Alegria, a tiny municipality sitting along the shores of Lake Mainit, in Surigao del Norte Province, has a storied past vis a vis the insurgency, more than one would expect for such a non-descript town. In 1999 the NPA finally decided to organise within the general area, after sewing up the adjacent municipality of Kitcharao, in Agusan del Norte Province, the town I have been discussing in other Fourth Quarter NPA entries regarding the 30IB (Infantry Battalion) terrorising the town's Mamanwa Tribe in the Zapanta Valley.
When the NPA first organises it deploys a seven to fifteen person guerilla unit known as the "SYP," short for Sandatahang Yunit Pagpropaganda, which translated from the Tagalog basically means, "Armed Propaganda Unit." The SYP only moves in after a small but effective mass base of support has been established. Peasant Organisations, KMP for example, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Peasant Organization of the Philippines) helps to incite dirt poor-almost always- landless farmers. Organising a local branch of such organizations, which, inevitably are themselves constituent to the NDFP, or, National Democratic Front of the Philippines, the above-ground umbrella for all Hard Left organisations in the Philippines. The NDFP was founded in the early 1970s, by the CPP (Communist Party of the Philippines), the political wing of the NPA equation, as a way in which to remain viable and at the forefront of the legal, above ground struggle versus the Marcos Dictatorship, but of course it has persevered for the quarter century since Marcos was toppled.
With a local chapter of a political organisation in place, NDFP activists agitate the local populace to organise, found "Barangay Committees" outside of the LGU (Local Government Unit) structure. In the Philippines, municipalities aren't constructed according to any Western model. There is a "municipality," which can very easily cover a 75 kilometer stretch of coastline. Within a given municipality there are "barangays," or "villages." Within each barangay, which can, like the municipality, be composed of disparate settlements, there are "sitios" or "puroks"- and one can even speak of another divisible unit within the purok or sitio, but for my purposes here, barangays are the smallest unit that needs to be examined.
Barangays are given de facto mayors known as "Barangay Chairmen," but usually referred to as "Barangay Captains." There is also a barangay council and both the Chairman and the Council are elected into office in an electoral process that is unsynchronised vis a vis the National Elections (which counter-intutively include the Mayoral and Provincial Gubernatorial Elections as well). As if that isn't confusing enough for you, Mindanao also has a Regional Election in the ARMM, or, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Again, this third election isn't synchronised with the other two.
The NDFP activists effectively organise a parallel, or "shadow government," but do so down to the sitio or purok level. Their "committees" are unlike the legal government's committees which devote time and energy to such non-sensical subjects (for Mindanao) as "tourism' and "sports." Instead, the parallel committees focus on real life issues that are incredibly important to villagers, issues like developing potable water systems that don't involve a two kilometer trek through hilly jungle. For the first time power is removed from the traditional Philippine power base, its ogliarchs and political dynasties, and instead offers the poorest of the poor the feeling (of course it is illusory) that their concerns and needs are finally being addressed.
Then the NPA SYP arrives and though they are armed, the villagers aren't afraid, because the SYP is presented as an extension of the previous organisational activity. The SYP organises village defence committees, what it calls, "Milisya ng Bayan," the Village Militia. Townspeople are drilled in the use of firearms and if by chance the guerilla unit, or "Front" with Operational Control of that given area, has somehow managed to fully arm its guerillas (which is almost never the case), the SYP may distribute revolvers and shotguns, or in extremly rare cases, a vintage Garand M1 to the "Milisya." Once a Milisya is organised, it serves mostly as an intelligence pool for a guerilla Front. Rarely, members will be utilised as NPA Irregulars, joining in large scale operations before melting back into their villages and returning to theor farm work and other day to day activities.
The most important purpose of the SYP is to provide cannon fodder for the NPA, young, expendable, men and women who take that small leap and become guerillas themselves, NPA Regulars. In 1999, in a town near Alegria, a 17 year old Lumad (Hilltribe) woman made that leap with her family's support and blessing. Jelyn Dayong was the eldest child of a landless peasant family. When the NPA's Front 16 (NEMRC or Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee) stopped in the Zapanta Valley, on the Agusan del Norte and Surigao del Norte Provincial borders, and suggested that Jelyn had the makings of a natural defender of the defenceless, and promised to help her extremly poor family provide for its youngest children, she readily followed the group into the jungle.
Unfortunately for Front 16, and more unfortunately for Jelyn, her time with the NPA ended abruptly, not long after joining the group. While trying to train Jelyn as a guerilla the then-leader of Front 16, Eusebio Gumaquit, known by the nom de guerre "Ka Irak," realised she would be more of a hinderance than a help. Therefore, he deployed Jelyn to an SYP Team. Although she would carry a rifle, she would probably never be involved in an armed contact with the AFP. On February 16th, 1999, the SYP Team entered the municipality of Alegria, in Surigao del Norte Province, and made its way along the shores of Lake Mainit, finally entering Barangay Perdida, a barangay that has since been dissolved, where it was tasked with forming a new Milisya in Sitio Baglamag. Unfortunately for the SYP, the AFP's 20IB (Infantry Battalion, "AFP" being the Armed Forces of the Philippines) was also in the sitio that day. Having just been transferred into that AOR (Area of Responsibility, as in "Area of Operation"), replacing the 29IB, and was spending time in every sitio in the sector so as to acclimate itself to the terrain.
Jelyn's SYP team was joined by three other guerillas , so as to cross train a number of new members as they themselves trained villagers, but even with ten Regulars was still woefully undermanned when her small group inadvertently crossed paths with the 20IB. The AFP managed to capture five rifles and a seriously wounded Jelyn, though she fared the best since the AFP killed the other nine in her detachment. Shot in her leg and pelvic bone, she was first taken to Caraga Regional Hospital in Surigao City before being airlifted first to Camp Bancasi in Butuan City, in Agusan del Norte Province, the 4ID (Infantry Division) support base, and then again ro Camp Evangelista, the 4ID's main camp. There in 4ID Hospital, her true age, 17, came to light. Not one to miss a propaganda opportunity, the 4ID broke not only Philippine Law BUT International Humanitarian Law and LOAC, the Laws of Armed Conflict as well. Philippine Law requires that any combatant under the age of 18 be turned over to the DSWD, or, Department of Social Welfare and Development, within 72 hours of the AFP taking custody. International Humanitarian Law, or IHL, mandates that juveniles not be identified when charged with serious crimes. LOAC mandates that enemy prisoners of war not be subjected to media exposure- something the AFP willfully contravenes with most any captured NPA member.
Naturally Jelyn Dayong's case became a cause celebre amongst the NDFP "human rights" groups like "Karapatan" and ao, it was only after a Writ of Habeus Corpus was filed and approved in April of that year that Jelyn surfaced, but by then she "begged" to remain within the "safe arms" of the AFP. Indeed, they used Jelyn terribly. Getting cash allotments from General Headquarters to "pay" for her public school education (P21,000 alone went for a "subsistence allowance"), they even made the poor girl "star" in a propaganda play about her capture ("Batan-on pa lang sa Kamatayan, or, "Too Young to Die"). At age 23, in 2003, finally graduating highschool, she was inducted into the 4ID where she eventually was deployed to its CMO (Civil Military Operations) Battalion as a clerk, married to a fellow soldier. Her family hates her, despite the AFP trying to bribe them with a 3 hectare lot in the Zapanta Valley, but Jelyn claims to be happy.
Since that memorable armed contact at the beginning of 1999, the NPA has steered wide and clear of the small town of Alegria. Aside from isolated cases of transiting to and fro through the municipality, Front 16 has simply let it be. Then, on November 18th, 2011, at 8PM, ten "guerillas" barged into the home of Danny Evarita in Alegria's Barangay Ombong, and demanded...GOLD. Mr.Evarita is one of the many "Treasure Hunters" who dream of finding "Yamashita's Gold" here on Mindanao. Never mind that General Yamashita never set foot on Mindanao, it is ebough to know that there were Japanese soldiers here for suck dreamy eyed fools, I mean innocents, I mean fools. Tired of people poking fun at him, Mr.Evarita boldly announced that he had found the motherlode. Not long after, ten men brandishing M16s, M14s, and M1s paid the Evarita household a visit.
Demanding "the gold," the gunmen said that they needed it to sell for cash so as to buy medicines for wounded colleagues. Mr.Evarita stumbled as he tried to explain that the truth of the matter was, he hadn't actually found any gold...or anything of value. Naturally this didn't go over too well and one of the men squeezed off three rounds from his M16, all of which met their mark. As Mr.Evarita lay on the floor whimpering in pain, the gunmen searched the home from top to bottom before leaving disgustedly with a mere P6,000 ($140). Withdrawing into Barangay Camp Edward (the new name for Barangay Geotina) the "guerillas" melted back into the jungle. Of course these weren't NPA guerillas who have a full array of medicines along with hospitals that gladly assist them.
Danny Evarita survived and made his way to Caraga Regional Hospital.
The counterinsurgency on Mindanao from a first hand perspective. As someone who has spent nearly three decades in the thick of it, I hope to offer more than the superficial fluff that all too often passes for news. Covering not only the blood and gore but offering the back stories behind the mayhem. Covering not only the guns but the goons and the gold as well. Development Aggression, Local Politics and Local History, "Focus on Mindanao" offers the total package.
Showing posts with label Zapanta Valley. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Zapanta Valley. Show all posts
Friday, December 16, 2011
Thursday, November 17, 2011
NPA Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part XII: Once Again, the Zapanta Valley Goes Up in Flames
In my entry, "NPA Armed Contacts for the Second Quarter of 2011, Part VI," I discussed the sad predicament of a band of Mamanwa Tribesmen that had somehow made their way to Surigao City, in Surigao del Norte Province in June of 2011, where they had ended up living under a set of huge blue plastic tarps that had been rendered into a gigantic tent in that city's Barangay Luna. The Mamanwa are Negritos and as such constitute the poorest of the poor on Mindanao. This particular band, under the leadership of Datu Rolando "Lando" Anlagan, also known as "Datu Mahuribok," had encamped on a private lot in Sitio Bacud that had been generously donated by Provincial Councilor Leonilo Aldonza.
Likewise, I covered the tribe's happy return to their homes in the adjacent province of Agusan del Norte, on June 26th. Happy to return to their modest thatched homes where they eeked out a hardscrabble existence in the municipality of Kitcharao. Their small settlement in the Zapanta Valley's Sitio Mahaba, in the upland barangay of Bangayan was shared with Manobo Tribesmen and a tiny minority of Bisaya, Cebuano-speakers, most of whom had inter-married into both tribes. Though the Manobo and Mamanwa tended separate communal plots the community was bereft of any ethnic communal strife with the biggest worry being wild boars who would uproot their crops of dry rice, corn, and ginger...that is until the Armed Forces of the Philippines classified their valley as an NPA Sentro de Grabidad, or Centre of Gravity.
As I have explained in other posts, the phrase "Centre of Gravity" is a generic term that denotes an oppositional force's strongest sector, the geographical in which the opposition, in this case the NPA, holds the strongest amount of influence and finds most of its support. In another recent NPA entry, "NPA Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter, Part XI," I discuss the NPA's methodology of first conquering a small area at a provincial border nexus, and how it uses that border convergence to outwit both the PNP and AFP (Philippine National Police and Armed Forces of the Philippines) by simply basing themselves on one side of a border and attacking across the provincial line. So it is for this far end of the NPA's Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee, or NEMRC.
As true as that is, the Zapanta Valley is far from a Centre of Gravity. It is only within the last six months that the single NPA Front operating on both sides of the Agusan del Norte and Surigao del Norte provincial borders, Front 19A, has re-emerged after nearly a year long hiatus during which the AFP's 4ID (Infantry Division) declared the entire province of Surigao del Norte to be "pacified." Indeed, even as the former Division Commander, Major General Mario Chang, was making that asinine claim, his 30IB (Infantry Battalion) was using the Zapanta Valley as its personal punching bag.
The "Pacification" was declared in the Spring of 2010. In June of that same year the 30IB launched a massive push on that provincial border, aimed at curtailing Front activities in and around the municipality of Kitcharao.
Then, in 2011, the 30IB did this again in May, as noted in that aforementioned Second Quarter entry, and then once again at the end of August, and now once again beginning on November 6th. On the day in question, at 10AM, villagers were startled as 105MM Howitzer shells began pockmarking the ground around their tiny settlement. By the end of the second Howitzer salvo a pair of MG520 helicopter gunships were showering the valley's heavily wooded slopes with 70MM rockets, seven per salvo. The 2.75 inch shells ripped apart everything they touched and while they failed to connect with a single NPA guerilla, they did manage to ruin the Abaca (Manila Hemp) crops of several Manobo families in the village.
As the copters began emptying their 250 round 50 caliber guns the villagers once again packed their most important possessions and began running for their lives. As distraught tribesmen jogged down the rutted dirt trail that serves as the only conduit into and out of the Zapanta Valley, they passed 6 x 6 trucks full of Scout Rangers from the 5th and 6th Companies who were spearheading the ground portion of the operation. This time the 30IB was relegated to flag waving at checkpoints established in the more populated environs of that same barangay, Bangayan, and another in the adjacent barangay of Mara-iging, as if the NPA would now drive out of the Zapanta Valley on the region's single road.
In any event, the PNP also took part in this shindig with the two Public Safety Companies* from PRO-13, or Police Regional Office for Region #13, establishing secondary blocking forces and checkpoints in Barangays Haliobong and Kanaway, which were closer to the town proper on National Hiway, as well as in the municipality of Tubay, an alternative route for anyone lucky enough to have made their way out onto the hiway (*Public Safety Companies, or PSCs, are simply the modernised Philippine Constabulary. When the Constabulary, or PC was de-mobilised, many PC companies were converted into PMGs, or Police Mobile Groups. At the end of 2009 the PNP Director General re-named them "Public Safety Companies" to negate a lot of the baggage associated with their history as counterinsurgency tools).
Back in Zapanta Valley the 6 x 6 trucks disgorged their passengers. The 6th Company, under Lieutenants Marco and Sara-sara was tasked with clearing Sitio Mahaba . At 1115AM they walked into an NPA ambush in which three soldiers were critically wounded:
1) Private First Class (Pfc.) Josel P.Sedrome
2) Pfc.Henry M.Simba
3) Corporal Mabel Sacay
After the NPA broke contact and withdrew the 6th Company set up a security perimeter as they awaited the lone Huey (UH-H1 helicopter) to Medivac the three wounded men to Camp Bancasi, the 4ID annex camp in Butuan City.
The 5th Company meanwhile, under Captain Cimini, began clearing the Mamanwa portion of the valley, Sitio Maribuhok, and were ambushed by a second NPA detachment. The Company Commander, Captain Mark Steve T.Cimini was wounded straight away while one of his men, Pfc.Ninoto C.Gulani was killed. At just before 1130AM both MG520s broke off and headed back to Camp Bancasi for refueling, only to return with the HUEY at just before 1PM. Captain Cimini and the body of Pfc.Gulani were evacuated back to Butuan as both companies of Scout Rangers continued clearing the valley without resistance.
As of today, November 17th, 2011, the push is still taking place. The AFP has killed ZERO, wounded ZERO, and captured ZERO guerillas, ZERO camps, and has otherwise failed to make one iota of progress. The only thing this third major operation in six months has managed to do is create a recruitment pool FOR the NPA. Amazingly, indeed, stupefyingly, the 30IB admits to "Hamletting" the valley. For those unfamiliar with the term, it involves a tight military cordon around a designated settlement. Nothing moves in or out of the cordon without explicit authorisation of the military hierarchy in that particular sector.
When I was in school we were taught that the British perfected the method during the Malayan Emergency of the late 1950s and early 1960s when dealing with the primarily ethnic Chinese Maoist insurgency. In reality the methodology is as old as warfare. In fact, in that very same sector the Americans were Hamletting villages both during the "Insurrecto Insurgency" as well as the so called "Colorum Insurgency," both of which caused heavy fighting in those first years of the 20th Century. The AFP's current protocol revolves around heavy-handed census taking under the guise of its PDT, or Peace and Development Teams. In the case of Hamletted settlements the census includes all food and possessions. Every kilogram of rice must be accounted for. Villagers can only work their fields at certain times of day and there is a 10PM to 6AM curfew. The AFP uses this protocol often enough but to my knowledge has never publicly admitted it until now.
Likewise, I covered the tribe's happy return to their homes in the adjacent province of Agusan del Norte, on June 26th. Happy to return to their modest thatched homes where they eeked out a hardscrabble existence in the municipality of Kitcharao. Their small settlement in the Zapanta Valley's Sitio Mahaba, in the upland barangay of Bangayan was shared with Manobo Tribesmen and a tiny minority of Bisaya, Cebuano-speakers, most of whom had inter-married into both tribes. Though the Manobo and Mamanwa tended separate communal plots the community was bereft of any ethnic communal strife with the biggest worry being wild boars who would uproot their crops of dry rice, corn, and ginger...that is until the Armed Forces of the Philippines classified their valley as an NPA Sentro de Grabidad, or Centre of Gravity.
As I have explained in other posts, the phrase "Centre of Gravity" is a generic term that denotes an oppositional force's strongest sector, the geographical in which the opposition, in this case the NPA, holds the strongest amount of influence and finds most of its support. In another recent NPA entry, "NPA Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter, Part XI," I discuss the NPA's methodology of first conquering a small area at a provincial border nexus, and how it uses that border convergence to outwit both the PNP and AFP (Philippine National Police and Armed Forces of the Philippines) by simply basing themselves on one side of a border and attacking across the provincial line. So it is for this far end of the NPA's Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee, or NEMRC.
As true as that is, the Zapanta Valley is far from a Centre of Gravity. It is only within the last six months that the single NPA Front operating on both sides of the Agusan del Norte and Surigao del Norte provincial borders, Front 19A, has re-emerged after nearly a year long hiatus during which the AFP's 4ID (Infantry Division) declared the entire province of Surigao del Norte to be "pacified." Indeed, even as the former Division Commander, Major General Mario Chang, was making that asinine claim, his 30IB (Infantry Battalion) was using the Zapanta Valley as its personal punching bag.
The "Pacification" was declared in the Spring of 2010. In June of that same year the 30IB launched a massive push on that provincial border, aimed at curtailing Front activities in and around the municipality of Kitcharao.
Then, in 2011, the 30IB did this again in May, as noted in that aforementioned Second Quarter entry, and then once again at the end of August, and now once again beginning on November 6th. On the day in question, at 10AM, villagers were startled as 105MM Howitzer shells began pockmarking the ground around their tiny settlement. By the end of the second Howitzer salvo a pair of MG520 helicopter gunships were showering the valley's heavily wooded slopes with 70MM rockets, seven per salvo. The 2.75 inch shells ripped apart everything they touched and while they failed to connect with a single NPA guerilla, they did manage to ruin the Abaca (Manila Hemp) crops of several Manobo families in the village.
As the copters began emptying their 250 round 50 caliber guns the villagers once again packed their most important possessions and began running for their lives. As distraught tribesmen jogged down the rutted dirt trail that serves as the only conduit into and out of the Zapanta Valley, they passed 6 x 6 trucks full of Scout Rangers from the 5th and 6th Companies who were spearheading the ground portion of the operation. This time the 30IB was relegated to flag waving at checkpoints established in the more populated environs of that same barangay, Bangayan, and another in the adjacent barangay of Mara-iging, as if the NPA would now drive out of the Zapanta Valley on the region's single road.
In any event, the PNP also took part in this shindig with the two Public Safety Companies* from PRO-13, or Police Regional Office for Region #13, establishing secondary blocking forces and checkpoints in Barangays Haliobong and Kanaway, which were closer to the town proper on National Hiway, as well as in the municipality of Tubay, an alternative route for anyone lucky enough to have made their way out onto the hiway (*Public Safety Companies, or PSCs, are simply the modernised Philippine Constabulary. When the Constabulary, or PC was de-mobilised, many PC companies were converted into PMGs, or Police Mobile Groups. At the end of 2009 the PNP Director General re-named them "Public Safety Companies" to negate a lot of the baggage associated with their history as counterinsurgency tools).
Back in Zapanta Valley the 6 x 6 trucks disgorged their passengers. The 6th Company, under Lieutenants Marco and Sara-sara was tasked with clearing Sitio Mahaba . At 1115AM they walked into an NPA ambush in which three soldiers were critically wounded:
1) Private First Class (Pfc.) Josel P.Sedrome
2) Pfc.Henry M.Simba
3) Corporal Mabel Sacay
After the NPA broke contact and withdrew the 6th Company set up a security perimeter as they awaited the lone Huey (UH-H1 helicopter) to Medivac the three wounded men to Camp Bancasi, the 4ID annex camp in Butuan City.
The 5th Company meanwhile, under Captain Cimini, began clearing the Mamanwa portion of the valley, Sitio Maribuhok, and were ambushed by a second NPA detachment. The Company Commander, Captain Mark Steve T.Cimini was wounded straight away while one of his men, Pfc.Ninoto C.Gulani was killed. At just before 1130AM both MG520s broke off and headed back to Camp Bancasi for refueling, only to return with the HUEY at just before 1PM. Captain Cimini and the body of Pfc.Gulani were evacuated back to Butuan as both companies of Scout Rangers continued clearing the valley without resistance.
As of today, November 17th, 2011, the push is still taking place. The AFP has killed ZERO, wounded ZERO, and captured ZERO guerillas, ZERO camps, and has otherwise failed to make one iota of progress. The only thing this third major operation in six months has managed to do is create a recruitment pool FOR the NPA. Amazingly, indeed, stupefyingly, the 30IB admits to "Hamletting" the valley. For those unfamiliar with the term, it involves a tight military cordon around a designated settlement. Nothing moves in or out of the cordon without explicit authorisation of the military hierarchy in that particular sector.
When I was in school we were taught that the British perfected the method during the Malayan Emergency of the late 1950s and early 1960s when dealing with the primarily ethnic Chinese Maoist insurgency. In reality the methodology is as old as warfare. In fact, in that very same sector the Americans were Hamletting villages both during the "Insurrecto Insurgency" as well as the so called "Colorum Insurgency," both of which caused heavy fighting in those first years of the 20th Century. The AFP's current protocol revolves around heavy-handed census taking under the guise of its PDT, or Peace and Development Teams. In the case of Hamletted settlements the census includes all food and possessions. Every kilogram of rice must be accounted for. Villagers can only work their fields at certain times of day and there is a 10PM to 6AM curfew. The AFP uses this protocol often enough but to my knowledge has never publicly admitted it until now.
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