignacio Madella, a professor at Mountain State Agricultural College. Balweg had relocated to Baguio to lay low as he sought treatment for hypertension that had led to two strokes and a serious case of spinal stenosis.
Brought to PRO-CAR Headquarters Balweg quickly asmitted who he was and without much pressure agreed to arrange the peaceful surrender of his wife Carmen, known by the nom de guerre "Ka Dumay," and herself also a high ranking member of both the CPP and NPA. They both then had one of their sons, Jovencio Balweg Jr., also an NPA member, surrender as well.
3) Maria Luisa "Ka Mariam/Ka Byul" Pucray, Secretary of the NCMRC, or Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee at the time of her arrest in February of 2010. She and NPA member Alan Solis, a Medical Secretary with the WMRC, or the Western Mindanao Regional Committee, the weakest of the five Regional Committees on Mindanao and all but inactive at this point. Ms.Pucray was found possesing the requisite hand grenade that almost all senior NPA figures carry when they run a chance of detection and/or arrest. The two were in a station wagon and attempting to transit an AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines checkpoint in the municipality of Katipunan in Zamboanga del Norte Province.
Ms.Pucray was the leader, or Secretary of Front 12 of the now defunct NMC, the Northern Mindanao Committee in the mid-1980s. In early 1985 four of her guerillas murdered Lorenzo Coloso and his wife Corazon Pacana Coloso in front of their home in the municipality of El Salvador's Barangay Kalabaybay in Misamis Oriental Province. The four guerillas had been sent to divest the couple of a reputed cache of weapons. Finding only a damaged BB gun the guerillas became enraged and after dragging the hogtied couple outside blew the backs of their skulls off.
Mrs.Coloso was the sister of then-Misamis Oriental Provincial Govenor Fernando Pacana as well as Lieutenant Colonel Virgilio Pacana of the AFP. Both brothers called in favours from the RUC, or Regional Unified Command, a now defunct clearing house for all AFP and PNP (Philippine National Police) detachments in a given region. Copying a sucesful strategem of former President Ramon Magsaysay from his days as the Secretary of National Defense the RUC recruited low ranking NPA guerillas and cadres to serve as DPAs, or Deep Penetration Agents. At the time of Magsaysay's plan in the early 1950s, the Huk Rebellion was in danger of overtaking Manila. At the behest of his mentor, an American Sr.Officer, Magsaysay created a DPA Programme. DPAs, or Deep Penetration Agents go undercover for long periods of time so as to rise to positions of trust and power and thereafter provide intelligence of the highest value.
In just NMRC and NEMRC (the latter being the Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee) the NPA had well over 4,000 guerillas and controlled 75% of the barangays within both AORs, or Areas of Responsibility (as in "Areas of Responsibility"). In the Summerer of 1985 the RUC called in its markers and began cashing in its chips. From December of 1985 to February 12th, 1986 the RUC killed more than 400 NPA Regulars and 90 of them were killed in just a single tactical operation, the February 12th raid on the NMRC's main camp. In addition, RUC captured 156 Regulars in that same time period and that doesn't touch upon Surrenderees, guerillas who voluntarily surrendered to the Government for whatever reason. The NPA suffered a 29% reduction in manpower between those two Committees in just a 75 day period. Moreover, in June of 1985 Ms.Pucray had begun purging her unit, Front 12, torturing and executing suspected DPAs.
The end result, especially after that fabulous capture of the NMRC's main camp in which 90 guerillas were killed was an intence paranoia and it was none other than Ms.Pucray who came up with what she eventually labelled, "Kampanyang Ahos," the Garlic Campaign, building upon the purges she had instituted within Front 12 back in June. The label comes from a naïve mistake. DPAs were referred to as "Zombies." The NPA associated the old "garlic as a prophylactic against vampirism" tale with zombies. In other words, in the NPA's mind, garlic would keep the zombies from harming the NPA. The result was a series of purges, with at least five mass graves along Mindanao's northern coast from Cagayan del Oro City (Barangay Taglimao's Sitio Nabitay) in Misamis Oriental Province on over to the municipality of Las Nieves in Agusan del Norte Province. It was Pucray's Front 12 that led that disgusting spate of bloodlust. When she was charged in 2000, along with two other high ranking NPA in those two AORs:
1) Sammy Buntag
2) Laureto Cagals
and the CPP/NPA hierarchy including the movement's founder and chief ideologue Jose Maria "JOMA" Sison, Ms.Pucray dared to blame the mass graves on the AFP, until scores of eye witnesses began surfacing. Though she remained free until her 2010 arrest, Pucray did finally accept responsibility though not as an individual. Offering families of victims a P10,000 indemnification ($200) and a letter calling the victims, collectively, "Heroes of the Revolution."
4) Gliceria "Ka Choy" Pernia, released August 3rd, 2011 from Albay Provincial Jail on Luzon. His incarceration resulted in a botched rescue attempt by fellow NPA guerillas on September 16th, 2009 as the BJMP, or Bureau of Jail Management and Penology was transporting him back to the jail from a court appearance. As the van drove through the municipality of Guinobatan's Barangay Binogsacan in Albay Province guerillas assaulted the van in a daylight ambush in the middle of that town. He was being held for Murder, Multiple Murder, and Hiway Robbery.
Of course the release of these four detainees has done nothing to alleviate the current impasse. On September 6th, 2011, Norwegian Ambassador Tor Lundh, who does double duty as Facilitator of the GPH-NDFP Peace Process, invited GPH Chairman Alex Padilla and NDFP Chairman Luis G.Jalandoni for a private lunch at his official residence in Makati. Contrary to what the media has been claiming, Jalandoni did NOT agree to attend a Formal Round in late October or early November. In fact, on September 8th, NDFP Panelist Fidel Agcaoili dispelled such notions by firmly stating that the next Round can ONLY take place three weeks AFTER all detained JASIG-protected personalities are released. Don't hold your breath.
Showing posts with label Front 12. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Front 12. Show all posts
Monday, October 3, 2011
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
NPA Armed Contacts for the Second Quarter of 2011, Part VII: Pacification of Misamis Oriental Province and the Attack on Lantad CAFGU
Misamis Oriental Province on Mindanao's northern coast is one of two Mindanaowan provinces declared "Pacified" by the AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines in the fourth quarter of 2010. Pacification simply requires the signature of the ID CO, or Infantry Division Commanding Officer, under whose AOR, or Area of Responsibility the province lies, in this case the 4ID. There is no quantified process requiring a minimum of armed contacts, etc. Once the ID CO makes what is purely judgement call, the armed response to the insurgency within that province is officialy turned over to the PPOC, or Provincial Peace and Order Committee for management and is perceived to then be a Law and Order issue, or in Philippine speak, a Peace and Order issue, to be dealt with by the PNP, or Philippine National Police on the ground.
Misamis Oriental had come a long way in a very short time to even be considered for a security downgrade. Indeed one of its municipalities, the town of Balingasag had just 4 years before been under virtual control of the NPA. Sitio Lantad, a Higaon-on Tribal settlement in the municipality's Barangay Kibanban was declared "Liberated Territory" by the NPA which had implemented a full parallel government there in 1987. While parallel NPA Governments are in no way unique, then OR now, the "Government" in Sitio Lantad exerted 100% control even to the point of issuing land deeds and recording births and deaths.
The standard narrative is that the big turn around is single handedly due to Misamis Oriental's Governor, Oscar Moreno. Elected in 2004 he turned his attention to the sitio, believing in the standard COIN, or Counterinsurgency mantra that "Insurgencies begin where good roads end." That adage sums up the orthadox take on the main impetus behind insurgency; namely, that organisations like the NPA flourish in places where governments fail to provide basic services. Of course there is truth in that but like most anything else, it involves a whole lot more.
If a lack of attention and services is the root cause of the NPA's strength in Sitio Lantad, Governor Moreno sought to effectively deal with that in a common sensical manner. The first step, from that orthadox perspective, is to have the AFP clear the sitio of NPA regulars, or full time guerillas. To that end the 8IB (Infantry Battalion) saturated the sitio and cleared it. Upon clearing the second step is to "hold" the community, to prevent re-infiltration by the insurgency. Therefore the 8IB established a garrison on a hill overlooking the 200 house sitio, manned by the battalions Company C. Finally, the 8IB supervised the recruitment of a CAFGU platoon from the sitio. CAFGU, or Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit is the cornerstone of the CAA, or Civilian Active Auxiliary programme, itself the cornerstone of the AFP's COIN blueprint. Since I have discussed the CAA in more than a couple of my recent NPA entries, for the sake of brevity I will merely offer that the CAFGU are a geographically specific armed reserve of the AFP (via J5, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations). Its personnel are residents of the community in which they serve and they may not operate outside of their parent municipality.
After the "holding" stage is reached, it is time to re-establish, or in most cases establish for the first time ever a visible and meaningful Governmental presence. Sitio Lantad sits in a valley in the Balatucan Mountains. Located 18km upland from the more populated sections of its parent barangay, Kibanban, the only way to reach Lantad was by a footpath that was usually impassable along an 11km stretch. The valley's rather high elevation means that it isn't subject to the two Monsoons that drive most of Mindanao's weather systems. Instead it receives a short but torrential rainfall on most every afternoon of the year, relegating that one footpath to almost marsh-like consistency. The impassability of the trail narrowed down travel options to either horse or buffalo (carabao), and kept the people of Lantad in dire povery and perpetual isolation. Governor Moreno then embarked upon the construction of a gravel track that when completed in July of 2006 allowed habal-habal (motorcycle taxi) travel on a permanent basis.
Next, Governor Moreno constructed a solar dryer, basically a concrete patio with concave furrows that allow easier sun drying of the dry rice grown in the valley. The Governor then secured the assistance of various NGOs to help provide solar panels that allowed electrification of most sitio homes along with health and educational initiatives. By 2007 Sitio Lantad itself was declared Pacified and the Governor vowed to use the experience gained there as a template for pacification for the rest of the province.
Of course the Government's re-taking of Sitio Lantad, if indeed that is what it really was, had little to do with the improvements given to the villagers. In the late 1980s to early 1990s Lantad became a logistical hub for the NPA's Northern Mindanao Region, or NMR as well as the CMR, or Central Mindanao Region and the NMR, or Northern Mindanao Region, the Region to which Lantad was attached. With NPA founder and leader Jose Maria Sison's release from prison in 1986 the NPA underwent an ideological shakeup that precipitated a major organisational crisis. With Sison locked away in prison since 1977 the group's Maoist foundation began to support other ideological lines. The shift began in the organisation's Manila-Rizal Committee on Luzon, under its Secretary, Felimon "Ka Popoy" Lagman. Maoism is built upon the premise that the rural masses, the peasantry, are the backbone of the nation and therefore must drive any far reaching social and/or political change. More to the point, the armed struggle must remain a rural-based campaign until the insurgency's final stages. NPA members living in Metro Manila naturally felt that the urban masses forming the bulk of their membership and 100% of their mass base of support also had alot to offer the armed struggle and under Lagman's custodianship the Manila-Rizal Committee further entrenched itself in this divergent position. There were a host of hard ideological issues and other underlying organisationally based issues dividing Lagman and the CPP, or Communist Party of the Philippines (the NPA is but an armed wing of the CPP) dating back to the 1978 Congressional and Senatorial Elections when Lagman eschewed the standard CPP/NPA boycott of elections and agitated for participation. Still, the crux of the divide centered upon the perspective that Maoism was tailored for the China of the 1930s and 40s, not the Philippines of the mid-1980s. That last point was especially popular in strong Regional Committees in all three of the major Philippine Regions, the entire top tier of leadership in KOMVIS, or Visayas Committee (Komiteng Visayas) the Visayas Region and in Central Mindanao, Far South Mindanao, and Western Mindanao in the Southern Philippines as well.
With Sison's re-emergence and the huge ideological misstep taken with the same CPP/NPA adherance to boycotting of all state elections...even when THE "election" happens to be the first post-Marcos Presidential Election, set the stage for a major showdown precipitated by the NPA over-reacted to these ideological variations. Ka Popoy and Manila-Rizal were at the forefront of the brewing storm. With Sison's re-entry came the need, as he and his organisational allies saw it, to separate the chaff and let it fall where it would. All the more pressing were a host of external forces driving this dynamic. While Sison almost gleefully pointed to the collapse of the Soviet Union as proof positive of Maoism's advantages Lagman, et al correctly pointed out that China was no longer the land of Mao caps and cookie cutter bicycles. It was quickly backsliding into capitalism. Lagman then made it a personal issue with thre widely distributed manifestos collectively known within the CPP/NPA as "Counter-Thesis I."
Lagman then upped it a notch, spurred on by high ranking allies in KOMVIS, he withdrew Manila-Rizal from the CPP/NPA and publicly distributed the resignation letter. Meanwhile, here on Mindanao, the Central Mindanao Region, or CMR, only in existence for less than 4 years (created from a merging of Moro Region, MR, and North Western Region, NWR) had begun chafing under Sison's "my way or the hiway" heavy handedness. The concern on Mindanao could never be "urbanist insurrectionism" as it had been with Lagman and his supporters. Instead, the issues at play were of a totally different sort, albeit just as divisive - if not more- than Lagman's disillusionment with Chairman Mao.
Mindanao had started later than most other regions as far as the Communist struggle is concerned. Its first cadres didn't arrive until 1973 and it wasn't until 1977 that the movement could support a tactical strike on the island. Then, in 1978 the movement suddenly caught on like wildfire and spread throughout Mindanao, even making headway into Muslim-dominated areas like Maguindanao Province by the dawn of the 1980s. The rest of the 1980s saw increasing momentum that had the NPA snowballing in all corners of the island. However all was not well. The CPP had never been well developed on Mindanao and now that the armed wing, the NPA, was expanding exponentially it was impossible to close the gap between the military and political wings. People were recruited directly into the NPA without an ounce of political underpinning and so at critical mass, in 1985, the organisation on Mindanao was set to implode.
The Kampanyang Aho, or "Garlic Campaign" began with a terrified but well intentioned investigation into the AFP and PC, or Philippine Constulbary (now defunct) DPAs, or Deep Penetration Agents. Dating back to the Philippine's immediate post WWII Communist Insurgency in Central Luzon, the so called "Huk Rebellion," the Philippine Military establishment had run deeply buried sleepers in all Leftist slash subversive organisations. The concern on Mindanao was entirely mis-placed. What few DPAs were in play were entirely under deployment on Luzon. Undoubtedly recently trained local youth may have been deployed but were in no way serving as DPAs whose modus operandi had been to climb the ranks of Leftist organisations in order to provide worthwhile intel worth of the substantial investment their deploment represented.
Centered in what was then NMR, or Northern Mindanao Region, in and around the municipality of Opol in Misamis Oriental Province, Aho ended up killing nearly 900 NPA guerillas, or 20% of all NPA regulars on Mindanao during the campaign's duration, 1985 to 1986. Then, largely because of the missteps taken during the purge, there was a total restructuring of the NPA on the island. To say that the situation was precarious even before Sison was released from prison and began trying to realign the CPP/NPA would be absolutely correct. The most power Front in NMR, Front 12, was also the entity spearheading the purge and so out with the old, in with the new. CMR was born as a direct reaction to Aho, in 1987.
eadership of CMR along with a portion of the leadership in FSR (Far South) and WMR (Western) felt that Sison's "one size fits all" approach was a piss poor fit for Mindanao's unique cultural and social landscape. Together the leadership of the three Regions, together comprising 60% of the NPA leadership on Mindanao signed a manifesto in which they expressed dissatisfaction with the CPP's lack of tendency and the increasingly despotic decision making process. They asked that the CPP allow for a Congress in which to sort out these divergent perspectives.
When, at the CPP's 10th Party Plenum in 1993, FSR and WMR stepped away from the aforementioned critique of Sison, CMR remained steadfast and by the end of 1993 found itself unceremoniously expelled from the CPP/NPA, joining Manila-Rizal and virtually the entire Central Visayas structure along with its parent structure, VISKOM, in trying to forge a new path independently of the Sison organisation. The three elements then parlezed and by the second organisational meeting in September of 1995 had formed the PCP, or Peoples Communist Party and its armed wing, the RPA, or Revolutionary Proletariat Army. This loosely structured organisation was militarily speaking, fairly active. Politically though there was no unified direction unless "away from Maoism" counts as a "direction." In mid-1998 the three separate strands within the PCP:
1) Manila-Rizal
2) KOMVIS
3) Central Mindanao Region
formed a much more cohesive and much better politically grounded organisation, the RPM-P, or Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa -Pilipinas. Usually referred to by its English translation, Revolutionary Workers Party of the Philippines, with the military component remaining the RPA. There was a second military organisation as well, ABB or the Alex Boncayo Brigade. Formed out of Manila-Rizal's SPARU, or Special Partisan Armed Revolutionary Unit. SPARU were and of course remain the NPA's assassination squads. The love affair wouldn't last though, when the RMP-P/RPA/ABB entered into a Peace Process with the Estrada Government the following year. As RMP-P etc reached a Final Peace Agreement in 2001 the Mindanowan branch broke away and formed the RPM-M/RPA. The "M" standing for Mindanao of course and the "P" in RPA changed to "Peoples," as in "Revolutionary Peoples Army."
So, not only was the NPA in Misamis Oriental Province, like all other areas, suffering from infighting but its logistics were decimated. Sitio Lantad had served as a logistical hub for two Regional NPA formations, besides the formation that would eventually come to be labelled, NCMRC, or Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee :
1) NEMRC or Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee
2) WMRC or Western Mindanao Regional Committee
All this led to the NPA losing its unquestioned hold upon Sitio Lantad in 1992. The truth of the matter is, pacification was assured even without Governor Moreno's intervention. The people MOST responsible for the dislodgement of the NPA in Sitio Lantad was the NPA itself.
By 2010 the NPA was re-establishing a foothold in Sitio Lantad's parent municipality, Balingasag, with a show of force at that town's Barangay Napaliran. On the day in question, at the barangay's fiesta, a yearly celebration devoted to the patron saint held near and dear by every Christian community in the Philippines, the NPA deployed a SPARU team for a public assassination. With the depleted resources of the Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee not being able to support its own SPARU element, the Southern Mindanao Regional Committee, or SMRC graciously "lent" the services of its more than capable Eking Balacuit Command. The SPARU team chose to make a point by blowing off the face of Staff Seargent Elmo G.Penar of the AFP's 8IB. Unfortunately they chose to do so as he stood next to his friend, Alexander Pabualan of that town's Barangay Uno. Both men died immediately. SSgt.Penar was targetted for two specific actions he had taken part in:
1) Capture of Front 4-B's main camp in December of 2003
2) Capture of two NPA guerillas on Janurary 14th, 2006
of course both incidents had nothing to do with the targetting of SSgt.Penar. If the NPA were to kill every member of the AFP who takes part in a Tactical Operation against it there would be bodies all over Mindanao...WAIT! There ARE bodies all over Mindanao! Anyway, I am sure that most readers will get the point. The killing merely served as a wake up call that the NPA was not out of the picture in the town of Balingasag. Front 4-B was utilised in the rationale because it is the Front that was supposedly destroyed in the clearing of Sitio Lantad.
Since the SPARU action Front 4-B has been steadily re-couping ground and support. It is ironic that the Pacification of Misamis Oriental Province took place just 80-odd days after that assassination. All the more so when Pacification entails a re-deployment of IBs (Infantry Battalions) out of cleared communities. 8IB's garrisons have remained as is. Maybe their CO, Lieutenant Colonel Pascua os psychic because on April 15th, 2011 Front 4-B attempted to overrun the CAFGU post in none other than Sitio Lantad. At just before midnite 20 guerillas launched an attack and though they failed to capture the post did end up critically wounding three CAAs from the 223rd CAA Company with shrapnel from a couple of rifle grenades:
1) Jimmy Lindahay
2) Nino Luga
3) Apolinario Luga
The recent ratcheting up of hostilities inspired William Castillio, a resident of Lantad and General Manager of the LMPC, or Lantad Multi-Purpose Co-operative to author a proclamation being billed as the "Lantad Manifesto" by some dimwitted local pseudo-journalists who seem to think the sitio's past as an NPA showpiece relegates everything in and about it to Communist cliches. Most notably perhaps was the proclamation's primary author being William Castillo. Castillo's father Conrado was a mid-level NPA guerilla who was "elected" as the NPA Mayor of Lantad during its NPA heyday. In the mid-90s Conrado Castillo became a Surrenderee to the Government only to receive his come uppance from the NPA in 1999 when he was killed by his ex-"Comrades."
The proclamation was handed to Father Albert "Paring Bert" Alejo, a Jeruit priest. Serving on the GPH portion of the RCW-SER, or Reciprocal Working Committee on the Socio-Economic Component of the GPH-NDFP (Government of the Philippines-National Democratic Front of the Philippines, the latter representing the NPA) Peace Process as well as to the joint PPOC of Agusan del Norte and Misamis Oriental Provinces where it was recited in session in late May of 2011.
Misamis Oriental had come a long way in a very short time to even be considered for a security downgrade. Indeed one of its municipalities, the town of Balingasag had just 4 years before been under virtual control of the NPA. Sitio Lantad, a Higaon-on Tribal settlement in the municipality's Barangay Kibanban was declared "Liberated Territory" by the NPA which had implemented a full parallel government there in 1987. While parallel NPA Governments are in no way unique, then OR now, the "Government" in Sitio Lantad exerted 100% control even to the point of issuing land deeds and recording births and deaths.
The standard narrative is that the big turn around is single handedly due to Misamis Oriental's Governor, Oscar Moreno. Elected in 2004 he turned his attention to the sitio, believing in the standard COIN, or Counterinsurgency mantra that "Insurgencies begin where good roads end." That adage sums up the orthadox take on the main impetus behind insurgency; namely, that organisations like the NPA flourish in places where governments fail to provide basic services. Of course there is truth in that but like most anything else, it involves a whole lot more.
If a lack of attention and services is the root cause of the NPA's strength in Sitio Lantad, Governor Moreno sought to effectively deal with that in a common sensical manner. The first step, from that orthadox perspective, is to have the AFP clear the sitio of NPA regulars, or full time guerillas. To that end the 8IB (Infantry Battalion) saturated the sitio and cleared it. Upon clearing the second step is to "hold" the community, to prevent re-infiltration by the insurgency. Therefore the 8IB established a garrison on a hill overlooking the 200 house sitio, manned by the battalions Company C. Finally, the 8IB supervised the recruitment of a CAFGU platoon from the sitio. CAFGU, or Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit is the cornerstone of the CAA, or Civilian Active Auxiliary programme, itself the cornerstone of the AFP's COIN blueprint. Since I have discussed the CAA in more than a couple of my recent NPA entries, for the sake of brevity I will merely offer that the CAFGU are a geographically specific armed reserve of the AFP (via J5, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations). Its personnel are residents of the community in which they serve and they may not operate outside of their parent municipality.
After the "holding" stage is reached, it is time to re-establish, or in most cases establish for the first time ever a visible and meaningful Governmental presence. Sitio Lantad sits in a valley in the Balatucan Mountains. Located 18km upland from the more populated sections of its parent barangay, Kibanban, the only way to reach Lantad was by a footpath that was usually impassable along an 11km stretch. The valley's rather high elevation means that it isn't subject to the two Monsoons that drive most of Mindanao's weather systems. Instead it receives a short but torrential rainfall on most every afternoon of the year, relegating that one footpath to almost marsh-like consistency. The impassability of the trail narrowed down travel options to either horse or buffalo (carabao), and kept the people of Lantad in dire povery and perpetual isolation. Governor Moreno then embarked upon the construction of a gravel track that when completed in July of 2006 allowed habal-habal (motorcycle taxi) travel on a permanent basis.
Next, Governor Moreno constructed a solar dryer, basically a concrete patio with concave furrows that allow easier sun drying of the dry rice grown in the valley. The Governor then secured the assistance of various NGOs to help provide solar panels that allowed electrification of most sitio homes along with health and educational initiatives. By 2007 Sitio Lantad itself was declared Pacified and the Governor vowed to use the experience gained there as a template for pacification for the rest of the province.
Of course the Government's re-taking of Sitio Lantad, if indeed that is what it really was, had little to do with the improvements given to the villagers. In the late 1980s to early 1990s Lantad became a logistical hub for the NPA's Northern Mindanao Region, or NMR as well as the CMR, or Central Mindanao Region and the NMR, or Northern Mindanao Region, the Region to which Lantad was attached. With NPA founder and leader Jose Maria Sison's release from prison in 1986 the NPA underwent an ideological shakeup that precipitated a major organisational crisis. With Sison locked away in prison since 1977 the group's Maoist foundation began to support other ideological lines. The shift began in the organisation's Manila-Rizal Committee on Luzon, under its Secretary, Felimon "Ka Popoy" Lagman. Maoism is built upon the premise that the rural masses, the peasantry, are the backbone of the nation and therefore must drive any far reaching social and/or political change. More to the point, the armed struggle must remain a rural-based campaign until the insurgency's final stages. NPA members living in Metro Manila naturally felt that the urban masses forming the bulk of their membership and 100% of their mass base of support also had alot to offer the armed struggle and under Lagman's custodianship the Manila-Rizal Committee further entrenched itself in this divergent position. There were a host of hard ideological issues and other underlying organisationally based issues dividing Lagman and the CPP, or Communist Party of the Philippines (the NPA is but an armed wing of the CPP) dating back to the 1978 Congressional and Senatorial Elections when Lagman eschewed the standard CPP/NPA boycott of elections and agitated for participation. Still, the crux of the divide centered upon the perspective that Maoism was tailored for the China of the 1930s and 40s, not the Philippines of the mid-1980s. That last point was especially popular in strong Regional Committees in all three of the major Philippine Regions, the entire top tier of leadership in KOMVIS, or Visayas Committee (Komiteng Visayas) the Visayas Region and in Central Mindanao, Far South Mindanao, and Western Mindanao in the Southern Philippines as well.
With Sison's re-emergence and the huge ideological misstep taken with the same CPP/NPA adherance to boycotting of all state elections...even when THE "election" happens to be the first post-Marcos Presidential Election, set the stage for a major showdown precipitated by the NPA over-reacted to these ideological variations. Ka Popoy and Manila-Rizal were at the forefront of the brewing storm. With Sison's re-entry came the need, as he and his organisational allies saw it, to separate the chaff and let it fall where it would. All the more pressing were a host of external forces driving this dynamic. While Sison almost gleefully pointed to the collapse of the Soviet Union as proof positive of Maoism's advantages Lagman, et al correctly pointed out that China was no longer the land of Mao caps and cookie cutter bicycles. It was quickly backsliding into capitalism. Lagman then made it a personal issue with thre widely distributed manifestos collectively known within the CPP/NPA as "Counter-Thesis I."
Lagman then upped it a notch, spurred on by high ranking allies in KOMVIS, he withdrew Manila-Rizal from the CPP/NPA and publicly distributed the resignation letter. Meanwhile, here on Mindanao, the Central Mindanao Region, or CMR, only in existence for less than 4 years (created from a merging of Moro Region, MR, and North Western Region, NWR) had begun chafing under Sison's "my way or the hiway" heavy handedness. The concern on Mindanao could never be "urbanist insurrectionism" as it had been with Lagman and his supporters. Instead, the issues at play were of a totally different sort, albeit just as divisive - if not more- than Lagman's disillusionment with Chairman Mao.
Mindanao had started later than most other regions as far as the Communist struggle is concerned. Its first cadres didn't arrive until 1973 and it wasn't until 1977 that the movement could support a tactical strike on the island. Then, in 1978 the movement suddenly caught on like wildfire and spread throughout Mindanao, even making headway into Muslim-dominated areas like Maguindanao Province by the dawn of the 1980s. The rest of the 1980s saw increasing momentum that had the NPA snowballing in all corners of the island. However all was not well. The CPP had never been well developed on Mindanao and now that the armed wing, the NPA, was expanding exponentially it was impossible to close the gap between the military and political wings. People were recruited directly into the NPA without an ounce of political underpinning and so at critical mass, in 1985, the organisation on Mindanao was set to implode.
The Kampanyang Aho, or "Garlic Campaign" began with a terrified but well intentioned investigation into the AFP and PC, or Philippine Constulbary (now defunct) DPAs, or Deep Penetration Agents. Dating back to the Philippine's immediate post WWII Communist Insurgency in Central Luzon, the so called "Huk Rebellion," the Philippine Military establishment had run deeply buried sleepers in all Leftist slash subversive organisations. The concern on Mindanao was entirely mis-placed. What few DPAs were in play were entirely under deployment on Luzon. Undoubtedly recently trained local youth may have been deployed but were in no way serving as DPAs whose modus operandi had been to climb the ranks of Leftist organisations in order to provide worthwhile intel worth of the substantial investment their deploment represented.
Centered in what was then NMR, or Northern Mindanao Region, in and around the municipality of Opol in Misamis Oriental Province, Aho ended up killing nearly 900 NPA guerillas, or 20% of all NPA regulars on Mindanao during the campaign's duration, 1985 to 1986. Then, largely because of the missteps taken during the purge, there was a total restructuring of the NPA on the island. To say that the situation was precarious even before Sison was released from prison and began trying to realign the CPP/NPA would be absolutely correct. The most power Front in NMR, Front 12, was also the entity spearheading the purge and so out with the old, in with the new. CMR was born as a direct reaction to Aho, in 1987.
eadership of CMR along with a portion of the leadership in FSR (Far South) and WMR (Western) felt that Sison's "one size fits all" approach was a piss poor fit for Mindanao's unique cultural and social landscape. Together the leadership of the three Regions, together comprising 60% of the NPA leadership on Mindanao signed a manifesto in which they expressed dissatisfaction with the CPP's lack of tendency and the increasingly despotic decision making process. They asked that the CPP allow for a Congress in which to sort out these divergent perspectives.
When, at the CPP's 10th Party Plenum in 1993, FSR and WMR stepped away from the aforementioned critique of Sison, CMR remained steadfast and by the end of 1993 found itself unceremoniously expelled from the CPP/NPA, joining Manila-Rizal and virtually the entire Central Visayas structure along with its parent structure, VISKOM, in trying to forge a new path independently of the Sison organisation. The three elements then parlezed and by the second organisational meeting in September of 1995 had formed the PCP, or Peoples Communist Party and its armed wing, the RPA, or Revolutionary Proletariat Army. This loosely structured organisation was militarily speaking, fairly active. Politically though there was no unified direction unless "away from Maoism" counts as a "direction." In mid-1998 the three separate strands within the PCP:
1) Manila-Rizal
2) KOMVIS
3) Central Mindanao Region
formed a much more cohesive and much better politically grounded organisation, the RPM-P, or Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa -Pilipinas. Usually referred to by its English translation, Revolutionary Workers Party of the Philippines, with the military component remaining the RPA. There was a second military organisation as well, ABB or the Alex Boncayo Brigade. Formed out of Manila-Rizal's SPARU, or Special Partisan Armed Revolutionary Unit. SPARU were and of course remain the NPA's assassination squads. The love affair wouldn't last though, when the RMP-P/RPA/ABB entered into a Peace Process with the Estrada Government the following year. As RMP-P etc reached a Final Peace Agreement in 2001 the Mindanowan branch broke away and formed the RPM-M/RPA. The "M" standing for Mindanao of course and the "P" in RPA changed to "Peoples," as in "Revolutionary Peoples Army."
So, not only was the NPA in Misamis Oriental Province, like all other areas, suffering from infighting but its logistics were decimated. Sitio Lantad had served as a logistical hub for two Regional NPA formations, besides the formation that would eventually come to be labelled, NCMRC, or Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee :
1) NEMRC or Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee
2) WMRC or Western Mindanao Regional Committee
All this led to the NPA losing its unquestioned hold upon Sitio Lantad in 1992. The truth of the matter is, pacification was assured even without Governor Moreno's intervention. The people MOST responsible for the dislodgement of the NPA in Sitio Lantad was the NPA itself.
By 2010 the NPA was re-establishing a foothold in Sitio Lantad's parent municipality, Balingasag, with a show of force at that town's Barangay Napaliran. On the day in question, at the barangay's fiesta, a yearly celebration devoted to the patron saint held near and dear by every Christian community in the Philippines, the NPA deployed a SPARU team for a public assassination. With the depleted resources of the Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee not being able to support its own SPARU element, the Southern Mindanao Regional Committee, or SMRC graciously "lent" the services of its more than capable Eking Balacuit Command. The SPARU team chose to make a point by blowing off the face of Staff Seargent Elmo G.Penar of the AFP's 8IB. Unfortunately they chose to do so as he stood next to his friend, Alexander Pabualan of that town's Barangay Uno. Both men died immediately. SSgt.Penar was targetted for two specific actions he had taken part in:
1) Capture of Front 4-B's main camp in December of 2003
2) Capture of two NPA guerillas on Janurary 14th, 2006
of course both incidents had nothing to do with the targetting of SSgt.Penar. If the NPA were to kill every member of the AFP who takes part in a Tactical Operation against it there would be bodies all over Mindanao...WAIT! There ARE bodies all over Mindanao! Anyway, I am sure that most readers will get the point. The killing merely served as a wake up call that the NPA was not out of the picture in the town of Balingasag. Front 4-B was utilised in the rationale because it is the Front that was supposedly destroyed in the clearing of Sitio Lantad.
Since the SPARU action Front 4-B has been steadily re-couping ground and support. It is ironic that the Pacification of Misamis Oriental Province took place just 80-odd days after that assassination. All the more so when Pacification entails a re-deployment of IBs (Infantry Battalions) out of cleared communities. 8IB's garrisons have remained as is. Maybe their CO, Lieutenant Colonel Pascua os psychic because on April 15th, 2011 Front 4-B attempted to overrun the CAFGU post in none other than Sitio Lantad. At just before midnite 20 guerillas launched an attack and though they failed to capture the post did end up critically wounding three CAAs from the 223rd CAA Company with shrapnel from a couple of rifle grenades:
1) Jimmy Lindahay
2) Nino Luga
3) Apolinario Luga
The recent ratcheting up of hostilities inspired William Castillio, a resident of Lantad and General Manager of the LMPC, or Lantad Multi-Purpose Co-operative to author a proclamation being billed as the "Lantad Manifesto" by some dimwitted local pseudo-journalists who seem to think the sitio's past as an NPA showpiece relegates everything in and about it to Communist cliches. Most notably perhaps was the proclamation's primary author being William Castillo. Castillo's father Conrado was a mid-level NPA guerilla who was "elected" as the NPA Mayor of Lantad during its NPA heyday. In the mid-90s Conrado Castillo became a Surrenderee to the Government only to receive his come uppance from the NPA in 1999 when he was killed by his ex-"Comrades."
The proclamation was handed to Father Albert "Paring Bert" Alejo, a Jeruit priest. Serving on the GPH portion of the RCW-SER, or Reciprocal Working Committee on the Socio-Economic Component of the GPH-NDFP (Government of the Philippines-National Democratic Front of the Philippines, the latter representing the NPA) Peace Process as well as to the joint PPOC of Agusan del Norte and Misamis Oriental Provinces where it was recited in session in late May of 2011.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)