The issue of "Child Warriors" (Philippine speak for "Child Soldiers") is a perennial punching bag for the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP, as well as for the New People'a Army, or NPA, with each side wasting great time and energy accusing the other of reprehensibly using "children" in armed combat. However, the dynamic is non-existent in both organisations. It is used as a propaganda exercise. In International Law there is an important genre known as LOAC (pronounced "Low-Ack"), an acronym representing the "Laws of Armed Conflict." Within LOAC the 1989 United Natioms Convention on the Rights of the Child defines the minimum age for soldiers- or rather, defines a "child" as anyone 17 or younger (Article I), but in terms of "Child Soldiers," the minimum age for front line combat soldiers- because outside of that narrow role there is absolutely no minimum age- is 18 or older for conscription but anyone 15 or older can voluntarily participate in front line combat (OPAC, or, Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, ratified May 25th, 2000). Conceivably you could dress a five year old in jungle camouflage and have him man an armed checkpoint but then you run into another genre, IHL, or International Humanitarian Law in which the "Rights of Children" are attended to in reams of Politically Correct verbiage.
To clarify, the minimum age for a front line combat soldier was, for decades, 14.5, or 14 years and six months for the decimally challenged amongst us. Then, in 1989, the UN authored a new Convention, the aforementioned "CROC," or, "Convention on the Rights of the Child," in which the age was raised to 15 years. So, the AFP is well within its rights to recruit 15 year old paramilitary soldiers in its CAA programme, right? Wrong...well...sort of... In "OPAC," the "Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict," Part IV, Article 1, only national militaries can recruit people 17 or younger. Paramilitaries are forbidden. But, according to the AFP the CAA programme is a Military Reserve, not a paramilitary. It is true that AFP cadres technically command each CAA detachment but it is also true that most CAAs never even receive their proscribed 45 days of military training. It would no doubt be a challenging case to prosecute were the Philippine Government to ever be called onto the carpet for the issue. The best defence the Government could offer is that CAA Regulations bar anyone under the age of 18 even being enlisted so that a 17 year old technically couldn't even join a rear echelon position (CAA being "Citizens Active Auxiliary" though usually the "C" is said to designate "Civilian," a faux paux that even the AFP has grown accustomed to making. The CAA are geographically fixed detachments composed of citizens living within a detachment's operational area. The best known form of CAA is the "CAFGU," pronounced "Kaf-goo," the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit).
In the AFP's defence, it isn't that the AFP seeks anyone younger than 18. Indeed, I reckon that even if confronted with someone under the stated minimum age most any member of the AFP would be unwilling to accept them. However, there are times when an AFP officer has no choice but to enlist such people although it is extremely rare. Insurgency in the Philippines is strongest in the remote countryside. On Mindanao the NPA concentrates its expansionist agenda within the Lumad demographic, the Lumad being the one size fits all generic label applied to the 18 Animist Hilltribes of Austronesian stock. There are still today many Lumad villages existing off the grid. Existing in unrecognised communities there is no civil registration in terms of births, weddings, deaths, and so forth. Without birth certificates there is no way in which to ascertain one's age and so this is done via one's word and the judgement of the AFP cadre in charge of organising a CAA detachment within that community. Extant law in fact holds that age must be ascertained as best as can reasonably be expected. As such, dealing with Hilltribes, it is the "Datu," or Chief's word that serves as the "proof."
There are other ways in which recruits may circumvent the age guidelines, such as a local Datu having a 16 year only son, nephew, or grandson that he wants enlisted, the datu compels the cadre by refusing to allow the detachment to exist unless the cadre complies, and other similar scenarios.
As for the NPA, until the late 1990s the organisation openly recruited males and females as young as 14 despite the political wing, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) Poltiburo (Political Bureau, aka the Executive Committee)having issued a directive that nobody under 18 must be recruited into the NPA's Guerilla Fronts, the front line units. The directive had no teeth and so recruitment of young teenagers continued until 1999 when the AFP suceeded in getting the Manila-based national media to co-operate in its propaganda campaign against the NPA, thereafter the "Child Warrior" became one of two AFP propaganda mainstays (the other being the AFP-manufactured issue of landmines). This changed with external sources joining the fray in that same year. UNICEF issued a report claiming that 3% of all NPA guerillas were "children."
That same year the NPA received a stern rebuke from the CPP's Military Commission, the entity serving as an interface between the CPP Central Committee and the NPA National Command. Now the minimum age for recruitment was firmly established at age 18. However, IF the NPA wished to recuit 9 year olds legally it could (according to the AFP it recruits nine year olds, at least that was the silly story told by the 10ID (Infantry Division) when it claimed a little girl it murdered was a guerilla). Laws dealing with minimum ages in the military merely apply to national governments, and then only if the government agrees to sign a voluntary agreement. These agreements, CROC, OPAC, Rome Statute, and so on can be abrogated simply by written notice of the nation wishing to withdraw.
Aside from the NPA, all Philippine insurgent organisations have, within recent memory, actively recruited children as young as 11. Although the BIAF, or Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces as the MILF military wing is known, now takes a stance that at least externally rejects the recruitment of children, it still enlists them. Although not very common, it is also not very rare to find BIAF guerillas in their very early teens. The MILF defends this by correctly noting that BIAF camps have never been conventional military camps. They are not properly defined and in most cases, neither are they properly protected. Within boundries haphazardly defined by the MILF/BIAF itself, several villages exist much like any other Philippine villages except for the MILF serving as the here all-end all power in villagers' lives. Shari'a Courts, courts administering Islamic Law, are administered by the MILF. People are whipped, executed, and so forth. Schools teach only MILF and Islamic principles and so the MILF/BIAF has created a state within a state. Each family is compelled to offer one male and one female to the organisation, with 12 being the minimum age for males, 11 for females.
Currently the ARMM, or, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao regional government has just awarded 20 BIAF Child Soldiers an educational package as it tries to lure more and more youth from a life of kill or be killed but the ARMM can only do this with foreign funding so that there isn't much hope that the BIAF will stop this practice. The MILF, as I noted, swears it won't do it anymore but then adds that children living in BIAF camps must be taught to defend themselves in the face of "external" aggression, as in the Philippine Government trying to merely re-establish its sovereign rights.
The ASG, or, Abu Sayyaf Group, is one organisation- and I used the word "organisation" VERY loosely- that makes no apologies about employing whichever male wishes to join them. On November 14th, 2011, the AFP's 4th Scout Ranger Battalion was once again operating in the municipality of Sumisip, in Basilan Province. Encircling a small camp under sub-Kumander Abdulbaki Ismanul, in Barangay Tongsengal, the soldiers began slowly crawling forward, uphill when they were detected. During the ensuing firefight the AFP was able to capture three Abu Sayyaf guerillas:
1) Al Mahdi Arshad, age 22
2) Abdul Baklis Manul
one of whom was 12 years old:
3) Abduhaya Pantasan
In doing so the AFP also managed to capture two M16s, one of which had an M203 grenade launcher, as well as one M14. In addition, twelve full magazines were captured, five M16, seven M14, and one ICOM walkie talkie. Not taking any chances since the 4th Battalion's Intelligence Unit was caught torturing an Abu Sayyaf guerilla this past summer, the battalion quickly turned the 12 year old over to the DSWD, or, Department of Social Welfare and Development as they are mandated to do.
Mandated or not, quite often youth are tacticaly interrogated, often brutally, and then incarcerated side by side with adults. It is only within the last 6 years that the Philippines has begun separating juvenile inmates from adults, yet hundreds are still not segregated. Children as young as 5 years old are held in large adult cells, and I need not describe the hellish life that awaits such children. At DSWD the young guerilla is ostensibly trained and counseled so as to have at least an opportunity to salvage his life. Of course in reality no real dedicated programme exists for de-programming such youth. Their counseling is with untrained paraprofessionals and their de-programming isn't via any established protocols and so naturallt these young people end up with little prospects outside the gross violence they have become accustomed too.
Sunday, November 27, 2011
Saturday, November 26, 2011
Kidnap for Ransom for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, PartXI: The Release of Three Koreans on the Lanao Border and the Execution of One Filipino on Lake Lanao
In my entry, "Kidnap for Ransom for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part VIII," I discussed six treasure hunters, three South Koreans and three Filipinos whose local guide led them right into a KFR, or, Kidnap for Ransom. The three Koreans:
1) Kim Nam Doo, age 48
2) Woo Seok Bong, age 60
3) In Choi Soo, age 53
checked into the Cagayan de Oro City's Miami Inn, a local hotel in Misamis Oriental Province, on October 20th, 2011. There they rendevouzed with their three local "partners":
1) Junie Ongie, of El Salvador, a municipality in that same province of Misamis Oriental
2) Nestor Modejar, of Barobo, a town in Surigao del Sur Province
and an unnamed third man, reputedly an "engineer" from the municipality of Parang, in Maguindanao Province. The six were met by a Maranaw (Maranaoan) Tribesmen who they had hired as their local guide for the Lanao del Norte and Misamis Occidental Provincial border region. Arriving at the hotel the guide had unexpectedly brought along two other Maranaw. Together the nine men left and instead of traveling to the borders of Lanao del Norte Province and Misamis Occidental Province, they ended up on the south shore of Lake Lanao, a place rife with KFR activity.
When the Koreans hadn't returned to the Miami Inn by October 31st, its manager reported the men as missing at the CPO, or City Police Office. This was the first authorities had heard of the incident although the kidnappers had been negotiating with the Koreans' families since just after their abduction. Initially demanding a package deal of P50 Million ($1.1 Million) for the three Koreans, calls had come regularly as the families did their best to maintain regular contact, parrying with kidnappers demands. Since the kidnappers had been communicating using their victims' cellphones. Which, unlike nearly all Philippine cellphones, are not prepaid devices, the families were able to use the frequent calls towards their advantage. Soon after receiving the initial telephone calls, two of the Koreans families had immediately gone to their local police stations which in turn almost immediately led to the South Korean Government involving itself. Triangulating (extrapolating) the cellphone signals allowed unofficial South Korean Government "investigators," a euphanism for Intelligence Agents, to zero in on the kidnapper's location, which as suspected, was almost exactly on the south shore of Lake Lanao.
The agents also zeroed in on the kidnappers' negotiator, Jhonny [sic] Tawan-Tawan, the former Mayor of Salvador, a municipality in Lanao del Norte Province, directly abutting the Lanao del Sur border. After learning that the management at the Miami Inn had contacted Philippine authorities the South Korean Government offered to liason with the local authorities handling the case. The actual kidnappers themselves are led by sub-Kumander Pogi of the BIAF, or, Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces as the armed wing of the MILF is known. A member of the 101 Base Command based in the town of Wao in Lanao del Norte Province, Pogi hopes to cash in on all the ransoms being collected by the adjacent 113 Base Command. When a much more reasonable P1 Million ($21,000) was offered in a package deal that would lead to the release of all three Koreans, the Korean Government accepted the terms.
On Thursdat, November 24th, one of the Koreans, Choi In Soo, was released on the border of Barangay Deguyanan in the municipality of Madamba in Lanao del Sur Province and the municipality of Salvador's Barangay Kalimudan in Lanao del Norte Province where the ever helpful ex-Mayor of Salvador, Jhonny Tawan-Tawan delivered a seriously ill Mr.Choi to soldiers from Task Force Ranaw. Choi, suffering for internal bleeding related to a stomach ulcer was rushed to Marawi City, home of the Task Force, where he was immediately operated on. After four hours he was wheeled out and is hopefully well on the road to revocery.
Mr.Choi had been released prior to the ransom handover because of his ill health. His two fellow South Koreans, Mr.Woo and Mr.Kim were released 21 hours later in Salvador, after a soldier from the Task Force delivered the full ransom on behalf of the South Korean Government.
As for the three Filipino captives, Mr.Modejar was executed after five days in captivity although his remains have yet to be recovered. The murder took place after his family truthfully explained that they were peasants and barely had enough money to buy rice each day. As for the other two, they are still being held as their families work to save each of them.
1) Kim Nam Doo, age 48
2) Woo Seok Bong, age 60
3) In Choi Soo, age 53
checked into the Cagayan de Oro City's Miami Inn, a local hotel in Misamis Oriental Province, on October 20th, 2011. There they rendevouzed with their three local "partners":
1) Junie Ongie, of El Salvador, a municipality in that same province of Misamis Oriental
2) Nestor Modejar, of Barobo, a town in Surigao del Sur Province
and an unnamed third man, reputedly an "engineer" from the municipality of Parang, in Maguindanao Province. The six were met by a Maranaw (Maranaoan) Tribesmen who they had hired as their local guide for the Lanao del Norte and Misamis Occidental Provincial border region. Arriving at the hotel the guide had unexpectedly brought along two other Maranaw. Together the nine men left and instead of traveling to the borders of Lanao del Norte Province and Misamis Occidental Province, they ended up on the south shore of Lake Lanao, a place rife with KFR activity.
When the Koreans hadn't returned to the Miami Inn by October 31st, its manager reported the men as missing at the CPO, or City Police Office. This was the first authorities had heard of the incident although the kidnappers had been negotiating with the Koreans' families since just after their abduction. Initially demanding a package deal of P50 Million ($1.1 Million) for the three Koreans, calls had come regularly as the families did their best to maintain regular contact, parrying with kidnappers demands. Since the kidnappers had been communicating using their victims' cellphones. Which, unlike nearly all Philippine cellphones, are not prepaid devices, the families were able to use the frequent calls towards their advantage. Soon after receiving the initial telephone calls, two of the Koreans families had immediately gone to their local police stations which in turn almost immediately led to the South Korean Government involving itself. Triangulating (extrapolating) the cellphone signals allowed unofficial South Korean Government "investigators," a euphanism for Intelligence Agents, to zero in on the kidnapper's location, which as suspected, was almost exactly on the south shore of Lake Lanao.
The agents also zeroed in on the kidnappers' negotiator, Jhonny [sic] Tawan-Tawan, the former Mayor of Salvador, a municipality in Lanao del Norte Province, directly abutting the Lanao del Sur border. After learning that the management at the Miami Inn had contacted Philippine authorities the South Korean Government offered to liason with the local authorities handling the case. The actual kidnappers themselves are led by sub-Kumander Pogi of the BIAF, or, Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces as the armed wing of the MILF is known. A member of the 101 Base Command based in the town of Wao in Lanao del Norte Province, Pogi hopes to cash in on all the ransoms being collected by the adjacent 113 Base Command. When a much more reasonable P1 Million ($21,000) was offered in a package deal that would lead to the release of all three Koreans, the Korean Government accepted the terms.
On Thursdat, November 24th, one of the Koreans, Choi In Soo, was released on the border of Barangay Deguyanan in the municipality of Madamba in Lanao del Sur Province and the municipality of Salvador's Barangay Kalimudan in Lanao del Norte Province where the ever helpful ex-Mayor of Salvador, Jhonny Tawan-Tawan delivered a seriously ill Mr.Choi to soldiers from Task Force Ranaw. Choi, suffering for internal bleeding related to a stomach ulcer was rushed to Marawi City, home of the Task Force, where he was immediately operated on. After four hours he was wheeled out and is hopefully well on the road to revocery.
Mr.Choi had been released prior to the ransom handover because of his ill health. His two fellow South Koreans, Mr.Woo and Mr.Kim were released 21 hours later in Salvador, after a soldier from the Task Force delivered the full ransom on behalf of the South Korean Government.
As for the three Filipino captives, Mr.Modejar was executed after five days in captivity although his remains have yet to be recovered. The murder took place after his family truthfully explained that they were peasants and barely had enough money to buy rice each day. As for the other two, they are still being held as their families work to save each of them.
Friday, November 25, 2011
Political Developments for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part I: President Aquino's Masterplan for the ARMM Hits a Tiny Speedbump, Part 2
In this second part of a three part entry, I will continue where I left off in "Part 1" (that always helps). When I had stopped in that preceding entry, Congressman Wahab Akbar (see my 2010 entry, "Portrait of a Warlord Part I: Wahab Akbar") had just been killed in the bombing of the Philippine Congressional complex, the Batasang Pambansa. Akbar had just left a long session at 8PM, November 13th, 2007, and was walking hurriedly outside of the building's south wing entrance when a parked black Honda XRM motorcycle packed with a powerful IED, or "Improvised Explosive Device" (as in "bomb") detonated. Immediately killed was Akbar's driver and an aide to another legislator. Fifteen people were wounded, including Akbar and two fellow Congressmen, Henry Pryde Teves, representing Negros Occidental Province from the Central Philippine Visayas Region, and Luzviminda Iligan, a Party List Representative from the Left Wing "Gabriela" party, a feminist-centric group.
Akbar and five other wounded people would die from their injuries, for a final deathtoll of eight. Using the record of entries into the south wing car park that day, the PNP CIDG NCR- PRO (Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group for the National Capital Region- Police Regional Office) traced two of those entries to a single home located near the Congressional Complex. Surveilling the home they discovered that one of the occupants, Alpaker "Abu Jundal" Sa'id, was a known Abu Sayyaf member with three open warrants relating to Abu Sayyaf's kidnapping activities in Basilan Province. Using those warrants as a pretext the CIDG accompanied the PNP SAF, or Special Action Force- the PNP's Special Operations Group, on a raid of that aforementioned home on November 15th.
Going in shooting the SAF managed to kill three of the six people in the house, including the only person with a warrant, Abu Jundal. They also critically wounded one of their own police officers but in the end the operation was hailed as a success because the two wanted men had been taken alive, Caidar Aunal and Ikram Indama, along with a third man, Adham Kusain. Inside the home PNP CIDG discovered a deed for the motorcycle used in the bombing as well as Ikram's Congressional Identity Badge, since he had, until June of that year, worked for former Congressman Abdulgani "Gerry" Salapuddin, whom Wahab Akbar had succeeded as the lone Congressman representing Basilan. Taken into custody the three arrestees were delivered to the IS-AFP (AFP Intelligence Service) where the men were reportedly tortured. Under "interrogation" all three fingered another man, Hajirun Jamiri. Then living in Metro Manila's Malate, Jamiri was the former mayor of Tuburan, a municipality on Basilan.
Raiding Jamiri's rented apartelle in Malate's Barangay San Andres on November 19th, the PNP CIDG were disappointed to find Jamiri gone. Thinking that their quarry had escaped the officers were just leaving the building when they literally ran into their target. Frisking him the PNP claimed that they had found an unlicensed 45 caliber pistol. I say "claims" because, aside from Jamiri swearing he was unarmed, the pistol is just too perfect a fit. In the Philippines a warrant is required before searching someone unless a crime is committed within the searching officers' presence. Having been led to Jamiri by three suspects who were being detained- at that point- without charges, the PNP needed a crime for which to detain Jamiri...enter a 45 caliber pistol, police issue no less (the same trick is pulled with suspected NPA who amazingly, always seem to be packing at least one hand grenade even while undergoing medical treatment, etc). Re-searching the premises they found paperwork leading to a grey Suzuki Shogun motorcycle with a garish blue polka dotted colour scheme. Impounding the motorcycle they took their new prisoner in, charging him of course for Possesion of an Illegal Firearm.
Having been taken, like the first three suspects, to IS-AFP, Jamiri was subjected to a range of physical torture, or so he would claim in a December 10th counter-affadavit. When they began applying electric current to his testicles Jamiri really had no choice but to reveal that the Batasang Pambansa Bombing had been one of three concrete plans to kill Congressman Akbar. Collectively known as Plans A, B, and C, the bombing had been "Plan B." Jamiri revealed that the Suzuki motorcycle the officers had just impounded had been employed in a previous attempt on Congressman Akbar's life, "Plan A." In that failed attempt, the Suzuki had had a three kilogram IED placed under its seat and been parked outside the entrance to a Quezon City "love motel," the Sulo Hotel. Akbar had regular weekly trysts there with one of his many local mistresses. However, on October 24th, and again on October 31st, Akbar had been spared because of more urgent appointments he couldn't miss.
Pressed to reveal more, Jamiri told investigators that the three kilogram IED had been disassembled and stored for possible use in "Plan C" should they fail with their November attempt at the Congressional complex. Investigators were told that on Malate's Leveriza Street, there was a four story building owned by fellow Basilan native Wilson Asanin, who allowed the group to store IED components within hiding places created on the building's first floor. Like many Philippine buildings with concrete floors, the centre of the room had a shallow trough in the floor, within which sat a large drain and a pipe leading into the city sewer system, a type of lowbrow comfort room, as Philippine bathrooms are known. Arriving at the building, the PNP removed a filing cabinet sitting atop the drain, then had an EOD (Explosives and Ordnance Detachment) gingerly remove the drain's metal grate and retrieve an aluminum powdered milk can tied to the grate by monofilament fishing line. Secreted inside the can, sealed with several layers of plastic held in place with a yellow rubber band, were more than two kilograms of the same unusual explosive mixture discovered by the American EOD team the night of the bombing. There was now no doubt that police had nabbed their man, even if they had to lie and cheat to do so.
The discovery of the multiple plots and explosives soon fell by the wayside as Jamiri kept right on talking. First, he told investigators that a police officer from Basilan had supplied the pre-prepared explosive, though to Jamiri's limited knowledge it had been purchased in Mindanao's Zamboanga City. In reality, the officer, Police Officer 1st Grade (PO1) Bayan Judda, had contracted with Abu Sayyaf to obtain the services of the now deceased Abu Jundal. Jundal had come to Manila simply to prepare the payload and to assemble two devices. More suprising was Jamiri's revelation vis a vis planning and funding of all three plans. According to Jamiri's ammended affadavit, the initial planning had began three months prior, in August of 2007. He would meet with the driving force behind the plan, former Congressman Gerry Salapuddin at Salapuddin's business, Green Bucks Grocers just outside Filinvest 2 Subdivision in Quezon City, the subdivision Salapuddin called home when in Metro Manila. Later, they would meet at the home of Salapuddin's partner, sitting Congressman, Mujiv Hataman.
While Salapuddin had served as the lone Congressman representing Basilan he had served side by side with Hataman, who although he too came from Basilan, served as a Party List legislator, representing ANAK Mindanao. Because the Philippines adopted a hybrid-system utilising both territorial AND party representatives, such interesting dynamics were not at all unusual. Salapuddin had been a popular Congressman, an ex-MNLF Commander who controlled all of Basilan until surrendering to the Marcos Regime in April of 1984. Content in recent years to relegate his partisanship towards strictly political pursuits, Salapuddin had reached his nine year term limit in Congress and so he was forced to abdicate his seat. He then set his sights on the Basilan gubernatorial race and began preparing for what he believed would be a simple campaign. As Salapuddin did so, Wahab Akbar prepared to step into Salapuddin's Congressional seat. He also had three of his four wives run for local office, with wife Jum Akbar running against Salapuddin in the gubernatorial race.
2007 was Wahab Akbar's year. Although one of his wives did end up losing a mayoral race, wife Cherrylynn Santos Akbar became mayor of the provincial capital, Isabela City, and Jum sailed right past Salapuddin and into the Governorship of Basilan. Salapuddin was livid.
Muviv Hataman's brother Hajiman "Jim" Hataman Salliman had raced against Wahab Akbar himself and of course had come out as a loser. Mindanowan politics being what it is, Congressman-elect Akbar was less than gracious towards Jim Hataman Salliman and once again, a powerful man had ended up enraged with Wahab Akbar.
Jamiri, like his three co-conspirators, was removed from IS-AFP custody and transferred to Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig City. However, still only charged for the pistol, the sitting Judge, Ralp Lee of Regional Trial Court #83 in Quezon City, set a bail of P80,000 ($1,600). Posting it on December 4th, Jamiri walked out of Camp Bagong Diwa and immediately took out a counter-affadavit to negate the affadavit (and its ammendment) which he claimed had been coerced via torture. Notarised by an attorney outside the camp, he could have now rest assured that his original affadavit was history. However, not trusting the Philippine Justice System, he had his attorney file for a court hearing with Judge Lee. Within days of the notarisation the media learned that Jamiri had recanted.
Although the media had been told that the three suspects initially arrested:
1) Ikram Indama
2) Caidar Aunal
3) Akham Kusain
had been charged with four counts of Murder, ten counts of Frustrated Attempted Multiple Murder, and a single count of Destruction of Property by the Department of Justice on November 19th, the truth of the matter was that they had merely been charged with Obstruction of Justice vis a vis the "shootout" during their arrest- and then only on December 6th, some 17 days after having supposedly ben charged with Murder, etc. (though Philippine Jurisprudence dictates formal charges within 36 hours or else release them.
It was there that I closed the preceding entry and so it is here that I begin:
From the initial discovery of items linking Ikram Indama to ex-Congressman Abdulgani "Gerry" Salapuddin the authorities had been investigating Salapuddin's role, if any, in the Batasang Pambansa Bombing. However, while the authorities freely admitted having discovered that Ikram Indama had served as a Congressional Aide to Salapuddin, they had refused to even discuss any possible role Salapuddin may have played as they were continuously prodded to do so by the hyper-aggressive Philippine Media. Days after that November 15th arrest though, Akbar's niece, Tahira S.Ismael Sansawi, then serving as the Mayor of Lamitan City, Basilan's second largest population centre, publicly accused not only Gerry Salapuddin but then-Congressman Mujiv Hataman, serving for the ANAK Party List, and his brother Hadjiman "Jim" Hataman Saliman, who had run against Wahab Akbar for Basilan's lone Congressional seat and lost, that previous May. In fact, Gerry Salapuddin, who has been compelled to vacate that same Congressional seat for having reached his nine year term limit, had run against one of Akbar's four wives, Jum Akbar, and lost the province's gubernatorial race (also in May of 2007). Investigators certainly had no problem in so far as establishing a motive went.
As the media ran with Salapuddin and the two Hataman brothers as the alleged "brains" behind the bombing a fourth name popped up out of left field. A third Hataman, Benjamin, popularly known as "Mang," was linked to the case as the man who actually detonated the IED via a cellular phone, having been fingered in the follow up interrogation of the jailed suspects, Ikram Indama, Caidar Aunal, and Adham Kusain. Moreover, it was revealed that the lessor of the house where the arrest took place, Redwan Indama, who had been killed by the PNP in the initial entry to the premises, turned out to be a cousin of all three Hatamans, albeit a third cousin to brothers Mujiv and Jim, and an even more distant relation to Benjamin Hataman.
On December 5th, Hajarun Jamiri was allowed to post bail in the amount of P80,000 ($1,600), a phenomenal sum given that his only charge to date had been the weapons charge over the 45 caliber pistol the PNP claimed to have found him carrying when he was arrested in Malate. That day, as noted above in my recap of "Part 1," Jamiri had a counter affadavit notarised in which he retracted his November 20th affadavit which he alleges- as I noted- had been obtained through extreme physical torture. In addition he retracted an ammended affadavit taken days after that initial November 20th document. After notarisation his attorney secured a hearing with Quezon City's Regional Trial Court #83 (RTC 83), the court that ended up with the entire case. Judge Ralph Lee set the hearing for December 10th and in the short interim Jamiri's attorney went at the media full throttle. A day after Jamiri had his counter affadavit notarised, PNP Director General Raul Bacalzo admitted that Jamiri had "not wanted" to sign his original affadavit, and only did so after much prodding (though he should have said "cattle prodding") and even then he immediately demanded that he be allowed to retract the affadavit. Still, Director General Bacalzo denied that any torture had taken place.
On December 10th Jamiri was allowed to formally retract his original affadavit. While the notarisation had in fact already ensured retraction, Jamiri was anxious to have the retraction formally on court record so that there could be no legal maneuvering around it. As PNP Director General had observed during his denial of Jamiri's accusations of torture, without Jamiri's ammended notation there was no case against Salapuddin or the Hattaman brothers. In the complete absence of physical proof, only an affadavit linking the three men to the case would keep the case against the three in play.
As 2008 began the three man Preliminary Investigatory Panel created by the Departmen of Justice, or DOJ, began preparing its findings and word leaked out that the three Hatamans, PO1 Bayan Judda, and Gerry Salapuddin would soon be joining Indama, Aunal, and Kusain in a cell at Camp Bagong Diwa. However, just before the February 28th, 2008 release of their preliminary investigation, the DOJ cleared Mujiv and Jim Hataman of the allegations, citing a lack of sufficient evidence. At the same time the DOJ found Sufficient Probable Cause to move against the three detainees, Indama, Aunal, and Kusain, along with PO1 Judda, Benjamin Hataman, Salapuddin, and Hahjirun Jamiri, the former Mayor of Tuburan who had bailed out of Camp Bagong Diwa back on December 5th, 2011.
The immediate result was a Counter-Motion by Salapuddin's attorneys seeking a Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, in essence, Salapuddin was asking Judge Lee to review the findings of the DOJ and to either concur, or else find the DOJ had erred, in which case Salapuddin would be cleared. Judge Lee concurred with the DOJ and so Salapuddin remained under the proceedings.
On March 4th, 2008, Judge Lee arraigned the three detained suspects, Ikram Indama, Caidar Aunal, and Adham Kusain. However, the other defendants scheduled to appear: PO1 Judda, Benjamin Hataman, Hajarun Jamiri, and Gerry Salapudding didn't bother to show up. The four were issued warrants. As for the three men present, Indama, being groomed as a State Witness, entered a plea of "Not Guilty." Aunal and Kusain however refused to enter a plea and so the court entered both men Not Guilty.
On April 23rd, the DOJ issued a Resolution to exclude Salapuddin from the case after prosecuting attirneys noted that the only thing connecting Salapuddin to the case was Ikram Indama's affadavit, now that Hajarun Jamiri had retracted his back in December. Aside from Indama's suspect assertion, there was nothing with which to tie Salapuddin to the bombing, certainly not a shred of physical evidence. The very next day, one of Congressnan Akbar's four widows, Governor Jum Akbar, filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals, hoping to have the DOJ Resolution trashed, thereby getting Salapuddin re-added to the docket. On May 23rd Judge Lee opted to suspend the DOJ Resolution for 30 days, pending its ajudication as he awaited Court of Appeals action.
On July 18th, 2008, after the Court of Appeals had rejected Governor Akbar's Petition, Judge Lee finally filed a 6pp Ruling in which he dropped Salapuddin from the case. It been an incredibly difficult for the last nine months, Gerry Salapuddin finally could show his face withou fear of arrest and with the shame, but this reprieve would only last a shortwhile as we should see in my third and final part, to follow shortly.
Akbar and five other wounded people would die from their injuries, for a final deathtoll of eight. Using the record of entries into the south wing car park that day, the PNP CIDG NCR- PRO (Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group for the National Capital Region- Police Regional Office) traced two of those entries to a single home located near the Congressional Complex. Surveilling the home they discovered that one of the occupants, Alpaker "Abu Jundal" Sa'id, was a known Abu Sayyaf member with three open warrants relating to Abu Sayyaf's kidnapping activities in Basilan Province. Using those warrants as a pretext the CIDG accompanied the PNP SAF, or Special Action Force- the PNP's Special Operations Group, on a raid of that aforementioned home on November 15th.
Going in shooting the SAF managed to kill three of the six people in the house, including the only person with a warrant, Abu Jundal. They also critically wounded one of their own police officers but in the end the operation was hailed as a success because the two wanted men had been taken alive, Caidar Aunal and Ikram Indama, along with a third man, Adham Kusain. Inside the home PNP CIDG discovered a deed for the motorcycle used in the bombing as well as Ikram's Congressional Identity Badge, since he had, until June of that year, worked for former Congressman Abdulgani "Gerry" Salapuddin, whom Wahab Akbar had succeeded as the lone Congressman representing Basilan. Taken into custody the three arrestees were delivered to the IS-AFP (AFP Intelligence Service) where the men were reportedly tortured. Under "interrogation" all three fingered another man, Hajirun Jamiri. Then living in Metro Manila's Malate, Jamiri was the former mayor of Tuburan, a municipality on Basilan.
Raiding Jamiri's rented apartelle in Malate's Barangay San Andres on November 19th, the PNP CIDG were disappointed to find Jamiri gone. Thinking that their quarry had escaped the officers were just leaving the building when they literally ran into their target. Frisking him the PNP claimed that they had found an unlicensed 45 caliber pistol. I say "claims" because, aside from Jamiri swearing he was unarmed, the pistol is just too perfect a fit. In the Philippines a warrant is required before searching someone unless a crime is committed within the searching officers' presence. Having been led to Jamiri by three suspects who were being detained- at that point- without charges, the PNP needed a crime for which to detain Jamiri...enter a 45 caliber pistol, police issue no less (the same trick is pulled with suspected NPA who amazingly, always seem to be packing at least one hand grenade even while undergoing medical treatment, etc). Re-searching the premises they found paperwork leading to a grey Suzuki Shogun motorcycle with a garish blue polka dotted colour scheme. Impounding the motorcycle they took their new prisoner in, charging him of course for Possesion of an Illegal Firearm.
Having been taken, like the first three suspects, to IS-AFP, Jamiri was subjected to a range of physical torture, or so he would claim in a December 10th counter-affadavit. When they began applying electric current to his testicles Jamiri really had no choice but to reveal that the Batasang Pambansa Bombing had been one of three concrete plans to kill Congressman Akbar. Collectively known as Plans A, B, and C, the bombing had been "Plan B." Jamiri revealed that the Suzuki motorcycle the officers had just impounded had been employed in a previous attempt on Congressman Akbar's life, "Plan A." In that failed attempt, the Suzuki had had a three kilogram IED placed under its seat and been parked outside the entrance to a Quezon City "love motel," the Sulo Hotel. Akbar had regular weekly trysts there with one of his many local mistresses. However, on October 24th, and again on October 31st, Akbar had been spared because of more urgent appointments he couldn't miss.
Pressed to reveal more, Jamiri told investigators that the three kilogram IED had been disassembled and stored for possible use in "Plan C" should they fail with their November attempt at the Congressional complex. Investigators were told that on Malate's Leveriza Street, there was a four story building owned by fellow Basilan native Wilson Asanin, who allowed the group to store IED components within hiding places created on the building's first floor. Like many Philippine buildings with concrete floors, the centre of the room had a shallow trough in the floor, within which sat a large drain and a pipe leading into the city sewer system, a type of lowbrow comfort room, as Philippine bathrooms are known. Arriving at the building, the PNP removed a filing cabinet sitting atop the drain, then had an EOD (Explosives and Ordnance Detachment) gingerly remove the drain's metal grate and retrieve an aluminum powdered milk can tied to the grate by monofilament fishing line. Secreted inside the can, sealed with several layers of plastic held in place with a yellow rubber band, were more than two kilograms of the same unusual explosive mixture discovered by the American EOD team the night of the bombing. There was now no doubt that police had nabbed their man, even if they had to lie and cheat to do so.
The discovery of the multiple plots and explosives soon fell by the wayside as Jamiri kept right on talking. First, he told investigators that a police officer from Basilan had supplied the pre-prepared explosive, though to Jamiri's limited knowledge it had been purchased in Mindanao's Zamboanga City. In reality, the officer, Police Officer 1st Grade (PO1) Bayan Judda, had contracted with Abu Sayyaf to obtain the services of the now deceased Abu Jundal. Jundal had come to Manila simply to prepare the payload and to assemble two devices. More suprising was Jamiri's revelation vis a vis planning and funding of all three plans. According to Jamiri's ammended affadavit, the initial planning had began three months prior, in August of 2007. He would meet with the driving force behind the plan, former Congressman Gerry Salapuddin at Salapuddin's business, Green Bucks Grocers just outside Filinvest 2 Subdivision in Quezon City, the subdivision Salapuddin called home when in Metro Manila. Later, they would meet at the home of Salapuddin's partner, sitting Congressman, Mujiv Hataman.
While Salapuddin had served as the lone Congressman representing Basilan he had served side by side with Hataman, who although he too came from Basilan, served as a Party List legislator, representing ANAK Mindanao. Because the Philippines adopted a hybrid-system utilising both territorial AND party representatives, such interesting dynamics were not at all unusual. Salapuddin had been a popular Congressman, an ex-MNLF Commander who controlled all of Basilan until surrendering to the Marcos Regime in April of 1984. Content in recent years to relegate his partisanship towards strictly political pursuits, Salapuddin had reached his nine year term limit in Congress and so he was forced to abdicate his seat. He then set his sights on the Basilan gubernatorial race and began preparing for what he believed would be a simple campaign. As Salapuddin did so, Wahab Akbar prepared to step into Salapuddin's Congressional seat. He also had three of his four wives run for local office, with wife Jum Akbar running against Salapuddin in the gubernatorial race.
2007 was Wahab Akbar's year. Although one of his wives did end up losing a mayoral race, wife Cherrylynn Santos Akbar became mayor of the provincial capital, Isabela City, and Jum sailed right past Salapuddin and into the Governorship of Basilan. Salapuddin was livid.
Muviv Hataman's brother Hajiman "Jim" Hataman Salliman had raced against Wahab Akbar himself and of course had come out as a loser. Mindanowan politics being what it is, Congressman-elect Akbar was less than gracious towards Jim Hataman Salliman and once again, a powerful man had ended up enraged with Wahab Akbar.
Jamiri, like his three co-conspirators, was removed from IS-AFP custody and transferred to Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig City. However, still only charged for the pistol, the sitting Judge, Ralp Lee of Regional Trial Court #83 in Quezon City, set a bail of P80,000 ($1,600). Posting it on December 4th, Jamiri walked out of Camp Bagong Diwa and immediately took out a counter-affadavit to negate the affadavit (and its ammendment) which he claimed had been coerced via torture. Notarised by an attorney outside the camp, he could have now rest assured that his original affadavit was history. However, not trusting the Philippine Justice System, he had his attorney file for a court hearing with Judge Lee. Within days of the notarisation the media learned that Jamiri had recanted.
Although the media had been told that the three suspects initially arrested:
1) Ikram Indama
2) Caidar Aunal
3) Akham Kusain
had been charged with four counts of Murder, ten counts of Frustrated Attempted Multiple Murder, and a single count of Destruction of Property by the Department of Justice on November 19th, the truth of the matter was that they had merely been charged with Obstruction of Justice vis a vis the "shootout" during their arrest- and then only on December 6th, some 17 days after having supposedly ben charged with Murder, etc. (though Philippine Jurisprudence dictates formal charges within 36 hours or else release them.
It was there that I closed the preceding entry and so it is here that I begin:
From the initial discovery of items linking Ikram Indama to ex-Congressman Abdulgani "Gerry" Salapuddin the authorities had been investigating Salapuddin's role, if any, in the Batasang Pambansa Bombing. However, while the authorities freely admitted having discovered that Ikram Indama had served as a Congressional Aide to Salapuddin, they had refused to even discuss any possible role Salapuddin may have played as they were continuously prodded to do so by the hyper-aggressive Philippine Media. Days after that November 15th arrest though, Akbar's niece, Tahira S.Ismael Sansawi, then serving as the Mayor of Lamitan City, Basilan's second largest population centre, publicly accused not only Gerry Salapuddin but then-Congressman Mujiv Hataman, serving for the ANAK Party List, and his brother Hadjiman "Jim" Hataman Saliman, who had run against Wahab Akbar for Basilan's lone Congressional seat and lost, that previous May. In fact, Gerry Salapuddin, who has been compelled to vacate that same Congressional seat for having reached his nine year term limit, had run against one of Akbar's four wives, Jum Akbar, and lost the province's gubernatorial race (also in May of 2007). Investigators certainly had no problem in so far as establishing a motive went.
As the media ran with Salapuddin and the two Hataman brothers as the alleged "brains" behind the bombing a fourth name popped up out of left field. A third Hataman, Benjamin, popularly known as "Mang," was linked to the case as the man who actually detonated the IED via a cellular phone, having been fingered in the follow up interrogation of the jailed suspects, Ikram Indama, Caidar Aunal, and Adham Kusain. Moreover, it was revealed that the lessor of the house where the arrest took place, Redwan Indama, who had been killed by the PNP in the initial entry to the premises, turned out to be a cousin of all three Hatamans, albeit a third cousin to brothers Mujiv and Jim, and an even more distant relation to Benjamin Hataman.
On December 5th, Hajarun Jamiri was allowed to post bail in the amount of P80,000 ($1,600), a phenomenal sum given that his only charge to date had been the weapons charge over the 45 caliber pistol the PNP claimed to have found him carrying when he was arrested in Malate. That day, as noted above in my recap of "Part 1," Jamiri had a counter affadavit notarised in which he retracted his November 20th affadavit which he alleges- as I noted- had been obtained through extreme physical torture. In addition he retracted an ammended affadavit taken days after that initial November 20th document. After notarisation his attorney secured a hearing with Quezon City's Regional Trial Court #83 (RTC 83), the court that ended up with the entire case. Judge Ralph Lee set the hearing for December 10th and in the short interim Jamiri's attorney went at the media full throttle. A day after Jamiri had his counter affadavit notarised, PNP Director General Raul Bacalzo admitted that Jamiri had "not wanted" to sign his original affadavit, and only did so after much prodding (though he should have said "cattle prodding") and even then he immediately demanded that he be allowed to retract the affadavit. Still, Director General Bacalzo denied that any torture had taken place.
On December 10th Jamiri was allowed to formally retract his original affadavit. While the notarisation had in fact already ensured retraction, Jamiri was anxious to have the retraction formally on court record so that there could be no legal maneuvering around it. As PNP Director General had observed during his denial of Jamiri's accusations of torture, without Jamiri's ammended notation there was no case against Salapuddin or the Hattaman brothers. In the complete absence of physical proof, only an affadavit linking the three men to the case would keep the case against the three in play.
As 2008 began the three man Preliminary Investigatory Panel created by the Departmen of Justice, or DOJ, began preparing its findings and word leaked out that the three Hatamans, PO1 Bayan Judda, and Gerry Salapuddin would soon be joining Indama, Aunal, and Kusain in a cell at Camp Bagong Diwa. However, just before the February 28th, 2008 release of their preliminary investigation, the DOJ cleared Mujiv and Jim Hataman of the allegations, citing a lack of sufficient evidence. At the same time the DOJ found Sufficient Probable Cause to move against the three detainees, Indama, Aunal, and Kusain, along with PO1 Judda, Benjamin Hataman, Salapuddin, and Hahjirun Jamiri, the former Mayor of Tuburan who had bailed out of Camp Bagong Diwa back on December 5th, 2011.
The immediate result was a Counter-Motion by Salapuddin's attorneys seeking a Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, in essence, Salapuddin was asking Judge Lee to review the findings of the DOJ and to either concur, or else find the DOJ had erred, in which case Salapuddin would be cleared. Judge Lee concurred with the DOJ and so Salapuddin remained under the proceedings.
On March 4th, 2008, Judge Lee arraigned the three detained suspects, Ikram Indama, Caidar Aunal, and Adham Kusain. However, the other defendants scheduled to appear: PO1 Judda, Benjamin Hataman, Hajarun Jamiri, and Gerry Salapudding didn't bother to show up. The four were issued warrants. As for the three men present, Indama, being groomed as a State Witness, entered a plea of "Not Guilty." Aunal and Kusain however refused to enter a plea and so the court entered both men Not Guilty.
On April 23rd, the DOJ issued a Resolution to exclude Salapuddin from the case after prosecuting attirneys noted that the only thing connecting Salapuddin to the case was Ikram Indama's affadavit, now that Hajarun Jamiri had retracted his back in December. Aside from Indama's suspect assertion, there was nothing with which to tie Salapuddin to the bombing, certainly not a shred of physical evidence. The very next day, one of Congressnan Akbar's four widows, Governor Jum Akbar, filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals, hoping to have the DOJ Resolution trashed, thereby getting Salapuddin re-added to the docket. On May 23rd Judge Lee opted to suspend the DOJ Resolution for 30 days, pending its ajudication as he awaited Court of Appeals action.
On July 18th, 2008, after the Court of Appeals had rejected Governor Akbar's Petition, Judge Lee finally filed a 6pp Ruling in which he dropped Salapuddin from the case. It been an incredibly difficult for the last nine months, Gerry Salapuddin finally could show his face withou fear of arrest and with the shame, but this reprieve would only last a shortwhile as we should see in my third and final part, to follow shortly.
Monday, November 21, 2011
NPA Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part XI: Human Rights Watch FINALLY Looks at the NPA and Screams 'Foul!'
Regular readers will know that I don't particularly have a lot of faith in the US- based international NGO, or in Filipino-speak, Civil Society Group, "Human Rights Watch," or "HRW" in shorthand. When I get my hands on their product, usually in the form of "reports," I spend a significant amount of time vetting their data, checking and re-checking their factual assertions, and so on. The following report, "Philippines: Communist Rebels Target Civilians: New People's Army Should Stop Unlawful Killings, Detentions," published on October 4th, 2011 condemns the NPA for the targeting of civilians, non-combatants. It is basically nothing but fluff, but worth including simply as a reference piece. The several killings described are all factually correct though, as far as I am concerned, the quotation from Philip Alston earns this short piece all the space it wants. Alstom served as the United Nations Rappoteur on Extra-Judicial Executions from 2004 to 2010. Speaking of the NPA's so called "People's Court," Alston says, "is either severly flawed, or else a sham." I am tempted to interject "I couldn't have said it better," but alas, I certainly can. It is a sham, point blank. The "Court Orders" it mysteriously talks about is simply one or two highly placed talking heads playing with people's lives.
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"Philippines: Communist Rebels Target Civilians: New People's Army Should Stop Unlawful Killings, Detentions"
The rebel New People's Army (NPA) in the Philippines should immediately end unlawful killings and detention of civilians, Human Rights Watch said today. The NPA, the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, has admitted to gunning down civilians and detaining others in recent months.
"For four decades the New People's Army has offered excuses for cold blooded killings of civilians," said Elaine Pearson, Deputy Asia Director at Human Rights Watch. "Recent attacks show that there has been no real departure from this illegal practice."
According to an NPA press statement provided to a journalist, the NPA's Mount Alip Front Operations Command in far south Mindanao admitted to the September 2, 2011 killing of Ramelito "Ramel" Gonzaga, 46, who the statement said was a member of a Government paramilitary force. The statement said that Gonzaga was sentenced to death by the NPA's "Revolutionary People's Court" or Hukumang Bayan, for "Crimes Against the People." The group has acknowledged that a stray bullet unintentionally wounded a pregnant woman, Ana Marie Campo.
The NPA has also claimed responsibility for the August 19 killing of Raymundo "Monding" Agaze in Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, saying it was carrying out a 2008 order of the "People's Court."
NPA leaders have often sought to justify killings by noting that "People's Courts" have condemned victims to death because of various "Crimes Against the People." Punishments are imposed both for alleged criminal acts, such as rape and murder, and for activities deemed anti-NPA, such as spying for the Armed Forces.
Philip Alston, the United Nations Special Rappoteur on Extra-Judicial Executions from 2004 to 2010, reported that the NPA's court system "is either deeply flawed or simply a sham."
"Any claim that people who are tried by the NPA's 'People's Courts' are receiving a fair hearing is ludicrous," Pearson said. "The NPA's 'Revolutionary Justice' is not justi it is simply old-fashioned murder."
The NPA has also detained civilians in violation of International Law. It is currently holding at least 13 people in Mindanao, at least some of them civilians. These include Mayor Henry Dano of Lingig, Surigao del Sur Province, along with his two Military Escorts, Cpl.Alrey Villasis de Samparado and Private First Class Allan Pellino (Actually, the last soldier's surname is "Saban"-Raki). The NPA captured them on July 13 and claims that they are intelligence operatives of the 75th Infantry Battalion- Intelligence Section and will face charges before the "People's Court." On October 1 the Communist Party of the Philippines ordered Mayor Dano's release. The NPA also detained four Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) guards on July 21- Murphy B.Todyog, Eric D.Llamasares, Rogelio E.Begontes, and Rolando D.Bajuyo Jr.- and claims to have granted them "Prisoner of War Status."
The remaining six are traders from Misamis Occidental, Ronald Boiles, James Mabaylan, Nelson Bagares, Ernesto Callo Jr., and Julieto Sarsaba, accused by the group of being Government spies. A representative of the families told Human Rights Watch that the six were going house to house on August 19 on the border of Davao City and Bukidnon selling "Kutson," Filipino style beds, when the NPA captured them, accusing them of trespassing. Ka Ariel Inda Magbanwag, Spokesperson for the NPA in Bukidnon-North Central Mindanao, has told journalists that the six are to be tried in the "People's Court."
Human Rights Watch called on the Philippine Government authorities to promptly investigate the killings and unlawful detentions and to prosecute those responsible in accordance with the law. Human Rights Watch has previously criticized the Philippine armed forces and police for Extra Judicial Killings and enforced disappearances of alleged NPA supporters and Leftist politicians and activists.
"Both the NPA and Government forces have committed atrocities in more than 40 years of armed conflict," Pearson said. "Each claims to have the interests of the ordinary Filipino at heart, but neither seems to show it."
Background
Since 1969 the NPA has engaged in an armed rebellion with the goal of establishing a Maoist State in the Philippines. The Philippine Military currently estimates that NPA consists of around 4,700 guerillas, who are active in about 69 of the country's 81 provinces.
As a party to an internal armed conflict, the NPA is obligated to abide by International Humanitarian Law, including Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its Second Additional Protocol, to which the Philippines is party. International Humanitarian Law prohibits the killing of civilians, mistreating anyone in custody, and convicting anyone in proceedings that do not meet international fair trial standards.
The NPA has long admitted to killing Government officials; soldiers, police, and pro-Government militia; civilians who are deemed to engage in acts "against the people;" and allegedly traitorous NPA or Communist Party members.
Recent killings implicating the NPA include:
On July 13, 2010, NPA members shot and killed Mateo Biong Jr., a former mayor of Giporlas town, Eastern Samar. The NPA claimed responsibility, saying it was carrying out a Death Sentence ordered by the NPA's "Revolutionary People's Court."
On July 23, 2010, NPA members shot and killed Sergio Villadar, a sugarcane farmer, in Escalanye Citu, Negros Occidental. The NPA claimed responsibility, saying its forces killed Villsar because he resisted arrest after being charged before the "People's Court."
On July 31, 2010, two NPA members shot and killed Leonardo "Andot" Behing, a leader of LUPACA (Lumadnong Pakigbisog sa Caraga), a group reported to have been affiliated with the Philippine armed forces at one time and is now largely a criminal band based in the town of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur.
On November 2, 2010, NPA fighters shot and killed Renante Canete, a former leader of the NPA breakaway faction, the Revolutionary Proletarian Army, in Sagay City, Negros Occidental.
On February 28, 2011, NPA members shot and killed Jeffrey Nerveza in Albay, Bicol, saying that thet were carrying out a Death Sentence ordered by the "People's Court."
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"Philippines: Communist Rebels Target Civilians: New People's Army Should Stop Unlawful Killings, Detentions"
The rebel New People's Army (NPA) in the Philippines should immediately end unlawful killings and detention of civilians, Human Rights Watch said today. The NPA, the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, has admitted to gunning down civilians and detaining others in recent months.
"For four decades the New People's Army has offered excuses for cold blooded killings of civilians," said Elaine Pearson, Deputy Asia Director at Human Rights Watch. "Recent attacks show that there has been no real departure from this illegal practice."
According to an NPA press statement provided to a journalist, the NPA's Mount Alip Front Operations Command in far south Mindanao admitted to the September 2, 2011 killing of Ramelito "Ramel" Gonzaga, 46, who the statement said was a member of a Government paramilitary force. The statement said that Gonzaga was sentenced to death by the NPA's "Revolutionary People's Court" or Hukumang Bayan, for "Crimes Against the People." The group has acknowledged that a stray bullet unintentionally wounded a pregnant woman, Ana Marie Campo.
The NPA has also claimed responsibility for the August 19 killing of Raymundo "Monding" Agaze in Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, saying it was carrying out a 2008 order of the "People's Court."
NPA leaders have often sought to justify killings by noting that "People's Courts" have condemned victims to death because of various "Crimes Against the People." Punishments are imposed both for alleged criminal acts, such as rape and murder, and for activities deemed anti-NPA, such as spying for the Armed Forces.
Philip Alston, the United Nations Special Rappoteur on Extra-Judicial Executions from 2004 to 2010, reported that the NPA's court system "is either deeply flawed or simply a sham."
"Any claim that people who are tried by the NPA's 'People's Courts' are receiving a fair hearing is ludicrous," Pearson said. "The NPA's 'Revolutionary Justice' is not justi it is simply old-fashioned murder."
The NPA has also detained civilians in violation of International Law. It is currently holding at least 13 people in Mindanao, at least some of them civilians. These include Mayor Henry Dano of Lingig, Surigao del Sur Province, along with his two Military Escorts, Cpl.Alrey Villasis de Samparado and Private First Class Allan Pellino (Actually, the last soldier's surname is "Saban"-Raki). The NPA captured them on July 13 and claims that they are intelligence operatives of the 75th Infantry Battalion- Intelligence Section and will face charges before the "People's Court." On October 1 the Communist Party of the Philippines ordered Mayor Dano's release. The NPA also detained four Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) guards on July 21- Murphy B.Todyog, Eric D.Llamasares, Rogelio E.Begontes, and Rolando D.Bajuyo Jr.- and claims to have granted them "Prisoner of War Status."
The remaining six are traders from Misamis Occidental, Ronald Boiles, James Mabaylan, Nelson Bagares, Ernesto Callo Jr., and Julieto Sarsaba, accused by the group of being Government spies. A representative of the families told Human Rights Watch that the six were going house to house on August 19 on the border of Davao City and Bukidnon selling "Kutson," Filipino style beds, when the NPA captured them, accusing them of trespassing. Ka Ariel Inda Magbanwag, Spokesperson for the NPA in Bukidnon-North Central Mindanao, has told journalists that the six are to be tried in the "People's Court."
Human Rights Watch called on the Philippine Government authorities to promptly investigate the killings and unlawful detentions and to prosecute those responsible in accordance with the law. Human Rights Watch has previously criticized the Philippine armed forces and police for Extra Judicial Killings and enforced disappearances of alleged NPA supporters and Leftist politicians and activists.
"Both the NPA and Government forces have committed atrocities in more than 40 years of armed conflict," Pearson said. "Each claims to have the interests of the ordinary Filipino at heart, but neither seems to show it."
Background
Since 1969 the NPA has engaged in an armed rebellion with the goal of establishing a Maoist State in the Philippines. The Philippine Military currently estimates that NPA consists of around 4,700 guerillas, who are active in about 69 of the country's 81 provinces.
As a party to an internal armed conflict, the NPA is obligated to abide by International Humanitarian Law, including Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its Second Additional Protocol, to which the Philippines is party. International Humanitarian Law prohibits the killing of civilians, mistreating anyone in custody, and convicting anyone in proceedings that do not meet international fair trial standards.
The NPA has long admitted to killing Government officials; soldiers, police, and pro-Government militia; civilians who are deemed to engage in acts "against the people;" and allegedly traitorous NPA or Communist Party members.
Recent killings implicating the NPA include:
On July 13, 2010, NPA members shot and killed Mateo Biong Jr., a former mayor of Giporlas town, Eastern Samar. The NPA claimed responsibility, saying it was carrying out a Death Sentence ordered by the NPA's "Revolutionary People's Court."
On July 23, 2010, NPA members shot and killed Sergio Villadar, a sugarcane farmer, in Escalanye Citu, Negros Occidental. The NPA claimed responsibility, saying its forces killed Villsar because he resisted arrest after being charged before the "People's Court."
On July 31, 2010, two NPA members shot and killed Leonardo "Andot" Behing, a leader of LUPACA (Lumadnong Pakigbisog sa Caraga), a group reported to have been affiliated with the Philippine armed forces at one time and is now largely a criminal band based in the town of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur.
On November 2, 2010, NPA fighters shot and killed Renante Canete, a former leader of the NPA breakaway faction, the Revolutionary Proletarian Army, in Sagay City, Negros Occidental.
On February 28, 2011, NPA members shot and killed Jeffrey Nerveza in Albay, Bicol, saying that thet were carrying out a Death Sentence ordered by the "People's Court."
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History of Mindanao, Part XX: Bad Blood: HRW Report on AFP Sponserd Paramilitaries in Caraga, 1990, Part 4
This is the fourth and final entry in my series of posts offering the verbatim Human Rights Watch report on CAA,or Civilian Active Auxiliary abuses under the protection of the AFP, or, Armed Forces of the Philippines. The CAAs, of which the CAFGU, or Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographical Units were the first created, serve in the AFP COIN, or Counterinsurgency programme as a geographically fixed armed reserve manned by the population the unit is protecting. They serve in the second step, or "Hold Phase," after the AFP has "cleared" a sector.
As I have noted, I don't particularly respect Human Rights Watch, or HRW, but this report- actually by Asia Watcg which later was subsumed by HRW- happens to provide a lot of great factual data about the CAA programme circa 1990.
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pp29
Militia Abuses in Areas of Sporadic Conflict
In areas of Northern Mindanao where the insurgency was no longer a major threat in 1991 and early 1992, the continued deployment of the CAFGU raised serious human rights concerns. Human Rights Watch findings suggest the presence of CAFGU over time may have led to heightened violence in the communities in which they are based. After combat units withdraw, military supervision of the CAFGU appears to weaken. CAFGU members remain armed, but without a clear target. In communities where the CAFGU remain without a visible enemy, poverty, fear, petty feuding, and the replacement of traditional legal systems by arbitrary force have made the militia, like civil patrols in Guatemala, "a dangerous conduit for vigilante justice and the abuse of power" ("Civil Patrols in Guatemala," pp11, Americas Watch, NY: August 1986).
This trend is evident in news reports. Between April and September 1991, Northern Mindanao's largest circulation newspaper, "The Goldstar Daily," published an average of two reports per month on CAFGU members' involvement in violent crimes in the four neighboring provinces of Northern Mindanao:
-An April 11, 1991 report described the manhunt for a CAFGU member in nearby Surigao del Norte Province accused of raping a 14 year old girl.
-A May 31, 1991 report detailed the arrest of a CAFGU member suspected of a hold up in Bukindon Province.
-A July 3, 1991 story reported that a CAFGU member in Misamis Oriental Province was declared guilty of Murder and Rape.
-On July 4, 1991, three CAFGU members in Surigao del Norte Province were arrested in a robbery.
-On July 25, 1991, charges were brought against three CAFGU members in Misamis Oriental for threats against a resident.
-A July 30, 1991 report pointed to CAFGU members as the main suspects in the ambush killings of a parish worker and her son in Misamis Oriental.
-On July 31, 1991, a CAFGU member was shot by another in Agusan del Norte Province.
-On August 12, 1991 the paper reported that a CAFGU member was the main suspect in the killing of a motorcycle driver in Misamis Oriental Province.
-On August 22, 1991, a CAFGU member was reported to have shot and killed a local resident in Surigao del Norte Province.
-On August 27, 1991, a CAFGU member was blamed for shooting a local resident and wounding his wife in Misamis Oriental.
-On September 25, 1991, three persons were killed in Bukidnon Province in a shootout between a CAFGU member and a policeman.
Human Rights Watch documented 14 killings by CAFGU or suspected CAFGU in Agusan del Norte and Bukidnon Provinces in 1991. Members of militant farners' organizations were the main victims of political violence.
In addition, Human Right Watch findings that the Military gives a cash bounty to militia and vigilante group members for the killing of suspected NPA rebels raises concerns that Military policy encourages arbitrary and uncontrolled acts of violence. The bounties for capture of suspected NPA are listed in documents known as the Order of Battle.
pp30
In Bukidnon, this provision served as a virtual go ahead for armed groups, some outside the ordinary chain of discipline or command, to take part in violent attacks on suspected rebels. Execution, and not merely capture, of the suspects was rewarded.
CAFGU and Military Killings in Agusan del Norte
Agusan del Norte, perched on the north coast of Mindanao at the mouth of the Agusan River, was not the site of major military operations in Mindanao in 1991. The infantry battalion located near Butuan City, the provincial capital, played a defensive role generally, and relatively few encounters were reported in the local press. CAFGU forces remained in place, some under the supervision of police security forces rather than military.
Despite the lack of military activity in the province, security, and CAFGU forces were implicated in several attacks on suspected NPA sympathizers and poor peasants, particularly members of local farmers' organizations. In 1991, in the province of Agusan del Norte, Human Rights Watch investigated four unprovoked killings of farmers, three of them leaders UMAN, the provincial affiliate of the Left Wing farmers' organization, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas.
Killing of a Peasant Community Leader by CAFGU
A witness to the killing of Jose Bongcoza in the village of Kabalalahan, in the town of Sangay, said she believed Bongcaza was killed because of his refusal to join the Bantay Bayan. She said he was visited three times by the same armed men before his shooting death.
On September 26, 1991, a Military man accompanied by three CAFGUs went to look for Bongcoza at his house. Noone was home, so the men went to the neighbor, who identified the Military officer as "Boy" Cascara and one CAFGU, a certain Rigo.
Bongciza had refused to join the volunteer village patrol, so when he learned about the visit, he said he was afraid. A neighbor, whose brother had been sought and killed by the Military, advised him to go into hiding, but Boncoza decided to wait for the men to return, and then go with them to speak with the local Military commander.
The same thre visited Bongcoza's house the next day, but left before Bongcoza returned. Neighbors told the family about the visit. The next day, the family went up to the farm to slaughter a pig for the Sunday Fiesta. When they returned, they found the door kicked in, with boot marks on it. The family was frightened and went to the home of a relative. The next day, Bongcoza went with his aunt to see a town council official in Sangay, the municipal center, to find out why the men were after him, "especially since this Cascara and Rigo are known to liquidate suspected NPAs," the source said. The official told them he could do nothing, because it was a Sunday, but advised Bongcoza to hide out until the next day.
Bongcoza, however, appeared upset and instead went looking for Cascara and Rigo. He later related to his family that he found the two at is house. They told him they were looking for him because they wanted to talk to him about the Bantay Bayan. They taunted him and asked him if he was afraid of them, which he asmitted. Later that evening, according to family members, Bongcoza appeared anxious and depressed, and spoke as if he expected he would die. At about 830PM, he went out to smoke a cigarette on the step ladder leading to the front entrance of his daughter's house. At that moment, he was shot once in the head, and died instantly. His daughter, wgo was inside the house, saw the flash of a shot blast in the dark, but did not see the gunmen. Neighbors reported hearing the footfalls of two or three individuals running away from the house.
Family members believed that the Military man, Cascara, abd the CAFGU man, Rigo, were responsible for the killing. As of January 1992, the family had not filed charges because of fear of reprisal. They believed the Military continued to keep them under surveillance because one of Bongcoza's sons was an NPA member. Rigo, the CAFGU member, continued to move freely about the community of Kabalalahan. Cascara was disarmed after he confessed to the killing of another CAFGU, in a neighboring town a few months after the killing of Bongcoza. However, he had still not been prosecuted and was reportedly often seen at the local cockfighting gallery in the municipal center.
pp31
Killing in Custody
A neighbor and local official described the killing of Virgilio Bongcales, a 35 year old resident in an outlying village of the provincial capital of Butuan City, by a combined group of two CAFGU members and a locak Philippine Constabulary seargent charged with supervising them. Bongcales' brother, Carmelo Bongcales, witnessed the events that resulted in his brother's killing.
On January 2, 1991 at around 2PM two CAFGU members identified as Melchor Jovita and Lando Trinidad went to Bongcales' home in the village of Salvacion and asked Bongcales to accompany them back to the 411th PC Company barracks to settle a longstanding dispute between Bongcales and another local resident. Bongcales' brother Carmelo joined the three. The detachment is located by the side of the Agusan River.
Jovita and Reinidad were among the CAFGU recruited and trained by the 30th IB in 1988, but the battalion was withdrawn after residents complained of abuses by the soldiers. The CAFGU, some of whom are said to be former CHDF, remained under the 411th PC Company.
At the barracks, the two CAFGU did not permit Carmelo to enter with Bongcales. After 15 minutes, Carmelo suddenly heard gunshots coming from the riverbank. He ran to a cliff overlooking the river and, from a distance of about 300 feet, watched as the PC officer, idemtified as Sgt.Britania, standing on the bank with his M16 rifle aimed at Bongcales who was thrashing about in the middle of the river. Britania aimed and fired his rifle at the water near Bongcales, laughing and shouting at him to swim back. But Bongcales could not swim, amd he screamed that he would never be able to swim back. Slowly, he was swept downstream by the current.
Bongcales' relatives reported the incident to the main PC Headquarters in Butuan City, but said their complaint was ignored and they were told to go home. Bongcales' body was recovered two days later at a village a few miles downstream. A photograph taken at the time showed obvious bruises on his right forearm and ribs, and a cut to his right eye. Additionaly, an autopsy performed by a Government medical officer found three front teeth missing, and a fracture to the rear of the skull, indicating that he had been struck with a heavy object.
A few weeks later, the PC Sergeant Britania approached the Bongcales family and offered them 12,000 Pesos ($500) to "keep quiet." The family, although poor peasant farmers, refused the money. In March, rumors began circulating that they might be "Kuotkuot," or killed by smothering. Six members of the family immediately fled to Manila to a relative's home.
The family was particularly afraid that the CAFGU would kill them in reprisal if they testified against Sergeant Britania. The local official explained, "They had heard from people in a neighboring village that the Government troops threatened members of the family of a victim. And they do that to you by charging you as an NPA sympathizer."
In October, a brother of Bongcales who had been actively pushing for filing the case was stabbed and killed in Davao City. The family believed the killing was related to Bongcales' death, but no additional details of that case were currently available. As of January 1992, despite a Government autopsy, the Government had not investigated or filed charges in the case.
Killings While in Unacknowledged Military Custody
Two prominent members of the farmers' organization, UMAN, were found dead after unidentified Military men picked them up just outside of the provincial capital on February 24, 1991. Information from witnesses' affadavits and locak human rights monitors ubdicate that the two...
pp32
...Bernardo Lagurin and Miguel Calso,may have been killed for their high profile involvement with UMAN. The organization has been openly and repeatedly branded as a zlfront" organization. Lagurin, 41, a resident of the neighboring province of Agusan del Sur, was an agricultural engineer who had been working as a consultant to UMAN; Calso, 29, a farmer, was the General Sevretary of UMAN in Butuan City.
A witness, Desederia Pabas, also a staff member of UMAN, was riding with the two on the same passenger jeep when the two were abducted. In her affadavit filed with the Provincial Prosecutor, she said that the abduction occurred at about 4PM that afternoon, while the three were making the regular commute from Ampayan, where the main UMAN office is located, back to the city center.
At that time, Pabas noticed a private jeep tailing their vehicle. Then the jeep passed the vehicle and stopped in front of it, forcing the jeep that Pabas and the others were riding in to stop as well. The jeep had no liscence plate. Three men jumped out and approached the passenger vehicle. Two of the men carried pistols, and one an Armalite rifle. One wore a fatigue uniform with no nameplate. The three looked inside the rear of the passenger jeep and ordered Lagurin and Calso to get out. They asked all of the other passengers if there were any more companions of Calso and Lagurin in the jeep. Pabas believed she was spared because a passenger responded that the two had been traveling alome. Then the men took Calso and Lagurin and led them at gunpoint into the waiting jeep.
The following day, the relatives of both victims went to the Police Headquarters and Central Police Station in Butuan City to inquire about the two mens' whereabouts, but police officials said that Calso and Lagurin were not in their custody. That same day, residents of a neighborhood in Cagayan del Oro City, three hours distant from Butuan City, found the two bodies at dawn in an empty field. According to local news reports, three hours before, at around 2AM, residents recalled hearing a succession of gunbursts coming from the field, amd seeing a vehicle speeding away from the scene.
Three days later, relatives identified the the dead as Calso and Lagurin. Color photographs and police reports confirmed that both had been shot in the forehead- Calso twice- and several times in the chest at close range.
CAFGU Killings in Bukidnon
The province of Bukidnon is no longer home to an active insurgency. In December 1991, the last remaining political detainees in the province were rleased. A local Military Commander estimated that only roughly 70 fully armed rebels exist in the province, mostly in the still forested hills above the municipality of Valencia. Military and Church leaders said the NPA is weak in Bukidnon because it has less civilian support or sympathy than in other provinces. In the 1970s and early 1980s, much of Central Bukidnon was controlled by the NPA. But in contrast with Eastern, where abuses by Government forces drove many to support the NPA, abuses by NPA forces in Bukidnon caused the insurgency to self destruct. Between 1982 and 1984, Church Leaders said, hundreds of people died in brutal "purging" campaigns by the rebels. The rebel forces weakened, and have not recovered their strength to the present.
Guinoyoran and Lourdes are two neighboring farming settlements roughly 8 miles southwest of the municipal center of Valencia, at the foot of a partially forested mountain ranger. Most residents engage in subsistence farming, but in upland communities, residents engage in small scale logging , called "Tablon-Tablon." Since 1989, all logging has been illegal in the province, but this has not stopped logging in the western most communities in Guioyoran.
pp33
Perhaps because of its remoteness and proximity to forest cover, rebel forces are more active in the area than in other parts of Bukidnon. In 1986, the military battalion stayioned in Valencia began recruiting a team of CHDF forces. The core of their recruits was a group of former rebels. In 1988, many of them joined a Right Wing armed fanatic cult, led by a local tribal Higaonon leader, Datu Bantu Domia. The group, knows as the "Tadtad," is said to be responsible for a series of killings and forced evictions in the settlement (the "Tadtad," translated "Chopchop," are so known because of the group's preference for use of long knives, or "bolos," in hacking enemies).
Even the Church could not quell the violence in Guinoyoran and Lourdes. In 1989, Father Arsenio Rubio was withdrawn from the parish after receiving nu$erous death threata and harassment from the gang. In 1990, the subsequent parish priest, Father Diosdado Tabios, also had to be transferred because of threats. In 1991, a priest newly stationed in the parish, Father Neri Satur, also received threats, but chose to continue work in the parish. In October, he was shot and bludgeoned by members of the grouP, some of whom were CAFGU members.
Killing of an Environmentalist Priest by CAFGU and Paramilitary
Extensive court testimony by witnesses and interviews with local officials painted a complex picture of the planning and assassination of Father Satur. Perpetrators were said to be a group of CAFGU and Tadtad members under the orders of a Military Intelligence officer.
At noon on October 14, 1991, Satur and a Church worker, Lacqueline Lunzaga, were making their way home by motorbike on a dusty, rugged road after saying Mass in a remote community of Guinoyoran. Suddenly, three men, two of them masked, lunged into the road ahead and opened fire. After emptying seven bullets into the priest, one of the gunmen crushed the prone victim's head with three blows of his rifle butt, breaking the rifle in two. Lunzaga was struck by one bullet and escaped death.
Several days later, two men, both CAFGU and Tadtad members, fled to the Provincial Bishop's Residence, for unclear reasons. The two men, Guillermo Ipanag and Carliti Baraquil, filed affidavits confessing their involvement in the planning of the killing, but not in its execution. The two men said the priest was killed because of gis strident opposition to illegal logging in his parish. They also said the Tadtad leader considered the priest a nuisance because of his efforts to prosecute a local vigilante member, Allan Cesar Abests, for the killing of a Guinoyoran resident earlier that year.
In their sworn testimony, the two men named three others, a CAFGU member and two members of the Tadtad, as the triggerman; and they asserted that a Military Intelligence officer was the mastermind behind the killing.
By January, 1992, the Provincial Prosecutor had filed charges against the three, Datu Bantu Domia, Allan Cesar Abesta and Crispin Onor, and the military officer, Sgt.Catalino Gabison. The Military, in retaliation, filed murder charges against the two original confessors, and denied involvement of Gabison and the others.
The killing of the priest led to an unprecedented level of international attention to human rights concerns in the area. Satur was one of the first of 46 parish priests deputized by the Government to confiscate illegal shipments of lumber and to apprehend illegal loggers. The action was taken after the Diocese of Malaybalay protested that the logging was continuing despite a total ban since December 1988. The Church had been involved in environmental campaigns against logging for several years.
Several other priests interviewed by Human Rights Watch had also received threats threats since they began their campaigns against logging, Father Cirilo "Loloy" Sajelan, parish ptiest of the municipal center of Valencia received threats three times in 1991 after confiscating shipments of lumber. Father Rino Bargola, Parish Priest of Barangay of San Jose...
pp34
...Sinayawan, had been threatened twice. Both priests said soldiers, CAFGU, and prominent local buisnessmen were involved in the illegal logging rings. Local news reports also pointed to official involvement in illegal logging. In order to protect themselves from being killed, priests in early 1992 travelled to confiscation sites accompanied by local police officers and parishoners.
CAFGU or Military Mercenaries?
Interviews with local government, military, and Church officials revealed that the six suspects in Father Satur's killing, Sgt.Catalino Gabison, Datu Bantu Domia, Crispin Onor, Allan Cesar Abesta, Guillermo Inpanag, and Carlio Baraquil, had a long and productive association with each other in local counterinsurgency campaigns,0In exchange for leading ambushes of nearly two dozen ambushes of nearby NPQ hideouts and guiding Military patrols, members of the gang received large cash "prizes" from the Military and engaged in extortion and killings without punishment.
In 19911, for example, the local Tadtad and rebel-returnees-turned-CAFGU led a detachment led by Sgt.Gabison of the 26th Infantry Battalion in a sucessful ambush killing of six New People's Army rebels. For leading the ambush, the group eas given P100,000 ($2,500). In his sworn testimony before the provincial trial court, ine of the co-accused, Guillermo Ipamag, an Active Duty CAFGU member and member of the Tadtad gang, referred to this exchange at a meeting with a large group of Tadtaf members, CAFGU, and Militsry men.
"I was informed that the checks or prize for the killing of the NPA rebels were ready encashed and turned over to the Military Brigade in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and... were ready for distribution to us who participated in the killing if these NPAs."
Despite repeated calls by the diocese, local residents, and human rights groups, the Military have chosen not to disarm the group. When asked why the Military have not discharged the CAFGU in Guinoyoran despite their notoriety. Colonel Rodolfo Rocamora completely denied that the CAFGU was responsible for killings and terror in the community. Those responsible were a few whom he said were as "Assets." The "people in the area were satisfied with the CAFGU there," he asserted. If there were any residents carrying arms who were not CAFGU, "they would be arrested and disarmed."
Other Killings by CAFGU and Paramilitart
Numerous other killings in Lourdes and Guinoyoran received little exposure, and some of the CAFGU and. Vigilante members responsible remained at large in January 1992.
The group of CAFGU and Tadtad members accused in Satur's death have also been implicated in numerous killings of local residentdzm Some of the victims were suspected supporters of the NPA. Other victims appeared to be targetted randomly, or because of a personal feud. Residents interviewed by local human rights monitors said they had been forced to provide food to both rebel forces and the local vigilante and CAFGU members since 1988. They said they were afraid to complain to local officials, since they were themselves suspect under the broad brush of the military's counterinsurgency campaign there.
By January 1992, twelve killings by the group had been documented by local human rights groups.
pp35
The Commission on Human Rights regional office
in Cagayan del Oro City estimated that 15 had been killed, but its lawyers had only investigated three of the more recent incidents. In two of the cases, perpetrators had been convicted of murder charges. However, most of the perpetrators are thought to remain armed and at large. Cases for which documentation exists include the following:
-The bodies of Martin Cabusas and Warlito Paraiso were found shot, hacked, and stabbed on March 28, 1987. Family members said the two had been under surveillance of the local CHDF members since they were labeled as NPA by Romeo Abesta, a former rebel turned CHDF, turned CAFGU, who as of January 1992 was in prison for a subsequent murderm
-Felipe Camarillo, a farmer in the community of Magsal, in the village of Guinoyoran, was shot to death on December 7, 1988. The killers were believed to be Tadtad members from the village of Lourdes.
-George Bahian, a farmer also in Magsal, was shot and killed and another resident, Francisco Tadiamon was injured on December 30, 1988 by Romeo Abesta, Enrico Domia, and Andrew Largo, all Tadtad and concurrent CAFGU members under Datu Bantu Domia. After the shooting, the flesh of Bahia's thighs and legs were sliced off.
Sabeniano Borres, a farmer and Church worker in the village of Cawasan was shot on Febuary 3, 1989, while standing in front of the market. The assailants were members of the CHDF who suspected Borres as an NPA supporter. One suspect, the CAFGU member Romeo Abesta, turned himself in and was sentenced to six years in prison.
-Joel Eras, a farmer, was shot to death in Magsal on October 15, 1990, allegedly by CAFGU members identified as Judy Gamayon and one known only as Lito. The motive was unclear. The case was investigated by the CHR but was later closed without explanation.
Juliana Tadiamon- a resident of the village of Magsal, was shot and killed when her house was sprayed with bullets on November 22, 1990. Tadiamon was married to a farmer suspected of being an NPA. Witnesses refused to testify to local authorites because of fear of reprisals.
-Nasario Burlas, was shot and killed by a cousin of Romeo Abesta's, another CAFGU member known as "Boyet" Abesta, on Januart 13, 1991. The motive is unclear, although local human rights groups said Burias was suspected as an NPA. Abesta is still at large and the family has not bought charges. Two months later, he was implicated in a shooting of a young woman and a girl in the village of Magsal. The family did not file charges.
pp36
(Synopsis)
As I have noted, I don't particularly respect Human Rights Watch, or HRW, but this report- actually by Asia Watcg which later was subsumed by HRW- happens to provide a lot of great factual data about the CAA programme circa 1990.
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pp29
Militia Abuses in Areas of Sporadic Conflict
In areas of Northern Mindanao where the insurgency was no longer a major threat in 1991 and early 1992, the continued deployment of the CAFGU raised serious human rights concerns. Human Rights Watch findings suggest the presence of CAFGU over time may have led to heightened violence in the communities in which they are based. After combat units withdraw, military supervision of the CAFGU appears to weaken. CAFGU members remain armed, but without a clear target. In communities where the CAFGU remain without a visible enemy, poverty, fear, petty feuding, and the replacement of traditional legal systems by arbitrary force have made the militia, like civil patrols in Guatemala, "a dangerous conduit for vigilante justice and the abuse of power" ("Civil Patrols in Guatemala," pp11, Americas Watch, NY: August 1986).
This trend is evident in news reports. Between April and September 1991, Northern Mindanao's largest circulation newspaper, "The Goldstar Daily," published an average of two reports per month on CAFGU members' involvement in violent crimes in the four neighboring provinces of Northern Mindanao:
-An April 11, 1991 report described the manhunt for a CAFGU member in nearby Surigao del Norte Province accused of raping a 14 year old girl.
-A May 31, 1991 report detailed the arrest of a CAFGU member suspected of a hold up in Bukindon Province.
-A July 3, 1991 story reported that a CAFGU member in Misamis Oriental Province was declared guilty of Murder and Rape.
-On July 4, 1991, three CAFGU members in Surigao del Norte Province were arrested in a robbery.
-On July 25, 1991, charges were brought against three CAFGU members in Misamis Oriental for threats against a resident.
-A July 30, 1991 report pointed to CAFGU members as the main suspects in the ambush killings of a parish worker and her son in Misamis Oriental.
-On July 31, 1991, a CAFGU member was shot by another in Agusan del Norte Province.
-On August 12, 1991 the paper reported that a CAFGU member was the main suspect in the killing of a motorcycle driver in Misamis Oriental Province.
-On August 22, 1991, a CAFGU member was reported to have shot and killed a local resident in Surigao del Norte Province.
-On August 27, 1991, a CAFGU member was blamed for shooting a local resident and wounding his wife in Misamis Oriental.
-On September 25, 1991, three persons were killed in Bukidnon Province in a shootout between a CAFGU member and a policeman.
Human Rights Watch documented 14 killings by CAFGU or suspected CAFGU in Agusan del Norte and Bukidnon Provinces in 1991. Members of militant farners' organizations were the main victims of political violence.
In addition, Human Right Watch findings that the Military gives a cash bounty to militia and vigilante group members for the killing of suspected NPA rebels raises concerns that Military policy encourages arbitrary and uncontrolled acts of violence. The bounties for capture of suspected NPA are listed in documents known as the Order of Battle.
pp30
In Bukidnon, this provision served as a virtual go ahead for armed groups, some outside the ordinary chain of discipline or command, to take part in violent attacks on suspected rebels. Execution, and not merely capture, of the suspects was rewarded.
CAFGU and Military Killings in Agusan del Norte
Agusan del Norte, perched on the north coast of Mindanao at the mouth of the Agusan River, was not the site of major military operations in Mindanao in 1991. The infantry battalion located near Butuan City, the provincial capital, played a defensive role generally, and relatively few encounters were reported in the local press. CAFGU forces remained in place, some under the supervision of police security forces rather than military.
Despite the lack of military activity in the province, security, and CAFGU forces were implicated in several attacks on suspected NPA sympathizers and poor peasants, particularly members of local farmers' organizations. In 1991, in the province of Agusan del Norte, Human Rights Watch investigated four unprovoked killings of farmers, three of them leaders UMAN, the provincial affiliate of the Left Wing farmers' organization, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas.
Killing of a Peasant Community Leader by CAFGU
A witness to the killing of Jose Bongcoza in the village of Kabalalahan, in the town of Sangay, said she believed Bongcaza was killed because of his refusal to join the Bantay Bayan. She said he was visited three times by the same armed men before his shooting death.
On September 26, 1991, a Military man accompanied by three CAFGUs went to look for Bongcoza at his house. Noone was home, so the men went to the neighbor, who identified the Military officer as "Boy" Cascara and one CAFGU, a certain Rigo.
Bongciza had refused to join the volunteer village patrol, so when he learned about the visit, he said he was afraid. A neighbor, whose brother had been sought and killed by the Military, advised him to go into hiding, but Boncoza decided to wait for the men to return, and then go with them to speak with the local Military commander.
The same thre visited Bongcoza's house the next day, but left before Bongcoza returned. Neighbors told the family about the visit. The next day, the family went up to the farm to slaughter a pig for the Sunday Fiesta. When they returned, they found the door kicked in, with boot marks on it. The family was frightened and went to the home of a relative. The next day, Bongcoza went with his aunt to see a town council official in Sangay, the municipal center, to find out why the men were after him, "especially since this Cascara and Rigo are known to liquidate suspected NPAs," the source said. The official told them he could do nothing, because it was a Sunday, but advised Bongcoza to hide out until the next day.
Bongcoza, however, appeared upset and instead went looking for Cascara and Rigo. He later related to his family that he found the two at is house. They told him they were looking for him because they wanted to talk to him about the Bantay Bayan. They taunted him and asked him if he was afraid of them, which he asmitted. Later that evening, according to family members, Bongcoza appeared anxious and depressed, and spoke as if he expected he would die. At about 830PM, he went out to smoke a cigarette on the step ladder leading to the front entrance of his daughter's house. At that moment, he was shot once in the head, and died instantly. His daughter, wgo was inside the house, saw the flash of a shot blast in the dark, but did not see the gunmen. Neighbors reported hearing the footfalls of two or three individuals running away from the house.
Family members believed that the Military man, Cascara, abd the CAFGU man, Rigo, were responsible for the killing. As of January 1992, the family had not filed charges because of fear of reprisal. They believed the Military continued to keep them under surveillance because one of Bongcoza's sons was an NPA member. Rigo, the CAFGU member, continued to move freely about the community of Kabalalahan. Cascara was disarmed after he confessed to the killing of another CAFGU, in a neighboring town a few months after the killing of Bongcoza. However, he had still not been prosecuted and was reportedly often seen at the local cockfighting gallery in the municipal center.
pp31
Killing in Custody
A neighbor and local official described the killing of Virgilio Bongcales, a 35 year old resident in an outlying village of the provincial capital of Butuan City, by a combined group of two CAFGU members and a locak Philippine Constabulary seargent charged with supervising them. Bongcales' brother, Carmelo Bongcales, witnessed the events that resulted in his brother's killing.
On January 2, 1991 at around 2PM two CAFGU members identified as Melchor Jovita and Lando Trinidad went to Bongcales' home in the village of Salvacion and asked Bongcales to accompany them back to the 411th PC Company barracks to settle a longstanding dispute between Bongcales and another local resident. Bongcales' brother Carmelo joined the three. The detachment is located by the side of the Agusan River.
Jovita and Reinidad were among the CAFGU recruited and trained by the 30th IB in 1988, but the battalion was withdrawn after residents complained of abuses by the soldiers. The CAFGU, some of whom are said to be former CHDF, remained under the 411th PC Company.
At the barracks, the two CAFGU did not permit Carmelo to enter with Bongcales. After 15 minutes, Carmelo suddenly heard gunshots coming from the riverbank. He ran to a cliff overlooking the river and, from a distance of about 300 feet, watched as the PC officer, idemtified as Sgt.Britania, standing on the bank with his M16 rifle aimed at Bongcales who was thrashing about in the middle of the river. Britania aimed and fired his rifle at the water near Bongcales, laughing and shouting at him to swim back. But Bongcales could not swim, amd he screamed that he would never be able to swim back. Slowly, he was swept downstream by the current.
Bongcales' relatives reported the incident to the main PC Headquarters in Butuan City, but said their complaint was ignored and they were told to go home. Bongcales' body was recovered two days later at a village a few miles downstream. A photograph taken at the time showed obvious bruises on his right forearm and ribs, and a cut to his right eye. Additionaly, an autopsy performed by a Government medical officer found three front teeth missing, and a fracture to the rear of the skull, indicating that he had been struck with a heavy object.
A few weeks later, the PC Sergeant Britania approached the Bongcales family and offered them 12,000 Pesos ($500) to "keep quiet." The family, although poor peasant farmers, refused the money. In March, rumors began circulating that they might be "Kuotkuot," or killed by smothering. Six members of the family immediately fled to Manila to a relative's home.
The family was particularly afraid that the CAFGU would kill them in reprisal if they testified against Sergeant Britania. The local official explained, "They had heard from people in a neighboring village that the Government troops threatened members of the family of a victim. And they do that to you by charging you as an NPA sympathizer."
In October, a brother of Bongcales who had been actively pushing for filing the case was stabbed and killed in Davao City. The family believed the killing was related to Bongcales' death, but no additional details of that case were currently available. As of January 1992, despite a Government autopsy, the Government had not investigated or filed charges in the case.
Killings While in Unacknowledged Military Custody
Two prominent members of the farmers' organization, UMAN, were found dead after unidentified Military men picked them up just outside of the provincial capital on February 24, 1991. Information from witnesses' affadavits and locak human rights monitors ubdicate that the two...
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...Bernardo Lagurin and Miguel Calso,may have been killed for their high profile involvement with UMAN. The organization has been openly and repeatedly branded as a zlfront" organization. Lagurin, 41, a resident of the neighboring province of Agusan del Sur, was an agricultural engineer who had been working as a consultant to UMAN; Calso, 29, a farmer, was the General Sevretary of UMAN in Butuan City.
A witness, Desederia Pabas, also a staff member of UMAN, was riding with the two on the same passenger jeep when the two were abducted. In her affadavit filed with the Provincial Prosecutor, she said that the abduction occurred at about 4PM that afternoon, while the three were making the regular commute from Ampayan, where the main UMAN office is located, back to the city center.
At that time, Pabas noticed a private jeep tailing their vehicle. Then the jeep passed the vehicle and stopped in front of it, forcing the jeep that Pabas and the others were riding in to stop as well. The jeep had no liscence plate. Three men jumped out and approached the passenger vehicle. Two of the men carried pistols, and one an Armalite rifle. One wore a fatigue uniform with no nameplate. The three looked inside the rear of the passenger jeep and ordered Lagurin and Calso to get out. They asked all of the other passengers if there were any more companions of Calso and Lagurin in the jeep. Pabas believed she was spared because a passenger responded that the two had been traveling alome. Then the men took Calso and Lagurin and led them at gunpoint into the waiting jeep.
The following day, the relatives of both victims went to the Police Headquarters and Central Police Station in Butuan City to inquire about the two mens' whereabouts, but police officials said that Calso and Lagurin were not in their custody. That same day, residents of a neighborhood in Cagayan del Oro City, three hours distant from Butuan City, found the two bodies at dawn in an empty field. According to local news reports, three hours before, at around 2AM, residents recalled hearing a succession of gunbursts coming from the field, amd seeing a vehicle speeding away from the scene.
Three days later, relatives identified the the dead as Calso and Lagurin. Color photographs and police reports confirmed that both had been shot in the forehead- Calso twice- and several times in the chest at close range.
CAFGU Killings in Bukidnon
The province of Bukidnon is no longer home to an active insurgency. In December 1991, the last remaining political detainees in the province were rleased. A local Military Commander estimated that only roughly 70 fully armed rebels exist in the province, mostly in the still forested hills above the municipality of Valencia. Military and Church leaders said the NPA is weak in Bukidnon because it has less civilian support or sympathy than in other provinces. In the 1970s and early 1980s, much of Central Bukidnon was controlled by the NPA. But in contrast with Eastern, where abuses by Government forces drove many to support the NPA, abuses by NPA forces in Bukidnon caused the insurgency to self destruct. Between 1982 and 1984, Church Leaders said, hundreds of people died in brutal "purging" campaigns by the rebels. The rebel forces weakened, and have not recovered their strength to the present.
Guinoyoran and Lourdes are two neighboring farming settlements roughly 8 miles southwest of the municipal center of Valencia, at the foot of a partially forested mountain ranger. Most residents engage in subsistence farming, but in upland communities, residents engage in small scale logging , called "Tablon-Tablon." Since 1989, all logging has been illegal in the province, but this has not stopped logging in the western most communities in Guioyoran.
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Perhaps because of its remoteness and proximity to forest cover, rebel forces are more active in the area than in other parts of Bukidnon. In 1986, the military battalion stayioned in Valencia began recruiting a team of CHDF forces. The core of their recruits was a group of former rebels. In 1988, many of them joined a Right Wing armed fanatic cult, led by a local tribal Higaonon leader, Datu Bantu Domia. The group, knows as the "Tadtad," is said to be responsible for a series of killings and forced evictions in the settlement (the "Tadtad," translated "Chopchop," are so known because of the group's preference for use of long knives, or "bolos," in hacking enemies).
Even the Church could not quell the violence in Guinoyoran and Lourdes. In 1989, Father Arsenio Rubio was withdrawn from the parish after receiving nu$erous death threata and harassment from the gang. In 1990, the subsequent parish priest, Father Diosdado Tabios, also had to be transferred because of threats. In 1991, a priest newly stationed in the parish, Father Neri Satur, also received threats, but chose to continue work in the parish. In October, he was shot and bludgeoned by members of the grouP, some of whom were CAFGU members.
Killing of an Environmentalist Priest by CAFGU and Paramilitary
Extensive court testimony by witnesses and interviews with local officials painted a complex picture of the planning and assassination of Father Satur. Perpetrators were said to be a group of CAFGU and Tadtad members under the orders of a Military Intelligence officer.
At noon on October 14, 1991, Satur and a Church worker, Lacqueline Lunzaga, were making their way home by motorbike on a dusty, rugged road after saying Mass in a remote community of Guinoyoran. Suddenly, three men, two of them masked, lunged into the road ahead and opened fire. After emptying seven bullets into the priest, one of the gunmen crushed the prone victim's head with three blows of his rifle butt, breaking the rifle in two. Lunzaga was struck by one bullet and escaped death.
Several days later, two men, both CAFGU and Tadtad members, fled to the Provincial Bishop's Residence, for unclear reasons. The two men, Guillermo Ipanag and Carliti Baraquil, filed affidavits confessing their involvement in the planning of the killing, but not in its execution. The two men said the priest was killed because of gis strident opposition to illegal logging in his parish. They also said the Tadtad leader considered the priest a nuisance because of his efforts to prosecute a local vigilante member, Allan Cesar Abests, for the killing of a Guinoyoran resident earlier that year.
In their sworn testimony, the two men named three others, a CAFGU member and two members of the Tadtad, as the triggerman; and they asserted that a Military Intelligence officer was the mastermind behind the killing.
By January, 1992, the Provincial Prosecutor had filed charges against the three, Datu Bantu Domia, Allan Cesar Abesta and Crispin Onor, and the military officer, Sgt.Catalino Gabison. The Military, in retaliation, filed murder charges against the two original confessors, and denied involvement of Gabison and the others.
The killing of the priest led to an unprecedented level of international attention to human rights concerns in the area. Satur was one of the first of 46 parish priests deputized by the Government to confiscate illegal shipments of lumber and to apprehend illegal loggers. The action was taken after the Diocese of Malaybalay protested that the logging was continuing despite a total ban since December 1988. The Church had been involved in environmental campaigns against logging for several years.
Several other priests interviewed by Human Rights Watch had also received threats threats since they began their campaigns against logging, Father Cirilo "Loloy" Sajelan, parish ptiest of the municipal center of Valencia received threats three times in 1991 after confiscating shipments of lumber. Father Rino Bargola, Parish Priest of Barangay of San Jose...
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...Sinayawan, had been threatened twice. Both priests said soldiers, CAFGU, and prominent local buisnessmen were involved in the illegal logging rings. Local news reports also pointed to official involvement in illegal logging. In order to protect themselves from being killed, priests in early 1992 travelled to confiscation sites accompanied by local police officers and parishoners.
CAFGU or Military Mercenaries?
Interviews with local government, military, and Church officials revealed that the six suspects in Father Satur's killing, Sgt.Catalino Gabison, Datu Bantu Domia, Crispin Onor, Allan Cesar Abesta, Guillermo Inpanag, and Carlio Baraquil, had a long and productive association with each other in local counterinsurgency campaigns,0In exchange for leading ambushes of nearly two dozen ambushes of nearby NPQ hideouts and guiding Military patrols, members of the gang received large cash "prizes" from the Military and engaged in extortion and killings without punishment.
In 19911, for example, the local Tadtad and rebel-returnees-turned-CAFGU led a detachment led by Sgt.Gabison of the 26th Infantry Battalion in a sucessful ambush killing of six New People's Army rebels. For leading the ambush, the group eas given P100,000 ($2,500). In his sworn testimony before the provincial trial court, ine of the co-accused, Guillermo Ipamag, an Active Duty CAFGU member and member of the Tadtad gang, referred to this exchange at a meeting with a large group of Tadtaf members, CAFGU, and Militsry men.
"I was informed that the checks or prize for the killing of the NPA rebels were ready encashed and turned over to the Military Brigade in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and... were ready for distribution to us who participated in the killing if these NPAs."
Despite repeated calls by the diocese, local residents, and human rights groups, the Military have chosen not to disarm the group. When asked why the Military have not discharged the CAFGU in Guinoyoran despite their notoriety. Colonel Rodolfo Rocamora completely denied that the CAFGU was responsible for killings and terror in the community. Those responsible were a few whom he said were as "Assets." The "people in the area were satisfied with the CAFGU there," he asserted. If there were any residents carrying arms who were not CAFGU, "they would be arrested and disarmed."
Other Killings by CAFGU and Paramilitart
Numerous other killings in Lourdes and Guinoyoran received little exposure, and some of the CAFGU and. Vigilante members responsible remained at large in January 1992.
The group of CAFGU and Tadtad members accused in Satur's death have also been implicated in numerous killings of local residentdzm Some of the victims were suspected supporters of the NPA. Other victims appeared to be targetted randomly, or because of a personal feud. Residents interviewed by local human rights monitors said they had been forced to provide food to both rebel forces and the local vigilante and CAFGU members since 1988. They said they were afraid to complain to local officials, since they were themselves suspect under the broad brush of the military's counterinsurgency campaign there.
By January 1992, twelve killings by the group had been documented by local human rights groups.
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The Commission on Human Rights regional office
in Cagayan del Oro City estimated that 15 had been killed, but its lawyers had only investigated three of the more recent incidents. In two of the cases, perpetrators had been convicted of murder charges. However, most of the perpetrators are thought to remain armed and at large. Cases for which documentation exists include the following:
-The bodies of Martin Cabusas and Warlito Paraiso were found shot, hacked, and stabbed on March 28, 1987. Family members said the two had been under surveillance of the local CHDF members since they were labeled as NPA by Romeo Abesta, a former rebel turned CHDF, turned CAFGU, who as of January 1992 was in prison for a subsequent murderm
-Felipe Camarillo, a farmer in the community of Magsal, in the village of Guinoyoran, was shot to death on December 7, 1988. The killers were believed to be Tadtad members from the village of Lourdes.
-George Bahian, a farmer also in Magsal, was shot and killed and another resident, Francisco Tadiamon was injured on December 30, 1988 by Romeo Abesta, Enrico Domia, and Andrew Largo, all Tadtad and concurrent CAFGU members under Datu Bantu Domia. After the shooting, the flesh of Bahia's thighs and legs were sliced off.
Sabeniano Borres, a farmer and Church worker in the village of Cawasan was shot on Febuary 3, 1989, while standing in front of the market. The assailants were members of the CHDF who suspected Borres as an NPA supporter. One suspect, the CAFGU member Romeo Abesta, turned himself in and was sentenced to six years in prison.
-Joel Eras, a farmer, was shot to death in Magsal on October 15, 1990, allegedly by CAFGU members identified as Judy Gamayon and one known only as Lito. The motive was unclear. The case was investigated by the CHR but was later closed without explanation.
Juliana Tadiamon- a resident of the village of Magsal, was shot and killed when her house was sprayed with bullets on November 22, 1990. Tadiamon was married to a farmer suspected of being an NPA. Witnesses refused to testify to local authorites because of fear of reprisals.
-Nasario Burlas, was shot and killed by a cousin of Romeo Abesta's, another CAFGU member known as "Boyet" Abesta, on Januart 13, 1991. The motive is unclear, although local human rights groups said Burias was suspected as an NPA. Abesta is still at large and the family has not bought charges. Two months later, he was implicated in a shooting of a young woman and a girl in the village of Magsal. The family did not file charges.
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(Synopsis)
Sunday, November 20, 2011
Kidnap for Ransom for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part IX: The Release of Monaliza Almonte Kapa
As noted in "Kidnap for Ransom for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part V," Monaliza Almonte Kapa was kidnapped by the BIAF 113 Base Command, the BIAF being the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, as the armed wing of the MILF is known. The 113 Base Command, the BIAF formation with operational control over the entire Zamboanga Peninsula, save the offshore islands attached to Zamboanga City, primarily earns its keep by KFR, or Kidnap for Ransom, and to a slightly lesser extent, by extortion. Indeed, it was this particular kidnapping that directly set in motion that hugely expencive Military operation in late October and early November, that accomplished nothing other then capturing a former MNLF camp in the municipality of Payao, in Zamboanga Sibugay Province.
As noted in a recent "MILF Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter of 2011" entry, Payao had been a long time coming and had been on the table since last spring's BIAF attack of a Rural Transit Lines passenger bus in the municipality of Tungawan, also in Zamboanga Sibugay Province. In that attack four guerillas from the 113 Base Command boarded the bus after hailing it near the end of its Ipil to Zamboanga City route. As the bus entered a series of challenging "s" turns in a mountain pass two of the young men stood up and revealed 45 caliber pistols. One of the men suddenly pivoted amd quickly fired a single round through the eyes of one of two CAAs serving as bus marshals. CAAs, or Civilian Active Auxiliaries are members of (almost always) geographically fixed armed reservists. Of the two types of CAAs, SCAAs, or Special CAAs, or privately funded paramilitaries under the employ of private businessmen. In this case, the owner of Rural Transit Lines needed protection for his large fleet and so formed his own paramilitary and employed two CAAs on each bus.
Rural Transit Line needed protection because like virtually any large business on Mindanao, his bus company had been targeted by professional extortion groups, in this case that group was the 113 Base Command although the company is also targeted by the 102 Base Command on its Lanao routes as well. Refusing to pay, Rural has been targeted for six years running now and as such, anyone on a Rural Transit bus is in serious risk of losing their life.
As the young men fired his 45 caliber pistol at the CAA sitting at the rear of the bus a man sitting next to the CAA instinctively reached for his own side arm and was killed along with his wife sitting next to him. That man was Major Julastidi Arasid, the Executive Officer of the 18IB (Infantry Battalion). He and his wife were making their way to Zamboanga City for their 15 year old son's highschool graduation (Philippine students graduate highschool at or slightly before age 16). Afterwards the gunmen and his three colleagues forced everyone off of the bus, including the second CAA who had been shot and wounded as well, and the bus was set afire, burning the remainins of the Major, his wife, and the murdered CAA.
That horrible incident suddenly made the AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines, anxious to reign in the man behind the multitude of attacks on Rural, and when they quickly discovered who the culprit was. BIAF sub-Kumander Waning Abdusalam, headquartered in that former MNLF camp in the municipality of Payao, they set their sights upon him. Sadly, it took more than five years of heinous crimes against civilians before the AFP was ready to act but at least they were moving against him.
After three halh hearted attempts, which will be discussed in a piece on this last campaign in Payao that is currently in the pipeline, a fourth was planned in order to try and get a handle on the aforementioned KFR victim, Monaliza Almonte Kapa. The SWAG, or, Naval Special Weapons Attack Group, a Naval Special Forces unit, was deployed off of Payao to prevent Waning Abdusalam from fleeing by water, as well as his possibly receiving re-inforcements. The stated objective was to prevent the 113 Base Command from taking Ms.Kapa off of the Zamboanga Peninsula and onto Basilan. Of course Ms.Kapa had never been taken to Payao. Instead, she had been taken to Olutanga Island where she was sold to the 114 Base Command which then took her to their strongest province, Basilan. It was in and around the municipality of Al Barka that Ms.Kapa had been repeatedly sighted.
Unbeknownst to the kidnappers apparently was that Ms.Kapa, a Muslim, had an uncle, Alimuddin Danganan Bual, a mid-ranking officer in the BIAF. Bual quickly assumed the role of family negotiator and just as quickly overcame the 114 Base Command's opening gambit of a demand for P20 Million ($425,000). Finally, whittling down the ransom to P500,000 ($11,000). The ransom was handed over to a BIAF courier on Thursday, November 17th, 2011, and on Friday evening, at 645PM, Ms.Kapa was released to her uncle on Varela Street in Zamboanga City's downtown area. The uncle immediately delivered by Ms.Kapa to the 102nd Infantry Brigade Headquarters for the requisite de-briefing and cursory medical examination. By midnite Ms.Kapa was back with her husband at their home in the municipality of Pitogo in Zamboanga del Sur Province.
As noted in a recent "MILF Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter of 2011" entry, Payao had been a long time coming and had been on the table since last spring's BIAF attack of a Rural Transit Lines passenger bus in the municipality of Tungawan, also in Zamboanga Sibugay Province. In that attack four guerillas from the 113 Base Command boarded the bus after hailing it near the end of its Ipil to Zamboanga City route. As the bus entered a series of challenging "s" turns in a mountain pass two of the young men stood up and revealed 45 caliber pistols. One of the men suddenly pivoted amd quickly fired a single round through the eyes of one of two CAAs serving as bus marshals. CAAs, or Civilian Active Auxiliaries are members of (almost always) geographically fixed armed reservists. Of the two types of CAAs, SCAAs, or Special CAAs, or privately funded paramilitaries under the employ of private businessmen. In this case, the owner of Rural Transit Lines needed protection for his large fleet and so formed his own paramilitary and employed two CAAs on each bus.
Rural Transit Line needed protection because like virtually any large business on Mindanao, his bus company had been targeted by professional extortion groups, in this case that group was the 113 Base Command although the company is also targeted by the 102 Base Command on its Lanao routes as well. Refusing to pay, Rural has been targeted for six years running now and as such, anyone on a Rural Transit bus is in serious risk of losing their life.
As the young men fired his 45 caliber pistol at the CAA sitting at the rear of the bus a man sitting next to the CAA instinctively reached for his own side arm and was killed along with his wife sitting next to him. That man was Major Julastidi Arasid, the Executive Officer of the 18IB (Infantry Battalion). He and his wife were making their way to Zamboanga City for their 15 year old son's highschool graduation (Philippine students graduate highschool at or slightly before age 16). Afterwards the gunmen and his three colleagues forced everyone off of the bus, including the second CAA who had been shot and wounded as well, and the bus was set afire, burning the remainins of the Major, his wife, and the murdered CAA.
That horrible incident suddenly made the AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines, anxious to reign in the man behind the multitude of attacks on Rural, and when they quickly discovered who the culprit was. BIAF sub-Kumander Waning Abdusalam, headquartered in that former MNLF camp in the municipality of Payao, they set their sights upon him. Sadly, it took more than five years of heinous crimes against civilians before the AFP was ready to act but at least they were moving against him.
After three halh hearted attempts, which will be discussed in a piece on this last campaign in Payao that is currently in the pipeline, a fourth was planned in order to try and get a handle on the aforementioned KFR victim, Monaliza Almonte Kapa. The SWAG, or, Naval Special Weapons Attack Group, a Naval Special Forces unit, was deployed off of Payao to prevent Waning Abdusalam from fleeing by water, as well as his possibly receiving re-inforcements. The stated objective was to prevent the 113 Base Command from taking Ms.Kapa off of the Zamboanga Peninsula and onto Basilan. Of course Ms.Kapa had never been taken to Payao. Instead, she had been taken to Olutanga Island where she was sold to the 114 Base Command which then took her to their strongest province, Basilan. It was in and around the municipality of Al Barka that Ms.Kapa had been repeatedly sighted.
Unbeknownst to the kidnappers apparently was that Ms.Kapa, a Muslim, had an uncle, Alimuddin Danganan Bual, a mid-ranking officer in the BIAF. Bual quickly assumed the role of family negotiator and just as quickly overcame the 114 Base Command's opening gambit of a demand for P20 Million ($425,000). Finally, whittling down the ransom to P500,000 ($11,000). The ransom was handed over to a BIAF courier on Thursday, November 17th, 2011, and on Friday evening, at 645PM, Ms.Kapa was released to her uncle on Varela Street in Zamboanga City's downtown area. The uncle immediately delivered by Ms.Kapa to the 102nd Infantry Brigade Headquarters for the requisite de-briefing and cursory medical examination. By midnite Ms.Kapa was back with her husband at their home in the municipality of Pitogo in Zamboanga del Sur Province.
Kidnap for Ransom for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part X: Leopoldo "Ronnie" Cabaya
Friday night, November 18th, 2011, Leopoldo "Ronnie" Cabaya took a rare evening off from his studies to enjoy a local barangay fiesta near his home in the municipality of Aleosan, in North Cotabato Province. With his days spent as a servant to a well to do family in the adjacent municipality of Midsayap, and most evenings spent studying at Southern Christian College in that same town, Ronnie's chances to relax came far and between. Still, when he finally graduated and found suitable work as an accountant it would all be worth it.
At just past midnite, Saturday, Ronnie found a "habal habal," or motorcycle taxi, to catch a ride back to Midsayap so that he could be ready for work later on that morning. As the motorcycle sped down Aleosan Kidapawan Hiway a another motorcycle passed them at a high rate of speed, carrying a passenger on the back riding tandem, the habal habal driver noticed both men on the other motorcycle were staring at them very intently before they accelerated far ahead of them. Suddenly, upahead, at Crossing Dualing, in Barangay Dualing,the driver saw that the road had been blocked by a pickup truck and two motorcycles parked lengthwise over the breadth of the road. Slowing down, thinking that it was an accident, by the time the driver realised what was really taking place it was too late to flee. Several men already had M16s and AK47s trained on him and his passenger.
As the driver was sitting there, unsure of his next course of action, four of the gunmen hurriedly ran over and grabbed his passenger, Ronnie, off of the rear of the habal habal and frog marched him over to the pickup truck, which then quickly sped off into the dark. As the impromptu checkpoint quickly disappeared the habal habal driver immediately proceeded to the Aleosan MPO, or Municipal Police Office. As he was quickly debriefed by the duty officer he recalled a strange comment made by one of the kidnappers to another, saying they had finally "captured the mayor's son." At once the dduty officer asked the habal habal driver, now the only eyewitness to a kidnapping, to examine a photo and tell him whether or not the man in the photograph looked familiar.
Startled, the driver admitted that that had been his passenger, the young man who had just been kidnapped. The officer immediately phoned the Mayor of Aleosan, Loreto Cabaya, and after apologising for calling at such an impolite hour, asked the Mayor if he knew the whereabouts of his son Jason. Mayor Cabayas answered in the affirmative and informed the duty officer that his son Jason was asleep in front of him, on the "sala" (livingroom) sofa. Perplexed, the duty officer explained about the kidnapping and how the habal habal driver had identified the victim as Jason. Moreover, the officer said, one of the kidnappers had told one of his accomplices that they had just snared the Mayor's son.
Almost immediately the Mayor surmised what had happened but told the officer to hold on for a few moments as he checked on some very important information. Calling a relative he discovered that his nephew Leopoldo "Ronnie" Cabayas had failed to return home from a barangay fiesta. Immediately informing the duty officer that the victim wasn't his son, but rather his nephew, the MPO immediately implemented checkpoints along major roads but it was too late. The pickup truck was last seen driving into Aleosan's Barangay Dungguan, was soon discovered next to a creek, having been set on fire as the gunmen headed into Liguasan Marsh by boat.
Apparently thr victim of mistaken identity, Ronnie's destitute parents have already been contacted by the kidnappers" negotiator who opened with the usual ridiculous gambit of P20 Million ($450,000). Ronnie doesn't work as a servant as a hobby. He does so because he is destitute. Hopefully his captors will not kill him when they discover this.
At just past midnite, Saturday, Ronnie found a "habal habal," or motorcycle taxi, to catch a ride back to Midsayap so that he could be ready for work later on that morning. As the motorcycle sped down Aleosan Kidapawan Hiway a another motorcycle passed them at a high rate of speed, carrying a passenger on the back riding tandem, the habal habal driver noticed both men on the other motorcycle were staring at them very intently before they accelerated far ahead of them. Suddenly, upahead, at Crossing Dualing, in Barangay Dualing,the driver saw that the road had been blocked by a pickup truck and two motorcycles parked lengthwise over the breadth of the road. Slowing down, thinking that it was an accident, by the time the driver realised what was really taking place it was too late to flee. Several men already had M16s and AK47s trained on him and his passenger.
As the driver was sitting there, unsure of his next course of action, four of the gunmen hurriedly ran over and grabbed his passenger, Ronnie, off of the rear of the habal habal and frog marched him over to the pickup truck, which then quickly sped off into the dark. As the impromptu checkpoint quickly disappeared the habal habal driver immediately proceeded to the Aleosan MPO, or Municipal Police Office. As he was quickly debriefed by the duty officer he recalled a strange comment made by one of the kidnappers to another, saying they had finally "captured the mayor's son." At once the dduty officer asked the habal habal driver, now the only eyewitness to a kidnapping, to examine a photo and tell him whether or not the man in the photograph looked familiar.
Startled, the driver admitted that that had been his passenger, the young man who had just been kidnapped. The officer immediately phoned the Mayor of Aleosan, Loreto Cabaya, and after apologising for calling at such an impolite hour, asked the Mayor if he knew the whereabouts of his son Jason. Mayor Cabayas answered in the affirmative and informed the duty officer that his son Jason was asleep in front of him, on the "sala" (livingroom) sofa. Perplexed, the duty officer explained about the kidnapping and how the habal habal driver had identified the victim as Jason. Moreover, the officer said, one of the kidnappers had told one of his accomplices that they had just snared the Mayor's son.
Almost immediately the Mayor surmised what had happened but told the officer to hold on for a few moments as he checked on some very important information. Calling a relative he discovered that his nephew Leopoldo "Ronnie" Cabayas had failed to return home from a barangay fiesta. Immediately informing the duty officer that the victim wasn't his son, but rather his nephew, the MPO immediately implemented checkpoints along major roads but it was too late. The pickup truck was last seen driving into Aleosan's Barangay Dungguan, was soon discovered next to a creek, having been set on fire as the gunmen headed into Liguasan Marsh by boat.
Apparently thr victim of mistaken identity, Ronnie's destitute parents have already been contacted by the kidnappers" negotiator who opened with the usual ridiculous gambit of P20 Million ($450,000). Ronnie doesn't work as a servant as a hobby. He does so because he is destitute. Hopefully his captors will not kill him when they discover this.
Abu Sayyaf Armed Contacts for the Second Quarter of 2011, Part II: AFP Operations in Al Barka End, Two Abu Sayyaf Guerillas Killed
I need to open this with a rejoinder that this was a Second Quarter of 2011 incident. Ergo, this was months before the AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines operation in October of 2011 that ended so badly with the loss of eighteen Scout Rangers in Basilan Province's municipality of Al Barka.
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On Saturday April 16th, 2011, at 615AM, the AFP's 3rd Special Forces Battalion (Airborne) once again captured the Abu Sayyaf Camp in the municipality of Al Barka's Barangay Makalang. Ironically the capture marked the end of a two month campaign against the ASG, or Abu Sayyaf Group's Jamiri Faction. That campaign began in February just after the AFP capture this very same camp.
According to standard military accumen, as well as according to AFP protocols, once a camp is captured it is turned over to the LGU, or, the Local Government Unit (as in municipal and/or provincial government). The LGU is supposed to then co-ordinate its local armed forces (CAAs, as in Civilian Active Auxiliaries, such as CAFGU, SCAA, or the CVO, the latter an LGU dedicated force under the supervision of the PNP, or Philippine National Police). The CAA, the progeny of the infamous Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) of the Marcos Era, is then tasked with "Holding" the tract, repelling any counter-operations launched to re-capture it as well as any kind of subversive armed activities around it.
Al Barka however, is a relatively new municipality carved out of the adjacent town of Tipo Tipo. It receives no IRA, or Internal Revenue Allotment. This allotment provides the funding for CAA operations in any given municipality. Therefore, after capturing this same camp in Janurary, the AFP "Cleared" the sector and turned it over to the LGU, in this case the municipal government. The LGU, having no means with which to "Hold" it promptly abandoned it, hence the two month operation that basically had the AFP treading water. The operation centered on the town of Al Barka, particularly its Barangays Cambug, Linuan, Kailih, Danapah, Guinanta and of course Makalang in addition to the adjoining Barangay's Limba Upas and Baguindan in Tipo Tipo.
Fifteen ASG guerillas had been sighted moving through the jungles around Al Barka and so once again, the AFP found itself trying to capture the ASG camp in Barangay Makalang's Sitio Bohe Bu'ug. Al Barka's Barangays Guinanta and Kailih are BIAF controlled. The BIAF, or Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, are the military wing of the MILF. Like all BIAF on Basilan they belong to the 114 Base Command. Naturally, as we were reminded in October of 2011, operating in close proximity to any BIAF position very often leads to extreme violence. In addition, there is a close relationship between the 114 Base Command and the ASG. Indeed, in both that aforementioned Janurary AND this latest incident, the BIAF DID engage the AFP after the latter inadvertently crossed the outer perimeter of the BIAF 114 Command's 3rd Brigade Camp- the same 3rd Brigade that would involve itself in the October 18th killing of AFP Scout Rangers.
On the day in question however, April 16th, 2011, at the ASG camp, only the ASG engaged the AFP. The AFP's superior forces outmanned the ASG who as noted had less than a single platoon's worth of fighters. When the smoke cleared the AFP managed to capture three M16s, one of which was fitted with an M203 rifle grenade launcher, and one M14. In addition to two dead ASG guerillas, three wounded guerillas were taken into custody. The two deceased were immediately turned over to the Barangay Captain of Makalang, himself a BIAF guerilla.
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On Saturday April 16th, 2011, at 615AM, the AFP's 3rd Special Forces Battalion (Airborne) once again captured the Abu Sayyaf Camp in the municipality of Al Barka's Barangay Makalang. Ironically the capture marked the end of a two month campaign against the ASG, or Abu Sayyaf Group's Jamiri Faction. That campaign began in February just after the AFP capture this very same camp.
According to standard military accumen, as well as according to AFP protocols, once a camp is captured it is turned over to the LGU, or, the Local Government Unit (as in municipal and/or provincial government). The LGU is supposed to then co-ordinate its local armed forces (CAAs, as in Civilian Active Auxiliaries, such as CAFGU, SCAA, or the CVO, the latter an LGU dedicated force under the supervision of the PNP, or Philippine National Police). The CAA, the progeny of the infamous Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) of the Marcos Era, is then tasked with "Holding" the tract, repelling any counter-operations launched to re-capture it as well as any kind of subversive armed activities around it.
Al Barka however, is a relatively new municipality carved out of the adjacent town of Tipo Tipo. It receives no IRA, or Internal Revenue Allotment. This allotment provides the funding for CAA operations in any given municipality. Therefore, after capturing this same camp in Janurary, the AFP "Cleared" the sector and turned it over to the LGU, in this case the municipal government. The LGU, having no means with which to "Hold" it promptly abandoned it, hence the two month operation that basically had the AFP treading water. The operation centered on the town of Al Barka, particularly its Barangays Cambug, Linuan, Kailih, Danapah, Guinanta and of course Makalang in addition to the adjoining Barangay's Limba Upas and Baguindan in Tipo Tipo.
Fifteen ASG guerillas had been sighted moving through the jungles around Al Barka and so once again, the AFP found itself trying to capture the ASG camp in Barangay Makalang's Sitio Bohe Bu'ug. Al Barka's Barangays Guinanta and Kailih are BIAF controlled. The BIAF, or Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, are the military wing of the MILF. Like all BIAF on Basilan they belong to the 114 Base Command. Naturally, as we were reminded in October of 2011, operating in close proximity to any BIAF position very often leads to extreme violence. In addition, there is a close relationship between the 114 Base Command and the ASG. Indeed, in both that aforementioned Janurary AND this latest incident, the BIAF DID engage the AFP after the latter inadvertently crossed the outer perimeter of the BIAF 114 Command's 3rd Brigade Camp- the same 3rd Brigade that would involve itself in the October 18th killing of AFP Scout Rangers.
On the day in question however, April 16th, 2011, at the ASG camp, only the ASG engaged the AFP. The AFP's superior forces outmanned the ASG who as noted had less than a single platoon's worth of fighters. When the smoke cleared the AFP managed to capture three M16s, one of which was fitted with an M203 rifle grenade launcher, and one M14. In addition to two dead ASG guerillas, three wounded guerillas were taken into custody. The two deceased were immediately turned over to the Barangay Captain of Makalang, himself a BIAF guerilla.
GPH-MILF Peace Process for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part II: An Informal Meeting in Kuala Lampur Attempts a Three Pointer
Counter-intuitively, the favourite sport of the Philippines is...basketball. In any corner of this country, a nation with 7,107 islands and well over 120 ethnicities, one can rest assured that they will see a paved basketball court in or around the municipal compound. Indeed, most barangays have one as well. Filipinos love basketball. Therefore, a metaphor that should be recognisable to most Filipinos. "Three Pointers," for those readers who are unaware, involves a basket shot from a long distance. In other words, a player, against all the odds, shoots- most often hurls- the ball down court in a desperate attempt to save the game...
On Thursday, November, 3rd 2011, the Chairmen of both the Government (GPH), Mario Victor "Marvic" Leonen, and the MILF Peace Panel Chairman, Mohagher Iqbal, sat across from each other on sofas in a carefully orchestrated, casual environment. Joining each man were two members of their respective Peace Panels, for the GPH:
1) Professor Miriam Coronel Ferrer
2) Senen Bacani
and for the MILF:
1) Datu Michael Mastura
2) Maulana "Bobby" Alonto
Additionally the MILF brought along a third Peace Panrlist, Professor Abhoud Syed Lingga but Mr.Lingga, like the nerd in gym class played the bench warmer (this I'd truly turning into a sports themed post). In any event, Professor Lyngga wasn't lonely as there were more than the usual gaggle of hangers on. Worth noting is that two men who wouldn't have usually even been in Kuala Lampur not only got a free but very short trip, but also got one of the highly coveted seats on those big comfy' couches;
1) Brigadier General Ariel Bernardo, Chairman of the GPH CCCH contingent. The CCCH, or Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities is the leading entity in a four-faceted Ceasefire Support Mechanism. The other three being:
A) IMT, or, International Monitoring Team, a consortium of foreign governmental and NGO (Non-Governmental Organizational) delegates who investigate any breeches that may lead to conflict and or any actual violations. Led by Malaysia, it has four facets itself:
a) Military
b) Rehabilitation
c) Socio-Economic
d) Civilian Protection
B) AHJAG, the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group, composed of representatives from the MILF/BIAF and the AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines. This entity was created specifically to allow the AFP to effectively deal with the large number of criminals who hide in and operate from MILF/BIAF controlled areas. An Anti-KFR (Kidnap for Ransom) operation in 2003 inadvertantly caused the Buliok Complex War when the AFP's aerial assault of the Pentagon Group (KFR organisation) came too close to the Buliok Complex, a MILF/BIAF camp that then served as the organizational headquarters and home of founder and then-Chairman, Hashim Salamat. All AHJAG really does is serve as early warning device, benefiting the MILF/BIAF, alerting it to AFP and/or PNP (Philippine National Prison) operations, a number of which aim to neutralise certain MILF/BIAF members.
C) LMT, the Local Monitoring Team, composed of five members from the following demographics:
a) MILF/BIAF (the BIAF being the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, the military wing of the MILF), although the Terms of Reference (TOR) mandate that the representative be a member of a provincial political committee of the MILF. In practice this has rarely been the case.
b) LGU, or Local Government Unit (munucipal or provincial government) representative
c) Representative from an NGO nominated by the MILF
d) Representative of an NGO nominated by the GPH, or Government of the Philippines
e) Religious sector
Designed to allow the CCCH and IMT to keep one foot in the thick of it. A good illustration of this entity's utility was the July of 2007 Al Barka incident on Basilan. As the composite detachment led by Marines were pinned down by two BIAF, brigades the LMT was able to implement a Local Ceasefire through the effort of a LMT member who happened to be a high ranking BIAF "officer." The LMT has been un-officially mothballed since the beginning of 2008, though the MILF Central Committee recently issued a Resolution seeking to revive the group (in late September of 2011, ironically, two and a half weeks before the latest Al Barka Incident).
As for the CCCH, the aforementioned Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities... The CCCH is composed of two teams, one from the AFP, the other from the MILF, and is used as an interface between the AFP and MILF/BIAF in that it serves as a notification conduit, much like the AHJAG though the latter is more specialised in only co-ordinating the Government's anti-crime maneuvers. If an AFP detachment is scheduled to conduct a maneuver of any type in the vicinity of a BIAF camp the CCCH is used to notify the MILF/BIAF so that the group doesn't mis-construe the AFP action as aggressive, thereby sparking an armed conflict.
Also on hand at the Kuala Lampur meeting:
2) Major Carlos Sol, Chairman of the GPH CCCH Secretariat, which handles the administrative end of the CPH CCCH contingent.
3) Brigadier General Alan Luga, Chairman of the GPH contingent of AHJAG.
The purpose all three were serving of course was to convey the seriousnes of the October 18th, 2011 Al Barka incident. The three were there for show since anything worth knowing from a less than 6 hour meeting could have easily been conveyed through the de riguer post-meeting briefing back in Manila.
Also joining the GPH contingent was:
4) Chairman of its Peace Panel Secretariat, Iona Jalijali, the Secretariat being the entity responsible for administrative and other important but less noticeable activities.
Along with Ms.Jalijali:
5) Secretariat member, Johaira Wahab
Joining Professor Abhoud Syed Lingga in the waiting room:
6) Jun Mantawil, Chairman of the MILF Peace Panel Secretariat
7) MILF Peace Panel Secretariat Member, attorney Mike Pasigan
8) MILF Peace Panel Secretariat Member, Mohajirin Alim.
Also present in the waiting room was an unusually large ICG contingent. The ICG, or International Contact Group, consists of foreign Governmental representatives and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs). It may be recalled that 72 days prior, at the 22nd Formal Exploratory Round, it was the ICG that prevented the entire Peace Process from going up in flames and that is certainly apt imagery given the guaranteed consequences of the Process ending abruptly. On the second of that planned three day 22nd Round, the MILF Peace Panel ended up screaming at their GHP counterparts after digesting the Government's long awaited Draft Comprehensive Agreement, a long awaited Interim Agreement meant to rapidly pave the way for an FPA, or Final Peace Agreement.
The GPH Chairman, Marvic Leonen, handed his MILF counterpart Mohagher Iqbal a watery mush that Leonen ridiculously describes as a "Three-in -One Agreement." The problem however, as the MILF correctly noted, was that the the "Three" major points- all of which I discussed at length on my Third Quarter entry analysing both the Round and the Draft so that for the sake pf brevity I will continue without touching upon both- is that nothing offered was new, and nothing offered even required negotiation. Three weeks before that Round both Chairmen had met at what was initially a secret meeting in a Tokyo suburb as President Aquino held his (initially) sectet tet a tet with MILF Chairman al Haj Murad Ebrahim. That meeting- again, analysed in depth in another one of my Third Quarter entries- was a bait and switch scam to alleviate some of the pressure coming to bear on the Aquino Administration after it had repeatedly failed to provide that Draft in repeatedly re-scheduled meetings since its actual due date in April of 2011. The date was pushed back to August 22nd when both sides were to convene for that repeatedly mentioned 22nd Formal Exploratory Round.
Then, after handing over the Draft, the Round imploded. Amid screaming GPH Chairman Leonen and his Panelists stormed out of that very same Boardroom where the couches had replaced the boardtable. Upon leaving the Talks the GPH Peace Panel pointedly sat down to a huge spread in the hotel's Chinese Resturant, on the same floor. Seeing as how it was Ramadan, the Islamic holiday in which adults forgo all food during daylight hours, Leonen's choice of meeting place seemed to many- myself included- to be a direct statement aimed at Iqbal, his Panel, and the MILF/BIAF on general.
It was then that the ICG represenatives on hand saved the day, quickly walking between the Boardroom and the resturant, ferrying messages and replies between the two Chairmen. In the end it produced tangible results with the GPH Panel returning to the Boardroom in the late afternoon, just enough time to agree to disagree but with civility and an eye on future Rounds.
Therefore, the ICG's cache has gone up considerably. At this "Informal Meeting," the ICG was represented by Political Officers from the Turkish, British, and the Japanese Embassies to Malaysia. On the NGO end, David Gorman from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Dr.Markus Sudibyo from the Indonesian-based Islamic-centered NGO "Muhammidiyah Foundation," Emma Leslie of Conciliation Resources and lastly, Dr.Stephen Rood of the Asia Foundation. I find the Asia Foundation's inclusion highly questionable in that it is a CIA front although it supposedly went independent back in the late 1960s, nearly two decades after it first began meddling in Mindanao from its Cotabato City offices. I could go off on a riff about the MILF hypocritically portraying itself as "Anti Colonialist" and "Anti Imperialist" and yet it pays fawning obesiance to both the American Embassy to the Philippines as well as to the Asia Foundation but alas, this is neither the time nor place for such observations. Don't despair fair reader because I do intend to out both sides in due time ("due time" being whenever I finally catch up in more pressing entries).
Regressing to attendees, one must not neglect to mention the Malaysian Facilitator, Dato Abdul Ghafaar Tengku Mohammed, who himself continued the ICG's Shuttle Diplomacy by spending the better part of the two and a half intervening months between the 22nd Exploratory Round and this latest meeting by flitting to and from in the Philippines. To his credit he even made what must have been excruciatingly maddening trips to the current MILF Headquarters, Camp Darapanan in the municipality of Sultan Kudarat (not the province of the same name) in Mindanao's Maguindanao Province. It was mostly due these exertions that this latest meeting was at all possible.
There was no Joint Statement at the end of the 6 hour meeting though it is clear that both unilateral Statements had been co-ordinated with each other, being nearly identical. I will not waste time analysing them because they offered absolutely nothing. Both sides agreed to meet again, sooner rather than later. Both sides agreed to allow the investigation being performed by the Ceasefire Mechanism entities- CCCH, IMT, and AHJAG- to serve as the Official Investigation of the October 18th, 2011 Al Barka incident, as opposed to the individual, parallel investigations performed by the MILF Central Committee and the AFP, the latter having been completed even before this November 3rd meeting transpired. Finally, the MILF agreed to co-operate with the AFP on operations in and around MILF/BIAF camps so long as the AFP abides by the protocols bi-laterally
implemented via the aforementioned four Ceasefire Mechanism entities: CCCH, IMT, AHJAG, and LMT. In other words, it is merely re-iterating its agreement from 2004 when it agreed to create and implement AHJAG.
On Thursday, November, 3rd 2011, the Chairmen of both the Government (GPH), Mario Victor "Marvic" Leonen, and the MILF Peace Panel Chairman, Mohagher Iqbal, sat across from each other on sofas in a carefully orchestrated, casual environment. Joining each man were two members of their respective Peace Panels, for the GPH:
1) Professor Miriam Coronel Ferrer
2) Senen Bacani
and for the MILF:
1) Datu Michael Mastura
2) Maulana "Bobby" Alonto
Additionally the MILF brought along a third Peace Panrlist, Professor Abhoud Syed Lingga but Mr.Lingga, like the nerd in gym class played the bench warmer (this I'd truly turning into a sports themed post). In any event, Professor Lyngga wasn't lonely as there were more than the usual gaggle of hangers on. Worth noting is that two men who wouldn't have usually even been in Kuala Lampur not only got a free but very short trip, but also got one of the highly coveted seats on those big comfy' couches;
1) Brigadier General Ariel Bernardo, Chairman of the GPH CCCH contingent. The CCCH, or Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities is the leading entity in a four-faceted Ceasefire Support Mechanism. The other three being:
A) IMT, or, International Monitoring Team, a consortium of foreign governmental and NGO (Non-Governmental Organizational) delegates who investigate any breeches that may lead to conflict and or any actual violations. Led by Malaysia, it has four facets itself:
a) Military
b) Rehabilitation
c) Socio-Economic
d) Civilian Protection
B) AHJAG, the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group, composed of representatives from the MILF/BIAF and the AFP, or Armed Forces of the Philippines. This entity was created specifically to allow the AFP to effectively deal with the large number of criminals who hide in and operate from MILF/BIAF controlled areas. An Anti-KFR (Kidnap for Ransom) operation in 2003 inadvertantly caused the Buliok Complex War when the AFP's aerial assault of the Pentagon Group (KFR organisation) came too close to the Buliok Complex, a MILF/BIAF camp that then served as the organizational headquarters and home of founder and then-Chairman, Hashim Salamat. All AHJAG really does is serve as early warning device, benefiting the MILF/BIAF, alerting it to AFP and/or PNP (Philippine National Prison) operations, a number of which aim to neutralise certain MILF/BIAF members.
C) LMT, the Local Monitoring Team, composed of five members from the following demographics:
a) MILF/BIAF (the BIAF being the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, the military wing of the MILF), although the Terms of Reference (TOR) mandate that the representative be a member of a provincial political committee of the MILF. In practice this has rarely been the case.
b) LGU, or Local Government Unit (munucipal or provincial government) representative
c) Representative from an NGO nominated by the MILF
d) Representative of an NGO nominated by the GPH, or Government of the Philippines
e) Religious sector
Designed to allow the CCCH and IMT to keep one foot in the thick of it. A good illustration of this entity's utility was the July of 2007 Al Barka incident on Basilan. As the composite detachment led by Marines were pinned down by two BIAF, brigades the LMT was able to implement a Local Ceasefire through the effort of a LMT member who happened to be a high ranking BIAF "officer." The LMT has been un-officially mothballed since the beginning of 2008, though the MILF Central Committee recently issued a Resolution seeking to revive the group (in late September of 2011, ironically, two and a half weeks before the latest Al Barka Incident).
As for the CCCH, the aforementioned Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities... The CCCH is composed of two teams, one from the AFP, the other from the MILF, and is used as an interface between the AFP and MILF/BIAF in that it serves as a notification conduit, much like the AHJAG though the latter is more specialised in only co-ordinating the Government's anti-crime maneuvers. If an AFP detachment is scheduled to conduct a maneuver of any type in the vicinity of a BIAF camp the CCCH is used to notify the MILF/BIAF so that the group doesn't mis-construe the AFP action as aggressive, thereby sparking an armed conflict.
Also on hand at the Kuala Lampur meeting:
2) Major Carlos Sol, Chairman of the GPH CCCH Secretariat, which handles the administrative end of the CPH CCCH contingent.
3) Brigadier General Alan Luga, Chairman of the GPH contingent of AHJAG.
The purpose all three were serving of course was to convey the seriousnes of the October 18th, 2011 Al Barka incident. The three were there for show since anything worth knowing from a less than 6 hour meeting could have easily been conveyed through the de riguer post-meeting briefing back in Manila.
Also joining the GPH contingent was:
4) Chairman of its Peace Panel Secretariat, Iona Jalijali, the Secretariat being the entity responsible for administrative and other important but less noticeable activities.
Along with Ms.Jalijali:
5) Secretariat member, Johaira Wahab
Joining Professor Abhoud Syed Lingga in the waiting room:
6) Jun Mantawil, Chairman of the MILF Peace Panel Secretariat
7) MILF Peace Panel Secretariat Member, attorney Mike Pasigan
8) MILF Peace Panel Secretariat Member, Mohajirin Alim.
Also present in the waiting room was an unusually large ICG contingent. The ICG, or International Contact Group, consists of foreign Governmental representatives and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs). It may be recalled that 72 days prior, at the 22nd Formal Exploratory Round, it was the ICG that prevented the entire Peace Process from going up in flames and that is certainly apt imagery given the guaranteed consequences of the Process ending abruptly. On the second of that planned three day 22nd Round, the MILF Peace Panel ended up screaming at their GHP counterparts after digesting the Government's long awaited Draft Comprehensive Agreement, a long awaited Interim Agreement meant to rapidly pave the way for an FPA, or Final Peace Agreement.
The GPH Chairman, Marvic Leonen, handed his MILF counterpart Mohagher Iqbal a watery mush that Leonen ridiculously describes as a "Three-in -One Agreement." The problem however, as the MILF correctly noted, was that the the "Three" major points- all of which I discussed at length on my Third Quarter entry analysing both the Round and the Draft so that for the sake pf brevity I will continue without touching upon both- is that nothing offered was new, and nothing offered even required negotiation. Three weeks before that Round both Chairmen had met at what was initially a secret meeting in a Tokyo suburb as President Aquino held his (initially) sectet tet a tet with MILF Chairman al Haj Murad Ebrahim. That meeting- again, analysed in depth in another one of my Third Quarter entries- was a bait and switch scam to alleviate some of the pressure coming to bear on the Aquino Administration after it had repeatedly failed to provide that Draft in repeatedly re-scheduled meetings since its actual due date in April of 2011. The date was pushed back to August 22nd when both sides were to convene for that repeatedly mentioned 22nd Formal Exploratory Round.
Then, after handing over the Draft, the Round imploded. Amid screaming GPH Chairman Leonen and his Panelists stormed out of that very same Boardroom where the couches had replaced the boardtable. Upon leaving the Talks the GPH Peace Panel pointedly sat down to a huge spread in the hotel's Chinese Resturant, on the same floor. Seeing as how it was Ramadan, the Islamic holiday in which adults forgo all food during daylight hours, Leonen's choice of meeting place seemed to many- myself included- to be a direct statement aimed at Iqbal, his Panel, and the MILF/BIAF on general.
It was then that the ICG represenatives on hand saved the day, quickly walking between the Boardroom and the resturant, ferrying messages and replies between the two Chairmen. In the end it produced tangible results with the GPH Panel returning to the Boardroom in the late afternoon, just enough time to agree to disagree but with civility and an eye on future Rounds.
Therefore, the ICG's cache has gone up considerably. At this "Informal Meeting," the ICG was represented by Political Officers from the Turkish, British, and the Japanese Embassies to Malaysia. On the NGO end, David Gorman from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Dr.Markus Sudibyo from the Indonesian-based Islamic-centered NGO "Muhammidiyah Foundation," Emma Leslie of Conciliation Resources and lastly, Dr.Stephen Rood of the Asia Foundation. I find the Asia Foundation's inclusion highly questionable in that it is a CIA front although it supposedly went independent back in the late 1960s, nearly two decades after it first began meddling in Mindanao from its Cotabato City offices. I could go off on a riff about the MILF hypocritically portraying itself as "Anti Colonialist" and "Anti Imperialist" and yet it pays fawning obesiance to both the American Embassy to the Philippines as well as to the Asia Foundation but alas, this is neither the time nor place for such observations. Don't despair fair reader because I do intend to out both sides in due time ("due time" being whenever I finally catch up in more pressing entries).
Regressing to attendees, one must not neglect to mention the Malaysian Facilitator, Dato Abdul Ghafaar Tengku Mohammed, who himself continued the ICG's Shuttle Diplomacy by spending the better part of the two and a half intervening months between the 22nd Exploratory Round and this latest meeting by flitting to and from in the Philippines. To his credit he even made what must have been excruciatingly maddening trips to the current MILF Headquarters, Camp Darapanan in the municipality of Sultan Kudarat (not the province of the same name) in Mindanao's Maguindanao Province. It was mostly due these exertions that this latest meeting was at all possible.
There was no Joint Statement at the end of the 6 hour meeting though it is clear that both unilateral Statements had been co-ordinated with each other, being nearly identical. I will not waste time analysing them because they offered absolutely nothing. Both sides agreed to meet again, sooner rather than later. Both sides agreed to allow the investigation being performed by the Ceasefire Mechanism entities- CCCH, IMT, and AHJAG- to serve as the Official Investigation of the October 18th, 2011 Al Barka incident, as opposed to the individual, parallel investigations performed by the MILF Central Committee and the AFP, the latter having been completed even before this November 3rd meeting transpired. Finally, the MILF agreed to co-operate with the AFP on operations in and around MILF/BIAF camps so long as the AFP abides by the protocols bi-laterally
implemented via the aforementioned four Ceasefire Mechanism entities: CCCH, IMT, AHJAG, and LMT. In other words, it is merely re-iterating its agreement from 2004 when it agreed to create and implement AHJAG.
Friday, November 18, 2011
NPA Armed Contacts for the Fourth Quarter of 2011, Part X: Rebelyn Pitao's Ghost Won't be Silenced, Part 3
In the first two parts of this three part entry I discussed the legendary figurehead of the NPA in Southern Mindanao, Leonicio Pitao who is known by many as "Ka Parago." Pitao, who joined the NPA as a farmboy in the municipality of Bayugan in Agusan del Sur Province in 1978, had by the late 1980s become the military commander of what is now known as the Southern Mindanao Regional Committee, or SMRC, the entity overseeing the entire Davao Region, also known as Region 11.
I have also been discussing member's of Pitao's immediate family, primarily his sister Evelyn and brother Danilo who were both murdered. The raison d'etra for this three part series however, was Pitao's third child with his wife, Evangeline Maasin Pitao, herself a former NPA guerilla. This child, a daughter, was saddled with the name "Rebelyn," pronounced "Rebellion," although the 20 year old shared nothing of father's propencity for violence nor his narrow Maoist ideology as filtered by the NPA, or New People's Army. Instead she was a homebody, only leaving her mother's side to tend to her recently acquired job at Davao City's Saint Peter's College of Technology where Rebelyn had usually been covering a second grade class.
Because of the relative security found in Davao City Rebelyn truly thought herself above the fray. This false sense of security led the young lady to being adhering to a regular routine. That regular routuine ended Rebelyn's life on March 4th, 2009. Upon her body being discovered half naked, stabbed, raped, and strangled the next afternoon, her father almost immediately pointed at the AFP as the true culprit. Two days after the death Leonicio Pitao named four men:
1) Sergeant (Sgt.) Helvin Bitang
2) Corporal (Cpl.) Orly Pedring Pedregosa
3) Sergeant Adan Masulao
4) Sergeant Ben Tipait
Pitao announced that these four mens' identities had been discovered during a quick, but painstaking investigation by the NPA. As I noted in Part 2, Pitao was lying through his teeth. Two of the men, Adan Musalao and Ben Tipait do not exist, at least under those names. The other two men, Sgt.Bitang and Cpl.Pedregosa, were both members of the ISAFP, Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and attached to MIG-11, or Military Intelligence Group for Region 11. Pitao knew these names because all those names were used by his brother Danilo's AFP handlers.
Still, with public opinion being what is and the media hounding him, the then Commanding Officer of the still very young 10ID (Infantry Divison), Major General Reynaldo B.Mapagu placed Sgt.Bitang and Cpl.Pedregosa on Barracks Restriction. At the time nobody bothered to ask the General just why he had put those two men on Restriction but did not do the same for the other two names.
In any event, as I noted in the preceding entry, by April 1st, 2009, less than 4 weeks after Leonicio Pitao announced those four names, he was ready to announce that there were 13 men tied to his daughter's death, some of who merely served as Military Assets, just like Danilo Santiago, Pitao's brother.
As luck or happenstance would have it, the Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), Leila de Lima- the same Ms.de Lima who is currently whoring herself- I mean serving the Aquino Administration- as the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ), was then in town to hold a two day hearing examining the so called "Davao Death Squad," an Extra Judicial Execution jugganaut doing the bidding of then-Mayor of Davao City, Rodrigo "Roddy" Duterte. Simply adding three days onto the end of the Davao Death Squad hearings, Commissioner de Lima summoned all 13 men named by Pitao.
On the sidelines of the Davao Death Squad hearing Major Genneral Mapagu tried to convince Ms.de Lima that due to the sensitive nature of all 13 men's security- related work, having them testify in the very public hearings very well might jeapordise their lives. The back and forth between the AFP and CHR continued until, on the afternoon of the first scheduled session, April 1st, the two sides agreed to a hastily created booth in the General Function Room of the Royal Mandaya Hotel, the venue in downtown Davao City that was histing both the hearings. Sitting behind a curtain rigged to cover a seven meter by three meter enclosure, soldiers would be able to offer their statements. However, by 1PM not a single of the thirteen had shown up. As Ms.de Lima threatened to not only cite the summoned men, but division brass as well, Major General Mapagu finally sent six of the men to the hotel. As for the rest, they were deployed outside of Davao City, which was then the location for 10ID Headquarters, or else were merely Military Assets over whom the AFP held no legal jurisdiction outside of their specific roles as covert agents. They could not be compelled by the AFP to appear at a hearing in which no specific charges had been filed.
Meanwhile, the two eyewitnesses to Rebelyn Pitao's abduction were located:
1) Danny Peliciano, a triksiad driver who had been driving Rebelyn home that night
2) Dina Talaboc, the female passenger who had also been riding with Rebelyn in Mr.Peliciano's triksiad
Both had gone into hiding immediately after the abduction but with a media onslaught and repeated appeals to the two eyewitnesses, both had surfaced. The CPO, or City Police's CIDG, or Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, showed each witness a photo array of the men named by Leonicio Pitao. Neither witness was able to identify a single one of the thirteen purported attackers.
The three day CHR Hearing on Rebelyn's Death the case went they way of virtually all such cases, no matter the notiriety. Although Leonicio Pitao would eventually list a total of twenty one men in the incident:
1) Sergeant Adan Masulao, the non-existent man first listed just after the killing was actually using an AFP provided identity, "Adan Sulao," but his real name was Sergeant Romeo Marcos
2) Sergeant Ben Tipait, another one of the first "non-existent" men was actually named Sergeant Edmar Tipait whose alias while handling Assets was "Ben"
3) Corporal Orly Pedring Pedregosa
4) Sergeant Helvin Bitang
5) Sergeant Melvin Punla
6) Sergeant Caballero, first name not known by Pitao
7) Major Cabanalan, first name not known by Pitao
8) Colonel Caguiwa, first name not known by Pitao
9) Sergeant Senit, first name not known by Pitao
10) Corporal Wennie Carampatan
The rest being Assets, some of whom are listed by their Asset Code Names, which is all Pitao knew:
11) Ruben Bitang, uncle of Sergeant Helvin Bitang. Ruben was the driver of the white Toyota Revo cargo van that was used in the abduction, according to Pitao
12) Romeo Carreon
13) Hagto
14) Embac
15) Ariel, also known as "Benjack"
16) Reynaldo "Joemar" Desales
17) Macky Estremos
18) Bobong Gambuta
19) Marcelino Cuyot Payot
The final two were listed by Pitao as "John Does." Not one was ever prosecuted. However, the NPA would begin checking names off of that long list, one by one, as the SMRC's SPARU Team began killing each of those attackers.
The first of the 21 to be killed was Macky Estremos, before the CHR hearing even took place, in the municipality of Carmen, in Davao del Norte Province.
Then, on April 14th, 2009, Marcelino Cuyot Payot, killed in Panabo City.
On April 27th, 2009, Bobong Gambuta was killed in Panabo City as well.
4) On May 3rd, 2009, Ruben Bitang, the man whom Pitao accused of driving the van used by the abductors.
5) On October 25th, 2009, the first actual AFP member on the list was killed. when Corpral Pedregosa was killed in Davao City's Paquibato District.
On December 14eh, 2009, a SPARU Team killed an innocent man, Fernando Timbal. Mr.Timbal, a bank courier for the quasi-Governmental Land Bank while he was driving the branch manger's pickup truck, in Panabo City. He was hit by 12 rounds from a 45 caliber pistol.
The sixth killing is the one which inspired this Fourth Quarter entry; On Thursday, November 10th, 2011, at 6AM, Corporal Winnie Carampatan was driving his motorcycle in Davao City's Pquibato District, driving his two young children and his nephew to school. As he entered Barangay Malabog two men walked into the middle of the road, both drawing down and opening fire. Carampatan was killed, causing the motorcycle to skid off the road but all three of the children survived, albeit with bumps, scrapes, and of course traumatising them for life. After Rebelyn was killed the AFP dissolved the detachment from MIG-11 biouvaced in Panabo City, the one fingered as having killed Rebelyn. Carampatan had ended up with the 73IB based in Compostela Vallet's municipality of Mawab..
Disgustingly, the 10ID never mentioned Rebelyn Pitao OR her killing when eulogising Carampatan in media releases, "Our soldier was a non-combatant during the incident. Worst, he was killed before the members of his own family..." Propaganda, propaganda, propaganda.
I have also been discussing member's of Pitao's immediate family, primarily his sister Evelyn and brother Danilo who were both murdered. The raison d'etra for this three part series however, was Pitao's third child with his wife, Evangeline Maasin Pitao, herself a former NPA guerilla. This child, a daughter, was saddled with the name "Rebelyn," pronounced "Rebellion," although the 20 year old shared nothing of father's propencity for violence nor his narrow Maoist ideology as filtered by the NPA, or New People's Army. Instead she was a homebody, only leaving her mother's side to tend to her recently acquired job at Davao City's Saint Peter's College of Technology where Rebelyn had usually been covering a second grade class.
Because of the relative security found in Davao City Rebelyn truly thought herself above the fray. This false sense of security led the young lady to being adhering to a regular routine. That regular routuine ended Rebelyn's life on March 4th, 2009. Upon her body being discovered half naked, stabbed, raped, and strangled the next afternoon, her father almost immediately pointed at the AFP as the true culprit. Two days after the death Leonicio Pitao named four men:
1) Sergeant (Sgt.) Helvin Bitang
2) Corporal (Cpl.) Orly Pedring Pedregosa
3) Sergeant Adan Masulao
4) Sergeant Ben Tipait
Pitao announced that these four mens' identities had been discovered during a quick, but painstaking investigation by the NPA. As I noted in Part 2, Pitao was lying through his teeth. Two of the men, Adan Musalao and Ben Tipait do not exist, at least under those names. The other two men, Sgt.Bitang and Cpl.Pedregosa, were both members of the ISAFP, Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and attached to MIG-11, or Military Intelligence Group for Region 11. Pitao knew these names because all those names were used by his brother Danilo's AFP handlers.
Still, with public opinion being what is and the media hounding him, the then Commanding Officer of the still very young 10ID (Infantry Divison), Major General Reynaldo B.Mapagu placed Sgt.Bitang and Cpl.Pedregosa on Barracks Restriction. At the time nobody bothered to ask the General just why he had put those two men on Restriction but did not do the same for the other two names.
In any event, as I noted in the preceding entry, by April 1st, 2009, less than 4 weeks after Leonicio Pitao announced those four names, he was ready to announce that there were 13 men tied to his daughter's death, some of who merely served as Military Assets, just like Danilo Santiago, Pitao's brother.
As luck or happenstance would have it, the Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), Leila de Lima- the same Ms.de Lima who is currently whoring herself- I mean serving the Aquino Administration- as the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ), was then in town to hold a two day hearing examining the so called "Davao Death Squad," an Extra Judicial Execution jugganaut doing the bidding of then-Mayor of Davao City, Rodrigo "Roddy" Duterte. Simply adding three days onto the end of the Davao Death Squad hearings, Commissioner de Lima summoned all 13 men named by Pitao.
On the sidelines of the Davao Death Squad hearing Major Genneral Mapagu tried to convince Ms.de Lima that due to the sensitive nature of all 13 men's security- related work, having them testify in the very public hearings very well might jeapordise their lives. The back and forth between the AFP and CHR continued until, on the afternoon of the first scheduled session, April 1st, the two sides agreed to a hastily created booth in the General Function Room of the Royal Mandaya Hotel, the venue in downtown Davao City that was histing both the hearings. Sitting behind a curtain rigged to cover a seven meter by three meter enclosure, soldiers would be able to offer their statements. However, by 1PM not a single of the thirteen had shown up. As Ms.de Lima threatened to not only cite the summoned men, but division brass as well, Major General Mapagu finally sent six of the men to the hotel. As for the rest, they were deployed outside of Davao City, which was then the location for 10ID Headquarters, or else were merely Military Assets over whom the AFP held no legal jurisdiction outside of their specific roles as covert agents. They could not be compelled by the AFP to appear at a hearing in which no specific charges had been filed.
Meanwhile, the two eyewitnesses to Rebelyn Pitao's abduction were located:
1) Danny Peliciano, a triksiad driver who had been driving Rebelyn home that night
2) Dina Talaboc, the female passenger who had also been riding with Rebelyn in Mr.Peliciano's triksiad
Both had gone into hiding immediately after the abduction but with a media onslaught and repeated appeals to the two eyewitnesses, both had surfaced. The CPO, or City Police's CIDG, or Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, showed each witness a photo array of the men named by Leonicio Pitao. Neither witness was able to identify a single one of the thirteen purported attackers.
The three day CHR Hearing on Rebelyn's Death the case went they way of virtually all such cases, no matter the notiriety. Although Leonicio Pitao would eventually list a total of twenty one men in the incident:
1) Sergeant Adan Masulao, the non-existent man first listed just after the killing was actually using an AFP provided identity, "Adan Sulao," but his real name was Sergeant Romeo Marcos
2) Sergeant Ben Tipait, another one of the first "non-existent" men was actually named Sergeant Edmar Tipait whose alias while handling Assets was "Ben"
3) Corporal Orly Pedring Pedregosa
4) Sergeant Helvin Bitang
5) Sergeant Melvin Punla
6) Sergeant Caballero, first name not known by Pitao
7) Major Cabanalan, first name not known by Pitao
8) Colonel Caguiwa, first name not known by Pitao
9) Sergeant Senit, first name not known by Pitao
10) Corporal Wennie Carampatan
The rest being Assets, some of whom are listed by their Asset Code Names, which is all Pitao knew:
11) Ruben Bitang, uncle of Sergeant Helvin Bitang. Ruben was the driver of the white Toyota Revo cargo van that was used in the abduction, according to Pitao
12) Romeo Carreon
13) Hagto
14) Embac
15) Ariel, also known as "Benjack"
16) Reynaldo "Joemar" Desales
17) Macky Estremos
18) Bobong Gambuta
19) Marcelino Cuyot Payot
The final two were listed by Pitao as "John Does." Not one was ever prosecuted. However, the NPA would begin checking names off of that long list, one by one, as the SMRC's SPARU Team began killing each of those attackers.
The first of the 21 to be killed was Macky Estremos, before the CHR hearing even took place, in the municipality of Carmen, in Davao del Norte Province.
Then, on April 14th, 2009, Marcelino Cuyot Payot, killed in Panabo City.
On April 27th, 2009, Bobong Gambuta was killed in Panabo City as well.
4) On May 3rd, 2009, Ruben Bitang, the man whom Pitao accused of driving the van used by the abductors.
5) On October 25th, 2009, the first actual AFP member on the list was killed. when Corpral Pedregosa was killed in Davao City's Paquibato District.
On December 14eh, 2009, a SPARU Team killed an innocent man, Fernando Timbal. Mr.Timbal, a bank courier for the quasi-Governmental Land Bank while he was driving the branch manger's pickup truck, in Panabo City. He was hit by 12 rounds from a 45 caliber pistol.
The sixth killing is the one which inspired this Fourth Quarter entry; On Thursday, November 10th, 2011, at 6AM, Corporal Winnie Carampatan was driving his motorcycle in Davao City's Pquibato District, driving his two young children and his nephew to school. As he entered Barangay Malabog two men walked into the middle of the road, both drawing down and opening fire. Carampatan was killed, causing the motorcycle to skid off the road but all three of the children survived, albeit with bumps, scrapes, and of course traumatising them for life. After Rebelyn was killed the AFP dissolved the detachment from MIG-11 biouvaced in Panabo City, the one fingered as having killed Rebelyn. Carampatan had ended up with the 73IB based in Compostela Vallet's municipality of Mawab..
Disgustingly, the 10ID never mentioned Rebelyn Pitao OR her killing when eulogising Carampatan in media releases, "Our soldier was a non-combatant during the incident. Worst, he was killed before the members of his own family..." Propaganda, propaganda, propaganda.
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