***CONTINUED FROM PART III***Responding to the Court Martial Panel's Response to the defence Petition on Adverse Publicity, in which the Panel had contended that the Supreme Court held no Powers of Review over the Military System of Justice, the Court conceeded that Jurisdiction WAS the primary manner of interface between the Court and the Military System. However, it maintained that Rule#65 clarified the issue and provided a rationale for further Review.
Quoting a portion of Rule#65 verbatim, the Court pointed out that a "grave abuse of discretion" could (easily) lead to errors in determining Jurisdiction, ergo "grave abuse of discretion" is itself a form of legal malfeasance open to Court Review. Again, I hesitate to delve too deeply into rationales, especially with regard to cited Case Law, since my goal with this series of entries is merely to outline the event itself ("Jabidah Massacre,"i.e. the failed "Operation Merdeka"). As I stated in an earlier entry I fully intend to go into great detail on the legalese in a future series of entries.
On "Publicity" per se, the Court pointed out that the actual recipient of Adverse Publicity is the state, i.e. the AFP, not the defence. This contention is incredibly problematic but again, this is neither the time nor place for me to explore that. The Court further observed that with 2 Restraining Orders already implemented, the case was undergoing a "cooling off" period during which attention would wane, including negative attention, ergo that concern by the defence was over stated.
The Court's prediction concerning an inattentive public , for the most part, was realised and very, very quietly, in 1971, the 24 defendants had their case (using the singular since they WERE tried in the collective) dismissed.
The 24...
Capt.Alberto G.Sateco
Benjamin"Lt.Baqui"Munar
M.Sgt.Benjamin C.Munar
Reynaldo"Lt.Rey"Munar
Eugenio Alcantara (who for Op.Merdeka was assigned the "rank" of Lt.)
Capt.Cerilo Oropesa
Capt.Teodoro P.Facelo
Capt.Ruperto E.Amistoso
1stLt.Eduardo B.Batalla
2ndLt.Rolando Abadilla
M.Sgt.Frederico Ilangilang
M.Sgt.Cesar Calinawagan
T.Sgt.Timoteo C.Malubay
T.Sgt.Pedro Banigued
S.Sgt.Narciso T.Dabbay
Cpl.Rolando Buenaventura
Cpl.Felix Lauzon
Cpl.Evaristo Ruiz
Cpl.Orlando Decena
Cpl.Francisco Grinn
Cpl.Agustin Dagdag
Cpl.Alfredo F.Forfieda
Pfc.Wlfredo Latonero
and last but not least...
Maj.Eduardo L.Martelino, the Operations Officer for the entire mission and man considered most culpable by most observers.
Maj.Martelino won a promotion to Col.for his trouble but retired shortly thereafter to Tawi Tawi. Converting to Islam and taking the name Abdul Latif (while retaining his surname Martelino) he married the young Sama woman he had been involved with prior to the case (and prior to the entire scheme itself). They made their home, ironically, on Siminul Island, the small islet where the whole affair began. In late 1978 Col.Martelino was killed under mysterious circumstances, on Sabah, perhaps befitting a man who had lived his entire life in volved in covert activities and as a man obsessed with Sabah.
Jibin Arula's life has taken a quieter path. During the Senate Investigations into Operation Merdeka and the deaths on Corregidor, his patron Gov.Montano had arranged to bring Arula's wife, Noring to Cavite. She and Arula lived together in a small non-descript home next to his protector and friend, Chief of Police de Sagun, in Tres Martires. For 2 years,as Arula worked at a job wrangled for him by the Governor, as a sort of inter-office messenger in the Cavite Provincial Capitol Building. Noring had quickly gotten pregnant with their 4th child and after 9 months in Cavite she returned south , to Jolo island, to await the return of her husband.
Jibin Arula never returned to her, having taken a 2nd wife, Lilia. A Bisaya (a non-Muslim tribe/ethnicity) like Noring, she had recently moved to Cavite from her home province of Antique and after marriage settled into what she had hoped would be a quiet life of domesticity.
In 1970 Gov.Montano lost his bid for re-election and Arula's short but heady life as a national celebrity came to an abrupt end. Perhaps recognising that his safety would now be in question he graciously accepted the 12,000 Pesos given to him by the Governor and his wife and moved to her home province of Antique . There he invested his money in livestock and helped his inlaws farm their modest plot. He and Lilia had 3 children of their own and in 1973 he gained custody of his 4 children by Noring as well.
In 1994 Lilia died and Arula made his way south to Jolo. It wasnt long until he came to the notice of the MNLF and Chairman Misuari. As Misuari inked the 96 Jakarta Accord and was given the governorship of ARMM as one of his "gifts,"he found a place for Arula as well. Basically a walking political statement for the MNLF, Arula was made a "paid consultant" at the newly created SCPDC (Southern Philippines Peace and Development Council), an entity also given to Misuari as his 2nd "gift."Making 7,000 Pesos a month he basically maintained a low profile until 2000 when Misuari, reading the writing on the wall began powering down the vast and bloated bureaucracy that characterised everything he touched.
The MNLF which was directly created because of Jibin Arula, and its Chairman Misuari who owes his entire "career" to Arula and his sad tale has done precious little for the man. Today he lives in a poor Manila neighbourhood with the youngest of his 7 children. Very rarely he is brought out, dusted and given some vigirous handshakes and sad clucks of the tongue as Moros and their allies try to parade his misery to try and justify whatever bloodletting has taken place sine 1968.
Showing posts with label Jabidah Massacre. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jabidah Massacre. Show all posts
Tuesday, August 24, 2010
Monday, August 23, 2010
Whole Lot of Ugly Part III, Jabidah Massacre...
***CONTINUED FROM PART II***On June 23, 1969 the Philippine Supreme Court rescinded the Restraining Order, after having ruled in favour of the AFP in terms of jurisdiction to try the case, and so the case proceeded. This basically relegated the case to the rubbish heap, and though the Opposition, spearheaded by icon Sen.Benigno S.Aquino Jr.tried their best to flog it with both Senatorial AND Congressional Investigations the conditions just prior to Martial Law combined with the case's covert nature and Security Clearances meant that nothing would ever become of it.
On August 12, 1969 the Martelino as lead defendant filed another Petition with the Court Martial Panel, this one questioning the Right of Pre-emptory Challenge. Basically, the defence had taken the position that each of the defendants was permitted 1 challenge, per specification (charge), per Court Martial Officer (judge). In other words, they were allowed to challenge the right of each judge to sit on each charge, separately. To explain it a bit more simply, if a defendant is on trial and finds that for some reason the judge trying the case is exhibiting bias, or some other less than objective trait, they have a right to challenge the assignation of THAT judge on THAT case.
In the case in question, with 24 defendants all being tried collectively, and with a panel of judges, and those 24 defendants being tried on a variety of charges (11 in total), should the defence be allowed to use 1 challenge, per each defendant against each judge on every charge? The defence naturally argued yes they should, because of course were this to be allowed the case would die out, taking decades to resolve.
The defence added a periphreal complaint claiming that Adverse Publicity was negating the objectivity of at least 1 Court Martial Officer, who had admitted in print that he had been reading about "coffins being prepared for Marcos in Jolo City," in a Manila daily (Manila's "Daily Mirror," 7/29/69). Added to the claim was the contention that Martelino, et al were being used as political scapegoats by the Opposition (Liberalistas) in view of the national election coming up on 11/11/1969.
The Court Martial Panel responded that each specification (charge) could be challenged a total of 6 times. Rather than the number of defendants (24) they used the number of Panel Officers (6) as their rationale. This resulted in 66 Challenges being permitted. The Panel maintained that this was so because the defendants were being tried collectively (jointly), not commonly (separately). The defence then reversed itself and chose to accept that rationale BUT took issue with the second part of that determination. The defence now maintained that the Panel had erred in finding that in collectively tried cases (multiple defendants tried as a whole) the entire pool of defendants functioned as 1 singular entity (the rationale supplied in determining the finding of 1 Challenge per each of the 6 Panel officers).
This new position by the defence led to a Petition to the Supreme Court to nullify the Panel's Ruling. This Petition combined the defence's prior Comaplaint of Adverse Publicity with the current exception (on Pre-emptive Challenges) and combined them in a unitary Petition. On 8/29/1069 the Court Ruled that they would accept the Petition with regard to Adverse Publicity, after having expedited a Ruling on Pre-emptory Challenges given two days prior, on 8/27/1969. As the acceptance was issued the Court implemented the second Restraining Order in the case (also on 8/29/1969).
In the 8/27/1969 Ruling on Pre-emptory Challenges the court cited Article#18 of the Philippine Articles of War and reminded the defence to be careful what they wish for. The Ruling maintained that since the 11 specifications (charges) had undergone Review and subsequent merging, there weere now a grand total of 8 charges. Each of the 8 charges would be permitted a single Challenge, for a new grand total of 8 Pre-emptory Challenges. From well over 100 to 66, then from 66 to 8, the Defence was not happy but they had asked for it and so there it was.
Required to offer a Response to the Petition on Adverse Publicity, the Court Martial Panel conceeded that publicity surrounding the case was an undeniable fact, as was that the nature of that publicity was adversarial (negative publicity). It pointed out however, that the defence had failed to include one iota of evidence to support their basic contention that this negative attention had caused the Panel to be anything less than absolutely objective. It then used the very language utilised by the defence in its Petition when it reminded the Court that the defence had characterised the Panel with glowing adjectives such as, "integrity,""background" and "experience" all preceeded with positive qualifiers. Then the Panel veered into offencive mode when it countered that outside the narrow scope of Jurisdiction and very limited cases of Malfeasance, the Supreme Court possesed no Powers of Review over the Military System of Justice. Finally, the Panel closed their Response by pointing out that the defence hadnt addressed itself to every avenue of recourse available WITHIN the Military system of Justice.
As the nation moved on, which is exactly what the defence, the AFP and indeed the Supreme Court was hoping for, Moro intellectuals were capitalising on the affair, aided by the Opposition...
On August 12, 1969 the Martelino as lead defendant filed another Petition with the Court Martial Panel, this one questioning the Right of Pre-emptory Challenge. Basically, the defence had taken the position that each of the defendants was permitted 1 challenge, per specification (charge), per Court Martial Officer (judge). In other words, they were allowed to challenge the right of each judge to sit on each charge, separately. To explain it a bit more simply, if a defendant is on trial and finds that for some reason the judge trying the case is exhibiting bias, or some other less than objective trait, they have a right to challenge the assignation of THAT judge on THAT case.
In the case in question, with 24 defendants all being tried collectively, and with a panel of judges, and those 24 defendants being tried on a variety of charges (11 in total), should the defence be allowed to use 1 challenge, per each defendant against each judge on every charge? The defence naturally argued yes they should, because of course were this to be allowed the case would die out, taking decades to resolve.
The defence added a periphreal complaint claiming that Adverse Publicity was negating the objectivity of at least 1 Court Martial Officer, who had admitted in print that he had been reading about "coffins being prepared for Marcos in Jolo City," in a Manila daily (Manila's "Daily Mirror," 7/29/69). Added to the claim was the contention that Martelino, et al were being used as political scapegoats by the Opposition (Liberalistas) in view of the national election coming up on 11/11/1969.
The Court Martial Panel responded that each specification (charge) could be challenged a total of 6 times. Rather than the number of defendants (24) they used the number of Panel Officers (6) as their rationale. This resulted in 66 Challenges being permitted. The Panel maintained that this was so because the defendants were being tried collectively (jointly), not commonly (separately). The defence then reversed itself and chose to accept that rationale BUT took issue with the second part of that determination. The defence now maintained that the Panel had erred in finding that in collectively tried cases (multiple defendants tried as a whole) the entire pool of defendants functioned as 1 singular entity (the rationale supplied in determining the finding of 1 Challenge per each of the 6 Panel officers).
This new position by the defence led to a Petition to the Supreme Court to nullify the Panel's Ruling. This Petition combined the defence's prior Comaplaint of Adverse Publicity with the current exception (on Pre-emptive Challenges) and combined them in a unitary Petition. On 8/29/1069 the Court Ruled that they would accept the Petition with regard to Adverse Publicity, after having expedited a Ruling on Pre-emptory Challenges given two days prior, on 8/27/1969. As the acceptance was issued the Court implemented the second Restraining Order in the case (also on 8/29/1969).
In the 8/27/1969 Ruling on Pre-emptory Challenges the court cited Article#18 of the Philippine Articles of War and reminded the defence to be careful what they wish for. The Ruling maintained that since the 11 specifications (charges) had undergone Review and subsequent merging, there weere now a grand total of 8 charges. Each of the 8 charges would be permitted a single Challenge, for a new grand total of 8 Pre-emptory Challenges. From well over 100 to 66, then from 66 to 8, the Defence was not happy but they had asked for it and so there it was.
Required to offer a Response to the Petition on Adverse Publicity, the Court Martial Panel conceeded that publicity surrounding the case was an undeniable fact, as was that the nature of that publicity was adversarial (negative publicity). It pointed out however, that the defence had failed to include one iota of evidence to support their basic contention that this negative attention had caused the Panel to be anything less than absolutely objective. It then used the very language utilised by the defence in its Petition when it reminded the Court that the defence had characterised the Panel with glowing adjectives such as, "integrity,""background" and "experience" all preceeded with positive qualifiers. Then the Panel veered into offencive mode when it countered that outside the narrow scope of Jurisdiction and very limited cases of Malfeasance, the Supreme Court possesed no Powers of Review over the Military System of Justice. Finally, the Panel closed their Response by pointing out that the defence hadnt addressed itself to every avenue of recourse available WITHIN the Military system of Justice.
As the nation moved on, which is exactly what the defence, the AFP and indeed the Supreme Court was hoping for, Moro intellectuals were capitalising on the affair, aided by the Opposition...
Saturday, August 21, 2010
Whole Lot of Ugly Part II, the Jabidah Massacare
***CONTINUED FROM PART I***With the Cavite City Fiscal refusing to transfer jurisdiction on the case, General Benjamin Espino moved into damage control mode and assigned Captain Alfredo O.Pantejos to perform a preliminary investigation and make a recommendation as to whether-or-not to pursue a Court Martial. In reality Gen.Espino had no real choice in the matter given the attention paid by President Marcos. It was the President in fact who had first told the General about the incident in a phone call on March 21. In that call he had ordered Espino to empanel a Court Martial and nip the whole affair in the bud, taking a pro-active stance and hoping to negate whatever damage the Opposition might try to do with the incident. After placing 21 men on Corregidor on Confinement to Base, on March 22, Gen.Espino began a quiet investigation into the event itself and all related happenings, but officially did nothing else until the subpoena by the Cavite City Fiscal.
On April 06 Pontejos submitted his findings and recommended all 21 men for Court Martial. That same day Gen.Espino issued Special Order #208, empaneling a General Court Martial for the events taking place on March 18 on Corregidor. Gen.Espino based his Order on an alleged contravention of Articles 94 and 97, of the Articles of War, in the Philippine Military Code. On April 16 Pontejos ammended his initial Report to add 3 more names to the list, for a total of 24 men facing Court Martial, those men were added to the list of subjects relegated to Confinement to Base.
With Captains Magsanoc and Pontejos having gotten nowhere in trying to convince the Cavite City Fiscal to transfer jurisdiction of the case to the military, the AFP moved on April 19 to have the Cavite City case dismissed since a Court Martial had been empaneled. Cavite City contested this move and argued their contention based upon 3 seemingly firm points:
I) Jibin Arula had never taken an Oath of Service and was enrolled in a programme overseen by the Civil Affairs Office, ergo could not strictly be considered as part and parcel of the AFP.
II) Correigdor was not a Military Reservation, i.e. an island entirely within the jurisdiction of the AFP, despite an order to that effect by former President Quirino in 1948. Indeed, former President Magsaysay had declared the island a "National Shrine." Such a designation negates any standing as a Military Reservation, a closed and guarded area, in that it allows civlians to visit at will.
III) Last but not least, Cavite City Court WAS the Court of First Instance (the court where charges were filed first).
This seemingly uncomplicated issue ended up stalling the case for more than a year as it wound its way through the system, all the way to the Supreme Court. In the meantime the Supreme Court issued a Restraining Order against both the Cavite City fiscal AND the AFP with regard to legal proceedings. The AFP argued that while it is true former Pres.Magsaysay DID declare the island a "National Shrine," his declaration did not and could not negate Presidential Proclamation #69 by former President Quirino, issued on May 31, 1948. Former Pres. Magsaysay made his designation via Executive Order #58, on August 16, 1954. Ergo, the AFP pointed out, Pres. Magsaysay made his delcaration some 6 years AFTER former Pres. Quirino made HIS. Again, precendence is the key.
The Supreme Court, which had issued a Restraining Order on both cases, the Court Martial and the civil case in Cavite City, ruled against Cavite City on jurisdiction and did so for a number of reasons. Briefly, former Pres. Magsaysay's designation in 1954 could not have negated former Pres. Quirino's unless it specifically stated that it was doing so. Implied Repeals, that is, assuming one order negates another have not received favourable treatment by the Philippine Courts and this was of course noted by the Supreme Court. For that matter, neither have they received favourable treatment in American Courts and at that time America served as the gold standard for the Philippine Justice System which openly utilised American Case Precedents as touch stones.
The Court pointed out as well that "National Shrines" are usually listed in great detail. In other words, on an island the size of Corregidor, battlefield areas, etc. are usually defined as "Shrines," without offering blanket enshrinement of the entire landmass. To this point the Court pointed out that nothing bars concurrent designation, a site may be a "Shrine" AND a "Reservation," without it having to be either one or the other.
Another interesting point was that Kinley Airfield, where the incident actually took place, was not included in the enshrinement. In other words, even if the Court had accepted the main premise of Cavite City, that enshrinement negates status as a military Reservation, the actual incident did not take place within any portion of the delineated "National Shrine."
Since this incident is truly pivotal to Philippine Insurgency, both the Communist as well as the Islamic, I believe in the near future I will go into great and exacting detail on the criminal proceedings. For the moment however it would be counter-productive as I am merely trying to document the event in this series of entries.
On the issue of "Court of First instance," that is, which court filed criminal charges first and therefore should get jurisdiction to try the case, the Supreme Court pointed out that although Jibin Arula HAD filed charges with the Cavite City Fiscal on April 02, 1968, no warrant of arrest had been issued against anyone. Merely a charge sheet had been entered. With the AFP however, a warrant of arrest was issued on April 06 so that the AFP clearly had precedence in trying the case.
Cavite City then tried a trump card, arguing that the Court should Rule in its favour as a matter of Public Policy, in that the benefit to society outweighs the strict adherance to case law. The Court rejected this out of hand.
TO BE CONTINUED...
On April 06 Pontejos submitted his findings and recommended all 21 men for Court Martial. That same day Gen.Espino issued Special Order #208, empaneling a General Court Martial for the events taking place on March 18 on Corregidor. Gen.Espino based his Order on an alleged contravention of Articles 94 and 97, of the Articles of War, in the Philippine Military Code. On April 16 Pontejos ammended his initial Report to add 3 more names to the list, for a total of 24 men facing Court Martial, those men were added to the list of subjects relegated to Confinement to Base.
With Captains Magsanoc and Pontejos having gotten nowhere in trying to convince the Cavite City Fiscal to transfer jurisdiction of the case to the military, the AFP moved on April 19 to have the Cavite City case dismissed since a Court Martial had been empaneled. Cavite City contested this move and argued their contention based upon 3 seemingly firm points:
I) Jibin Arula had never taken an Oath of Service and was enrolled in a programme overseen by the Civil Affairs Office, ergo could not strictly be considered as part and parcel of the AFP.
II) Correigdor was not a Military Reservation, i.e. an island entirely within the jurisdiction of the AFP, despite an order to that effect by former President Quirino in 1948. Indeed, former President Magsaysay had declared the island a "National Shrine." Such a designation negates any standing as a Military Reservation, a closed and guarded area, in that it allows civlians to visit at will.
III) Last but not least, Cavite City Court WAS the Court of First Instance (the court where charges were filed first).
This seemingly uncomplicated issue ended up stalling the case for more than a year as it wound its way through the system, all the way to the Supreme Court. In the meantime the Supreme Court issued a Restraining Order against both the Cavite City fiscal AND the AFP with regard to legal proceedings. The AFP argued that while it is true former Pres.Magsaysay DID declare the island a "National Shrine," his declaration did not and could not negate Presidential Proclamation #69 by former President Quirino, issued on May 31, 1948. Former Pres. Magsaysay made his designation via Executive Order #58, on August 16, 1954. Ergo, the AFP pointed out, Pres. Magsaysay made his delcaration some 6 years AFTER former Pres. Quirino made HIS. Again, precendence is the key.
The Supreme Court, which had issued a Restraining Order on both cases, the Court Martial and the civil case in Cavite City, ruled against Cavite City on jurisdiction and did so for a number of reasons. Briefly, former Pres. Magsaysay's designation in 1954 could not have negated former Pres. Quirino's unless it specifically stated that it was doing so. Implied Repeals, that is, assuming one order negates another have not received favourable treatment by the Philippine Courts and this was of course noted by the Supreme Court. For that matter, neither have they received favourable treatment in American Courts and at that time America served as the gold standard for the Philippine Justice System which openly utilised American Case Precedents as touch stones.
The Court pointed out as well that "National Shrines" are usually listed in great detail. In other words, on an island the size of Corregidor, battlefield areas, etc. are usually defined as "Shrines," without offering blanket enshrinement of the entire landmass. To this point the Court pointed out that nothing bars concurrent designation, a site may be a "Shrine" AND a "Reservation," without it having to be either one or the other.
Another interesting point was that Kinley Airfield, where the incident actually took place, was not included in the enshrinement. In other words, even if the Court had accepted the main premise of Cavite City, that enshrinement negates status as a military Reservation, the actual incident did not take place within any portion of the delineated "National Shrine."
Since this incident is truly pivotal to Philippine Insurgency, both the Communist as well as the Islamic, I believe in the near future I will go into great and exacting detail on the criminal proceedings. For the moment however it would be counter-productive as I am merely trying to document the event in this series of entries.
On the issue of "Court of First instance," that is, which court filed criminal charges first and therefore should get jurisdiction to try the case, the Supreme Court pointed out that although Jibin Arula HAD filed charges with the Cavite City Fiscal on April 02, 1968, no warrant of arrest had been issued against anyone. Merely a charge sheet had been entered. With the AFP however, a warrant of arrest was issued on April 06 so that the AFP clearly had precedence in trying the case.
Cavite City then tried a trump card, arguing that the Court should Rule in its favour as a matter of Public Policy, in that the benefit to society outweighs the strict adherance to case law. The Court rejected this out of hand.
TO BE CONTINUED...
Tuesday, August 17, 2010
The Jabidah Massacre, Operation Mardeka, No Good, but Alot of Bad and Ugly
The Malaysian state of Sabah sits on the northwestern corner of Borneo, roughly 45 minutes by regular boat from the Philippine's southern most province, Tawi Tawi. This geographic proximity allows the regions ethnicities to come and go across international borders just as they always have. The almost half a century of insurgency in the Southern Philippines have also caused a huge influx of Filipinos to both the Malaysian AND Indonesian parts of Borneo, with the 3rd nation on Borneo, Brunei, having been spared because of its incredibly small area. Likewise, Sabah has played its own part in exporting that insurgency TO the Philippines. Indeed, in its own way that tiny corner of Borneo has had more to do with the bloodletting and torture that as afflicted the Southern Philippines this last half a century.
Brunei more than any other Bornean nation has had a deep historical relationship with the peoples and lands that now collectively make up the Philippines. It was this deep bond that led to the Sultan of Brunei ceding much of what is now Sabah, along with Palawan to the Sultan of Sulu. Though the history of what transpired both then and long afterwards is important, for the sake of brevity I will fast forward to Malasyian independance and that country's incorporation of Sabah into its fold.
Understandably the loss of Sabah has not sat well with both the Sultante of Sulu nor with the Philippines. This deep resentment came to a head not long after Malaysian independance when the Marcos Government gave considerable support to a plan floated by supporters of Sultan Kiram of Sulu, and more so by members of his own extremely right wing government. Using a combined pool of Illokano,Tausug and Sama (Samal) Tribesmen the civil Affairs Office of the Department of National Defense oversaw the formation of a guerilla force, comprised of almost 2,000 men, and given the code name, "Jabidah."
The Office of the Secretary of Defense, via Under Secretary Manuel Syquio created a protocol for destabilisation of Sabah. Destabilisation was desired because of the Philippine claims on Sabah, claims that were taking years to slowly wind their way through international legal channels. While President Marcos had backed off of earlier vows to take Sabah by any means neccessary and had played the good neighbour in spearheading the creation of ASEAN, a regional cooperative bloc, he never took his eyes off of Borneo. Not wanting to wait decades, and even then all that waiting would amount to nothing more than a gamble with steep odds against the Philippines, the Marcos Government gave its tacit support to a plan to forment unrest and dissent in Eastern Malaysia, and thereby bolster Philippine claims by pointing to such dissent and unrest as proof of disatisfaction (amongst the people of Sabah) with Malaysian Rule.
As Under Secretary Syquio set up shoppe in the Civil Affairs Office, a move designed to keep almost all AFP personnel out of the loop, he hand picked the Operations Officer for his enterprise based upon a book that had been written the decade before, in 1959. This book, "Someday Malaysia," envisioned a SE Asia with a pan-Malayan state. This monolithic nation would encompass all of the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei and of course...Malaysia. the books author happened to be a Sr, Officer in the Philippine Air Force, Major Eduardo Martelino. An ethnic Ilonggo from Aklan Province, Martelino was very familiar with the targetted area, in fact he was romantically involved with a Samal woman on Tawi Tawi, a woman he would later marry.
In the early Summer of 1967 Maj.Martelino had an underling travel to Cebu City, on Cebu Island to begin recruitment of non-military staff for the project, primarily Medical Technicians and Lawyers, concentrating their efforts in 1 institution, the Cebu Institute of Technology. At the same time, on Luzon, Jolo Island and Tawi Tawi recruitment efforts began with cursory background checks of prosepctive applicants. By autumn they had their preliminary lists in terms of manpower and refurbishment of Camp Sofia, the primary base of training on Tawi Tawi's Simunul Island began, then still a part of Sulu Province.
On December 17, 1967 recruits began arriving on Camp Sofia, in Barangay Tampakan on Simunul Island. Counter-intuitively the first of a 3 phased training regimen took place there, as opposed to the 3rd phase since the island approximated their Operational Terrain. where as they should have finished their training at Camp Sophia, they merely engaged in calesthenics and cleaning up the base compound. On December 30, 1967 Philippine Naval Boat #68 left the island due north carrying a full complement of trainees heading to Manila Bay for Phase II of their training.
Arriving late in the vening on Janurary 03 the Illokanos among them were ecstatic, knowing that they were very close to home. For the Tausug and Sama men involved however it was a different story. Though some were undoubtedly happy to be that much closer to becoming members of the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines), most had never been anywhere but Sulu and Tawi Tawi and so it came as quite a shock, in many ways, when they first arrived on Corregidor on Janurary 03, 1968. This period of adjustment was complicated by a lack of sensitivity on the part of their trainers. Issues involving a bland and unaccustomed diet, lack of religious materiels or allowances for observance, and perhaps most problematic for many of the men was the presence of females in their housing unit, a converted wing of Corregidor's Fort Mills Hospital. Things went from bad to worse when their pay vouchers, 50 Pesos a month (roughly 1 Euro or 1.25 US) were lost in transit after being delayed for almost 2 months due to funding issues owing to the covert nature of the endeavour.
Roughly 1/3rd of the Tausug recruits formed a clique and began agitating for better conditions. When their trainers ignored them, treating them much as they would any other AFP recruit, 87 men, all Tausugs, signed a petition to President Marcos demanding better conditions and their pay. Led by Dugasan Julkainan, a from Jolo City, the letter was entrusted to a a member of the Navy, a fellow Tausug named Abhoud Tay, who was about to pass through Manila. Tay promised the men that he would post the petition by mail as soon as he got to Manila.
The men handed the envelope to Tay on the afternoon of March 2nd while thanking him profusely for his assistance. Early on March 3rd, at 3PM, seven of the most antagonistic recruits were told to report to Lieutenant Eduardo Batalla, the Junior Officer who handled the administrative functions when Major Martelino was out of camp, which was most of the time. When the meeting concluded conditions showed a marked improvement and almost all trainees buckled down and began to adjust.
Maeanwhile, as the preceding had been transpiring, beginning on March 1st, fellow recruits had begun shipping out to Camp Capinpin in Tanay, Rizal Province, for the third and final phase of their training. Likewise, 24 who had flunked out of Phase II had begun shipping back to Sulu and Tawi Tawi. Therefore it came as no suprise when late in the evening, March 17th, their trainers read off of a short list of names and told those whose names had just been called to pack up their gear, they were shipping out.
Just before day break, March 18th, 12 of the men were told to carry their gear and get on a 6X6 truck idling outside the base gate. Not told where they were going but assuming it was onto to Luzon and the 3rd and final phase of their grueling training, the men excitedly complied. Happily riding in the rear of the truck as it took the narrow and twisting jungle track to the airfield below the base, they were unprepared for what took place. The lone survivor Jibin Arula recalled that the truck had also been carrying Ilokano recruits as well, and that they had been picked up prior to the Tausugs. Just as their truck emerged from Malinta Tunnel one of the Illokano recruits had inadvertantly hit the release switch on his carbine's (rifle) magazine release (the magazine being the detachable component that holds the rounds, the bullets). Although Arula himself found nothing strange about that an older recruit remarked that the magazine switch was situated next to the safety switch (the "safety" is a switch that keeps the weapon from firing by mistake). The unspoken message was that something might be amiss, that the Ilokano recruit's mishap may have been alot more than just another innocent mistake. As they say, hindsight is 20/20 vision...
Rolling to a stop at Kindley Airfield, roughly 3 kilometers down hill from their camp, they and and their trainers, led by Lieutenants Eduardo Batalla and Rolando Abadilla dismounted from the truck. As the Tausugs took their time happily getting their fallen gear together the trainers and the Ilokano recruits formed a group several meters away, between the tarmac and the truck. As the last of the Tausug men joined together in a small group the Ilokanos, who had their backs towards the 12 Jabidah soldiers, spun and opened fire.
As his squadmates fell around him Jibin Arula remembers running blindly in the opposite direction, not even aware that he had been wounded above his knee. Coming to a precipice 12 meters above the rocky shoreline he threw himself over with abandon, the only thing on his mind was survival. Coming back to consciousness he found himself just a couple of meters from breaking waves. Grabbing a piece of wooden debris he stumbled into the surf and began swimming.
Arula sawm with abandon, not conscious of his pain, or even of his exhaustion, adrenaline taking care of all that. As the sun came up above the water he could hear the sounds of outboard motors, to his mind the sound of his trainers looking for him. Swimming onward he had made his way almost to Carballo Island when he was spotted by fishermen who hauled him aboard, saving his life. Incredulous, the fishermen, Tagalogs, asked him how he had come to be swimming in the middle of Manila Bay. Thinking fast on the cuff Arula explained that he was a crewmen on a local merchant vessel and had fallen overboard after a night of drinking with his fellow shipmates. Accepting his story at face value the fishermen decided to call it a day and made their way for port, in Naic, Cavite.
While Jibin Arula was thankful for having been saved he knew that his ordeal had only just begun. never having been off his home island of Jolo, and speaking very little Tagalog, or any language other than his native Tausug, he was terrified knowing that getting home was next to impossible. Thinking quickly he asked the fishermen that had saved him if anyone knew someone in government. Told by one that he had a cousin in the Cavite Provincial Guard, tasked with guarding that province's Governor, Delfin Montano, a well known member of the Opposition. Arula decided to invest his fate with this fisherman and the man's unknown cousin.
Back upon land Arula and the fisherman made their way to the cousin's home in the municipailty of Trece Martires only to
discover that the cousin was away, on duty. As they were trying to decide their next move the Barangay Captain, alerted to their presence, arrived with the local Barangay Guards, armed to the teeth. This was a time long before the Muslim neighbourhoods in Luzon even existed. There was no Golden Mosque in Quiapo, no Maharlika Housing Scheme, no Pasig City ghetto, a time when, aside from a hundred or so university students in Quezon City who wanted to assimilate and so for the most part lived and looked just like their non-Muslim countrymen. Most Filipinos on Luzon, certainly the working class, viewed all Filipino- Muslims as the slaveraiders and brigands of the Spanish Era "Moro-Moro" folklore, a perception that was unfortunately quite rooted in fact (in that the only Muslims Luzon had ever seen up until that point- apart from seafaring traders in Manila- had been those that raided their coastal villages though this was usually relegated to the Visayas Region). Therefore, the Barangay Captain suspected that Arula was a pirate who had somehow gotten separated from his fellow Suluanos, and demanded that he make an appearance at the local police station the very next morning.
Returning at daybreak with even more gunmen the Barangay Captain refused to listen to Arula's hastily made excuses and escorted him to the station, at gunpoint. Finally boxed into a corner Arula refused to give a statement, demanding that he be allowed to give it to the Chief of Police, who was away on business. The officers began beating him and only stopped once the chief arrived. The chief, Melencio de Sagun, who would soon become a lifelong friend and defender of Arula admonished his men for mistreating Arula, whom he reminded them, was not a prisoner.
After having Arula checked at a local medical clinic Chief de Sagun personally escorted him to the Governor's Residence in Cavite City, the provincial capital. Arriving in the evening of March 19th he was ushered into the govenor's antechamber where he proceeded to tell his tale. After a couple of days of consideration, on March 23rd, 1968, the Governor had Arula file a criminal complaint of Frustrated Murder against Major Martelino and 10 other AFP (de facto and otherwise) officers and enlisted men at the Cavite City Fiscal's Office, and so the story quickly became known.
The Cavite City Fiscal filed the appropriate charges and also named the AFP's Chief of Staff, General Benjamin Espino as a Respondant. On April 2nd the AFP's Captain Jose Magsanoc appeared at the Fiscal's Office to offer the AFP's Legal Response but also to try and convince the Fiscal to transfer jurisdiction to the AFP, to allow a Court Martial to take place in lieu of Civil Proceedings. Thus the stage was set for what would be a nearly 4 year legal battle...
I will continue in Part II.
Brunei more than any other Bornean nation has had a deep historical relationship with the peoples and lands that now collectively make up the Philippines. It was this deep bond that led to the Sultan of Brunei ceding much of what is now Sabah, along with Palawan to the Sultan of Sulu. Though the history of what transpired both then and long afterwards is important, for the sake of brevity I will fast forward to Malasyian independance and that country's incorporation of Sabah into its fold.
Understandably the loss of Sabah has not sat well with both the Sultante of Sulu nor with the Philippines. This deep resentment came to a head not long after Malaysian independance when the Marcos Government gave considerable support to a plan floated by supporters of Sultan Kiram of Sulu, and more so by members of his own extremely right wing government. Using a combined pool of Illokano,Tausug and Sama (Samal) Tribesmen the civil Affairs Office of the Department of National Defense oversaw the formation of a guerilla force, comprised of almost 2,000 men, and given the code name, "Jabidah."
The Office of the Secretary of Defense, via Under Secretary Manuel Syquio created a protocol for destabilisation of Sabah. Destabilisation was desired because of the Philippine claims on Sabah, claims that were taking years to slowly wind their way through international legal channels. While President Marcos had backed off of earlier vows to take Sabah by any means neccessary and had played the good neighbour in spearheading the creation of ASEAN, a regional cooperative bloc, he never took his eyes off of Borneo. Not wanting to wait decades, and even then all that waiting would amount to nothing more than a gamble with steep odds against the Philippines, the Marcos Government gave its tacit support to a plan to forment unrest and dissent in Eastern Malaysia, and thereby bolster Philippine claims by pointing to such dissent and unrest as proof of disatisfaction (amongst the people of Sabah) with Malaysian Rule.
As Under Secretary Syquio set up shoppe in the Civil Affairs Office, a move designed to keep almost all AFP personnel out of the loop, he hand picked the Operations Officer for his enterprise based upon a book that had been written the decade before, in 1959. This book, "Someday Malaysia," envisioned a SE Asia with a pan-Malayan state. This monolithic nation would encompass all of the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei and of course...Malaysia. the books author happened to be a Sr, Officer in the Philippine Air Force, Major Eduardo Martelino. An ethnic Ilonggo from Aklan Province, Martelino was very familiar with the targetted area, in fact he was romantically involved with a Samal woman on Tawi Tawi, a woman he would later marry.
In the early Summer of 1967 Maj.Martelino had an underling travel to Cebu City, on Cebu Island to begin recruitment of non-military staff for the project, primarily Medical Technicians and Lawyers, concentrating their efforts in 1 institution, the Cebu Institute of Technology. At the same time, on Luzon, Jolo Island and Tawi Tawi recruitment efforts began with cursory background checks of prosepctive applicants. By autumn they had their preliminary lists in terms of manpower and refurbishment of Camp Sofia, the primary base of training on Tawi Tawi's Simunul Island began, then still a part of Sulu Province.
On December 17, 1967 recruits began arriving on Camp Sofia, in Barangay Tampakan on Simunul Island. Counter-intuitively the first of a 3 phased training regimen took place there, as opposed to the 3rd phase since the island approximated their Operational Terrain. where as they should have finished their training at Camp Sophia, they merely engaged in calesthenics and cleaning up the base compound. On December 30, 1967 Philippine Naval Boat #68 left the island due north carrying a full complement of trainees heading to Manila Bay for Phase II of their training.
Arriving late in the vening on Janurary 03 the Illokanos among them were ecstatic, knowing that they were very close to home. For the Tausug and Sama men involved however it was a different story. Though some were undoubtedly happy to be that much closer to becoming members of the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines), most had never been anywhere but Sulu and Tawi Tawi and so it came as quite a shock, in many ways, when they first arrived on Corregidor on Janurary 03, 1968. This period of adjustment was complicated by a lack of sensitivity on the part of their trainers. Issues involving a bland and unaccustomed diet, lack of religious materiels or allowances for observance, and perhaps most problematic for many of the men was the presence of females in their housing unit, a converted wing of Corregidor's Fort Mills Hospital. Things went from bad to worse when their pay vouchers, 50 Pesos a month (roughly 1 Euro or 1.25 US) were lost in transit after being delayed for almost 2 months due to funding issues owing to the covert nature of the endeavour.
Roughly 1/3rd of the Tausug recruits formed a clique and began agitating for better conditions. When their trainers ignored them, treating them much as they would any other AFP recruit, 87 men, all Tausugs, signed a petition to President Marcos demanding better conditions and their pay. Led by Dugasan Julkainan, a from Jolo City, the letter was entrusted to a a member of the Navy, a fellow Tausug named Abhoud Tay, who was about to pass through Manila. Tay promised the men that he would post the petition by mail as soon as he got to Manila.
The men handed the envelope to Tay on the afternoon of March 2nd while thanking him profusely for his assistance. Early on March 3rd, at 3PM, seven of the most antagonistic recruits were told to report to Lieutenant Eduardo Batalla, the Junior Officer who handled the administrative functions when Major Martelino was out of camp, which was most of the time. When the meeting concluded conditions showed a marked improvement and almost all trainees buckled down and began to adjust.
Maeanwhile, as the preceding had been transpiring, beginning on March 1st, fellow recruits had begun shipping out to Camp Capinpin in Tanay, Rizal Province, for the third and final phase of their training. Likewise, 24 who had flunked out of Phase II had begun shipping back to Sulu and Tawi Tawi. Therefore it came as no suprise when late in the evening, March 17th, their trainers read off of a short list of names and told those whose names had just been called to pack up their gear, they were shipping out.
Just before day break, March 18th, 12 of the men were told to carry their gear and get on a 6X6 truck idling outside the base gate. Not told where they were going but assuming it was onto to Luzon and the 3rd and final phase of their grueling training, the men excitedly complied. Happily riding in the rear of the truck as it took the narrow and twisting jungle track to the airfield below the base, they were unprepared for what took place. The lone survivor Jibin Arula recalled that the truck had also been carrying Ilokano recruits as well, and that they had been picked up prior to the Tausugs. Just as their truck emerged from Malinta Tunnel one of the Illokano recruits had inadvertantly hit the release switch on his carbine's (rifle) magazine release (the magazine being the detachable component that holds the rounds, the bullets). Although Arula himself found nothing strange about that an older recruit remarked that the magazine switch was situated next to the safety switch (the "safety" is a switch that keeps the weapon from firing by mistake). The unspoken message was that something might be amiss, that the Ilokano recruit's mishap may have been alot more than just another innocent mistake. As they say, hindsight is 20/20 vision...
Rolling to a stop at Kindley Airfield, roughly 3 kilometers down hill from their camp, they and and their trainers, led by Lieutenants Eduardo Batalla and Rolando Abadilla dismounted from the truck. As the Tausugs took their time happily getting their fallen gear together the trainers and the Ilokano recruits formed a group several meters away, between the tarmac and the truck. As the last of the Tausug men joined together in a small group the Ilokanos, who had their backs towards the 12 Jabidah soldiers, spun and opened fire.
As his squadmates fell around him Jibin Arula remembers running blindly in the opposite direction, not even aware that he had been wounded above his knee. Coming to a precipice 12 meters above the rocky shoreline he threw himself over with abandon, the only thing on his mind was survival. Coming back to consciousness he found himself just a couple of meters from breaking waves. Grabbing a piece of wooden debris he stumbled into the surf and began swimming.
Arula sawm with abandon, not conscious of his pain, or even of his exhaustion, adrenaline taking care of all that. As the sun came up above the water he could hear the sounds of outboard motors, to his mind the sound of his trainers looking for him. Swimming onward he had made his way almost to Carballo Island when he was spotted by fishermen who hauled him aboard, saving his life. Incredulous, the fishermen, Tagalogs, asked him how he had come to be swimming in the middle of Manila Bay. Thinking fast on the cuff Arula explained that he was a crewmen on a local merchant vessel and had fallen overboard after a night of drinking with his fellow shipmates. Accepting his story at face value the fishermen decided to call it a day and made their way for port, in Naic, Cavite.
While Jibin Arula was thankful for having been saved he knew that his ordeal had only just begun. never having been off his home island of Jolo, and speaking very little Tagalog, or any language other than his native Tausug, he was terrified knowing that getting home was next to impossible. Thinking quickly he asked the fishermen that had saved him if anyone knew someone in government. Told by one that he had a cousin in the Cavite Provincial Guard, tasked with guarding that province's Governor, Delfin Montano, a well known member of the Opposition. Arula decided to invest his fate with this fisherman and the man's unknown cousin.
Back upon land Arula and the fisherman made their way to the cousin's home in the municipailty of Trece Martires only to
discover that the cousin was away, on duty. As they were trying to decide their next move the Barangay Captain, alerted to their presence, arrived with the local Barangay Guards, armed to the teeth. This was a time long before the Muslim neighbourhoods in Luzon even existed. There was no Golden Mosque in Quiapo, no Maharlika Housing Scheme, no Pasig City ghetto, a time when, aside from a hundred or so university students in Quezon City who wanted to assimilate and so for the most part lived and looked just like their non-Muslim countrymen. Most Filipinos on Luzon, certainly the working class, viewed all Filipino- Muslims as the slaveraiders and brigands of the Spanish Era "Moro-Moro" folklore, a perception that was unfortunately quite rooted in fact (in that the only Muslims Luzon had ever seen up until that point- apart from seafaring traders in Manila- had been those that raided their coastal villages though this was usually relegated to the Visayas Region). Therefore, the Barangay Captain suspected that Arula was a pirate who had somehow gotten separated from his fellow Suluanos, and demanded that he make an appearance at the local police station the very next morning.
Returning at daybreak with even more gunmen the Barangay Captain refused to listen to Arula's hastily made excuses and escorted him to the station, at gunpoint. Finally boxed into a corner Arula refused to give a statement, demanding that he be allowed to give it to the Chief of Police, who was away on business. The officers began beating him and only stopped once the chief arrived. The chief, Melencio de Sagun, who would soon become a lifelong friend and defender of Arula admonished his men for mistreating Arula, whom he reminded them, was not a prisoner.
After having Arula checked at a local medical clinic Chief de Sagun personally escorted him to the Governor's Residence in Cavite City, the provincial capital. Arriving in the evening of March 19th he was ushered into the govenor's antechamber where he proceeded to tell his tale. After a couple of days of consideration, on March 23rd, 1968, the Governor had Arula file a criminal complaint of Frustrated Murder against Major Martelino and 10 other AFP (de facto and otherwise) officers and enlisted men at the Cavite City Fiscal's Office, and so the story quickly became known.
The Cavite City Fiscal filed the appropriate charges and also named the AFP's Chief of Staff, General Benjamin Espino as a Respondant. On April 2nd the AFP's Captain Jose Magsanoc appeared at the Fiscal's Office to offer the AFP's Legal Response but also to try and convince the Fiscal to transfer jurisdiction to the AFP, to allow a Court Martial to take place in lieu of Civil Proceedings. Thus the stage was set for what would be a nearly 4 year legal battle...
I will continue in Part II.
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