On Wednesday, October 26th, 2011, 19 year old Lobeto Ibanez laboured away under the hot sun. As difficult as it was working as a construction labourer in Zamboanga City's Barangay Sangali, it was many times worse to have no job at all. Worst of all would be to have remained in his parents' home in the small municipality of Sindangen, in Zamboanga del Norte Province. At lest this way Lobeto would be earning his own way, even earning enough to help out his poverty stricken family, as they struggled with the weather and the insurgency, trying to wrest a meagre harvest from their rented farm.
Landing work in Zamboanga City, he had been a labourer on a building site where a bank was being built, he spent most evenings just down the street from his job, eating lonely suppers in the small, non-descript roadside eater owned by Paul Toribio. A member of one of Zamboanga City's oldest and richest families, Toribio often felt he had gotten the short end of the stick, working seven days a week, often sixteen hours a day, and yet barely turning a profit. Even then he was being targeted by protection rackets, criminals offering not to destroy his business IF he would simply help his protector out with some pocket money. Toribio refused to oblige his would be benefactor.
On the day in question, October 26th, Lobeto Ibanez finished his long, dusty day and as usual, made his way down the street to Toribio's. Sitting at a table, Ibanez felt his knee brush a large rice sack. Pulling out his chair, Ibanez reached down and discovered that the nylon sack was filled with "camote," a common tuber found and cultivated on Mindanao. Alerting Mr.Toribio's son Jaime, Lobeto was asked to bring it outside the cafe and place it atop the small woodpile out front to make it easier for the customer who left it to retrieve it. Picking up the rice sack Lobeto obliged Jaime Toribio and placed it atop the woodpile. However, curiosity got the best of Lobeto and after making sure the coast was clear, he quickly opened the bag, and in doing so had his head blown off from an extremely powerful IED.
Ironically, as the IED detonated, the Zamboanga City Police Office (CPO), had had its EOD, or, Explosives and Ordnabce Detachment, deployed right around the corner from the cafe, less than 100 meters from that very woodpile. An IED had been left in front of a lottery outlet owned by another member of the Toribio Clan. Two curious bettors had quickly notified the CPO's Police Station #3, which has jurisdiction over Barangay Sangali. Station #3's Chief, Senior Inspector Elmer Acuna immediately phoned CPO Headquarters which in turn deployed the CPO EOD. While that first IED had been safely neutralised with a Water Phased Disruptor (a PAN, or Percussion Acentuated Neutraliser, a blasting cap detonates a bottle of water which then, if one is lucky, shoots into the device which such force as to ruin the wiring, etc.), the second device had killed Lobeto Ibanez and wounded eight people:
1) Jaime Toribio, 50 year old son of the owner of the cafe
2) Romeo Ebang, age 45
3) Rizaldo Rebollos, age 50
4) Natividad Taripe, age 75
5) Marie Karen Medalla, age 18
6) Elbert Manlangit
7) Rosita Toribio, wife of Jaime
8) Dodong Pitik
As the EOD realised that the lottery outlet device was only the first device, they called in a K9 unit from the CPO. The dog and its handler then located a third IED, in front of the barangay health station, a village medical clinic. Located in shrubbery adjacent to the barangay basketball court in front of the clinic. The device was also 100 meters from the woodpile, only in the opposite direction from the lottery outlet. The EOD again used the Water Phased Disruptor to neutralise the device.
Now on edge, the K9 unit spent the overnight period patrolling the vicinity for any other possible devices. At 630AM, on October 27th, a fourth IED was discovered inside a nearby grocery store, Toribio Minigrocery [sic], which, as the name might suggest, happenes to also be owned by the Toribio Clan. This device was likewise neutralised in the same manner. Further searching of Barangay Sangali discovered a fifth IED at 1040AM next to a second cafe owned by the Toribio Clan, "JRJ Toribio Eatery." This last device was neutralised in exactly the same way.
All five IEDs used ANFO payloads. Placed inside a small plastic container, which itself was placed within an aluminum m powdered milk can which was then placed inside a small, black plastic bag, which was then secreted within a nylon rice sack. ANFO, a simple mixture of common fuel oil and ammonium nitrate fertiliser, has become the substance de jour for the Abu Sayyaf. The BIAF, or, Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, as the armed wing of the MILF is known, overwhelmingly utilises Compound B, the payload in undetonated mortar and Howitzer rounds. However, all four devices had a unique, advanced signature. Instead of using radio signals, such as from cellphones, these devices all used a collapsible circuit centering upon LED bulbs, or, Light Emiting Diode light bulbs . The power sources were all 9volt dry cell batteries in which holes had been fashioned so that detonation could occur one of two ways: Either from moving or jostling the rice saxk, which would then case the semi dry material within the battery to drain out, or else by neutralising via clipping the wires. A collapsible circuit detonates of you break the circuit. Philippine IEDs will either be command detonated- as with the NPA, or else they rely on radio frequencies with cellphones as the receiver. The use of a collapsible circuit is upping the ante, a creative bomber has entered the game here on Mindanao.
As for the culprit, the 113 Base Command's sub-Kumander Waning Abdusalam has been targeting the Toribio Clan for near on a decade. Yet, as noted in my previous Abu Sayyaf Fourth Quarter entry, the Directorate for Integrated Police Operations for Western Mindanao, or, DIPO-W, claims it is the handiwork of the long extinct Abu Sayyaf Urban Terrorist Group. It insisted just after this incident took place that it must be the BIAF, soup de jour.
Showing posts with label ASG. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ASG. Show all posts
Sunday, December 4, 2011
Abu Sayyaf Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part II: Resurrection of the Abu Sayyaf 4
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Saturday, December 3, 2011
Abu Sayyaf Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part II: The Resurrection of the Abu Sayyaf Urban Terrorist Group, Part 3
In my preceding entry in this four part series, "Part 2," I discussed just how the media invention known as the "Abu Sayyaf Urban Terrorist Group came into existence. From Abu Sayyaf's 1988 inception with founder Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, to his death at the hands of the PNP SAF, or, Philippine National Police Special Action Force, in 1998, to the different factions doing battle to claim the Abu Sayyaf's empire of dust. Likewise, I described how Abdurajak's younger brother Khadaffy tried to lead the group without much success, and how a faction under Amilhamsa Antal Sali Jr., better known by the moniker "Kumander Kosovo," ended up operating in Zamboanga City on Mainland Mindanao. After Kosovo's downfall and incarceration in New Bilibid Prison in Metro Manila's Muntilupa City on Luzon (he died on the second day of a two day prison uprising there that he led on March 14th and 15th of 2005), his small operation came under the control of Zamboanga City native Amiljamsa Ajijul, known by the nom de guerre, "Abu Alex Alvarez." Noting how Ajijul was mortally wounded during a police operation in September of 2006, that killed his father Andalul as well, I discussed how even this tiny group of no more than nine members factionalised as well.
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Shortly after Alihamja Ajijul and his father Andalul were killed in 2006, younger son Abdullah, known as "Abu Termiji," assumed control of what was by then an eight man extortion outfit wielding the "Abu Sayyaf" name strictly for show. What better way to get your point across than to sign your threatening letter with that most threatening of names, "Abu Sayyaf"? Unfortunately for Abu Termiji however, his chance to shine only lasted so long before his small group grew even smaller. In the interim between taking the reins of power eight months before, Abdullah had diversified into KFR, or Kidnap for Ransom, assisting the larger faction of Puruji "Boy Sapodek" Indama in the kidnapping of three public school teachers on the water between Zamboanga City's Barangay Arena Blanco, and that barangay's offshore island of Landang Guia on January 23rd, 2009.
The three kidnapped eachers:
1) Rafael Mayonado, age 22,
2) Janette de los Reyes, 27,
3) Quiozon Freires, 29,
were together with a fourth teacher and the boat's operator aboard a motorbanca- Philippine-speak for a motorised wooden skiff- travelling to Landang Guia Island, where all four taught at the island's public highschool, "Arena Blanco National Highschool- Landang Guia Annex." Less than two kilometers off of the coast of the city, they were overtaken by a faster boat carrying four BIAF gunmen from the 113 Base Command. The BIAF, or, Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces as the armed wing of the MILF is known, had been fed intelligence by none other than Puruji "Boy Sapodek" Indama, courtesy of Abdullah "Abu Termiji" Ijijul and his band of cretins.
The 113 Base Command, with operational control over the entire Zamboanga Peninsula and SOME of its offshore islets, is one of a few BIAF Base Commands that dips and dabbles in the KFR trade. Actually, the 113 is the leading BIAF formation in the kidnapping industry. Two sub-Kumanders control most of the kidnappings on the Zamboanga Peninsula:
1) Kamsa Asdanal, disowned by the MILF Central Committee, which claims he is a pirate, et cetera and so forth. Kamsa operates on the peninsula but has small camps on both Olutanga and Sacol Islands
2) Waning Abdusalam, headquartered in the municipality of Payao, in Zamboanga Sibugay Province, until the end of October, 2011, when the AFP, or, Armed Forces of the Philippines, captured his main camp in retaliation for his having had an AFP major and his wife both shot between the eyes and burned during an act of retaliation against Rural Transit Bus Lines, a bus company he has been terrorising for years.
The three teachers were kidnapped while the fourth was left aboard the motorbanca with the boat's operator as the BIAF changed course heading towards Olutanga Island off of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. The 113 Base Command then sold the three kidnsppto the BIAF's 114 Base Command, on Basilan, who then sold the three to the Abu Sayyaf's leading faction on Basilan, that of Puruji Indama so that although Indama planned the entire cqper. Although three more teachers had been kidnapped not long after, on March 13th, 2009, also by sub-Kumander Kamsa Asdanal of the 113 Base Command:
1) Jocelyn Enriquez, 43
2) Jocelyn Inion, 39
3) Noemi Mandi 34
Abdullah Ajijul and his small group had absolutely nothing to do with it. In any event, the small group found much greener pastures on Basilan, relocating there over the Summer of 2009, although four men soon grew tired of the constant life on the run and living in the rough. By July, Abdulkhalil Mallah had taken three men and said "Adios." In retrospect, at least for the short term, Mallah, who much preferred to be called "Ibni Acosta," must have been glad he had done so, for on November 18th, 2009, Abdullah Ajijul was killed in a firefight with the AFP in the municipality of Sumisip, as the AFP moved against the Abu Sayyaf in its on again- off again encampment in that town's Sitio Bakisong, in Barangay Cambug. What little remained of his group, three men including Abdullah's son, Ramjay Ijijul.
Abdulkahil Mallah didn't have much time to think deeply about such things because by the time his ex-leader met his own sad demise, Mallah had already been sitting on the IS-AFP hotseat for a solid month. As with those before him, it wasn't long before Abdulkhalil Mallah ran afoul of local authorities and with three of his fellow Abu Sayyaf guerillas,fled south. Instead of heading to Jolo Island as is the case with most Abu Sayyaf members who end up turning tail south, he led his men to the promised land of Tawi Tawi. There Mallah played house while dispatching followers to and fro between Tawi Tawi and Zamboanga City to keep the group's extortion ledgers current.
Still, eventually one of Mallah's followers ran afoul of the local powers that be in Tawi Tawi's capital of Bongao. On Saturday night, October 8th, 2009 Mallah and three of his men got into a brief but intense firefight in Bongao's Barangay Tubig Tanah. As the other side withdrew down Kalye Bisaya, in the adjacent barangay of Kasanyangan, Mallah had his men clear out all their belongings from their shared home in Sitio Kasulutan and set off for the Bongao Municipal Pier. It was on the pier, as the Zamboanga City-bound ferry pulled up to the dock, that the AFP's MBLT-2- that same MBLT-2- recognised Mallah as the detachment's Marines provided security for the ferry arrival. With a serious wound above his collar bone Abdulkahil Mallah naturally attracted attention.
Charged with twenty-one counts of Kidnapping, Mallah got a free ride north but not on the ferry. Instead he was bundled aboard a Philippine Air Force (PAF) Huey (UH-1H) for a hop, skip, and a jump to Jolo City where he was then transferred to an AC-130 and shipped to IS-AFP Headquarters at AFP Headquarters, at Fort Bonifacio in Metro Manila's Quezon City. There Mallah enjoyed the hospitality that only the IS-AFP can provide as he was subjected to tactical interrogation. There Mallah would perhaps even feel lucky to have been tortured, considering what had happened to Abdullah Ajijul.
Back in Zamboanga City, Abdullah's son Ramjay began trying to salvage what was left of the family business, but alas, what is dead is dead, and what is buried is buried. While one can find an occasional arrest of an Abu Sayyaf member within the borders of Zamboanga City, it is usually only because the subject is transiting the city on their way to and from their homes in Basilann Jolo, or Tawi Tawi and Manila. After all, Zamboanga City IS the regional population centre and the only airport connecting with Manila for the Filipinos living in the three aforementioned island provinces of Mindanao. Of course extortion and KFR continues to plague the city just it has ever since the Subunan Tribesmen first arrived from Indonesia. It must be said that part of the activity is the handiwork of the Abu Sayyaf, while most of the rest is split between the two aforementioned Base Commamds of the BIAF, the 113th and the 114th. Like Davao City far to the south, Zamboanga City is an "open city" in which anyone and everyone willing to engage in nefarious act can- and often does.
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In thr fourth and final part I will cover a recent event in Zamboanga City in which the authorities blamed the Abu Sayyaf Group Urban Terrorist Group, or ASG-UTG.
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Shortly after Alihamja Ajijul and his father Andalul were killed in 2006, younger son Abdullah, known as "Abu Termiji," assumed control of what was by then an eight man extortion outfit wielding the "Abu Sayyaf" name strictly for show. What better way to get your point across than to sign your threatening letter with that most threatening of names, "Abu Sayyaf"? Unfortunately for Abu Termiji however, his chance to shine only lasted so long before his small group grew even smaller. In the interim between taking the reins of power eight months before, Abdullah had diversified into KFR, or Kidnap for Ransom, assisting the larger faction of Puruji "Boy Sapodek" Indama in the kidnapping of three public school teachers on the water between Zamboanga City's Barangay Arena Blanco, and that barangay's offshore island of Landang Guia on January 23rd, 2009.
The three kidnapped eachers:
1) Rafael Mayonado, age 22,
2) Janette de los Reyes, 27,
3) Quiozon Freires, 29,
were together with a fourth teacher and the boat's operator aboard a motorbanca- Philippine-speak for a motorised wooden skiff- travelling to Landang Guia Island, where all four taught at the island's public highschool, "Arena Blanco National Highschool- Landang Guia Annex." Less than two kilometers off of the coast of the city, they were overtaken by a faster boat carrying four BIAF gunmen from the 113 Base Command. The BIAF, or, Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces as the armed wing of the MILF is known, had been fed intelligence by none other than Puruji "Boy Sapodek" Indama, courtesy of Abdullah "Abu Termiji" Ijijul and his band of cretins.
The 113 Base Command, with operational control over the entire Zamboanga Peninsula and SOME of its offshore islets, is one of a few BIAF Base Commands that dips and dabbles in the KFR trade. Actually, the 113 is the leading BIAF formation in the kidnapping industry. Two sub-Kumanders control most of the kidnappings on the Zamboanga Peninsula:
1) Kamsa Asdanal, disowned by the MILF Central Committee, which claims he is a pirate, et cetera and so forth. Kamsa operates on the peninsula but has small camps on both Olutanga and Sacol Islands
2) Waning Abdusalam, headquartered in the municipality of Payao, in Zamboanga Sibugay Province, until the end of October, 2011, when the AFP, or, Armed Forces of the Philippines, captured his main camp in retaliation for his having had an AFP major and his wife both shot between the eyes and burned during an act of retaliation against Rural Transit Bus Lines, a bus company he has been terrorising for years.
The three teachers were kidnapped while the fourth was left aboard the motorbanca with the boat's operator as the BIAF changed course heading towards Olutanga Island off of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. The 113 Base Command then sold the three kidnsppto the BIAF's 114 Base Command, on Basilan, who then sold the three to the Abu Sayyaf's leading faction on Basilan, that of Puruji Indama so that although Indama planned the entire cqper. Although three more teachers had been kidnapped not long after, on March 13th, 2009, also by sub-Kumander Kamsa Asdanal of the 113 Base Command:
1) Jocelyn Enriquez, 43
2) Jocelyn Inion, 39
3) Noemi Mandi 34
Abdullah Ajijul and his small group had absolutely nothing to do with it. In any event, the small group found much greener pastures on Basilan, relocating there over the Summer of 2009, although four men soon grew tired of the constant life on the run and living in the rough. By July, Abdulkhalil Mallah had taken three men and said "Adios." In retrospect, at least for the short term, Mallah, who much preferred to be called "Ibni Acosta," must have been glad he had done so, for on November 18th, 2009, Abdullah Ajijul was killed in a firefight with the AFP in the municipality of Sumisip, as the AFP moved against the Abu Sayyaf in its on again- off again encampment in that town's Sitio Bakisong, in Barangay Cambug. What little remained of his group, three men including Abdullah's son, Ramjay Ijijul.
Abdulkahil Mallah didn't have much time to think deeply about such things because by the time his ex-leader met his own sad demise, Mallah had already been sitting on the IS-AFP hotseat for a solid month. As with those before him, it wasn't long before Abdulkhalil Mallah ran afoul of local authorities and with three of his fellow Abu Sayyaf guerillas,fled south. Instead of heading to Jolo Island as is the case with most Abu Sayyaf members who end up turning tail south, he led his men to the promised land of Tawi Tawi. There Mallah played house while dispatching followers to and fro between Tawi Tawi and Zamboanga City to keep the group's extortion ledgers current.
Still, eventually one of Mallah's followers ran afoul of the local powers that be in Tawi Tawi's capital of Bongao. On Saturday night, October 8th, 2009 Mallah and three of his men got into a brief but intense firefight in Bongao's Barangay Tubig Tanah. As the other side withdrew down Kalye Bisaya, in the adjacent barangay of Kasanyangan, Mallah had his men clear out all their belongings from their shared home in Sitio Kasulutan and set off for the Bongao Municipal Pier. It was on the pier, as the Zamboanga City-bound ferry pulled up to the dock, that the AFP's MBLT-2- that same MBLT-2- recognised Mallah as the detachment's Marines provided security for the ferry arrival. With a serious wound above his collar bone Abdulkahil Mallah naturally attracted attention.
Charged with twenty-one counts of Kidnapping, Mallah got a free ride north but not on the ferry. Instead he was bundled aboard a Philippine Air Force (PAF) Huey (UH-1H) for a hop, skip, and a jump to Jolo City where he was then transferred to an AC-130 and shipped to IS-AFP Headquarters at AFP Headquarters, at Fort Bonifacio in Metro Manila's Quezon City. There Mallah enjoyed the hospitality that only the IS-AFP can provide as he was subjected to tactical interrogation. There Mallah would perhaps even feel lucky to have been tortured, considering what had happened to Abdullah Ajijul.
Back in Zamboanga City, Abdullah's son Ramjay began trying to salvage what was left of the family business, but alas, what is dead is dead, and what is buried is buried. While one can find an occasional arrest of an Abu Sayyaf member within the borders of Zamboanga City, it is usually only because the subject is transiting the city on their way to and from their homes in Basilann Jolo, or Tawi Tawi and Manila. After all, Zamboanga City IS the regional population centre and the only airport connecting with Manila for the Filipinos living in the three aforementioned island provinces of Mindanao. Of course extortion and KFR continues to plague the city just it has ever since the Subunan Tribesmen first arrived from Indonesia. It must be said that part of the activity is the handiwork of the Abu Sayyaf, while most of the rest is split between the two aforementioned Base Commamds of the BIAF, the 113th and the 114th. Like Davao City far to the south, Zamboanga City is an "open city" in which anyone and everyone willing to engage in nefarious act can- and often does.
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In thr fourth and final part I will cover a recent event in Zamboanga City in which the authorities blamed the Abu Sayyaf Group Urban Terrorist Group, or ASG-UTG.
Friday, December 2, 2011
Abu Sayyaf Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part II: Resurrection of the Abu Sayyaf Urban Terrorist Group, Part 2
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Thursday, December 1, 2011
Abu Sayyaf Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part II: Resurrection of Abu Sayyaf's Urban Terrorist Group, Part 1
The ASG, or, Abu Sayyaf Group's Urban Terrorist Group- known in shorthand as the "ASG-UTG," is yet another one of those externally defined organisations. What I mean by that is that the group has never referred to themselves by any name other than simply calling themselves "Abu Sayyaf." In fact, Abu Sayyaf was a name that was pasted onto a group then calling itself "Muhajidin Commando Freedom Fighters," usually shortened to "Muhajidin Commando Fighters," the armed wing of what was called- by its followers again, "The Islamic Movement," or in Arabic, "al Harakkatul al Islamiyya." Like so many things the group has been defined by the media who used the Islamic Movememt's founder, the late Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani's nom de guerre- "Abu Sayyaf" (Father of the Bearer of the Sword), as the group's organisational name.
With the "Urban Terrorism Group," it was first coined by the AFP, or, Armed Forces of the Philippines, as a catchy label to differentiate a faction that had developed entirely within the borders of Zamboanga City on Mainland Mindanao from the older factions centered either in the movement's birthplace, Basilan Province, or else in Sulu Province, both of which are islands south of the mainland. The Philippine Media, the lumbering, unthinking animal that it usually is, simply consumed what it was fed and spit out the "Abu Sayyaf Urban Terrorism Group."
The faction began in Zamboanga City's Barangay Curuan (since re-named as Sibulao), where Andalul Ajijul, a Yakan Tribesman from Basilan raised his large family and attempted to make a living as a pedicab driver. In the late 1980s the Muslim areas of the city came under the growing influence of young charismatic preachers returning from the Middle East where most had been indoctrinated in the Saudi Wahhabi orthadoxy. Wahabbism, as it is known in English, was born in the 18th Century and seeks to strip Islam of what it sees as non-Islamic, synchrestic practices, such as Sufism, saint worshiping, faith healing, and so on. At the same time other youth were returning from Afghanistan where they had fought the Soviets with Wahhabi-centric factions who sought to impose the austere, stripped down version of Islam that eventually made itself felt with the subsequent Aghan Civil War in which the Wahhabists, united with Deobandists, a similar movement from 19th Century India, and a homegrown Afghan amalgamation now known as "Talibinism" sought to get overall control of the nation. Together they battled what Westerners call the "Nothern Alliance," less religious groups spearheaded by the Uzbek and Tajik minorities from the north of the nation. From that caustic environment young Filipinos had been molded into soldiers for a very austere form of Islam now generically known as "Islamo-fascism."
Coming under this new invigorating influence pedicab driver Andalul Ajijul enrolled his eldest son, Alihamja Ajijul, in a free madrassa, or Islamic elementary school, in this case funded by a Saudi charity known as the "IIRO," or, International Islamic Relief Organization, created by the late Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, a Saudi national who had had the great fortune to marry a sister of Osama bin Laden, and thereby gain entry into one of Saudi Arabia's richest families outside that nation's monarchy. Khalifa had been quite free with his money targeting Zamboanga City along with Marawi City in Lanao del Sur Province as two areas in which to indoctrinate Philippine young people into his ultra-extreme take on Wahhabism. In his worldview- shared by his brother in law Osama- the Saudi Monarchy were as loose as harlots. In other words, Wahhabism as practiced by the Saudi Government might as well be a Western New Age movement for all it was worth. Instead, the Taliban presented a proper orientation much more in line with Khalifa, Bin Laden, and like minded people. In that way of thinking, Outer Jihad, the physical, violent Jihad, was not only permissable- it was incumbent upon all men.
By 1991 Abdurajak Janjalani had begun the movement now known as Abu Sayyaf, while ostensibly still a member of the MNLF, with similar minded members that had begun coallescing around none other than the late Congressman Wahab Akbar, who was at the time merely a hellfire and brimstone MNLF preacher, fresy returned from the Middle East, just like Janjalani. The faction began to gel in 1988, the year Janjalani returned home to Basilan from the Middle East. By 1991 the group branched out on its own, taking particular aim at Christians whom Janjalani saw as trying to prey on weak minded Filipino Muslims via so called "charitable works." The nascent group primarily confined its activities to the region's largest population centre, Zamboanga City. The Western missionaries aboard the M/V Doulos, owned by the German-based Christian charity, "Gute Bucher fur Alles" became Abu Sayyaf's first target of note. An ocean going cruise ship refitted out as a floating library and medical clinic, the ship served as a front for the missionaries' own type of "Hearts and Minds" operations, combining their religious indoctrination with musical concerts and stage plays. These activities particularly irked Janjalani and his small but growing band of followers. The Philippines of the very early 1990s was very different than the computer-savvy nation it is today, where even the most remote settlements have access to the internet and cellular phone service. Filipinos then were much more innocent and naïve and so effective missionaries like those aboard the M/V Doulos found many ready takers, including Filipino-Muslims.
On August 11th, 1991, on the ship's last night docked in Zamboanga City, missionaries were putting on a play for a larger than usual audience. Amongst the attendees were members of Abu Sayyaf. As the sun set over the water an Abu Sayyaf member threw a fragmentation grenade up onto the stage. Two American missionaries were immediately killed, along with four Filipinos from Zamboanga City. The attackers simply walked away as the crowd slipped into pandemonium.
Likewise, Abu Sayyaf next took aim at the local Christian establishment by targeting Father Salvatore Carzedda, a Catholic missionary priest from the PIME Order. I have written a lot about PIME as of late, since the murder of Father Fausto Tentorio in Arakan, a municipality in North Cotabato Province, this past October of 2011. I have also posted the first in what will be a three part entry about the other PIME priests that have been targeted over the years before Father Tentorio. Indeed, Father Salvatore Carzedda had been the first PIME priest to be targeted. As the Italian born cleric left an inter-faith organisation he had co-founded to bring Muslims and Christians together, he was driving in a minivan, approaching the PIME Mindanao Headquarters, when a motorcycle with two men riding tandem pulled abreast and shot him to death. The minivan careened off the road and into a concrete road divider...Abu Sayyaf had suceeded in becoming an international force to be reckoned with.
These incidents garnered domestic as well as international attention and inspired people such as Andalul Ajijul, and more importantly for this entry, his eldest son Alihamja. By the mid-1990s Alihamja Ajijul was on the cusp of manhood and so he joined Janjalani's group, byb then almost universally known as "Abu Sayyaf." At that point the group had just gained hundreds of new followers on Jolo Island, in Sulu Province, with the large organisation of the late Ghalib Andang, much better known by the unforgettable moniker, "Kumander Robot." Janjalani had fled south to Jolo at the behest of Andang, after the AFP had captured Janjalani's main camp, "al Madina al Mujahidin," or, "The City of Holy Fighters." Located in Upper Kapayawan, an upland barangay of Basilan's capital, Isabela City, the AFP had managed to overrun it in May 15th, 1993, after a heavy week of fighting using all four branches of the Military. "Camp Madina" as it is popularly known, had but little more than a year of existence and yet it turned out several dozen extremely well trained guerilla leaders. Yet the camp was now history. In doing this the AFP relegated Abu Sayyaf to guerilla status but an un-intended result was the group splitting up, though still nominally controlled by Janjalani and his "Shura," or "Council," there were now cells in several places- including Mainland Mindanao. From Lake Sebu in South Cotabato Province in the south, all the way to Marawi City in Lanao del Sur Province in the north and all places in between, Abu Sayyaf had become impossible to eradicate.
One place on the mainland that had always been within its sphere had been the aforementioned Zamboanga City. There Andalul Ajijul gladly gave his blessing as his eldest son, Alihamja Ajijul heard the call to Jihad and answered loudly. Journeying to Basilan, 18 kilometers across the water from Zamboanga City, Alihamja was fully trained in Abu Sayyaf's even larger camp located atop a nearly 700 meter high promontory in the interior jungle, named Puno Mohaji, in back of the municipality of Sumisip. Later christened "Camp Abdurajak" after founder Abdurajak Janjalani, the camp was covered with an impenetrable cloud canopy of virgin tain forest abd on three sides by sheer cliff faces that were practically impossible to scale. This much more secure camp would serve as the Abu Sayyaf Headquarters on Basilan until it too fell in May of 2000. For the interim however it trained nearly two thousand Abu Sayyaf guerillas trained by members who would later go on to form and lead all the various Abu Sayyaf factions. It was there in Sumisip that Abu Sayyaf continued building a working relationship with a wide range of former and current BIAF, or, Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces guerillas. The BIAF of course is the armed wing of the MILF, and so despite the academic rigamorole there is an undeniable close working relationship between much of the MILF/BIAF and the Abu Sayyaf. Among the many instructors that taught Alijamsa and other new recruits was a local resident from Sumisip's Barangay Cambug, Ustadz Hadji Asnawi Hassan "Laksaw" Addan Salah, popularly known as "Kumander Dan Laksaw Asnawi." As his training advanced Alijamsa became closer to Laksaw and the instructor ended up singling Alijamsa out for extended, specialised training centering upon IED Construction and Application. For the un-initiated, IED stands for "Improvised Explosive Device," though the word "Bomb" rolls much more easily off one's tongue.
In this phase of training Alijamsa was taught by men who themselves been trained in the Middle East and who dealt with simple but effective forms relying on singnal phase variance to close the circuit and thereby deronate the device. Many devices could be used, remote television controls, remote garage door openers, electronic doorbells, and of course- cellular telephones, which ended up becoming the tool of choice in the Southern Philippines. Not showing very much creativity, thereby creating a distinct Abu Suyyaf device signature, Abu Sayyaf bomb makers inevitably utilise Nokia 8910 model phones, though in a pinch, many other models would do.
In 1998 founder, leader, and chief ideologue Abdurajak Ababakar Janjalani was gunned down in a firefight with the PNP. A detachment from the PNP SAF, or, Special Action Force (the PNP Special Forces) ran across Janjalani and roughly 20 of his guerillas as the police began a foot patrol on October 2nd, 1998, in the municipality of Lamitan (now Lamitan City). The patrol, led by Chief Inspector Reynaldo "Rey" Romo, ended with Romo being shot to death, as was one of his subordinates, Police Officer Second Class (PO2) David Magnaye, and losing two other officers whose bodies took days to find while authorities concentrated on the safe recovery and extrication of three wounded SAF officers.
The death of Janjalani, Abu Sayyaf's unchallenged leader at that point, threatened to split apart Abu Sayyaf which like so many small organisations had effectively become a cult of personality. While some members thought to seize what was essentially unfathomable opportunity and branch out on their own, most got ready to move south and join Andang's group on Jolo, finding security in numbers. Alijamsa though, had a novel approach. Having reached the point where he was ready to swim on his own and not so willing to move south to unfamiliar terrain and culture in Jolo, Alijamsa Ajijul instead moved back to his hometwon Zamboanga City. There he drew a small but tightknit group around him, including his brother, Abdullah Ajijul, and began making plans to continue in much the same way. The group's determination ebbed and waned however, only becoming steadfast in the wake of 9/11 and the attacks on America's World Trade Center towers and the simultaneous assault on the US Military Headquarters, the Pentagon. This rash of attacks had a direct result on the US-Philippine relationship in that then-President Gloria Arroyo whored herself and her nation for a nice slice of the American largesse that was about to be handed out under the guise of "Anti Terrorism Funds." Of course Abu Sayyaf's undeniable-albeit entirely unofficial relationship with Bin Laden's "al Qadah" organisation was more than enough reason to start bouncing Dollar Bills off of the heads of the loads of more than willing Philippine authorities. That Abu Sayyaf had snatched three American citizens in its most recent mass kidnapping at the "Dos Palmas Resort" in the municipality of Puerto Princessa, in Palawan Province, served as proof positive for the gads and gads of fence sitters who opted to take a "look and see" approach.
Though recognising early on that KFR, or Kidnapping for Ransom, was a valid form of fund raisin, Alijamsa Ajijul wanted to stay on the theological straight and narrow. Trained in IED construction, emplacement, and detonation he directed his small group numbering only five men including himself and his younger brother Abdullah, to remain focused on Janjalani's core message of Outer Jihad. Although the group had a hand in many Zamboanga City IEDs, it wasn't until a so called "Suicide Bombing" in October of 2002 that the group finally gained international recognitition on its own.
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To be concluded in "Part 2" of thus four part series.
With the "Urban Terrorism Group," it was first coined by the AFP, or, Armed Forces of the Philippines, as a catchy label to differentiate a faction that had developed entirely within the borders of Zamboanga City on Mainland Mindanao from the older factions centered either in the movement's birthplace, Basilan Province, or else in Sulu Province, both of which are islands south of the mainland. The Philippine Media, the lumbering, unthinking animal that it usually is, simply consumed what it was fed and spit out the "Abu Sayyaf Urban Terrorism Group."
The faction began in Zamboanga City's Barangay Curuan (since re-named as Sibulao), where Andalul Ajijul, a Yakan Tribesman from Basilan raised his large family and attempted to make a living as a pedicab driver. In the late 1980s the Muslim areas of the city came under the growing influence of young charismatic preachers returning from the Middle East where most had been indoctrinated in the Saudi Wahhabi orthadoxy. Wahabbism, as it is known in English, was born in the 18th Century and seeks to strip Islam of what it sees as non-Islamic, synchrestic practices, such as Sufism, saint worshiping, faith healing, and so on. At the same time other youth were returning from Afghanistan where they had fought the Soviets with Wahhabi-centric factions who sought to impose the austere, stripped down version of Islam that eventually made itself felt with the subsequent Aghan Civil War in which the Wahhabists, united with Deobandists, a similar movement from 19th Century India, and a homegrown Afghan amalgamation now known as "Talibinism" sought to get overall control of the nation. Together they battled what Westerners call the "Nothern Alliance," less religious groups spearheaded by the Uzbek and Tajik minorities from the north of the nation. From that caustic environment young Filipinos had been molded into soldiers for a very austere form of Islam now generically known as "Islamo-fascism."
Coming under this new invigorating influence pedicab driver Andalul Ajijul enrolled his eldest son, Alihamja Ajijul, in a free madrassa, or Islamic elementary school, in this case funded by a Saudi charity known as the "IIRO," or, International Islamic Relief Organization, created by the late Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, a Saudi national who had had the great fortune to marry a sister of Osama bin Laden, and thereby gain entry into one of Saudi Arabia's richest families outside that nation's monarchy. Khalifa had been quite free with his money targeting Zamboanga City along with Marawi City in Lanao del Sur Province as two areas in which to indoctrinate Philippine young people into his ultra-extreme take on Wahhabism. In his worldview- shared by his brother in law Osama- the Saudi Monarchy were as loose as harlots. In other words, Wahhabism as practiced by the Saudi Government might as well be a Western New Age movement for all it was worth. Instead, the Taliban presented a proper orientation much more in line with Khalifa, Bin Laden, and like minded people. In that way of thinking, Outer Jihad, the physical, violent Jihad, was not only permissable- it was incumbent upon all men.
By 1991 Abdurajak Janjalani had begun the movement now known as Abu Sayyaf, while ostensibly still a member of the MNLF, with similar minded members that had begun coallescing around none other than the late Congressman Wahab Akbar, who was at the time merely a hellfire and brimstone MNLF preacher, fresy returned from the Middle East, just like Janjalani. The faction began to gel in 1988, the year Janjalani returned home to Basilan from the Middle East. By 1991 the group branched out on its own, taking particular aim at Christians whom Janjalani saw as trying to prey on weak minded Filipino Muslims via so called "charitable works." The nascent group primarily confined its activities to the region's largest population centre, Zamboanga City. The Western missionaries aboard the M/V Doulos, owned by the German-based Christian charity, "Gute Bucher fur Alles" became Abu Sayyaf's first target of note. An ocean going cruise ship refitted out as a floating library and medical clinic, the ship served as a front for the missionaries' own type of "Hearts and Minds" operations, combining their religious indoctrination with musical concerts and stage plays. These activities particularly irked Janjalani and his small but growing band of followers. The Philippines of the very early 1990s was very different than the computer-savvy nation it is today, where even the most remote settlements have access to the internet and cellular phone service. Filipinos then were much more innocent and naïve and so effective missionaries like those aboard the M/V Doulos found many ready takers, including Filipino-Muslims.
On August 11th, 1991, on the ship's last night docked in Zamboanga City, missionaries were putting on a play for a larger than usual audience. Amongst the attendees were members of Abu Sayyaf. As the sun set over the water an Abu Sayyaf member threw a fragmentation grenade up onto the stage. Two American missionaries were immediately killed, along with four Filipinos from Zamboanga City. The attackers simply walked away as the crowd slipped into pandemonium.
Likewise, Abu Sayyaf next took aim at the local Christian establishment by targeting Father Salvatore Carzedda, a Catholic missionary priest from the PIME Order. I have written a lot about PIME as of late, since the murder of Father Fausto Tentorio in Arakan, a municipality in North Cotabato Province, this past October of 2011. I have also posted the first in what will be a three part entry about the other PIME priests that have been targeted over the years before Father Tentorio. Indeed, Father Salvatore Carzedda had been the first PIME priest to be targeted. As the Italian born cleric left an inter-faith organisation he had co-founded to bring Muslims and Christians together, he was driving in a minivan, approaching the PIME Mindanao Headquarters, when a motorcycle with two men riding tandem pulled abreast and shot him to death. The minivan careened off the road and into a concrete road divider...Abu Sayyaf had suceeded in becoming an international force to be reckoned with.
These incidents garnered domestic as well as international attention and inspired people such as Andalul Ajijul, and more importantly for this entry, his eldest son Alihamja. By the mid-1990s Alihamja Ajijul was on the cusp of manhood and so he joined Janjalani's group, byb then almost universally known as "Abu Sayyaf." At that point the group had just gained hundreds of new followers on Jolo Island, in Sulu Province, with the large organisation of the late Ghalib Andang, much better known by the unforgettable moniker, "Kumander Robot." Janjalani had fled south to Jolo at the behest of Andang, after the AFP had captured Janjalani's main camp, "al Madina al Mujahidin," or, "The City of Holy Fighters." Located in Upper Kapayawan, an upland barangay of Basilan's capital, Isabela City, the AFP had managed to overrun it in May 15th, 1993, after a heavy week of fighting using all four branches of the Military. "Camp Madina" as it is popularly known, had but little more than a year of existence and yet it turned out several dozen extremely well trained guerilla leaders. Yet the camp was now history. In doing this the AFP relegated Abu Sayyaf to guerilla status but an un-intended result was the group splitting up, though still nominally controlled by Janjalani and his "Shura," or "Council," there were now cells in several places- including Mainland Mindanao. From Lake Sebu in South Cotabato Province in the south, all the way to Marawi City in Lanao del Sur Province in the north and all places in between, Abu Sayyaf had become impossible to eradicate.
One place on the mainland that had always been within its sphere had been the aforementioned Zamboanga City. There Andalul Ajijul gladly gave his blessing as his eldest son, Alihamja Ajijul heard the call to Jihad and answered loudly. Journeying to Basilan, 18 kilometers across the water from Zamboanga City, Alihamja was fully trained in Abu Sayyaf's even larger camp located atop a nearly 700 meter high promontory in the interior jungle, named Puno Mohaji, in back of the municipality of Sumisip. Later christened "Camp Abdurajak" after founder Abdurajak Janjalani, the camp was covered with an impenetrable cloud canopy of virgin tain forest abd on three sides by sheer cliff faces that were practically impossible to scale. This much more secure camp would serve as the Abu Sayyaf Headquarters on Basilan until it too fell in May of 2000. For the interim however it trained nearly two thousand Abu Sayyaf guerillas trained by members who would later go on to form and lead all the various Abu Sayyaf factions. It was there in Sumisip that Abu Sayyaf continued building a working relationship with a wide range of former and current BIAF, or, Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces guerillas. The BIAF of course is the armed wing of the MILF, and so despite the academic rigamorole there is an undeniable close working relationship between much of the MILF/BIAF and the Abu Sayyaf. Among the many instructors that taught Alijamsa and other new recruits was a local resident from Sumisip's Barangay Cambug, Ustadz Hadji Asnawi Hassan "Laksaw" Addan Salah, popularly known as "Kumander Dan Laksaw Asnawi." As his training advanced Alijamsa became closer to Laksaw and the instructor ended up singling Alijamsa out for extended, specialised training centering upon IED Construction and Application. For the un-initiated, IED stands for "Improvised Explosive Device," though the word "Bomb" rolls much more easily off one's tongue.
In this phase of training Alijamsa was taught by men who themselves been trained in the Middle East and who dealt with simple but effective forms relying on singnal phase variance to close the circuit and thereby deronate the device. Many devices could be used, remote television controls, remote garage door openers, electronic doorbells, and of course- cellular telephones, which ended up becoming the tool of choice in the Southern Philippines. Not showing very much creativity, thereby creating a distinct Abu Suyyaf device signature, Abu Sayyaf bomb makers inevitably utilise Nokia 8910 model phones, though in a pinch, many other models would do.
In 1998 founder, leader, and chief ideologue Abdurajak Ababakar Janjalani was gunned down in a firefight with the PNP. A detachment from the PNP SAF, or, Special Action Force (the PNP Special Forces) ran across Janjalani and roughly 20 of his guerillas as the police began a foot patrol on October 2nd, 1998, in the municipality of Lamitan (now Lamitan City). The patrol, led by Chief Inspector Reynaldo "Rey" Romo, ended with Romo being shot to death, as was one of his subordinates, Police Officer Second Class (PO2) David Magnaye, and losing two other officers whose bodies took days to find while authorities concentrated on the safe recovery and extrication of three wounded SAF officers.
The death of Janjalani, Abu Sayyaf's unchallenged leader at that point, threatened to split apart Abu Sayyaf which like so many small organisations had effectively become a cult of personality. While some members thought to seize what was essentially unfathomable opportunity and branch out on their own, most got ready to move south and join Andang's group on Jolo, finding security in numbers. Alijamsa though, had a novel approach. Having reached the point where he was ready to swim on his own and not so willing to move south to unfamiliar terrain and culture in Jolo, Alijamsa Ajijul instead moved back to his hometwon Zamboanga City. There he drew a small but tightknit group around him, including his brother, Abdullah Ajijul, and began making plans to continue in much the same way. The group's determination ebbed and waned however, only becoming steadfast in the wake of 9/11 and the attacks on America's World Trade Center towers and the simultaneous assault on the US Military Headquarters, the Pentagon. This rash of attacks had a direct result on the US-Philippine relationship in that then-President Gloria Arroyo whored herself and her nation for a nice slice of the American largesse that was about to be handed out under the guise of "Anti Terrorism Funds." Of course Abu Sayyaf's undeniable-albeit entirely unofficial relationship with Bin Laden's "al Qadah" organisation was more than enough reason to start bouncing Dollar Bills off of the heads of the loads of more than willing Philippine authorities. That Abu Sayyaf had snatched three American citizens in its most recent mass kidnapping at the "Dos Palmas Resort" in the municipality of Puerto Princessa, in Palawan Province, served as proof positive for the gads and gads of fence sitters who opted to take a "look and see" approach.
Though recognising early on that KFR, or Kidnapping for Ransom, was a valid form of fund raisin, Alijamsa Ajijul wanted to stay on the theological straight and narrow. Trained in IED construction, emplacement, and detonation he directed his small group numbering only five men including himself and his younger brother Abdullah, to remain focused on Janjalani's core message of Outer Jihad. Although the group had a hand in many Zamboanga City IEDs, it wasn't until a so called "Suicide Bombing" in October of 2002 that the group finally gained international recognitition on its own.
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To be concluded in "Part 2" of thus four part series.
Sunday, November 27, 2011
Abu Sayyaf Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part II: Twelve Year Old Guerilla Captured in Basilan
The issue of "Child Warriors" (Philippine speak for "Child Soldiers") is a perennial punching bag for the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP, as well as for the New People'a Army, or NPA, with each side wasting great time and energy accusing the other of reprehensibly using "children" in armed combat. However, the dynamic is non-existent in both organisations. It is used as a propaganda exercise. In International Law there is an important genre known as LOAC (pronounced "Low-Ack"), an acronym representing the "Laws of Armed Conflict." Within LOAC the 1989 United Natioms Convention on the Rights of the Child defines the minimum age for soldiers- or rather, defines a "child" as anyone 17 or younger (Article I), but in terms of "Child Soldiers," the minimum age for front line combat soldiers- because outside of that narrow role there is absolutely no minimum age- is 18 or older for conscription but anyone 15 or older can voluntarily participate in front line combat (OPAC, or, Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, ratified May 25th, 2000). Conceivably you could dress a five year old in jungle camouflage and have him man an armed checkpoint but then you run into another genre, IHL, or International Humanitarian Law in which the "Rights of Children" are attended to in reams of Politically Correct verbiage.
To clarify, the minimum age for a front line combat soldier was, for decades, 14.5, or 14 years and six months for the decimally challenged amongst us. Then, in 1989, the UN authored a new Convention, the aforementioned "CROC," or, "Convention on the Rights of the Child," in which the age was raised to 15 years. So, the AFP is well within its rights to recruit 15 year old paramilitary soldiers in its CAA programme, right? Wrong...well...sort of... In "OPAC," the "Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict," Part IV, Article 1, only national militaries can recruit people 17 or younger. Paramilitaries are forbidden. But, according to the AFP the CAA programme is a Military Reserve, not a paramilitary. It is true that AFP cadres technically command each CAA detachment but it is also true that most CAAs never even receive their proscribed 45 days of military training. It would no doubt be a challenging case to prosecute were the Philippine Government to ever be called onto the carpet for the issue. The best defence the Government could offer is that CAA Regulations bar anyone under the age of 18 even being enlisted so that a 17 year old technically couldn't even join a rear echelon position (CAA being "Citizens Active Auxiliary" though usually the "C" is said to designate "Civilian," a faux paux that even the AFP has grown accustomed to making. The CAA are geographically fixed detachments composed of citizens living within a detachment's operational area. The best known form of CAA is the "CAFGU," pronounced "Kaf-goo," the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit).
In the AFP's defence, it isn't that the AFP seeks anyone younger than 18. Indeed, I reckon that even if confronted with someone under the stated minimum age most any member of the AFP would be unwilling to accept them. However, there are times when an AFP officer has no choice but to enlist such people although it is extremely rare. Insurgency in the Philippines is strongest in the remote countryside. On Mindanao the NPA concentrates its expansionist agenda within the Lumad demographic, the Lumad being the one size fits all generic label applied to the 18 Animist Hilltribes of Austronesian stock. There are still today many Lumad villages existing off the grid. Existing in unrecognised communities there is no civil registration in terms of births, weddings, deaths, and so forth. Without birth certificates there is no way in which to ascertain one's age and so this is done via one's word and the judgement of the AFP cadre in charge of organising a CAA detachment within that community. Extant law in fact holds that age must be ascertained as best as can reasonably be expected. As such, dealing with Hilltribes, it is the "Datu," or Chief's word that serves as the "proof."
There are other ways in which recruits may circumvent the age guidelines, such as a local Datu having a 16 year only son, nephew, or grandson that he wants enlisted, the datu compels the cadre by refusing to allow the detachment to exist unless the cadre complies, and other similar scenarios.
As for the NPA, until the late 1990s the organisation openly recruited males and females as young as 14 despite the political wing, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) Poltiburo (Political Bureau, aka the Executive Committee)having issued a directive that nobody under 18 must be recruited into the NPA's Guerilla Fronts, the front line units. The directive had no teeth and so recruitment of young teenagers continued until 1999 when the AFP suceeded in getting the Manila-based national media to co-operate in its propaganda campaign against the NPA, thereafter the "Child Warrior" became one of two AFP propaganda mainstays (the other being the AFP-manufactured issue of landmines). This changed with external sources joining the fray in that same year. UNICEF issued a report claiming that 3% of all NPA guerillas were "children."
That same year the NPA received a stern rebuke from the CPP's Military Commission, the entity serving as an interface between the CPP Central Committee and the NPA National Command. Now the minimum age for recruitment was firmly established at age 18. However, IF the NPA wished to recuit 9 year olds legally it could (according to the AFP it recruits nine year olds, at least that was the silly story told by the 10ID (Infantry Division) when it claimed a little girl it murdered was a guerilla). Laws dealing with minimum ages in the military merely apply to national governments, and then only if the government agrees to sign a voluntary agreement. These agreements, CROC, OPAC, Rome Statute, and so on can be abrogated simply by written notice of the nation wishing to withdraw.
Aside from the NPA, all Philippine insurgent organisations have, within recent memory, actively recruited children as young as 11. Although the BIAF, or Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces as the MILF military wing is known, now takes a stance that at least externally rejects the recruitment of children, it still enlists them. Although not very common, it is also not very rare to find BIAF guerillas in their very early teens. The MILF defends this by correctly noting that BIAF camps have never been conventional military camps. They are not properly defined and in most cases, neither are they properly protected. Within boundries haphazardly defined by the MILF/BIAF itself, several villages exist much like any other Philippine villages except for the MILF serving as the here all-end all power in villagers' lives. Shari'a Courts, courts administering Islamic Law, are administered by the MILF. People are whipped, executed, and so forth. Schools teach only MILF and Islamic principles and so the MILF/BIAF has created a state within a state. Each family is compelled to offer one male and one female to the organisation, with 12 being the minimum age for males, 11 for females.
Currently the ARMM, or, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao regional government has just awarded 20 BIAF Child Soldiers an educational package as it tries to lure more and more youth from a life of kill or be killed but the ARMM can only do this with foreign funding so that there isn't much hope that the BIAF will stop this practice. The MILF, as I noted, swears it won't do it anymore but then adds that children living in BIAF camps must be taught to defend themselves in the face of "external" aggression, as in the Philippine Government trying to merely re-establish its sovereign rights.
The ASG, or, Abu Sayyaf Group, is one organisation- and I used the word "organisation" VERY loosely- that makes no apologies about employing whichever male wishes to join them. On November 14th, 2011, the AFP's 4th Scout Ranger Battalion was once again operating in the municipality of Sumisip, in Basilan Province. Encircling a small camp under sub-Kumander Abdulbaki Ismanul, in Barangay Tongsengal, the soldiers began slowly crawling forward, uphill when they were detected. During the ensuing firefight the AFP was able to capture three Abu Sayyaf guerillas:
1) Al Mahdi Arshad, age 22
2) Abdul Baklis Manul
one of whom was 12 years old:
3) Abduhaya Pantasan
In doing so the AFP also managed to capture two M16s, one of which had an M203 grenade launcher, as well as one M14. In addition, twelve full magazines were captured, five M16, seven M14, and one ICOM walkie talkie. Not taking any chances since the 4th Battalion's Intelligence Unit was caught torturing an Abu Sayyaf guerilla this past summer, the battalion quickly turned the 12 year old over to the DSWD, or, Department of Social Welfare and Development as they are mandated to do.
Mandated or not, quite often youth are tacticaly interrogated, often brutally, and then incarcerated side by side with adults. It is only within the last 6 years that the Philippines has begun separating juvenile inmates from adults, yet hundreds are still not segregated. Children as young as 5 years old are held in large adult cells, and I need not describe the hellish life that awaits such children. At DSWD the young guerilla is ostensibly trained and counseled so as to have at least an opportunity to salvage his life. Of course in reality no real dedicated programme exists for de-programming such youth. Their counseling is with untrained paraprofessionals and their de-programming isn't via any established protocols and so naturallt these young people end up with little prospects outside the gross violence they have become accustomed too.
To clarify, the minimum age for a front line combat soldier was, for decades, 14.5, or 14 years and six months for the decimally challenged amongst us. Then, in 1989, the UN authored a new Convention, the aforementioned "CROC," or, "Convention on the Rights of the Child," in which the age was raised to 15 years. So, the AFP is well within its rights to recruit 15 year old paramilitary soldiers in its CAA programme, right? Wrong...well...sort of... In "OPAC," the "Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict," Part IV, Article 1, only national militaries can recruit people 17 or younger. Paramilitaries are forbidden. But, according to the AFP the CAA programme is a Military Reserve, not a paramilitary. It is true that AFP cadres technically command each CAA detachment but it is also true that most CAAs never even receive their proscribed 45 days of military training. It would no doubt be a challenging case to prosecute were the Philippine Government to ever be called onto the carpet for the issue. The best defence the Government could offer is that CAA Regulations bar anyone under the age of 18 even being enlisted so that a 17 year old technically couldn't even join a rear echelon position (CAA being "Citizens Active Auxiliary" though usually the "C" is said to designate "Civilian," a faux paux that even the AFP has grown accustomed to making. The CAA are geographically fixed detachments composed of citizens living within a detachment's operational area. The best known form of CAA is the "CAFGU," pronounced "Kaf-goo," the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit).
In the AFP's defence, it isn't that the AFP seeks anyone younger than 18. Indeed, I reckon that even if confronted with someone under the stated minimum age most any member of the AFP would be unwilling to accept them. However, there are times when an AFP officer has no choice but to enlist such people although it is extremely rare. Insurgency in the Philippines is strongest in the remote countryside. On Mindanao the NPA concentrates its expansionist agenda within the Lumad demographic, the Lumad being the one size fits all generic label applied to the 18 Animist Hilltribes of Austronesian stock. There are still today many Lumad villages existing off the grid. Existing in unrecognised communities there is no civil registration in terms of births, weddings, deaths, and so forth. Without birth certificates there is no way in which to ascertain one's age and so this is done via one's word and the judgement of the AFP cadre in charge of organising a CAA detachment within that community. Extant law in fact holds that age must be ascertained as best as can reasonably be expected. As such, dealing with Hilltribes, it is the "Datu," or Chief's word that serves as the "proof."
There are other ways in which recruits may circumvent the age guidelines, such as a local Datu having a 16 year only son, nephew, or grandson that he wants enlisted, the datu compels the cadre by refusing to allow the detachment to exist unless the cadre complies, and other similar scenarios.
As for the NPA, until the late 1990s the organisation openly recruited males and females as young as 14 despite the political wing, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) Poltiburo (Political Bureau, aka the Executive Committee)having issued a directive that nobody under 18 must be recruited into the NPA's Guerilla Fronts, the front line units. The directive had no teeth and so recruitment of young teenagers continued until 1999 when the AFP suceeded in getting the Manila-based national media to co-operate in its propaganda campaign against the NPA, thereafter the "Child Warrior" became one of two AFP propaganda mainstays (the other being the AFP-manufactured issue of landmines). This changed with external sources joining the fray in that same year. UNICEF issued a report claiming that 3% of all NPA guerillas were "children."
That same year the NPA received a stern rebuke from the CPP's Military Commission, the entity serving as an interface between the CPP Central Committee and the NPA National Command. Now the minimum age for recruitment was firmly established at age 18. However, IF the NPA wished to recuit 9 year olds legally it could (according to the AFP it recruits nine year olds, at least that was the silly story told by the 10ID (Infantry Division) when it claimed a little girl it murdered was a guerilla). Laws dealing with minimum ages in the military merely apply to national governments, and then only if the government agrees to sign a voluntary agreement. These agreements, CROC, OPAC, Rome Statute, and so on can be abrogated simply by written notice of the nation wishing to withdraw.
Aside from the NPA, all Philippine insurgent organisations have, within recent memory, actively recruited children as young as 11. Although the BIAF, or Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces as the MILF military wing is known, now takes a stance that at least externally rejects the recruitment of children, it still enlists them. Although not very common, it is also not very rare to find BIAF guerillas in their very early teens. The MILF defends this by correctly noting that BIAF camps have never been conventional military camps. They are not properly defined and in most cases, neither are they properly protected. Within boundries haphazardly defined by the MILF/BIAF itself, several villages exist much like any other Philippine villages except for the MILF serving as the here all-end all power in villagers' lives. Shari'a Courts, courts administering Islamic Law, are administered by the MILF. People are whipped, executed, and so forth. Schools teach only MILF and Islamic principles and so the MILF/BIAF has created a state within a state. Each family is compelled to offer one male and one female to the organisation, with 12 being the minimum age for males, 11 for females.
Currently the ARMM, or, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao regional government has just awarded 20 BIAF Child Soldiers an educational package as it tries to lure more and more youth from a life of kill or be killed but the ARMM can only do this with foreign funding so that there isn't much hope that the BIAF will stop this practice. The MILF, as I noted, swears it won't do it anymore but then adds that children living in BIAF camps must be taught to defend themselves in the face of "external" aggression, as in the Philippine Government trying to merely re-establish its sovereign rights.
The ASG, or, Abu Sayyaf Group, is one organisation- and I used the word "organisation" VERY loosely- that makes no apologies about employing whichever male wishes to join them. On November 14th, 2011, the AFP's 4th Scout Ranger Battalion was once again operating in the municipality of Sumisip, in Basilan Province. Encircling a small camp under sub-Kumander Abdulbaki Ismanul, in Barangay Tongsengal, the soldiers began slowly crawling forward, uphill when they were detected. During the ensuing firefight the AFP was able to capture three Abu Sayyaf guerillas:
1) Al Mahdi Arshad, age 22
2) Abdul Baklis Manul
one of whom was 12 years old:
3) Abduhaya Pantasan
In doing so the AFP also managed to capture two M16s, one of which had an M203 grenade launcher, as well as one M14. In addition, twelve full magazines were captured, five M16, seven M14, and one ICOM walkie talkie. Not taking any chances since the 4th Battalion's Intelligence Unit was caught torturing an Abu Sayyaf guerilla this past summer, the battalion quickly turned the 12 year old over to the DSWD, or, Department of Social Welfare and Development as they are mandated to do.
Mandated or not, quite often youth are tacticaly interrogated, often brutally, and then incarcerated side by side with adults. It is only within the last 6 years that the Philippines has begun separating juvenile inmates from adults, yet hundreds are still not segregated. Children as young as 5 years old are held in large adult cells, and I need not describe the hellish life that awaits such children. At DSWD the young guerilla is ostensibly trained and counseled so as to have at least an opportunity to salvage his life. Of course in reality no real dedicated programme exists for de-programming such youth. Their counseling is with untrained paraprofessionals and their de-programming isn't via any established protocols and so naturallt these young people end up with little prospects outside the gross violence they have become accustomed too.
Sunday, November 20, 2011
Abu Sayyaf Armed Contacts for the Second Quarter of 2011, Part II: AFP Operations in Al Barka End, Two Abu Sayyaf Guerillas Killed
I need to open this with a rejoinder that this was a Second Quarter of 2011 incident. Ergo, this was months before the AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines operation in October of 2011 that ended so badly with the loss of eighteen Scout Rangers in Basilan Province's municipality of Al Barka.
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On Saturday April 16th, 2011, at 615AM, the AFP's 3rd Special Forces Battalion (Airborne) once again captured the Abu Sayyaf Camp in the municipality of Al Barka's Barangay Makalang. Ironically the capture marked the end of a two month campaign against the ASG, or Abu Sayyaf Group's Jamiri Faction. That campaign began in February just after the AFP capture this very same camp.
According to standard military accumen, as well as according to AFP protocols, once a camp is captured it is turned over to the LGU, or, the Local Government Unit (as in municipal and/or provincial government). The LGU is supposed to then co-ordinate its local armed forces (CAAs, as in Civilian Active Auxiliaries, such as CAFGU, SCAA, or the CVO, the latter an LGU dedicated force under the supervision of the PNP, or Philippine National Police). The CAA, the progeny of the infamous Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) of the Marcos Era, is then tasked with "Holding" the tract, repelling any counter-operations launched to re-capture it as well as any kind of subversive armed activities around it.
Al Barka however, is a relatively new municipality carved out of the adjacent town of Tipo Tipo. It receives no IRA, or Internal Revenue Allotment. This allotment provides the funding for CAA operations in any given municipality. Therefore, after capturing this same camp in Janurary, the AFP "Cleared" the sector and turned it over to the LGU, in this case the municipal government. The LGU, having no means with which to "Hold" it promptly abandoned it, hence the two month operation that basically had the AFP treading water. The operation centered on the town of Al Barka, particularly its Barangays Cambug, Linuan, Kailih, Danapah, Guinanta and of course Makalang in addition to the adjoining Barangay's Limba Upas and Baguindan in Tipo Tipo.
Fifteen ASG guerillas had been sighted moving through the jungles around Al Barka and so once again, the AFP found itself trying to capture the ASG camp in Barangay Makalang's Sitio Bohe Bu'ug. Al Barka's Barangays Guinanta and Kailih are BIAF controlled. The BIAF, or Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, are the military wing of the MILF. Like all BIAF on Basilan they belong to the 114 Base Command. Naturally, as we were reminded in October of 2011, operating in close proximity to any BIAF position very often leads to extreme violence. In addition, there is a close relationship between the 114 Base Command and the ASG. Indeed, in both that aforementioned Janurary AND this latest incident, the BIAF DID engage the AFP after the latter inadvertently crossed the outer perimeter of the BIAF 114 Command's 3rd Brigade Camp- the same 3rd Brigade that would involve itself in the October 18th killing of AFP Scout Rangers.
On the day in question however, April 16th, 2011, at the ASG camp, only the ASG engaged the AFP. The AFP's superior forces outmanned the ASG who as noted had less than a single platoon's worth of fighters. When the smoke cleared the AFP managed to capture three M16s, one of which was fitted with an M203 rifle grenade launcher, and one M14. In addition to two dead ASG guerillas, three wounded guerillas were taken into custody. The two deceased were immediately turned over to the Barangay Captain of Makalang, himself a BIAF guerilla.
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On Saturday April 16th, 2011, at 615AM, the AFP's 3rd Special Forces Battalion (Airborne) once again captured the Abu Sayyaf Camp in the municipality of Al Barka's Barangay Makalang. Ironically the capture marked the end of a two month campaign against the ASG, or Abu Sayyaf Group's Jamiri Faction. That campaign began in February just after the AFP capture this very same camp.
According to standard military accumen, as well as according to AFP protocols, once a camp is captured it is turned over to the LGU, or, the Local Government Unit (as in municipal and/or provincial government). The LGU is supposed to then co-ordinate its local armed forces (CAAs, as in Civilian Active Auxiliaries, such as CAFGU, SCAA, or the CVO, the latter an LGU dedicated force under the supervision of the PNP, or Philippine National Police). The CAA, the progeny of the infamous Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) of the Marcos Era, is then tasked with "Holding" the tract, repelling any counter-operations launched to re-capture it as well as any kind of subversive armed activities around it.
Al Barka however, is a relatively new municipality carved out of the adjacent town of Tipo Tipo. It receives no IRA, or Internal Revenue Allotment. This allotment provides the funding for CAA operations in any given municipality. Therefore, after capturing this same camp in Janurary, the AFP "Cleared" the sector and turned it over to the LGU, in this case the municipal government. The LGU, having no means with which to "Hold" it promptly abandoned it, hence the two month operation that basically had the AFP treading water. The operation centered on the town of Al Barka, particularly its Barangays Cambug, Linuan, Kailih, Danapah, Guinanta and of course Makalang in addition to the adjoining Barangay's Limba Upas and Baguindan in Tipo Tipo.
Fifteen ASG guerillas had been sighted moving through the jungles around Al Barka and so once again, the AFP found itself trying to capture the ASG camp in Barangay Makalang's Sitio Bohe Bu'ug. Al Barka's Barangays Guinanta and Kailih are BIAF controlled. The BIAF, or Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, are the military wing of the MILF. Like all BIAF on Basilan they belong to the 114 Base Command. Naturally, as we were reminded in October of 2011, operating in close proximity to any BIAF position very often leads to extreme violence. In addition, there is a close relationship between the 114 Base Command and the ASG. Indeed, in both that aforementioned Janurary AND this latest incident, the BIAF DID engage the AFP after the latter inadvertently crossed the outer perimeter of the BIAF 114 Command's 3rd Brigade Camp- the same 3rd Brigade that would involve itself in the October 18th killing of AFP Scout Rangers.
On the day in question however, April 16th, 2011, at the ASG camp, only the ASG engaged the AFP. The AFP's superior forces outmanned the ASG who as noted had less than a single platoon's worth of fighters. When the smoke cleared the AFP managed to capture three M16s, one of which was fitted with an M203 rifle grenade launcher, and one M14. In addition to two dead ASG guerillas, three wounded guerillas were taken into custody. The two deceased were immediately turned over to the Barangay Captain of Makalang, himself a BIAF guerilla.
Monday, October 17, 2011
Abu Sayyaf Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part II: MBLT-10 Attacked by 150 Abu Sayyaf in
With great aplomb the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP, announced that one of its garrison in Sulu Province was attacked by a new Islamo-fascist organisation. Ominously we learned that "several foreigners" had been sighted in amongst the 150 guerillas who swarmed MBLT-10's 30th Company post in the municipality of Talipao's Barangay Kabungkol, on Jolo Island. When the smoke cleared some 4 hours after the shooting began thirteen bodies laid sprawled around the perimeter of the Marine compound. Of seven unidentified bodies there was one who didn't "look Filipino."
The new group we are told is "Team Awliya," or simply, "Awliya." In reality it was merely the usual ASG, or Abu Sayyaf Group combined with the usual gaggle of MNLF-Misuari via Kumander Ustadz Hatib Jakaria, closely allied with MNLF-Misuari Kumander Habier Malik whose main camp in Barangay Bitan-ag sits less than 2 kilometers from the Marine garrison in question. Malik is obsessed with Governmental infrastructual schemes recognising their dual use nature and their backing by the US Government. As the old adage tells us, "Insurgency begins where good roads end."
The attack in question took place on Sunday at 330AM on September 25th, 2011. With the Marines outnumbered nearly three to one the post was extremely vulnerable to being overun and captured. Indeed, the only thing that saved the post and most of its men was a bit of air support courtesy of a pair of MG520 helicopter gunships. Running low off of the ground and seemingly unconcerned about the danger posed by both RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenades) as well as by 90MM recoiless guns, the gunships pointed their own guns downward and swept the jungle clearing around MBLT-10's post.
When the smoke cleared the Marines had lost two men while the Abu Sayyaf, courtesy of the AFP's gunship, had lost at least 13 guerillas, with two villagers nearby having been killed by errand rounds as well. Usually AFP casualty counts need to be taken with a grain of salt. However, this time there were thirteen bodies laying in their blood and in grotesque countenances.
So what about Team Awliya? As noted, MNLF-Misuari Kumander Hatib Jakariya is attached to Kumander Ustadz Habier Malik who holds a deep loyalty to MNLF co-founder and Chairman Nur Misuari while not accepting the latter's political directives. When Misuari signed the 1996 Jakarta Agreement, a faux FPA or Final Peace Agreement, Malik went feral. Periodically Malik's large force lashes out against any nearby symbol of state authority.
Perhaps his most notable action was the audacious capture of retired Major General Mohammed Ben Dolorfino on February 2nd, 2007 when the latter entered Malik's camp under a flag of truce to hand over compensation for the AFP having "mistakenly" having killed several MNLF-Misuari guerillas. When Dolorfino and his entourage of 18 AFP and one very scared diplomat in way over his head attempted to leave Malik announced that they would be his guest until Nur Misuari, then under detention on Luzon, was allowed to attend an OIC (Organisation of the Islamic Conference, a Saudi-based entity that has served as the MNLF's most steadfast patron) meeting scheduled for April of that year.
In the end Malik was assured that Misuari would be allowed to go and so he released his 20 captives on February 5th. When the Government reneged in April of that year Malik led an assault against a Marine garrison in which two enlisted men were killed by 60MM mortar volleys. The AFP retaliated by deploying two brigades to capture Malik's camp in Barangay Bitan-ag but by the autumn of that year the OIC had twisted Manila's arm and so the AFP not only abandoned Malik's camp but also helped him transport men and equipment into it as he once again set up a state within a state (at least in his own mind). A good second as to Malik's most noteworthy acts would probably his killing of two American Special Forces soldiers in September of 2009, via IED (though it is never mentioned an AFP Marine was also killed when their Hummer was flipped by the blast).
As of late he has been taking potshots at AFP Engineer corpsmen who are working on a nearby bridge but a two story public school building has been eating at him.The objective in this attack is said to be MNLT-10s role as Security Escort to AFP Engineers working on that aforementioned public school. Compounding matters is the fact that America is funding the project. As noted Kumander Malik at least is steadfastly opposed to any and all Government initiatives.
Habier Malik's sub-Kumander, or second in charge, Ustadz Hatib Jakaria has co-opted a bit of Sufi theology in his quest to take a more active role in the island's insurgency. Team Awliya is his ballgame. Under Jakaria are, or rather WERE two sub-Kumanders:
1) Jawalibal Uhod
2) Sarip Jainal Kausi
Kausi however was one of the thirteen confirmed dead so that at least one important cog has been removed in what may have been a nascent faction.
Of the thirteen dead ASG, six have been identified:
1) Akman Badda
2) Bassar Abbur
3) Aksid Bassir
4) Innu Sadjari
5) Crispin Sadadji
6) sub-Kumander Salip Jainal Kausi
Seven others have been buried by Barangay Kabungol officials. The single civilian casualty was buried almost immediately according to Shari'a, or Islamic Law. The Marines, as noted, suffered two KIAs, or Kills in Action/
1) Corporal Rufino "Rufy" Fermin
2) Private First Class Richard Monte
In addition, 10 Marines were also wounded:
1) Second Lieutenant Arnel Arieta
2) Seargant Angelito Nier
3) Seargant Ricardo Necesario
4) Corporal Salvador Bausa
5) Corporal Juan Ibrando
6) Corporal Reysson Boriasa
7) Corporal Adrian Pis-an
8) Private First Class Roldan Bagares
9) Private First Class Eutiquio Nagales
10) Private Erven Dacumos
The new group we are told is "Team Awliya," or simply, "Awliya." In reality it was merely the usual ASG, or Abu Sayyaf Group combined with the usual gaggle of MNLF-Misuari via Kumander Ustadz Hatib Jakaria, closely allied with MNLF-Misuari Kumander Habier Malik whose main camp in Barangay Bitan-ag sits less than 2 kilometers from the Marine garrison in question. Malik is obsessed with Governmental infrastructual schemes recognising their dual use nature and their backing by the US Government. As the old adage tells us, "Insurgency begins where good roads end."
The attack in question took place on Sunday at 330AM on September 25th, 2011. With the Marines outnumbered nearly three to one the post was extremely vulnerable to being overun and captured. Indeed, the only thing that saved the post and most of its men was a bit of air support courtesy of a pair of MG520 helicopter gunships. Running low off of the ground and seemingly unconcerned about the danger posed by both RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenades) as well as by 90MM recoiless guns, the gunships pointed their own guns downward and swept the jungle clearing around MBLT-10's post.
When the smoke cleared the Marines had lost two men while the Abu Sayyaf, courtesy of the AFP's gunship, had lost at least 13 guerillas, with two villagers nearby having been killed by errand rounds as well. Usually AFP casualty counts need to be taken with a grain of salt. However, this time there were thirteen bodies laying in their blood and in grotesque countenances.
So what about Team Awliya? As noted, MNLF-Misuari Kumander Hatib Jakariya is attached to Kumander Ustadz Habier Malik who holds a deep loyalty to MNLF co-founder and Chairman Nur Misuari while not accepting the latter's political directives. When Misuari signed the 1996 Jakarta Agreement, a faux FPA or Final Peace Agreement, Malik went feral. Periodically Malik's large force lashes out against any nearby symbol of state authority.
Perhaps his most notable action was the audacious capture of retired Major General Mohammed Ben Dolorfino on February 2nd, 2007 when the latter entered Malik's camp under a flag of truce to hand over compensation for the AFP having "mistakenly" having killed several MNLF-Misuari guerillas. When Dolorfino and his entourage of 18 AFP and one very scared diplomat in way over his head attempted to leave Malik announced that they would be his guest until Nur Misuari, then under detention on Luzon, was allowed to attend an OIC (Organisation of the Islamic Conference, a Saudi-based entity that has served as the MNLF's most steadfast patron) meeting scheduled for April of that year.
In the end Malik was assured that Misuari would be allowed to go and so he released his 20 captives on February 5th. When the Government reneged in April of that year Malik led an assault against a Marine garrison in which two enlisted men were killed by 60MM mortar volleys. The AFP retaliated by deploying two brigades to capture Malik's camp in Barangay Bitan-ag but by the autumn of that year the OIC had twisted Manila's arm and so the AFP not only abandoned Malik's camp but also helped him transport men and equipment into it as he once again set up a state within a state (at least in his own mind). A good second as to Malik's most noteworthy acts would probably his killing of two American Special Forces soldiers in September of 2009, via IED (though it is never mentioned an AFP Marine was also killed when their Hummer was flipped by the blast).
As of late he has been taking potshots at AFP Engineer corpsmen who are working on a nearby bridge but a two story public school building has been eating at him.The objective in this attack is said to be MNLT-10s role as Security Escort to AFP Engineers working on that aforementioned public school. Compounding matters is the fact that America is funding the project. As noted Kumander Malik at least is steadfastly opposed to any and all Government initiatives.
Habier Malik's sub-Kumander, or second in charge, Ustadz Hatib Jakaria has co-opted a bit of Sufi theology in his quest to take a more active role in the island's insurgency. Team Awliya is his ballgame. Under Jakaria are, or rather WERE two sub-Kumanders:
1) Jawalibal Uhod
2) Sarip Jainal Kausi
Kausi however was one of the thirteen confirmed dead so that at least one important cog has been removed in what may have been a nascent faction.
Of the thirteen dead ASG, six have been identified:
1) Akman Badda
2) Bassar Abbur
3) Aksid Bassir
4) Innu Sadjari
5) Crispin Sadadji
6) sub-Kumander Salip Jainal Kausi
Seven others have been buried by Barangay Kabungol officials. The single civilian casualty was buried almost immediately according to Shari'a, or Islamic Law. The Marines, as noted, suffered two KIAs, or Kills in Action/
1) Corporal Rufino "Rufy" Fermin
2) Private First Class Richard Monte
In addition, 10 Marines were also wounded:
1) Second Lieutenant Arnel Arieta
2) Seargant Angelito Nier
3) Seargant Ricardo Necesario
4) Corporal Salvador Bausa
5) Corporal Juan Ibrando
6) Corporal Reysson Boriasa
7) Corporal Adrian Pis-an
8) Private First Class Roldan Bagares
9) Private First Class Eutiquio Nagales
10) Private Erven Dacumos
Friday, October 7, 2011
Abu Sayyaf Armed Contacts for the Third Quarter of 2011, Part I: Abu Sayyaf Decapitates Two Marines
Soldiers dying in defence of their dury is always poigbant but many, if not most, take some measure of comfort knowing that such men have not died in vain...but what about when soldiers die needlessly?
Sitio Tubig Magtuh in the municipality of Patikul's Barangay Panglayahan sits in between two sheer-faced peaks, Mount Tunggol and Mount Gasam. Towards the rear of the sitio going upland there is a very sharp incline, heavily forested with successive ridgelines. The only way in is by foot and going uphill. Above the third ridgeline the land takes a more gentle slope and it is there that the Abu Sayyaf's Kumander Radullan "Putol" Sahiron established a well entrenched encampment.
On July 27th, 2011 the AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines, implemented its OPlan (Operational Plan)_ Wild Finger, the latest facet of its more comprehensive OPlan Five Fingers. Wild Finger aimed to de-stabilise the ASG, or Abu Sayyaf Group infrastructure by putting all its numerous Jolo-based factions on the defencive with an aggressive and concerted Fleet-Marine push ("Fleet Marine" being the inclusive Naval-Marine intertwined operational doctrine implemented by the AFP in 2006). Marine Battalion Landing Team #5, or MBLT-5, 311th Company divided itself into three platoons of thirty-two riflemen and one commanding officer and divvied up its given AOR, or Area of Responsibility (as in "Area of Operation").
After midnite Company 311's Platoon 30, under Second Lieutenant Michael Baladad, cautiously entered the upland barangay of Panglayahan and began advancing very slowly as the barangay is ASG-controlled in its upper environs. At 315AM, as the thirty-three men began moving painstakingly slow, advancing up a steep rise, the skies opened up with a torrential thunderstorm. As the men stopped to quietly switch into their rain gear the jungle uphill and to the sides of them came alive with automatic rifle fire.
Immediately Second Lieutenant Baladad and the man closest to him, his second in command, Seargant Desiderio Serdan Jr., who was carrying the platoon's ICOM radio, fell, both instantly killed in the initial fusiilade. The remaining thirty-one men, now rudderless, devoid of command, spread out and fell to their stomachs as their years of training kicked in. Unable to even crawl to Seargant Serdan to call in on the ICOM for assistance the marines concentrated their fire, ever mindful of conserving ammunition. Holding their positions they continued inching to the sides to prevent the Abu Sayyaf from encircling them. Applying pressure on both flanks the marines were slowly able to force the ASG guerillas into a short retreat uphill, albeit to a posiion still very well within firing range.
With rain subsiding just after daybreak the Abu Sayyaf began re-gaining what little ground they had lost. Outnumbering their Marine counterparts by a factor of two and using well honed tactics the guerillas soon had the platoon retreating down hill though very slowly. Seven dead Marines were left where they had died, as the twenty-six survivors, all wounded to the last man themselves, maintained a cohesive formation and repelled numerous attempts to outflank their position. By 7AM the ASG firepower diminished and then quickly subsided as the guerillas retreated further into the mountains.
Slowly the platoon re-climbed the slope to retrieve the bodies of their fallen comrades and any equipment they might salvage. Not only were all seven corpses stripped of everything but their underwear, four of the corpses had been defiled. Second Lieutenant Baladad and another of the fallen, Corporal Freddie Castellano Jr., had been decapitated and their hads had been taken with the retreating guerillas. Two other corpses had been mutilated with a sword. With the ICOM now captured by the Abu Sayyaf the twenty-six surviving- but wounded- members of Platoon 30 realised that they were ill equipped to negotiate the very steep, and now muddied slopes while carrying their fallen comrades. Therefore they reluctantly made their way downhill without the seven and threaded their way into the town proper. There a corporal phoned in a status report to Brigade Headquarters and tended to the most seriously injured amongst them.
It was late in the afternoon before two UH-1H helicopters, popularly known as "Hueys," landed near the town's municipal compound. Taking two of the least injured Marines aboard, one in each helicopter, they lifted off covered by two MG-520 helicopter gunships hovering on their flanks for aircover. The Hueys disgorged portions of MBLTs 5 and 10, the other two battalions engaged in OPlan Wild Finger, and the tedious and painstaking recovery effort began. By night fall the seven bodies of the fallen Marines. The casualties:
1) Second Lieutenant Michael Baladad, the platoon leader, of Quezon City in Metro Manila. He left behind his wife Michelle and their two young children, Macky, age 6, and Mikayla, age 2. Michelle had spoken to her husband just before he led his men into the jungle. They had discussed his upcoming R and R (Rest and Relaxation, aka "Leave") just a week away and how they were going to take the kids to the Manila Zoo. Sadly, she had last seen her husband in March when they had gotten married.
2) Seargant Desiderio Serdan Jr., a resident of Iriga City in Camarines del Sur Province on Luzon.
3) Corporal Freddie Castellano Jr., a lifelong resident of Sitio Mercedes in the municipality of La Castellana's Barangay Sag-ang. He and his family lived on Hacienda Mercedes, a sugar plantation where Corporal Castellano had laboured before entering the military.
4) Corporal Claro Lapasaran III, a resident of the municipality of Barotac's Barangay Licuan in Nuevo Iolio Province in the Central Philippine's Visayas Region.
5) Corporal Ramsel Laynesa, a resident of the municipality of Nabua in the province of Camarines del Sur on Luzon.
6) Private First Class Juanito Evasco Jr., also a resident of Nabua.
7) Private Nico Tinambunan, a lifelong resident of Lamitan City in Basilan Province.
All seven bodies were immediately brought to Camp Bautista in Jolo City on that same island of Jolo where they were stored as arrangements were made. Early Saturday morning, July 30th, they were transported to Camp Erwin Andrews in Zamboanga City where Private Tinambunan's body was offloaded. As a Muslim his funeral had to take place as soon as possible. Ideally a Muslim must be interred before sunset on the day of his or her death but in this case not much could be done. As his body was flown across the strait to Basilan the C-130 lifted off for the flight to Manila where the six remaining corpses would be given a military funeral. Upon landing each white enameled coffin was loaded onto six separate hearses and driven to the auditorium at Marine Headquarters at Fort Bonifacio.
The next morning, Sunday, July 31st, President Aquino made his appearance aa did all high ranking personalities in the military echelon. The President vowed revenge, and promised that each family of the deceased would receive P250,000 ($5,150), a vertible fortune in Philippine terms at nearly two times the annual salary of an enlisted man. The payouts will be sourced from the Presidential Social Fund, a euphanism for "Slush Fund." Considering that AFP personnel are dying in combat every month it seems a bit strange that President Aquino would offer such largesse when he never even raises an eyebrow when other soldiers or marines are killed. Photo opportunities make all the difference.
Each of the seven men received a promotion of a single rank which is a standard procedure and does help to boost the pension any spouse or primary survivor will receive. Also, President Aquino personally awarded- posthumously- the nation's second highest honour, the Gold Cross, for "Gallantry in Action." Again, plenty of people dying and noone bats an eye. On Tuesday, August 2nd, all bodies were released to their families with the AFP delivering them.
Some readers may have remembered that in my first paragraph I had inferred that these seven men gave up their lives for nothing. That seems extremely harsh, but I am sure that if you know the facts that you very well might agree with me.
That very same Abu Sayyaf camp in Sitio Tubig Magtuh? It has been overun and captured by AFP Marines no less than five times in the last seven years. It is true that in war a barren hill with no apparent utility tactically OR strategically can be taken, and re-taken, with great casualties incurred. However, in insurgency it is a different story. When a strategic position is captured, no matter the cost, it must be held and eventually consolidated with other similarly cleared assets. Realising that Sitio Tubig Magtuh holds extreme strategical value for Kumander Sahiron the AFP should have long ago capitalised on its gains there and at least biouvaced a CAA, or Civilian Active Auxiliary (as in CAFGU or CVO) detachment there to repel any future attempts at re-taking the site.
Sadly, each of the several AFP assaults on that particular camp have taken place at a particular time of year, late March. So, just about every Easter Week the AFP sends in a Marine detachment, usually from MBLT-5, to re-take this same camp. It borders on insanity. At least this time the AFP has learned a lesson or two and has installed a military post at the encampment site. Naming the post "Camp Baladad" in honour of Second Lieutenant Michael Baladad, the fallen platoon leader, it is manned by a platoon from none other than MBLT-5.
Sitio Tubig Magtuh in the municipality of Patikul's Barangay Panglayahan sits in between two sheer-faced peaks, Mount Tunggol and Mount Gasam. Towards the rear of the sitio going upland there is a very sharp incline, heavily forested with successive ridgelines. The only way in is by foot and going uphill. Above the third ridgeline the land takes a more gentle slope and it is there that the Abu Sayyaf's Kumander Radullan "Putol" Sahiron established a well entrenched encampment.
On July 27th, 2011 the AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines, implemented its OPlan (Operational Plan)_ Wild Finger, the latest facet of its more comprehensive OPlan Five Fingers. Wild Finger aimed to de-stabilise the ASG, or Abu Sayyaf Group infrastructure by putting all its numerous Jolo-based factions on the defencive with an aggressive and concerted Fleet-Marine push ("Fleet Marine" being the inclusive Naval-Marine intertwined operational doctrine implemented by the AFP in 2006). Marine Battalion Landing Team #5, or MBLT-5, 311th Company divided itself into three platoons of thirty-two riflemen and one commanding officer and divvied up its given AOR, or Area of Responsibility (as in "Area of Operation").
After midnite Company 311's Platoon 30, under Second Lieutenant Michael Baladad, cautiously entered the upland barangay of Panglayahan and began advancing very slowly as the barangay is ASG-controlled in its upper environs. At 315AM, as the thirty-three men began moving painstakingly slow, advancing up a steep rise, the skies opened up with a torrential thunderstorm. As the men stopped to quietly switch into their rain gear the jungle uphill and to the sides of them came alive with automatic rifle fire.
Immediately Second Lieutenant Baladad and the man closest to him, his second in command, Seargant Desiderio Serdan Jr., who was carrying the platoon's ICOM radio, fell, both instantly killed in the initial fusiilade. The remaining thirty-one men, now rudderless, devoid of command, spread out and fell to their stomachs as their years of training kicked in. Unable to even crawl to Seargant Serdan to call in on the ICOM for assistance the marines concentrated their fire, ever mindful of conserving ammunition. Holding their positions they continued inching to the sides to prevent the Abu Sayyaf from encircling them. Applying pressure on both flanks the marines were slowly able to force the ASG guerillas into a short retreat uphill, albeit to a posiion still very well within firing range.
With rain subsiding just after daybreak the Abu Sayyaf began re-gaining what little ground they had lost. Outnumbering their Marine counterparts by a factor of two and using well honed tactics the guerillas soon had the platoon retreating down hill though very slowly. Seven dead Marines were left where they had died, as the twenty-six survivors, all wounded to the last man themselves, maintained a cohesive formation and repelled numerous attempts to outflank their position. By 7AM the ASG firepower diminished and then quickly subsided as the guerillas retreated further into the mountains.
Slowly the platoon re-climbed the slope to retrieve the bodies of their fallen comrades and any equipment they might salvage. Not only were all seven corpses stripped of everything but their underwear, four of the corpses had been defiled. Second Lieutenant Baladad and another of the fallen, Corporal Freddie Castellano Jr., had been decapitated and their hads had been taken with the retreating guerillas. Two other corpses had been mutilated with a sword. With the ICOM now captured by the Abu Sayyaf the twenty-six surviving- but wounded- members of Platoon 30 realised that they were ill equipped to negotiate the very steep, and now muddied slopes while carrying their fallen comrades. Therefore they reluctantly made their way downhill without the seven and threaded their way into the town proper. There a corporal phoned in a status report to Brigade Headquarters and tended to the most seriously injured amongst them.
It was late in the afternoon before two UH-1H helicopters, popularly known as "Hueys," landed near the town's municipal compound. Taking two of the least injured Marines aboard, one in each helicopter, they lifted off covered by two MG-520 helicopter gunships hovering on their flanks for aircover. The Hueys disgorged portions of MBLTs 5 and 10, the other two battalions engaged in OPlan Wild Finger, and the tedious and painstaking recovery effort began. By night fall the seven bodies of the fallen Marines. The casualties:
1) Second Lieutenant Michael Baladad, the platoon leader, of Quezon City in Metro Manila. He left behind his wife Michelle and their two young children, Macky, age 6, and Mikayla, age 2. Michelle had spoken to her husband just before he led his men into the jungle. They had discussed his upcoming R and R (Rest and Relaxation, aka "Leave") just a week away and how they were going to take the kids to the Manila Zoo. Sadly, she had last seen her husband in March when they had gotten married.
2) Seargant Desiderio Serdan Jr., a resident of Iriga City in Camarines del Sur Province on Luzon.
3) Corporal Freddie Castellano Jr., a lifelong resident of Sitio Mercedes in the municipality of La Castellana's Barangay Sag-ang. He and his family lived on Hacienda Mercedes, a sugar plantation where Corporal Castellano had laboured before entering the military.
4) Corporal Claro Lapasaran III, a resident of the municipality of Barotac's Barangay Licuan in Nuevo Iolio Province in the Central Philippine's Visayas Region.
5) Corporal Ramsel Laynesa, a resident of the municipality of Nabua in the province of Camarines del Sur on Luzon.
6) Private First Class Juanito Evasco Jr., also a resident of Nabua.
7) Private Nico Tinambunan, a lifelong resident of Lamitan City in Basilan Province.
All seven bodies were immediately brought to Camp Bautista in Jolo City on that same island of Jolo where they were stored as arrangements were made. Early Saturday morning, July 30th, they were transported to Camp Erwin Andrews in Zamboanga City where Private Tinambunan's body was offloaded. As a Muslim his funeral had to take place as soon as possible. Ideally a Muslim must be interred before sunset on the day of his or her death but in this case not much could be done. As his body was flown across the strait to Basilan the C-130 lifted off for the flight to Manila where the six remaining corpses would be given a military funeral. Upon landing each white enameled coffin was loaded onto six separate hearses and driven to the auditorium at Marine Headquarters at Fort Bonifacio.
The next morning, Sunday, July 31st, President Aquino made his appearance aa did all high ranking personalities in the military echelon. The President vowed revenge, and promised that each family of the deceased would receive P250,000 ($5,150), a vertible fortune in Philippine terms at nearly two times the annual salary of an enlisted man. The payouts will be sourced from the Presidential Social Fund, a euphanism for "Slush Fund." Considering that AFP personnel are dying in combat every month it seems a bit strange that President Aquino would offer such largesse when he never even raises an eyebrow when other soldiers or marines are killed. Photo opportunities make all the difference.
Each of the seven men received a promotion of a single rank which is a standard procedure and does help to boost the pension any spouse or primary survivor will receive. Also, President Aquino personally awarded- posthumously- the nation's second highest honour, the Gold Cross, for "Gallantry in Action." Again, plenty of people dying and noone bats an eye. On Tuesday, August 2nd, all bodies were released to their families with the AFP delivering them.
Some readers may have remembered that in my first paragraph I had inferred that these seven men gave up their lives for nothing. That seems extremely harsh, but I am sure that if you know the facts that you very well might agree with me.
That very same Abu Sayyaf camp in Sitio Tubig Magtuh? It has been overun and captured by AFP Marines no less than five times in the last seven years. It is true that in war a barren hill with no apparent utility tactically OR strategically can be taken, and re-taken, with great casualties incurred. However, in insurgency it is a different story. When a strategic position is captured, no matter the cost, it must be held and eventually consolidated with other similarly cleared assets. Realising that Sitio Tubig Magtuh holds extreme strategical value for Kumander Sahiron the AFP should have long ago capitalised on its gains there and at least biouvaced a CAA, or Civilian Active Auxiliary (as in CAFGU or CVO) detachment there to repel any future attempts at re-taking the site.
Sadly, each of the several AFP assaults on that particular camp have taken place at a particular time of year, late March. So, just about every Easter Week the AFP sends in a Marine detachment, usually from MBLT-5, to re-take this same camp. It borders on insanity. At least this time the AFP has learned a lesson or two and has installed a military post at the encampment site. Naming the post "Camp Baladad" in honour of Second Lieutenant Michael Baladad, the fallen platoon leader, it is manned by a platoon from none other than MBLT-5.
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