Misamis Oriental Province on Mindanao's northern coast is one of two Mindanaowan provinces declared "Pacified" by the AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines in the fourth quarter of 2010. Pacification simply requires the signature of the ID CO, or Infantry Division Commanding Officer, under whose AOR, or Area of Responsibility the province lies, in this case the 4ID. There is no quantified process requiring a minimum of armed contacts, etc. Once the ID CO makes what is purely judgement call, the armed response to the insurgency within that province is officialy turned over to the PPOC, or Provincial Peace and Order Committee for management and is perceived to then be a Law and Order issue, or in Philippine speak, a Peace and Order issue, to be dealt with by the PNP, or Philippine National Police on the ground.
Misamis Oriental had come a long way in a very short time to even be considered for a security downgrade. Indeed one of its municipalities, the town of Balingasag had just 4 years before been under virtual control of the NPA. Sitio Lantad, a Higaon-on Tribal settlement in the municipality's Barangay Kibanban was declared "Liberated Territory" by the NPA which had implemented a full parallel government there in 1987. While parallel NPA Governments are in no way unique, then OR now, the "Government" in Sitio Lantad exerted 100% control even to the point of issuing land deeds and recording births and deaths.
The standard narrative is that the big turn around is single handedly due to Misamis Oriental's Governor, Oscar Moreno. Elected in 2004 he turned his attention to the sitio, believing in the standard COIN, or Counterinsurgency mantra that "Insurgencies begin where good roads end." That adage sums up the orthadox take on the main impetus behind insurgency; namely, that organisations like the NPA flourish in places where governments fail to provide basic services. Of course there is truth in that but like most anything else, it involves a whole lot more.
If a lack of attention and services is the root cause of the NPA's strength in Sitio Lantad, Governor Moreno sought to effectively deal with that in a common sensical manner. The first step, from that orthadox perspective, is to have the AFP clear the sitio of NPA regulars, or full time guerillas. To that end the 8IB (Infantry Battalion) saturated the sitio and cleared it. Upon clearing the second step is to "hold" the community, to prevent re-infiltration by the insurgency. Therefore the 8IB established a garrison on a hill overlooking the 200 house sitio, manned by the battalions Company C. Finally, the 8IB supervised the recruitment of a CAFGU platoon from the sitio. CAFGU, or Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit is the cornerstone of the CAA, or Civilian Active Auxiliary programme, itself the cornerstone of the AFP's COIN blueprint. Since I have discussed the CAA in more than a couple of my recent NPA entries, for the sake of brevity I will merely offer that the CAFGU are a geographically specific armed reserve of the AFP (via J5, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations). Its personnel are residents of the community in which they serve and they may not operate outside of their parent municipality.
After the "holding" stage is reached, it is time to re-establish, or in most cases establish for the first time ever a visible and meaningful Governmental presence. Sitio Lantad sits in a valley in the Balatucan Mountains. Located 18km upland from the more populated sections of its parent barangay, Kibanban, the only way to reach Lantad was by a footpath that was usually impassable along an 11km stretch. The valley's rather high elevation means that it isn't subject to the two Monsoons that drive most of Mindanao's weather systems. Instead it receives a short but torrential rainfall on most every afternoon of the year, relegating that one footpath to almost marsh-like consistency. The impassability of the trail narrowed down travel options to either horse or buffalo (carabao), and kept the people of Lantad in dire povery and perpetual isolation. Governor Moreno then embarked upon the construction of a gravel track that when completed in July of 2006 allowed habal-habal (motorcycle taxi) travel on a permanent basis.
Next, Governor Moreno constructed a solar dryer, basically a concrete patio with concave furrows that allow easier sun drying of the dry rice grown in the valley. The Governor then secured the assistance of various NGOs to help provide solar panels that allowed electrification of most sitio homes along with health and educational initiatives. By 2007 Sitio Lantad itself was declared Pacified and the Governor vowed to use the experience gained there as a template for pacification for the rest of the province.
Of course the Government's re-taking of Sitio Lantad, if indeed that is what it really was, had little to do with the improvements given to the villagers. In the late 1980s to early 1990s Lantad became a logistical hub for the NPA's Northern Mindanao Region, or NMR as well as the CMR, or Central Mindanao Region and the NMR, or Northern Mindanao Region, the Region to which Lantad was attached. With NPA founder and leader Jose Maria Sison's release from prison in 1986 the NPA underwent an ideological shakeup that precipitated a major organisational crisis. With Sison locked away in prison since 1977 the group's Maoist foundation began to support other ideological lines. The shift began in the organisation's Manila-Rizal Committee on Luzon, under its Secretary, Felimon "Ka Popoy" Lagman. Maoism is built upon the premise that the rural masses, the peasantry, are the backbone of the nation and therefore must drive any far reaching social and/or political change. More to the point, the armed struggle must remain a rural-based campaign until the insurgency's final stages. NPA members living in Metro Manila naturally felt that the urban masses forming the bulk of their membership and 100% of their mass base of support also had alot to offer the armed struggle and under Lagman's custodianship the Manila-Rizal Committee further entrenched itself in this divergent position. There were a host of hard ideological issues and other underlying organisationally based issues dividing Lagman and the CPP, or Communist Party of the Philippines (the NPA is but an armed wing of the CPP) dating back to the 1978 Congressional and Senatorial Elections when Lagman eschewed the standard CPP/NPA boycott of elections and agitated for participation. Still, the crux of the divide centered upon the perspective that Maoism was tailored for the China of the 1930s and 40s, not the Philippines of the mid-1980s. That last point was especially popular in strong Regional Committees in all three of the major Philippine Regions, the entire top tier of leadership in KOMVIS, or Visayas Committee (Komiteng Visayas) the Visayas Region and in Central Mindanao, Far South Mindanao, and Western Mindanao in the Southern Philippines as well.
With Sison's re-emergence and the huge ideological misstep taken with the same CPP/NPA adherance to boycotting of all state elections...even when THE "election" happens to be the first post-Marcos Presidential Election, set the stage for a major showdown precipitated by the NPA over-reacted to these ideological variations. Ka Popoy and Manila-Rizal were at the forefront of the brewing storm. With Sison's re-entry came the need, as he and his organisational allies saw it, to separate the chaff and let it fall where it would. All the more pressing were a host of external forces driving this dynamic. While Sison almost gleefully pointed to the collapse of the Soviet Union as proof positive of Maoism's advantages Lagman, et al correctly pointed out that China was no longer the land of Mao caps and cookie cutter bicycles. It was quickly backsliding into capitalism. Lagman then made it a personal issue with thre widely distributed manifestos collectively known within the CPP/NPA as "Counter-Thesis I."
Lagman then upped it a notch, spurred on by high ranking allies in KOMVIS, he withdrew Manila-Rizal from the CPP/NPA and publicly distributed the resignation letter. Meanwhile, here on Mindanao, the Central Mindanao Region, or CMR, only in existence for less than 4 years (created from a merging of Moro Region, MR, and North Western Region, NWR) had begun chafing under Sison's "my way or the hiway" heavy handedness. The concern on Mindanao could never be "urbanist insurrectionism" as it had been with Lagman and his supporters. Instead, the issues at play were of a totally different sort, albeit just as divisive - if not more- than Lagman's disillusionment with Chairman Mao.
Mindanao had started later than most other regions as far as the Communist struggle is concerned. Its first cadres didn't arrive until 1973 and it wasn't until 1977 that the movement could support a tactical strike on the island. Then, in 1978 the movement suddenly caught on like wildfire and spread throughout Mindanao, even making headway into Muslim-dominated areas like Maguindanao Province by the dawn of the 1980s. The rest of the 1980s saw increasing momentum that had the NPA snowballing in all corners of the island. However all was not well. The CPP had never been well developed on Mindanao and now that the armed wing, the NPA, was expanding exponentially it was impossible to close the gap between the military and political wings. People were recruited directly into the NPA without an ounce of political underpinning and so at critical mass, in 1985, the organisation on Mindanao was set to implode.
The Kampanyang Aho, or "Garlic Campaign" began with a terrified but well intentioned investigation into the AFP and PC, or Philippine Constulbary (now defunct) DPAs, or Deep Penetration Agents. Dating back to the Philippine's immediate post WWII Communist Insurgency in Central Luzon, the so called "Huk Rebellion," the Philippine Military establishment had run deeply buried sleepers in all Leftist slash subversive organisations. The concern on Mindanao was entirely mis-placed. What few DPAs were in play were entirely under deployment on Luzon. Undoubtedly recently trained local youth may have been deployed but were in no way serving as DPAs whose modus operandi had been to climb the ranks of Leftist organisations in order to provide worthwhile intel worth of the substantial investment their deploment represented.
Centered in what was then NMR, or Northern Mindanao Region, in and around the municipality of Opol in Misamis Oriental Province, Aho ended up killing nearly 900 NPA guerillas, or 20% of all NPA regulars on Mindanao during the campaign's duration, 1985 to 1986. Then, largely because of the missteps taken during the purge, there was a total restructuring of the NPA on the island. To say that the situation was precarious even before Sison was released from prison and began trying to realign the CPP/NPA would be absolutely correct. The most power Front in NMR, Front 12, was also the entity spearheading the purge and so out with the old, in with the new. CMR was born as a direct reaction to Aho, in 1987.
eadership of CMR along with a portion of the leadership in FSR (Far South) and WMR (Western) felt that Sison's "one size fits all" approach was a piss poor fit for Mindanao's unique cultural and social landscape. Together the leadership of the three Regions, together comprising 60% of the NPA leadership on Mindanao signed a manifesto in which they expressed dissatisfaction with the CPP's lack of tendency and the increasingly despotic decision making process. They asked that the CPP allow for a Congress in which to sort out these divergent perspectives.
When, at the CPP's 10th Party Plenum in 1993, FSR and WMR stepped away from the aforementioned critique of Sison, CMR remained steadfast and by the end of 1993 found itself unceremoniously expelled from the CPP/NPA, joining Manila-Rizal and virtually the entire Central Visayas structure along with its parent structure, VISKOM, in trying to forge a new path independently of the Sison organisation. The three elements then parlezed and by the second organisational meeting in September of 1995 had formed the PCP, or Peoples Communist Party and its armed wing, the RPA, or Revolutionary Proletariat Army. This loosely structured organisation was militarily speaking, fairly active. Politically though there was no unified direction unless "away from Maoism" counts as a "direction." In mid-1998 the three separate strands within the PCP:
1) Manila-Rizal
2) KOMVIS
3) Central Mindanao Region
formed a much more cohesive and much better politically grounded organisation, the RPM-P, or Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa -Pilipinas. Usually referred to by its English translation, Revolutionary Workers Party of the Philippines, with the military component remaining the RPA. There was a second military organisation as well, ABB or the Alex Boncayo Brigade. Formed out of Manila-Rizal's SPARU, or Special Partisan Armed Revolutionary Unit. SPARU were and of course remain the NPA's assassination squads. The love affair wouldn't last though, when the RMP-P/RPA/ABB entered into a Peace Process with the Estrada Government the following year. As RMP-P etc reached a Final Peace Agreement in 2001 the Mindanowan branch broke away and formed the RPM-M/RPA. The "M" standing for Mindanao of course and the "P" in RPA changed to "Peoples," as in "Revolutionary Peoples Army."
So, not only was the NPA in Misamis Oriental Province, like all other areas, suffering from infighting but its logistics were decimated. Sitio Lantad had served as a logistical hub for two Regional NPA formations, besides the formation that would eventually come to be labelled, NCMRC, or Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee :
1) NEMRC or Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee
2) WMRC or Western Mindanao Regional Committee
All this led to the NPA losing its unquestioned hold upon Sitio Lantad in 1992. The truth of the matter is, pacification was assured even without Governor Moreno's intervention. The people MOST responsible for the dislodgement of the NPA in Sitio Lantad was the NPA itself.
By 2010 the NPA was re-establishing a foothold in Sitio Lantad's parent municipality, Balingasag, with a show of force at that town's Barangay Napaliran. On the day in question, at the barangay's fiesta, a yearly celebration devoted to the patron saint held near and dear by every Christian community in the Philippines, the NPA deployed a SPARU team for a public assassination. With the depleted resources of the Northcentral Mindanao Regional Committee not being able to support its own SPARU element, the Southern Mindanao Regional Committee, or SMRC graciously "lent" the services of its more than capable Eking Balacuit Command. The SPARU team chose to make a point by blowing off the face of Staff Seargent Elmo G.Penar of the AFP's 8IB. Unfortunately they chose to do so as he stood next to his friend, Alexander Pabualan of that town's Barangay Uno. Both men died immediately. SSgt.Penar was targetted for two specific actions he had taken part in:
1) Capture of Front 4-B's main camp in December of 2003
2) Capture of two NPA guerillas on Janurary 14th, 2006
of course both incidents had nothing to do with the targetting of SSgt.Penar. If the NPA were to kill every member of the AFP who takes part in a Tactical Operation against it there would be bodies all over Mindanao...WAIT! There ARE bodies all over Mindanao! Anyway, I am sure that most readers will get the point. The killing merely served as a wake up call that the NPA was not out of the picture in the town of Balingasag. Front 4-B was utilised in the rationale because it is the Front that was supposedly destroyed in the clearing of Sitio Lantad.
Since the SPARU action Front 4-B has been steadily re-couping ground and support. It is ironic that the Pacification of Misamis Oriental Province took place just 80-odd days after that assassination. All the more so when Pacification entails a re-deployment of IBs (Infantry Battalions) out of cleared communities. 8IB's garrisons have remained as is. Maybe their CO, Lieutenant Colonel Pascua os psychic because on April 15th, 2011 Front 4-B attempted to overrun the CAFGU post in none other than Sitio Lantad. At just before midnite 20 guerillas launched an attack and though they failed to capture the post did end up critically wounding three CAAs from the 223rd CAA Company with shrapnel from a couple of rifle grenades:
1) Jimmy Lindahay
2) Nino Luga
3) Apolinario Luga
The recent ratcheting up of hostilities inspired William Castillio, a resident of Lantad and General Manager of the LMPC, or Lantad Multi-Purpose Co-operative to author a proclamation being billed as the "Lantad Manifesto" by some dimwitted local pseudo-journalists who seem to think the sitio's past as an NPA showpiece relegates everything in and about it to Communist cliches. Most notably perhaps was the proclamation's primary author being William Castillo. Castillo's father Conrado was a mid-level NPA guerilla who was "elected" as the NPA Mayor of Lantad during its NPA heyday. In the mid-90s Conrado Castillo became a Surrenderee to the Government only to receive his come uppance from the NPA in 1999 when he was killed by his ex-"Comrades."
The proclamation was handed to Father Albert "Paring Bert" Alejo, a Jeruit priest. Serving on the GPH portion of the RCW-SER, or Reciprocal Working Committee on the Socio-Economic Component of the GPH-NDFP (Government of the Philippines-National Democratic Front of the Philippines, the latter representing the NPA) Peace Process as well as to the joint PPOC of Agusan del Norte and Misamis Oriental Provinces where it was recited in session in late May of 2011.
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