In my entry, "NPA Armed Contacts for the Second Quarter of 2011, Part VI," I discussed the sad predicament of a band of Mamanwa Tribesmen that had somehow made their way to Surigao City, in Surigao del Norte Province in June of 2011, where they had ended up living under a set of huge blue plastic tarps that had been rendered into a gigantic tent in that city's Barangay Luna. The Mamanwa are Negritos and as such constitute the poorest of the poor on Mindanao. This particular band, under the leadership of Datu Rolando "Lando" Anlagan, also known as "Datu Mahuribok," had encamped on a private lot in Sitio Bacud that had been generously donated by Provincial Councilor Leonilo Aldonza.
Likewise, I covered the tribe's happy return to their homes in the adjacent province of Agusan del Norte, on June 26th. Happy to return to their modest thatched homes where they eeked out a hardscrabble existence in the municipality of Kitcharao. Their small settlement in the Zapanta Valley's Sitio Mahaba, in the upland barangay of Bangayan was shared with Manobo Tribesmen and a tiny minority of Bisaya, Cebuano-speakers, most of whom had inter-married into both tribes. Though the Manobo and Mamanwa tended separate communal plots the community was bereft of any ethnic communal strife with the biggest worry being wild boars who would uproot their crops of dry rice, corn, and ginger...that is until the Armed Forces of the Philippines classified their valley as an NPA Sentro de Grabidad, or Centre of Gravity.
As I have explained in other posts, the phrase "Centre of Gravity" is a generic term that denotes an oppositional force's strongest sector, the geographical in which the opposition, in this case the NPA, holds the strongest amount of influence and finds most of its support. In another recent NPA entry, "NPA Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter, Part XI," I discuss the NPA's methodology of first conquering a small area at a provincial border nexus, and how it uses that border convergence to outwit both the PNP and AFP (Philippine National Police and Armed Forces of the Philippines) by simply basing themselves on one side of a border and attacking across the provincial line. So it is for this far end of the NPA's Northeast Mindanao Regional Committee, or NEMRC.
As true as that is, the Zapanta Valley is far from a Centre of Gravity. It is only within the last six months that the single NPA Front operating on both sides of the Agusan del Norte and Surigao del Norte provincial borders, Front 19A, has re-emerged after nearly a year long hiatus during which the AFP's 4ID (Infantry Division) declared the entire province of Surigao del Norte to be "pacified." Indeed, even as the former Division Commander, Major General Mario Chang, was making that asinine claim, his 30IB (Infantry Battalion) was using the Zapanta Valley as its personal punching bag.
The "Pacification" was declared in the Spring of 2010. In June of that same year the 30IB launched a massive push on that provincial border, aimed at curtailing Front activities in and around the municipality of Kitcharao.
Then, in 2011, the 30IB did this again in May, as noted in that aforementioned Second Quarter entry, and then once again at the end of August, and now once again beginning on November 6th. On the day in question, at 10AM, villagers were startled as 105MM Howitzer shells began pockmarking the ground around their tiny settlement. By the end of the second Howitzer salvo a pair of MG520 helicopter gunships were showering the valley's heavily wooded slopes with 70MM rockets, seven per salvo. The 2.75 inch shells ripped apart everything they touched and while they failed to connect with a single NPA guerilla, they did manage to ruin the Abaca (Manila Hemp) crops of several Manobo families in the village.
As the copters began emptying their 250 round 50 caliber guns the villagers once again packed their most important possessions and began running for their lives. As distraught tribesmen jogged down the rutted dirt trail that serves as the only conduit into and out of the Zapanta Valley, they passed 6 x 6 trucks full of Scout Rangers from the 5th and 6th Companies who were spearheading the ground portion of the operation. This time the 30IB was relegated to flag waving at checkpoints established in the more populated environs of that same barangay, Bangayan, and another in the adjacent barangay of Mara-iging, as if the NPA would now drive out of the Zapanta Valley on the region's single road.
In any event, the PNP also took part in this shindig with the two Public Safety Companies* from PRO-13, or Police Regional Office for Region #13, establishing secondary blocking forces and checkpoints in Barangays Haliobong and Kanaway, which were closer to the town proper on National Hiway, as well as in the municipality of Tubay, an alternative route for anyone lucky enough to have made their way out onto the hiway (*Public Safety Companies, or PSCs, are simply the modernised Philippine Constabulary. When the Constabulary, or PC was de-mobilised, many PC companies were converted into PMGs, or Police Mobile Groups. At the end of 2009 the PNP Director General re-named them "Public Safety Companies" to negate a lot of the baggage associated with their history as counterinsurgency tools).
Back in Zapanta Valley the 6 x 6 trucks disgorged their passengers. The 6th Company, under Lieutenants Marco and Sara-sara was tasked with clearing Sitio Mahaba . At 1115AM they walked into an NPA ambush in which three soldiers were critically wounded:
1) Private First Class (Pfc.) Josel P.Sedrome
2) Pfc.Henry M.Simba
3) Corporal Mabel Sacay
After the NPA broke contact and withdrew the 6th Company set up a security perimeter as they awaited the lone Huey (UH-H1 helicopter) to Medivac the three wounded men to Camp Bancasi, the 4ID annex camp in Butuan City.
The 5th Company meanwhile, under Captain Cimini, began clearing the Mamanwa portion of the valley, Sitio Maribuhok, and were ambushed by a second NPA detachment. The Company Commander, Captain Mark Steve T.Cimini was wounded straight away while one of his men, Pfc.Ninoto C.Gulani was killed. At just before 1130AM both MG520s broke off and headed back to Camp Bancasi for refueling, only to return with the HUEY at just before 1PM. Captain Cimini and the body of Pfc.Gulani were evacuated back to Butuan as both companies of Scout Rangers continued clearing the valley without resistance.
As of today, November 17th, 2011, the push is still taking place. The AFP has killed ZERO, wounded ZERO, and captured ZERO guerillas, ZERO camps, and has otherwise failed to make one iota of progress. The only thing this third major operation in six months has managed to do is create a recruitment pool FOR the NPA. Amazingly, indeed, stupefyingly, the 30IB admits to "Hamletting" the valley. For those unfamiliar with the term, it involves a tight military cordon around a designated settlement. Nothing moves in or out of the cordon without explicit authorisation of the military hierarchy in that particular sector.
When I was in school we were taught that the British perfected the method during the Malayan Emergency of the late 1950s and early 1960s when dealing with the primarily ethnic Chinese Maoist insurgency. In reality the methodology is as old as warfare. In fact, in that very same sector the Americans were Hamletting villages both during the "Insurrecto Insurgency" as well as the so called "Colorum Insurgency," both of which caused heavy fighting in those first years of the 20th Century. The AFP's current protocol revolves around heavy-handed census taking under the guise of its PDT, or Peace and Development Teams. In the case of Hamletted settlements the census includes all food and possessions. Every kilogram of rice must be accounted for. Villagers can only work their fields at certain times of day and there is a 10PM to 6AM curfew. The AFP uses this protocol often enough but to my knowledge has never publicly admitted it until now.
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