In my last NPA entry, "NPA Armed Attacks for the Second Quarter of 2011, Part VII" I discussed the supposed "Pacification" of Misamis Oriental Province and the resurgence of the North Central Mindanao Regional Committee, or NCMRC of the NPA. Central to that entry was the municipality of Balingasag in the Balitucan Mountains, home to the NPA's Front 4B. This particular Front has a storied past, one which I touched upon in that aforementioned recent Second Quarter entry.
The ressurection of Front 4B is now undeniable with its spearheading of a major tactical operation on Thursday, August 25th, 2011. Early in the morning on the day in question a female guerilla from Front 16A of the NEMRC, or Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee chartered a van in Surigao City, in the province of Surigao del Norte. The young lady said that she and her siblings would be travelling for a family get together to take place that afternoon in the municipality of Medina, two provinces away in Misamis Oriental. Leaving Surigao City at 930AM the van carrying 10 NPA guerillas began the long drive along Mindanao's northern coast.
Arriving on the outskirts of Medina at 3PM the young female guerilla directed the unsuspecting driver to her "cousin's" home, actually an empty lot where two other rented vans awaited them. Pulling up to the other two vans the driver looked quizicaly at his fare only to be told that he had been commandeered by the NPA and that if he complied without resistance he would live to tell about his exciting day. The other two vans had been chartered that very afternoon, there in Medina, by members of the NPA's Front 4B of the NCMRC, or Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee. Removing assault rifles from boxes and rice sacks that had been transported aboard the three vans, the guerillas then waited until 430PM before ordering the three drivers to proceed into the town centre, Barangay Poblacion, after first co-ordinating positions with a small Blocking Force at two key positions on the only routes in and out of the town centre:
1) A checkpoint on National Hiway
2) In between the Public Market and the entrance into the town's main drag
Driving slowly through the small municipality the three vans, travelling together, mangaged to avoid arousing suspicion as they made their way to the municipal compound. At 515PM the vans stopped several meters from the compound entrance. Instructing the drivers to quickly walk away, 2 well armed guerillas were left to guard the idling vans while the other 28 put their plan into motion. As guerillas poured out of the vans horrified townspeople quickly began running for cover knowing all too well what was about to transpire. Firing rifles as they flooded the compound, SPO1 Edito Bayhon was immediately shot in the head and killed. The 25 year veteran of the Medina MPO, or Municipal Police Office and a resident of the town's Barangay Tupop, had been manning the station's desk, situated just inside the building's doorway. A detachment of 10 guerillas then attempted to infiltrate the town hall situated next to the MPO building.
Sitting inside his office in the town hall Mayor Pacifico Pupos was deep in conversation with two barangay captains and a town councilor when the staccato blasts from rifles, punctuated by detonations of rifle grenades immediately caught his attention. Proceeding to an inner office that was far more secure he and his three guests did their best to ride out the attack.
Alerted to the attack and knowing he had only 7 officers inside the MPO, the Chief of Police rushed past the Public Market only to run headlong into the second Blocking Force position. The result was a quick but intense firefight that prevented the Chief from aiding his men. The first Blocking Force position, the checkpoint on National Hiway, quickly closed up shoppe upon learning from a Spotter that a massive amount of re-inforcements were en route to Medina from neighbouring Gingoog City.
Outside the town hall the 10 man detachment met unexpected resistance in the front foyer and quickly backpedaled into the compound to join in on the assault's main target, the MPO and its modest stock of weaponry. At the 45 minute mark, having failed to infiltrate either objective the guerillas withdrew in orderly fashion and climbed aboard the idling vans before speeding out of Barangay Poblacion and into Barangay San Isidro where they abandoned all three vans before dispersing on foot in different directions, later rendevouzing over the border in the adjacent province of Bukidnon. From there the combined forces of Front 16A and 4B made their way overland to the mountainous border of Bukidnon and Agusan del Norte Provinces in a hard push that ended very late Friday night, August 26th.
The NPA had lost one guerilla, from Front 4B, whose identity remains unknown despite early information that he might have been a Team Leader (detachment commanding officer) known by the nom de guerre "Ka Hakim." The Government casualties, aside from the deceased SPO1, Edito Bayhon, were two critically wounded officers:
1) SPO2 Renie Galera Rombo
2) SPO1 Diosdado Salas Sendiong
The next day while scouring Medina the 8IB (Infantry Battalion) discovered all three vans in Barangay San Isidro, the only progress made by the AFP during its "hot pursuit" of the guerillas. The incident is note worthy in and above it being yet another NPA attack. It followed the blueprint used in the SMRC, or Southern Mindanao Regional Committee's attack on the Panabo City CPO (City Police Office), in Davao del Norte Province back on March 19th of 2011. Employing a non-threatening female guerilla to charter vans for a "family gathering," and then retaining the vans for stage one of their withdrawal...Likewise, one should pay attention to the high degree of co-operation not only between Fronts (not unusual) but between Regional Committees as well (very unusual). In the end the NPA lost a guerilla but did capture an additional M16 off of one of the wounded police officers. Still, the operation, one of an astounding 64 tactical operations by the NPA, in 4ID (Infantry Division) AOR, or Area of Responsibility (as in "Area of Operation") in just the Third Quarter, put Front 4B firmly back into play, even if they did need Front 19A in order to do it.
No comments:
Post a Comment