In my previous KFR, or, Kidnap for Ransom entries, I have very often offered an overview of just why KFR is so well entrenched here on Mindanao. Tied into the local power base, the industry feeds not only insurgent organisations like Abu Sayyaf and the BIAF, but politicians, police, and yes, even the AFP, or, Armed Forces of the Philippines (BIAF being the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, the armed wing of the MILF). In February of 2011 there was a rash of criminal cases filed against Cotabato City Vice Mayor Muslimin Sema and his KFR organisation, but of course he has managed very well, getting the charges bounced at least two times since. Now, we have a senior AFP officer and two NCOs (Non Commissioned Officers) involved in another KFR organisation. Thus far the AFP is doing the right thing; while one cannot expect full transparency with the organisation (it will be a long time coming, if ever), the mother unit, the 4ID (Infantry Division) has at least allowed the civilian authorities deal with the case.
There are four IDs, or, Infantry Divisions on the island:
1) 1ID, Headquartered at Camp Sang-an in the municipality of Labangan, in Zamboanga del Sur Province, covering all of the Zamboanga Peninsula, all points south of Mainland Mindanao, and most of the Lanao Region (Lanao del Sur Province and a portion of Lanao del Norte Province). The Division is almost entirely dedicated to Islamic Insurgencies. Although there is an NPA Regional Command within its territory, the WMRC, or, Western Mindanao Regional Committee, it is the weakest of the island's five NPA Regional Commands.
2) 6ID, Headquartered in Camp Siongco in the municipality of Datu Odin Sinsuat, in Maguindanao Province. The division's AOR, or, Area of Responsibility (Area of Operation), is Central Mindanao, the smallest geographical scope of any and yet it sees a lot of action being on the front lines of the BIAF Insurgency, Central Mindanao being that organisation's center of gravity, its heartland.
3) 10ID, Headquartered in Camp Yan, in the municipality of Mawab, in Compostela Valley Province (ComVal), this division's AOR covers the Davao Region (Davao del Sur, Davao del Norte, Davao Oriental, and ComVal Provinces). With a small BIAF interaction- mostly through the 73IB (Infantry Battalion), operating in the northern sector of Sarangani Province, this division's bread and butter is the NPA. Indeed, it was created specifically to deal with the NPA, to free up the 4ID, the division that prior to 2006 had the largest single AOR on the island.
4) 4ID, Headquartered in Camp Evangelista, in Cagayan del Oro City on the island's Northern Coast. This division's AOR covers the entire Nortern Coast from the Misamis Oriental and Occidental Provincial borders, moving east along the Northern Coast, then down the entire Eastern Coast until the Caraga and Davao Regional borders at Agusan del Sur and ComVal Provincial lines. This division is entirely dedicated to the NPA at the moment although, from time to time, it has heavy interaction with the BIAF (in the 2000 War it was the lead division).
Therefore, when, after the 1996 FPA, or, Final Peace Agreement (a misnomer if ever there was one) between the Government and the MNLF, and its military wing, the BMA (Bangsamoro Army), the Government needed to integrate nearly 7,000 BMA guerillas into the AFP and PNP (Philippine National Police), the 4ID received the bulk of them. With no Islamic Insurgency the powers to be thought the 4ID to be the best environment for the "Integrees." The thinking was that the culture shock of joining the AFP would be enough of a hurdle without transporting thousands of battle-hardened Muslim tribesmen into points north, like the Visayas Region, or Luzon, and of course the unspoken concern-one that was discussed at length in classified correspondence, was that exporting MNLF/BMA guerillas north could very well widen what had up until then been a problem relegated to the Southern Philippines (and to a slightly lesser extent, Palawan which had a tiny Muslim population on islands off of its southern tip). A significant number also went to the 1ID, but in non-combat elements such as its Engineering Battalion. With the 4ID, they were primed for, and eventually integrated into front line units.
The Integration Programme was a huge undertaking. Just picking a somewhat random example, one aspect, the "Balik Baril" (Gun Return), failed miserably. In order to gain admittance, applicants, after going through the Selection Process, had to surrender at least one long arm. The rifle would then be catalouged, registered, issued an AFP serial number, and then re-distributed to the applicant as his service weapon. The biggest problem in that is that the first of three groups admitted into the Enlisted end of the programme, weren't BMA guerillas at all. Most were either younger relatives of guerillas who were farmed to the programme so as to provide a stable source of income to their large extended families. Others had no direct connection to the MNLF/BMA at all and merely bought their way in, as if buying a career opportunity, at a rather steep price. MNLF/BMA officers on the MNLF half of the administration of the programme profited rather nicely from this. Lastly, most Filipino Muslim Tribes are heavily into Gun Culture. Until the 1950s the de riguer acoutrement was a razour sharp bladed weapon akin to the Middle Eastern Scimtar. Kris, Kampilan, and so forth were worn by all males and were central to male identity. After WWII this changed as firearms finally became more affordable to the masses. Instead of sidearms though, the de riguer weapon now became a longarm, preferably semi-automatic.
Indeed, this is just how the MNLF Insurgency began. After Martial Law had been declared in September of 1972, then-President Marcos decreed that all weapon ownership was now illegal and ordered the now defunct Philippine Constabulary, or, PC, collect all weapons, sector by sector. When the PC attempted to do so in Marawi City, the Maranaw (Maranao) Tribal centre, the population waged war, and from there the entire south quickly went up in flames. Indeed, today, most militaries factor in such cultural affectations as the price of doing business. For example, US Forces in Iraq allow each head of household to retain two fully automatic rifles, the usual long arm being the AK47. This seems counter-intuitive to the laymen, but US Forces now have capable anthropologists on the payroll and realise that stripping a male population of its basic masculinity isn't going to endear the American Forces to the average Iraqi.
Aside from the Enlisted end of the Integration programme, there was also one group of BMA Officers admitted to an abbreviated AFP Officers' Training Course. Such applicants received 48 weeks training that, like the Enlisted end, was undertaken in three phases, albeit much longer than the Enlisted course. Of the three phases, the last phase, number three, being on the job training, so that in reality, BMA officers were only trained for 26 weeks. One looming problem was that whatever rank the BMA officers had been holding, they were inducted as Second Lieutenants. One hundred and sixty officers were integrated, although twenty were within fifteen years of retirement according to AFP Regulations. Then and now the mandatory age of retirement is age 56. Amongst the 140 BMA Officer Integrees who weren't packed away for a relatively quick retirement was an Iranun (Illanun) Tribesmen by the name of Mikunung "Mickey" Tanggote, who grew up amongst Maranaw along the shores of Lake Lanao. Integrated into the 4ID, Tanggote gradually rose from the lowest junior officer rank of Second Lieutenant to the rank he holds today, Major. In command of the division's Military Police company, he is attached to the Headquarters Service Battalion, and until recently served as the battalion's Intelligence Officer, only leaving that position reluctantly upon the incoming transfer of an officer from the IS-AFP, the AFP Intelligence Service, a dedicated position instead of the part time endeavour under Tanggote, as he juggled his different responsibilities.
Like virtually all his fellow Integrees, Major Tanggote earned not only the trust of his peers, but the trust of his superiors. Living on Officers' Row, the onbase housing for AFP officers, Tanggote's entire life revolved around the AFP. Although married with two children, both children were in university and so Mickey spent most of his offtime involved in his hobby, making music. Leading the division's marching band, a position that made Major Tanggote very, very well known on base, he also led of all things, a Country and Western combo in which he sang, in Tagalog, and played lead electric guitar.
Corporal Harvey Mabaylan Borreta served as Major Tanggote's right hand man in the battalion's Intelligence Unit, a de facto Aide de Camp, and when Tanggote rotated out of that command Borreta retained his role as wingman in the Headquarters Service Battalion. At 7PM, on Thursday, December 1st, 2011, Borreta was eating supper with his wife when his cellphone wentoff. Rising from the table he merely told her that he had to get dressed to go meet Major Tanggote. Spending years as the wife of an AFP Intelligence Agent had taught Ms.Borreta not to ask questions. Harvey Boretta hopped aboard his black Honda XRM and roared off into the night.
Major Tanggote then phoned a second subordinate, Staff Sergeant Edwin Paculba and just as he had with Corporal Borreta, didn't offer any details of the "mission" while asking Paculba to meet him and Corporal Borreta at Liceo de Cagayan Resturant, next to the university of the same name. Staff Sergeant Paculba got into his blue Kia SUV and drove off to meet the two men.
As Corporal Borreta was taking that call from his superior, Major Tanggote, another call was taking place across town, at the Cagayan de Oro City CPO, or, City Police Office, the department headquarters. The call, directed to CPO CIDG, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (the equivalent of a Major Crimes Unit), was coming from the Director of the Marawi City CPO, in the adjacent province of Lanao del Sur, Inspector (Insp.) Jaime Mojica Jr. Insp.Mojica advised the Chief of CIDG that a KFR of an important Marawi City businessman, Ibrahim Ali Racman, had taken place on November 29th, and that the family of the victim had just negotiated a P5 Million Ransom ($110,000). The KFR organisation's negotiator had insisted that the payoff take place at SM Mall in Cagayan del Oro City and so Marawi City CPO needed to co-ordinate a joint action plan quickly, since the payoff would take place near midnite, on Father Masterson Avenue in Barangay Upper Carmen. At the moment, Mawari City CPO personnel were tailing two Iranun cousins:
1) Hadji Drisha "Dada" Tomawis Mohamed, alias "Abdul
2) Yahya "Pingko" Moscana Tomawis, alias "Marmaya"
in a red Mazda sedan as it sped towards Cagayan del Oro City. Cagayan del Oro CPO, or, CDO CPO, arranged to meet their colleagues from Marawi City near the agreed upon ransom exchange location, Calda's Pizza, an eatery in SM Mall. Reaching Cagayan del Oro City, Marawi City's Insp.Mojica was puzzled when the red Mazda made its way into Barangay Patag and stopped just outside the main gate to Camp Evangelista, the 4ID Headquarters. There, they saw a man, whom they would soon discover to be Major Tanggote, rise from a bench at a jeepney stop, and get into the rear seat of the Mazda. Tailing it towards Barangay Carmen and the meeting place, the Marawi police were again stymied as the Mazda turned into the carpark for the Liceo de Cagayan Resturant. Parking, only Major Tanggote left the car. Officers watched as the Major walked over two men, standing next to a black Honda XRM and a blue Kia minivan.
After a few minutes spent quietly conferring with one another, Major Tanggote turned and returned to the Mazda and its two occupants, as the blue Kia and Honda motorcycle slowly left the carpark. Minutes later, the red Mazda sedan left as well, followed of course by the Marawi City CPO and its Director, Superintendent Mojica. As the small convoy neared the turnoff for Father Masterson Avenue, the vehicles were joined by a marked unit from the CDO CPO, which then turned on its siren and signaled for the Mazda to pull over. Enraged, Marawi City police officers had no choice now but to follow through. However, instead of stopping, the Mazda gunned its engine and attempted to out run the five police vehicles tailing it. As the car chase reached neared SM Mall, Corporal Borreta on his Honda XRM motorcycle joined the chase. Officers inside the marked CDO CPO car began firing their 45 caliber pistols at the Mazda, prompting Corporal Borreta, while still driving his motorcycle, to pull his AFP-issued 45 caliber pistol and return fire. The massive car chase slash gunbattle finally ground to a halt in the SM Mall carpark, where the sedan screeched to a halt outside the Pan de Pugon Bakeshop. As Tanggote and the two Tomawis cousins attempted to flee on foot, a police officer with an M16 fired in their direction, wounding all three suspects. The two Tomawis cousins, seriously wounded, stopped dead in their tracks. Major Tanggote however, made a dash for it and despite the very late hour, managed to enter a call centre (the huge operations which field phonecalls for corporations' customer service departments, etc.). It was in that call centre lobby that Major Tanggote's colourful life hit a brickwall, dead on.
Frisking all three, Tanggote was found to be carrying a loaded 45 caliber pistol, albeit AFP-issued, and therefore legal. It was during this frisking however, that police officers discovered Tanggote's AFP Identification Card. Immediately calling CDO CPO to inform them of this fact, the CPO soon called the 4ID switchboard to inform them of a shooting incident involving one of their senior officers, and mentioned that KFR charges may be laid on him. Meanwhile, Corporal Borreta had been cornered at the next intersection by a CPO Blocking Force and soon joined the other three suspects in the mall carpark. Staff Sergeant Edwin Paculba managed to elude his pursuers only to run into a mobile PNP checkpoint. Seeing as how a report of the shooting incident had gone out all over the airwaves, the officers at the checkpoint quickly collared him and proceded to CPO Headquarters for interrogation.
While also in civilian clothes, Borreta also carried his AFP-issued 45 caliber pistol with him that night. Just as with his superior, Major Tanggote, Borreta had his AFP ID on him but the CPO had already notified the AFP of one military arrest. They would wait to inform the AFP's responding personnel at CPO Headquarters. The PNP checkpoint that had snared Staff Sergeant Paculba likewise decided to wait for the AFP's response to Major Tanggote, while vouchsafing Paculba's AFP-issued 45 caliber pistol.
Under interrogation by CDO CPO CIDG, it was revealed that the two Tomawis cousins are also cousins with Major Tanggote. Tanggote, in his version, consuming four pages in his affadavit, claimed that his two cousins from Lanao del Sur Province had been in town and invited him out for a meal at that quinessential Filipino takeaway joint, Jollibees. For reasons not disclosed, they had decided instead to eat at Liceo de Cagayan Resturant. While eating there Tanggote says, he and two cousins noticed members from a Marnaw (Maranao) clan that they recognised from Marawi City. The clan in question, the Salics, had been in a "Rido," or violent clan feud, with the Tomawis Clan for an entire generation. Unsettled, the three men then noticed high ranking members of the Marawi City CPO staking out the resturant. Seeing as how the Salic Clan has ruled Marawi City's government for well over a decade now, seeing those police made the three Tomawis clansmrn very nervous. With only one single pistol between the three men, and it by then being nearly 8PM, he desperately reached out to his two subordinates, Corporal Borreta and Staff Sergeant Paculba.
After the two non commision officers, or, NCOs, arrived on scene Tanggote quietly conferred with both. After, the two men agreed to follow Tanggote to Camp Evangelista where he could shed the Salic Clan and their police protection. While en route to the base, on Father Masterson Avenue, Cagayan del ORO CPO officers opened fire on the Mazda carrying the two Tomawis cousins and Major Tanggote. Pulling into the carpark where they car skidded to a stop and its three occupants attempted to make an ill fated run for it, all three Tomawis Clansmem had been shot.
The three wounded suspects were taken to JR Borja Hospital where the two Tomawis cousins were admitted in serious condition while Major Tanggote was patched up and whisked away to enjoy two days of tactical interrogation at the CDO CPO Headquarters, alongside the two NCOs who had been taken there soon after being caught earlier that morning. The AFP deployed a senior officer from JAGO, or, Judge Advocate General's Office (the AFP legal department for both defence and prosecution of major charges), Major Aldrich Uayan, who was accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC.) Rene Canete, the Commanding Officer of the 36IB (Infantry Battalion), and a former Commanding Officer of Tanggote's.
LTC.Canete, when hearing the police version of events noted that he was also Tanggote's neighbour on Officer's Row and that the Major hadn't left the base in nearly two weeks. Therefore, he highly doubted the accusation of KFR being made against a fellow senior officer he knew inside and out. Lately, the AFP has taken a few body hits to its collective image, especially here on Mindanao. One Private First Class was found to have beaten his wife to death and then, audaciously, buried her in the brigade headquarters graveyard in an unmarked grave. On Basilan, an Intelligence Officer and two subordinates were nabbed for giving an innocent villager a gasoline enema with a glass pop bottle. In North Cotabato Province, aside from being repeatedly fingered in yet another priest killing, the AFP is accused of murdering yet another villager and these are only three of literally dozens of recent cases- real or figments of propaganda- of which the AFP stands accused. Now, add KFR, which by the way, is not a new accusation.
The two Tomawis cousins have been released due to the defence taking advantage of two loopholes. When an accused subject goes through the pre-requisite inquest, there is a waiver form against Arbitrary Detention. If you sign it, the prosecution may incarcerate you even if you aren't charged. Most defendants sign it unthingkingly. These two men did not. When, at the inquest, a Manila-based prosecutor from the Department of Justice, or, DOJ, failed to include the two in her Charge Sheet- since she, like virtually all prosecutors, used the signed Waiver as a point of reference, the two cousins had their unusually capable attorney file a Writ of Habeus Corpus, on December 6th. On the 7th it was granted and the police guards at the hospital were removed. On December 8th that same Manila-based prosecutor flew into Cagayan del Oro City just to formally ammend her Charge Sheet but alas, there is still no Commitment Order against the men (loophole #2). The two men have been whisked away out of the hospital and into the wind.
The three AFP personnel are however, being held in the city jail in Barangay Lumbia, that same facility where several inmates escaped within the last week, AFTER an escape tunnel being constructed from outside the prison was discovered.
The counterinsurgency on Mindanao from a first hand perspective. As someone who has spent nearly three decades in the thick of it, I hope to offer more than the superficial fluff that all too often passes for news. Covering not only the blood and gore but offering the back stories behind the mayhem. Covering not only the guns but the goons and the gold as well. Development Aggression, Local Politics and Local History, "Focus on Mindanao" offers the total package.
Thursday, December 15, 2011
Kidnap for Ransom for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part XIV: Ali Ibrahim Rakman, Kidnapped by Soldiers
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