Probably the most newsworthy of stories coming out of the GPH-MILF Peace Process in all of 2011 has been the Kumander Kato story. As many readers already know, Kumander Ustadz Ameril Ombra Kato was the one person most responsible for the 2008 War. Commanding the 105 Base Command, the largest and most powerful of all the BIAF (Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces as the military wing of the MILF is known) Base Commands, Kato led his men in the attack on and susbsequent occupation of the PALMMA Complex in North Cotabato Province just after the failed signing of the GPH-MILF Interim Agreement popularly known as the MoA-AD, or Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain, on August 4th, 2008. Operating in tandem with Kato was the 102 and 103 Base Commands in the Lanao Region and between these three Base Commands, collectively (and incorrectly) labeled as "Lawless Elements" (meaning that they were operating outside of the MILF/BIAF Chain of Command which of course was utter nonsense), they terrorised 70% of Mindanao for the better part of a year and a half.
When, in July of 2009, both the Philippine military and the MILF re-established their spotty Ceasefire Kato was left out of the loop. Orders were being transmitted from the BIAF General Staff directly to Kato's subordinates but much more importantly Kato hadn't been consulted when the MILF/BIAF leadership had been negotiating the terms that led to each side uni-laterally declaring their respective SOMO/SOMAs (Stop of Military Operation/Stop of Military Actions). Kato felt that he was being made a scapegoat for the 2008 War and sacrificed by his organisation. Kato also felt that the MILF leadership had forgotten the teachings and principles of its late founder and Chairman, Hashim Salamat.
In a bit of childish egotism Kato decided to "test" the MILF leadership by tendering his resignation from the BIAF, the military wing, citing his age and increasing physical infirmities. He then had his core following and the civilians within his AOR, or Area of Responsibility (as in "Area of Operations") submit emotionally laden petitions in which they demanded that the MILF Central Committee reject Kato's Letter of Resignation. Kato admits that even he was suprised when the Central Committee accepted his resignation without a murmur, let alone even a mentioning of the petitions that had been submitted. In Kato's own words it was then that he resolved to leave the organisation.
Having accepted Kato's resignation the BIAF promoted a more moderate sub-Kumander named Zacarias Goma to replace Kato as overall commander, or "Kumander," of the 105 Base Command. Leaving the BIAF is not synonymous with leaving the MILF and so the Central Committee put Kato out to pasture as an "Advisor" to the MILF Shari'a Court (Islamic Court) with concurrent- but non-existent- responsibilities with the MILF Da'wa Committee (Islamic Outreach). Kato ignored the snub and declared the founding of BIFF, or the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters. BIFF, as Kato described it at the time, was not an independent organisation but rather a new faction WITHIN the MILF/BIAF that aimed to remain true to the teachings of MILF founder Hashim Salamat. Ensconcing himself in the 105 Base Command's main base, Camp Omar ibn Khattab in Maguindanao Province, Kato continued his schizophrenic double talk of "not MILF/BIAF but still MILF/BIAF" and went about luring guerillas and sub-Kumanders from other Base Commands.
Kato's rationale in not burning his bridges with the MILF/BIAF was simple prudence. While still clinging to the organisation he and BIFF were all but immune from arrest, capture, and/or blatant attack from the AFP/PNP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines/Philippine National Police. The 2008 War had earned Kato a P10 Million ($215,000) bounty and at least 82 criminal charges most of which were Murder and Multiple Murder. Because of the GPH-MILF Peace Process the Government was and remains today very careful about going after any member of the MILF/BIAF. The few that have been apprehended were nabbed well outside of MILF/BIAF AOR. For example, MILF Central Committee member Abraham Yap Alonto who is much better known by the alias Eduardo Guerra (even the MILF has a sense of humor, "Guerra" being Spanish for "War"); Alonto/Guerra was only captured when he stupidly left the safety of the MILF/BIAF AOR and entered Davao City which for better or worse is deemed neutral territory. Still, authorities were so cautious that they waited until their target had physically boarded an airplane that then left the terminal and hovered on the tarmac.
Kato remained both associated with the MILF/BIAF AND well inside one of the BIAF camps formally recognised by the Government during the GPH-MILF Peace Process. Meanwhile, the GPH Peace Panel manipulated this internal MILF/BIAF issue for all it is worth. The focus of the GPH-MILF Peace Process, for all of 2011 thus far, should have been the Comprehensive Compact. The Comprehensive Compact is the blueprint for the envisioned Interim Agreement that will allow both sides to coast almost effortlessly to the FPA, or the Final Peace Agreement. In the Philippine approach Interim Agreements are the actual "peace treaties" while FPAs are merely a legal afterthought and truth be told we might as well omit the "legal" aspect because, as we see with the MNLF, CPLA, RPM-M, and RPM-P FPAs, the Government never worries itself with the upholding of its end of FPAs. Interim Agreements bring the "reward," and act as the "end game." Instead, the GPH Peace Panel focused on Kato.
The MILF Peace Panel turned over their revised draft of its Comprehensive Compact in February. The GPH Peace Panel was to reciprocate the following month, March. From March until August 22nd the Government has played footsy with the MILF and tried its best to deflect attention away from that crucial issue by focusing upon the rift within the ranks of the MILF/BIAF. Don't get me wrong, Kato and his BIFF is indeed a serious matter that definitely is deserving of the GPH Peace Panel's time and energy. IF the Interim Agreement is ever inked, how will BIFF and its position outside of the MILF/BIAF Chain of Command affect the Interim Agreement? If BIFF attacks a municipality and the AFP responds, would neighbouring BIAF Base Commands involve themselves on the side of BIFF? If the PNP attempts to serve an arrest warrant on a BIFF member within the MILF/BIAF AOR would the BIAF use it as a pretext to engage Government forces? Still, it is nowhere near an important an issue as the Comprehensive Compact. Put technically, Kato is a Side Table issue, the meat and potatoes is the Comprehensive Compact.
To offer a prime example of how the GPH Peace Panel has manipulated the Kato imbroglio, in that aforementioned August 22nd, 2011, 22nd Exploratory Round, which took place in Kuala Lampur, Malaysia, the GPH Peace Panel was once agaim scheduled to turn over its long awaited Comprehensive Compact. As the Round opened GPH Peace Panel Chairperson Mario Victor "Marvic" Leonen asked for an hour delay in officialy opening the plenary session so as to converse with his MILF counterpart, Mohagher Iqbal, in a side conference in an adjoining anteroom. Peeved but with little choice in the matter Iqbal, along with Malaysian Facilitator Tengku Dato Abdullah Ghafar Tengku Mohammed proceeded into the anteroom where Leonen once again attempted to steer procedings towards yet another discussion of the BIFF issue. After nearly an hour that had both Chairpeople screaming at the top of their lungs Chairperson Leonen was forced to comply with the scheduled itinerary. Since I have discussed that very contentious Round and the MILF's disgust with the GPH Comprehensive Compact in two other "GPH-MILF Peace Process for the Third Quarter of 2011" entries I will segue directly back into my current topic, Kato, BIFF and Kato's manipulation of the BIFF issue vis a vis his refusal to claim outright secession from the MILF/BIAF organisation.
It took the MILF Central Committee a full year to grow a spine and take action on the matter. In the interim two other BIAF Base Commands almost collapsed as their core followings jumped ship to BIFF, resulting in the creation of a new Base Command, the 118, to try and act as a magnet for any disaffected guerillas within those two other Base Commands, the 104 and the 106. The MILF Central Committee was terrified of acting decisively against Kato and BIFF because it would be perceived by many BIAF guerillas as if the MILF leadership was in collusion with Manila, if not simply doing its bidding. While most of the BIAF wasn't about to join BIFF many, if not most within the military wing, viewed Kato as an icon of the Islamic Insurgency no matter what label he applied to himself. So, in between sending emissaries to Camp Omar ibn al Khattab the MILF Central Committee had its Ulama Council act in its stead.
To most lay people the "Bangsamoro Supreme Ulama Council," or BSUC, is an independent body of Islamic clerics but the fact of the matter is that it is an MILF entity just as the Bangsamoro Consultative Assembly, the Institute for Bangsamoro Studies, and the BDA, or Bangsamoro Development Agency are as well. Led by Sheikh Jamil Datu Haron Yahya, a Maranaw (Maranao) Tribesman from Marawi City in Lanao del Sur Province, the BSUC is a handy standby when the MILF seeks to show the outside world how it speaks for the Philippine Muslims of Mainland Mindanao.
Sheikh Yahya is a 66 year old graduate of the Medina Islamic University of Saudi Arabia. Usually seen in a purple silk caftan that would make Liberace faint from jealousy and topped with a purple turban that wonderfuly frames his Old Testament-like flowing white beard Yahya leads 125 clerics who issue rubber stamp approvals for the MILF Central Committee. When the MILF, who prides itself on absolute non-involvement in Philippine politics, had the BSCU issue its infamous Fatwa against former President Joseph "Erap" Estrada (along with Senator Franlin Drilon and Manuel "Mar" Roxas III) in the 2010 Presidential Campaign, the MILF flaunted the pronouncement while abdicating all responsibility for it, since it came from an "independent" entity. When the MILF needs some distance from anything that may be construed negatively by the Philippines' non-Muslim majority it unleashes its sock puppet Yahya to do its bidding.
While the aforementioned Fatwa is a good example it pales against the MILF's reaction to the death of Osama Bin Laden. After an MILF Central Committee member was caught supporting the terrorist icon the organisation as a whole backpedaled furiously in a mad race to distance itself from that clusterfuc* of a geopolitical nightmare while still saving face amongst Philippine Muslims who by and large supported Bin Laden and continue to view him favourably many months after his demise. Enter Sheikh Yahya, stage right. Back in October of 2001, just one month after 9/11, Yahya signed up at least 6,000 Filipino Muslims in the Lanao region to go to Afghanistan to fight in support of al Qadah and the Taliban. Most assuredly never left Mindanao but only because Yahya was unable to obtain the P40,000 ($800) per man needed to smuggle them to Afghanistan via a very circuitous route starting in Jolo, in Sulu Province. Much more recently, on May 6th, 2011, Yahya led a "Memorial Service" for Bin Laden at the Quiapo Golden Masjid in Metro Manila. He then accompanied marchers as they left the masjid (synonymous with "mosque") on Globo de Oro Street and threaded their way towards Roxas Boulevard and what they hoped was a march on the US Embassy. Interestingly, but NOT suprisingly, people close to Yahya tried to engage in damage control BEFORE the protest by claiming that the sheikh had only thought he was involved in a demonstration in support of former Libyan Dictator Khadaffi (not much damage control one reckons). However, the comments made both within the masjid whose 5,000 person capacity was far exceeded and in the march that followed dispell the claims that Sheikh Yahya wasn't acting in concert with the demonstrators.
Then, when just two weeks later the USS Carl Vinson, the American Aircraft Carrier that dumped Bin Laden's maggot laden corpse (pun perhaps intended) docked at Manila for a port call it was Yahya once again who lionised Bin Laden and demonised Americans whom he ridiculously claimed were "the world's number one terrorist." Co-incidentally the Khadaffi issue was another "MILF but not MILF" public relations nightmare. Libya has long been the patron saint of Mindanao's Islamic Insurgency. He has lent support to all three of its major organisations:
1) MNLF
2) MILF
3) Abu Sayyaf Group
and was single handedly responsible for bringing the MNLF into the OIC, or, Organisation of Islamic Countries, a move which forced then-Dictator Marcos into the GPH-MNLF Peace Process. It was only when the OIC turned on Khadaffi this past summer when the MILF finally took an official stance that criticised everyone's favourite crossdressing Islamo-fascist. Sheikh Yahya however has continued supporting Khadaffi and thereby representing the MILF's actual sentiments far more accurately than the single news release (all four sentences of it) that "criticised" him.
On June 27th, 2011 the BSCU labeled Kato a "Bughaat," an admonishment in Arabic akin to labeling one a "renegade," and cautioned Kumander Kato to make amends with MILF Chairman al Haj Murad Ebrahim. It reminded Kato that he had comitted himself to unflinching support of the MILF/BIAF via his "Bayat," or "Holy Vow of Obesiance" and that unless al Haj Murad Embrahim sinned unrepentantly, it was forbidden to withdraw support for the leader and his organisation. Theologically speaking the BSCU is basically correct but to Kato's way of thinking the MILF, under Ebrahim, has distanced itself so far from the goals and ideals of Hashim Salamat that the Bayat no longer stands. It is a situation entirely open for interpretation. Kato himself is just as educated as Sheikh Yahya, even attending that same university before graduating from another Saudi institution, and so he feels that he is at least just as qualified to make that judgement call. On July 5th the MILF Central Committee backed a Resolution (#03-06-2011) "accepting" the BSCU's labeling of "Bugha'at" and fowarded it for MILF Chairman al Haj Murad Ebrahim's signature. Ebrahim was of course cautious about signing this Resolution despite it merely being an admonishment with no teeth. Finally, feeling more secure after the August 4th meeting in Japan between himself and President Aquino, Ebrahim signed on the dotted line, on August 18th.
Finally, on September 10th, with Kato ignoring the Central Committee Resolution, the BSCU gave Kato 14 days to "repent" and make amends with the MILF Central Committe lest he be declared persona non grata by the MILF/BIAF (Hey! I thought that the BSCU was "independent" of the MILF!). Kato knew that this juncture would eventually come and so he has prepared accordingly and has even founded a political wing, the BIFM, or Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement, albeit one devoid of any real ideology apart from the MILF circa 2002. Forwarded to the MILF Central Committee the warning was finally transmitted to Kato on September 12th so that the deadline ended up becoming September 26th. The deadline came and went and so the MILF Central Committee was able to finally say that the Ulama (Islamic Scolars) gave Kato an ultimatum that he failed to acknowledge and that because of Kato's refusal to do so he left the MILF no choice but to publicly declare him persona non grata. The MILF Central Committee finally produced an official Resolution saying as much, signed by Chairman Ebrahim on September 30th, and even went so far as to commit itself towards jointly hunting down Kato and his men in tandem with the AFP (though later the MILF struggled to clarify that in doing so it would merely commit to serving as a Blocking Force to any AFP assault on Camp Omar ibn al Khattab.
The counterinsurgency on Mindanao from a first hand perspective. As someone who has spent nearly three decades in the thick of it, I hope to offer more than the superficial fluff that all too often passes for news. Covering not only the blood and gore but offering the back stories behind the mayhem. Covering not only the guns but the goons and the gold as well. Development Aggression, Local Politics and Local History, "Focus on Mindanao" offers the total package.
Showing posts with label Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters. Show all posts
Wednesday, October 5, 2011
Saturday, August 20, 2011
MILF Armed Contacts for the Third Quarter of 2011, Part I: The 106 Base Command Battles BIFF in Datu Piang
Datu Piang was a half Chinese, half Maguindanowan Tribesman who lived at the tail end of the 19th Century. Piang was more or less a self made man. Son of a Maguindanowan concubine to the Rajah of Buayan and a favoured Chinese merchant she was gifted to he gambled his future on an alliance with the Americans. As Datu Ali inherited what was left of Buayan Datu Piang moved down river into the Cotabato Basin, to a lowland site in what is today Maguindanao Province. Eventually becoming the richest man in the Southern Philippines his climb to riches and fame was made over the broken backs of countless enemies and more than a few innocent bystanders. Like its namesake, the municipality of Datu Piang, in Maguindanao Province has never enjoyed more than a few peaceful days. Datu Piang is perhaps the most violent town in an extremely violent province which itself exists on the Philippine's most violent island.
In early August of 2010 a clash took place in Datu Piang between sub-Kumander Ustadz Akas "Adzmie" Kasim of the BIAF, or Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (the military wing of the MILF) and sub-Kumander Ustadz Abu Nuwas "Bayawak" Ibad Maniog of the BIAF's 104 Base Command (see my entry entilted "MILF Armed Contacts for the Second and Third Quarters of 2010"). Both men are natives of Datu Piang's Barangay Alonganen and in fact are related to one another as indeed are most villagers living in that barangay. At stake was a 6 hectare tract of arable land immediately adjacent to the Pulangi River (Rio Grande del Mindanao), situated directly on the border of Datu Piang's Barangays Alonganen and Liong and a stone's throw from the infamous Liguasan Marsh. The conflicting claims on the untitled tract first turned violent in 2009 but was largely ignored by the Philippine Government and world at large. After all, any armed conflict in Central Mindanao must automatically be connected to War of 2008, a larger conflict that continued unabated until July of 2009, or so goes the popular assumption.
The firefights lasted only as long as the rice harvest since most of that 6 hectare tract had been cultivated with rice. As soon as the paddy was plowed under life returned to normal, at least as "normal" as it ever gets in Mindanao. Just before New Year 2011 sub-Kumander Bayawak (Abu Nawas) tendered his formal resignation to the MILF Central Committe and almost immediately afterward joined Kumander Ustadz Ameril Ombra Kato's Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, or BIFF. Fast forward to July 20th, 2011. BIFF's Chief of Staff, sub-Kumander Karialan Indong personaly led an attack on BIAF 106 Base Command positions in Barangay Balanaken's Sitio Nimao after BIAF guerillas had been sighted on a security permiter established around that 6 hectare collection of rice paddies in Barangay Alonganen. As the BIAF responded by launching retaliattory strikes the wife of sub-Kumander Bayawak (Abu Nuwas) was critically wounded during a mortar volley.
After that initial attack in July both sides took a step back from that bloody abyss and orally agreed to resolve their differences in a non-violent manner, despite the wounds inflicted on sub-Kumander Adzmie. That agreement held fast for a little more than two weeks. On August 6th Abu Nuwas led his men on an attack against Adzmie's men in their camp in Barangay Alonganen. Even before the shooting began that morning hundreds of families had began fleeing. Quickly joining them were families from the adjacent barangays Liong and Balanaken. The town's Datu Gumbay Piang Elementary School has long served as the municipality's IDP, or Internally Displaced Persons centre. By night fall on August 6th the official IDP tally stood at 482 families, of which 190 came from Balakaken, 180 from Liong, and 112 from Alonganen. In the Philippines a "family" is assumed to include five people but that figure borders on useless since demographers make no allowances for cultural, religious or even regional differences. A "family in Luzon will on average contain much less people than a socio-economically disadvantaged Tribal family whose head of household practices polygamy and whose religion commands a high reproductive rate. Moreover, the figures offered only take into account the number of heads of household that have managed to undergo the official registration process. Most IDPs take succor in other households and a fair number, distrustful of the Government or fearing disease and other negative aspects found in the state IDP centres make the best of it alongside hiways and in isolated jungle clearings. The displaced people themselves, known as "Bakwit" in the local dialect have had their daily lives disrupted every couple of months since 1972 and yet we have politicians in Manila asking why Maguindanao is the poorest province in the nation. Go figure
The day, August 7th, intermittent firefights took place in Barangays Alonganen, Liong, Balanaken with IDPs fleeing from the adjacent municipality of Guindulungan, home to the BIFF's main camp, the former-BIAF camp Omar ibn Khattab on Perez Hill. The resident of Barangay Muslim had received word that the BIAF was considering a direct attack on the camp and the news caused widespread apprehension that very quickly devolved into sheer panic. The day's fighting ended at nightfall with a finall tally (including the initial clash the day before) of five BIAF KIAs, or Killed in Actions with one known wounded. BIFF made out slightly better with three KIAs.
On August 8th BIFF launched the first attack with a moderate salvo of mortar shells against BIAF positions in Barangays Alonganen, now devoid of all civilians with the entire population having fled and Barangay Balanaken, itself nearly a carbon copy with the rest of its residents fleeing during a lull between salvos.
August 9th saw the heaviest fighting yet since this latest round commenced on August 6th. Fighting began at 630AM with the BIAF initiating a firefight and continued unabated until 330PM. At 700PM fighting began once again and only ended right before 11PM. During the morning exchanges fighting did finally spread to Guindulungan's Barangay Muslim although not related to any BIAF tactical strike against the main BIFF camp on Perez Hill. Most of Barangay Muslim's population had already fled in the preceding days but the remaining residents fled as the combatants entered the barangay with BIFF guerillas attempting to implement a Blocking Force there to deal more than 100 re-inforcements from the BIAF's 105 Base Command, co-incidentally the old command of BIFF leader Kumander Ustadz Kato. The IDPs from Barangay Muslim made their way into the ajoining municipality of Talayan's Barangays Binangga North, Tambunan, and Katibpuan. Gunidulungan's Barangay Damablak then fled en masse, totally emptying the barangay with most villagers taking shelter in Talayan's Barangay Katibpuan as well, along with the IDPs from Barangay Muslim.
August 10th FINALLY saw the Government respond. In cases of intercine conflict within the BIAF, or in this case between the BIAF and its recent offshoot BIFF, the AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines almost always takes a hands off approach. This isn't an absolute rule as in last year's BIAF 104 Base Command throwdown with the MNLF/BMA's newest faction, MMSC, or Mainland Mindanao State Committee on the Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao Provincial borders. In that imbroglio the AFP entered the fray AGAINST the BIAF, but then BIAF on BMA (Bangsamoro Army, armed wing of the MNLF) isn't exactly an intercine affair. The AFP's 40IB (Infantry Battalion) implemented Blocking Force positions along the riverfront of Midsayap, in North Cotabato Province.
Midsayap sits directly parallel to Datu Piang, across the Pulangi River. It is also home to a camp of the BIAF's 105 Base Command, the Base Command most likely to re-inforce the 106th despite a bit of anomosity between the two Base Commands (after all, this anomosity led to the recent creation of the 118 Base Command, an episode I covered in a "MILF Armed Contacts for the Second Quarter of 2011" entry). In addition PNP, or Philippine National Police's PRO-12, or Police Regional Office for Region 12 deployed its PSCs, or Public Saety Companies (aaaah, the Filipino penchant for acronyms, gotta' love it) in key entrances to all North Cotabato municipalities fronting the Pulangi River. Until August 10th the only AFP element involved was the 1st Mechanised Brigade (M 1st Bde), attached to 6ID (Infantry Division) from 1ID, tasked with aiding IDPs and providing security at the IDP centre at Datu Gumbay Piang Elementary School.
The next day, August 11th, fighting finally spread across the river into North Cotabato Province's municipality of Midsayap when the predicted re-inforcement from the 105 Base Command began and their guerillas happened upon BIFF re-inforcements making their way into Maguindanao Province. Resident's of Midsayap's Barangay Damatulan fled as they witnessed BIAF guerillas from the 105 Base Command moving through their barangay en route. As night fell and fighting continued most residents living across the river in Puroks #4 and 5 in Guindulungan's Barangay Binangga North fled en masse with most IDPs ending up in that barangay's Purok #1.
On August 12th the AFP actually deployed non-lethal munitions as it dropped smoke in Datu Piang in an effort to separate both sides. On Mindanao smoke is used as a warning that should belligerents not heed the warning and cease and desist, the next munition will not be innocuous. The smoke did manage to soften the exhanges from incessant to sporadic but did not come close to shutting down the firefights raging in barangays Alonganen, Liong and Balanaken and just then spreading into Barangay Masigay. As fighting began in Barangay Masigay 170 of its families fled to Datu Gumbay Piang Elementary School.
On the following day, August 13th fighting petered out shortly after re-commencing just after daybreak. Sub-Kumander Adzmie, leader of the BIAF forces in this nightmare finally paid heed to the MILF's Central Command directive issued on August 10th in which he was ordered to stand down "unless attacked." As for sub-Kumander Bayawak (Abu Nuwas), he was under no such orders with Kumander Kato brusquely telling the media that IF the BIAF doesn't want trouble IT should NOT attack BIFF guerillas. Aaah, can't you just feel the love?
In early August of 2010 a clash took place in Datu Piang between sub-Kumander Ustadz Akas "Adzmie" Kasim of the BIAF, or Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (the military wing of the MILF) and sub-Kumander Ustadz Abu Nuwas "Bayawak" Ibad Maniog of the BIAF's 104 Base Command (see my entry entilted "MILF Armed Contacts for the Second and Third Quarters of 2010"). Both men are natives of Datu Piang's Barangay Alonganen and in fact are related to one another as indeed are most villagers living in that barangay. At stake was a 6 hectare tract of arable land immediately adjacent to the Pulangi River (Rio Grande del Mindanao), situated directly on the border of Datu Piang's Barangays Alonganen and Liong and a stone's throw from the infamous Liguasan Marsh. The conflicting claims on the untitled tract first turned violent in 2009 but was largely ignored by the Philippine Government and world at large. After all, any armed conflict in Central Mindanao must automatically be connected to War of 2008, a larger conflict that continued unabated until July of 2009, or so goes the popular assumption.
The firefights lasted only as long as the rice harvest since most of that 6 hectare tract had been cultivated with rice. As soon as the paddy was plowed under life returned to normal, at least as "normal" as it ever gets in Mindanao. Just before New Year 2011 sub-Kumander Bayawak (Abu Nawas) tendered his formal resignation to the MILF Central Committe and almost immediately afterward joined Kumander Ustadz Ameril Ombra Kato's Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, or BIFF. Fast forward to July 20th, 2011. BIFF's Chief of Staff, sub-Kumander Karialan Indong personaly led an attack on BIAF 106 Base Command positions in Barangay Balanaken's Sitio Nimao after BIAF guerillas had been sighted on a security permiter established around that 6 hectare collection of rice paddies in Barangay Alonganen. As the BIAF responded by launching retaliattory strikes the wife of sub-Kumander Bayawak (Abu Nuwas) was critically wounded during a mortar volley.
After that initial attack in July both sides took a step back from that bloody abyss and orally agreed to resolve their differences in a non-violent manner, despite the wounds inflicted on sub-Kumander Adzmie. That agreement held fast for a little more than two weeks. On August 6th Abu Nuwas led his men on an attack against Adzmie's men in their camp in Barangay Alonganen. Even before the shooting began that morning hundreds of families had began fleeing. Quickly joining them were families from the adjacent barangays Liong and Balanaken. The town's Datu Gumbay Piang Elementary School has long served as the municipality's IDP, or Internally Displaced Persons centre. By night fall on August 6th the official IDP tally stood at 482 families, of which 190 came from Balakaken, 180 from Liong, and 112 from Alonganen. In the Philippines a "family" is assumed to include five people but that figure borders on useless since demographers make no allowances for cultural, religious or even regional differences. A "family in Luzon will on average contain much less people than a socio-economically disadvantaged Tribal family whose head of household practices polygamy and whose religion commands a high reproductive rate. Moreover, the figures offered only take into account the number of heads of household that have managed to undergo the official registration process. Most IDPs take succor in other households and a fair number, distrustful of the Government or fearing disease and other negative aspects found in the state IDP centres make the best of it alongside hiways and in isolated jungle clearings. The displaced people themselves, known as "Bakwit" in the local dialect have had their daily lives disrupted every couple of months since 1972 and yet we have politicians in Manila asking why Maguindanao is the poorest province in the nation. Go figure
The day, August 7th, intermittent firefights took place in Barangays Alonganen, Liong, Balanaken with IDPs fleeing from the adjacent municipality of Guindulungan, home to the BIFF's main camp, the former-BIAF camp Omar ibn Khattab on Perez Hill. The resident of Barangay Muslim had received word that the BIAF was considering a direct attack on the camp and the news caused widespread apprehension that very quickly devolved into sheer panic. The day's fighting ended at nightfall with a finall tally (including the initial clash the day before) of five BIAF KIAs, or Killed in Actions with one known wounded. BIFF made out slightly better with three KIAs.
On August 8th BIFF launched the first attack with a moderate salvo of mortar shells against BIAF positions in Barangays Alonganen, now devoid of all civilians with the entire population having fled and Barangay Balanaken, itself nearly a carbon copy with the rest of its residents fleeing during a lull between salvos.
August 9th saw the heaviest fighting yet since this latest round commenced on August 6th. Fighting began at 630AM with the BIAF initiating a firefight and continued unabated until 330PM. At 700PM fighting began once again and only ended right before 11PM. During the morning exchanges fighting did finally spread to Guindulungan's Barangay Muslim although not related to any BIAF tactical strike against the main BIFF camp on Perez Hill. Most of Barangay Muslim's population had already fled in the preceding days but the remaining residents fled as the combatants entered the barangay with BIFF guerillas attempting to implement a Blocking Force there to deal more than 100 re-inforcements from the BIAF's 105 Base Command, co-incidentally the old command of BIFF leader Kumander Ustadz Kato. The IDPs from Barangay Muslim made their way into the ajoining municipality of Talayan's Barangays Binangga North, Tambunan, and Katibpuan. Gunidulungan's Barangay Damablak then fled en masse, totally emptying the barangay with most villagers taking shelter in Talayan's Barangay Katibpuan as well, along with the IDPs from Barangay Muslim.
August 10th FINALLY saw the Government respond. In cases of intercine conflict within the BIAF, or in this case between the BIAF and its recent offshoot BIFF, the AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines almost always takes a hands off approach. This isn't an absolute rule as in last year's BIAF 104 Base Command throwdown with the MNLF/BMA's newest faction, MMSC, or Mainland Mindanao State Committee on the Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao Provincial borders. In that imbroglio the AFP entered the fray AGAINST the BIAF, but then BIAF on BMA (Bangsamoro Army, armed wing of the MNLF) isn't exactly an intercine affair. The AFP's 40IB (Infantry Battalion) implemented Blocking Force positions along the riverfront of Midsayap, in North Cotabato Province.
Midsayap sits directly parallel to Datu Piang, across the Pulangi River. It is also home to a camp of the BIAF's 105 Base Command, the Base Command most likely to re-inforce the 106th despite a bit of anomosity between the two Base Commands (after all, this anomosity led to the recent creation of the 118 Base Command, an episode I covered in a "MILF Armed Contacts for the Second Quarter of 2011" entry). In addition PNP, or Philippine National Police's PRO-12, or Police Regional Office for Region 12 deployed its PSCs, or Public Saety Companies (aaaah, the Filipino penchant for acronyms, gotta' love it) in key entrances to all North Cotabato municipalities fronting the Pulangi River. Until August 10th the only AFP element involved was the 1st Mechanised Brigade (M 1st Bde), attached to 6ID (Infantry Division) from 1ID, tasked with aiding IDPs and providing security at the IDP centre at Datu Gumbay Piang Elementary School.
The next day, August 11th, fighting finally spread across the river into North Cotabato Province's municipality of Midsayap when the predicted re-inforcement from the 105 Base Command began and their guerillas happened upon BIFF re-inforcements making their way into Maguindanao Province. Resident's of Midsayap's Barangay Damatulan fled as they witnessed BIAF guerillas from the 105 Base Command moving through their barangay en route. As night fell and fighting continued most residents living across the river in Puroks #4 and 5 in Guindulungan's Barangay Binangga North fled en masse with most IDPs ending up in that barangay's Purok #1.
On August 12th the AFP actually deployed non-lethal munitions as it dropped smoke in Datu Piang in an effort to separate both sides. On Mindanao smoke is used as a warning that should belligerents not heed the warning and cease and desist, the next munition will not be innocuous. The smoke did manage to soften the exhanges from incessant to sporadic but did not come close to shutting down the firefights raging in barangays Alonganen, Liong and Balanaken and just then spreading into Barangay Masigay. As fighting began in Barangay Masigay 170 of its families fled to Datu Gumbay Piang Elementary School.
On the following day, August 13th fighting petered out shortly after re-commencing just after daybreak. Sub-Kumander Adzmie, leader of the BIAF forces in this nightmare finally paid heed to the MILF's Central Command directive issued on August 10th in which he was ordered to stand down "unless attacked." As for sub-Kumander Bayawak (Abu Nuwas), he was under no such orders with Kumander Kato brusquely telling the media that IF the BIAF doesn't want trouble IT should NOT attack BIFF guerillas. Aaah, can't you just feel the love?
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