Counter-intutitively the 1996"Jakarta Agreement"(Jakarta Accord) between the MNLF and GPH (Govt.of the Philippines) only unleashed even more confounding problems rather than helping to end the MNLF Insurgency,or-Heaven Forbid-solve its underlying causes.The 1996 Agreement,known as the"FPA,"or Final Peace Agreement,was meant to frame the implementation of a much earlier agreement,"Tripoli 1976,"signed in Tripoli Libya.Tripoli was a Marcos Era shell game that had a lot of bells and whistles but in reality lacked any real substance.According to Tripoli the Philippines would create an autonomous zone in Central Mindanao.In reality it created very little and solved even less.
With Marcos's ouster in 1986 and his successor,Corazon"Cory"Aquino ascending to the Presidency,the GHP-MNLF Peace Process began anew.By 1989 President Aquino had created ARMM,the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.Still,nothing really changed until she was succeeded by President Fidel Ramos,former AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) Chief of Staff.Ramos re-initiated the Process which had been left to its own devices and stalled out in 1987.Beginning in late 1993 and concluding in late 1996,after a mere 4 Rounds of Formal Talks,the 2 sides concluded Jakarta 1996.
Jakarta 96,or the FPA,devised an implementational blueprint for Tripoli 1976.It divided the implementation into 2 Phases:
1) Phase I)"Transitional",to take place from 1996 to 1999 though it optioned the built in extension rider so that Phase I officially concluded in 2001).This Phase involved:
A) The creation of the SPCPD,or Southern Philippines Center for Peace and Development.An Executive Branch entity with 81 members,directly answerable to the President.SPCPD would take direct control over other governmental developmental entities operation within the ARMM AOR.
B) Creation of SZOPAD (Special Zone of Peace and Development).This entity was to function as an economically advantageous area and would include 14 provinces:
1) Lanao del Norte
2) Lanao d Sur
3) North Cotabato
4) South Cotabato
5) Davao del Sur
6) Sarangani
7) Zamboanga del Sur
8) Zamboanga del Norte
9) Basilan
10) Sulu
11) Tawi Tawi
12) Maguindanao
13) Sultan Kudarat
14) Palawan
as well as focusing on 9 cities:
1) Cotabato City
2) Dapitan City
3) Dipolog City
4) GenSan (General Santos City)
5) Iligan City
6) Marawi City
7) Pagadian City
8) Zamboanga City
9) Puerto Princessa City
SZOPAD was under control of SPCPD.
C) Creation of the CA,or Consultative Assembly.An 81 member advisory body to the SPCPD without any legislative powers and overwhelmingly composed of MNLF/BMA members.
2) De-mobilisation of BMA,the Bangsamoro Army,the MNLF's military wing.Thousands og guerillas would integrated into the AFP and to a lesser degree,the PNP.
Phase II would involve 1)Ammending RA (Republic Act)# 6734,the"Organic Act of ARMM (Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao)".This was to take place by 1998.
2) After Ammending,a plebiscite would be held within those 9 cities and 14 provinces.
3) After Ammending the Organic Act,the Transitory Mechanisms would be de-commissoned (SPCPD,SZOPAD and CA).
RA# 6734 ended up Ammended as RA# 9054 in 2001 but in the plebiscite only 1 city,Marawi and 1 province,Basilan opted to join.Basilan's provincial capitol,Isabela City didn't join the rest of its province and so while Basilan Island is now part of ARMM,its capitol is part of Zamboanga del Norte administratively.The MNLF boycotted the plebiscite with Misuari contending that both President Ramos and his successor Joseph"ERAP"Estrada had violated the spirit,if not the letter of Jakarta 96 with GPH having authored,passed and ratified RA# 9054 (Ammended Organic Act) without consulting the MNLF.More to the point,GPH had hobbled Misuari financially,thus stunting crucial infrastructual development.Also an important factor,duly noted by Misuari was that Congress had treated Misuari like Ramos' whipping boy.Ramos,in creating the SPCPD and installing Misuari as the Council's Chairman had managed to infuriate Congress.The House was livid over GPH creating the entity as part and parcel of the Executive branch.In doing this Ramos hoped to avoid unwanted Congressional interference which would delay implemention of modalities and programmes.Likewise this circumvention of the Legislative Branch enabled President Ramos to directly fund certain modalities via certain discretionary funds allocated to the President under generic labels out of the Annual Presidential Budget.There in lies a hugely problematic issue.
Misuari was made Chairman of the SPCPD which acted as the supervisory entity over SZOPAD and all other developmemtal programmes within the SZOPAD AOR (Area of Responsibility).Entities like TF Basilan (not to be confused with the AFP's Task Force of the same name which at that point did not exist),TF Malmar (covering Central Mindanao),Sulu Developmental TF,OMA (Office of Muslim Affairs),OSCC (Office if Southern Cultural Communities),SPDA (Southern Philippines Development Authority) and SDGP (Special Development Planning Group,an ad hoc entity composed of representatives from different national agencies dealing with infrastructural development).Misuari wasn't devoid of organisational skills.He ran a moderately complex organisation that operated on an international basis and had spent 24 years interacting with governmental agencies on one level or another.Still,that is a whole different dynamic than sitting in the cockpit of a bureaucratic behemoth.All the more so when many of these same governmental entities actively work to stifle your efforts.
After the last portion of Phase I was completed,the de-mobilisation of the BMA and mass intefration of demobilised guerillas into both the AFP and the PNP (Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police) attentions turned to Phase II.At this point,in 199,Misuari was under incredible pressure to produce tangible results.He faced opposition from literally every corner.The Catholic Church had mobilised and had taken great issue with the FPA's Article II,Section 5 which mandated the creation of an advisory body to the SPCPD,the"Darul Iftah."Misuari had always maintained that his crusade revolved around ethnicity and culture,not religion.Yet,at MNLF insistence a single advisory body composed entirely of Islamic clergy was created to ensure-as its proponents stated-the enshrinement of Islamic Values.Naturally this rankled the Catholic Church.Understandably it also became a political hot potato with local politicians forming entire platforms around the entity.The fact that this was taking place within SZOPAD was a nightmare for Misuari and his ever dwindling coterie of backers.
The Church also focused on another of the 3 transitory entities created in Phase I,the CA (Consultative Assembly).Like the SPCPD it had Misuari as its Chairman.Tasked with acting as a soundboard to advise Misuari and the rest of the SPCPD.Particularly troubling to the Church,and even to a fair number of Muslims was that the CA had a dedicated slot of 44 seats for MNLF/BMA members.This translated into a majority control and so instead of representing all stakeholders it would be overwhelmingly representing the MNLF programme.The facct that Misuari automaticaly Chaired the entity mandated to advise him also troubled more than a few people.
Yet the real trouble came with the implementation of Phase II.Article III of the FPA/Jarkata 1996 mandated a repeal or Ammending of RA# 6734,the Organic Act of ARMM.Congress then embarked on a quest to do so but without an iota of input from a single member of the MNLF.Seeing as how the purpose of this endeavor was to fashion an entity in accordance with the FPA,it seems almost criminal to have ignored the group at the epicentre of the dynamic.Of course Congress had an axe to grind over President Ramos's delegation of Executive Power to the SPCPD.No matter if such childish tit for tat sinks the nation into another decade of orgiastic violence,just so long as the political dynasties filling Congress get to salve their battered egos.Though Congress was ready to Ammend RA# 6734 by 1999 it took roughly 2 years to pass.It had been introduced in the 2nd Session of the 10th Congress but had taken until the 11th Congress,finally entering into effect on March 31,2001.Opinions seems to be united in viewing Congress as having stalled consideration purposefully.
With passage of the Ammended Organic Act ("Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act" in shorthand) the transitory mechanisms implemented in Phase I of the FPA were to be abolished in favour of more permanent governmental bodies.The SPCPD was to be replaced with a Governor,Vice Governor and an Executive Council.Yet,it was really only a name change since the Governor appointed the 3 Deputies of the Executive Council,or"EC",just as the Chairman of the SPCPD had.Just as in the SPCPD the 3 Deputies were to each represent 1 of the 3 main demographic pools on Mindanao,and so on.CA was to be replaced with the RLA,or Regional Legislative Assembly.Finally,SZOPAD was to be erased,as is.Despite this being explicitly articulated in the FPA,then President Gloria M.Arroyo,"GMA,"saw fit to earn her stripes by issuing an Executive Order that left no room for doubt.EO# 80 countermanded EO# 161 issued by her predecessor,President Joseph"ERAP"Estrada in September of 1999.EO# 161 was merely a 1 year extension of the original Executive Order,EO# 371 issued by ERAP's predecessor,President Fidel Ramos.
Between the passage of RA# 9054 and issuance of EO# 80,which dissolved the SPCPD and CA Misuari was raked over the coals.As if the passage of RA# 9054 wasn't hard enough to deal with,just 29 days later he saw his closest confidantes turn on him.On April 29,2001 his #2,Dr.Parouk Sawadjaan Hussin led the MNLF's 15 member Executive Council in voting Misuari out as Chairman,though they did deign to bestow the meaningless title"Chairman Emeritus"upon him in that same Resolution.The move was especially treacherous given the fact that there was nothing to gain in pushing him out.Then,to do so at that particular juncture?After you have ridden Misuari's acclaim to positions of moderate power?Just reading the Resolution can make one cringe.In it Misuari was scalded as an inept administrator,a terrible leader,egotistical and hellbent on personal enrichment at the expence of the cause he pretended to represent.Misuari was labeled as"incompetent,"and what muat have hurt Misuari the most was that a lot of those callously offered judgments were spot on.
Parouk,with Cotabato City Mayor Muslimin G.Sema as the new #2 proclaimed themselves the new leaders of the MNLF.Immediately afterwards President Arroyo recognised their assumption of control and sponsored Parouk Hussin's campaign to replace a battered Misuari as Governor of ARMM.Predictably,Hussin won (November 26,2001),and Misuari returned to his hometown of Maimbung,Jolo Island,Sulu Province to lick his wounds.He must have healed very quickly because just dats after returning to Jolo he ended up directing the factions still loyal to him on an assault of an AFP position on Jolo that resulted in well over 100 deaths.That debacle led to a paperless escape to Sabah,where he was arrested for Illegal Entry. As the Arroyo Goverment charged him with Rebellion Misuari was returned to Manila after a hellish 45 days in a Malaysian prison.He would spend most of the next 8 years incarcerated though the vast bulk of it was spent in a 2 bedroom cottage on a PNP base.That of course is the Cliffnotes version of the Misuari narrative,as well as the backstory of ARMM,and of course the FPA.Ahhhh,the FPA,even today it is still stirring controversy.
Even as Misuari managed to emerge as the leader of the strongest MNLF faction,and much more importantly the one with which the OIC (Organisation of the Islamic Conference) does business with,the FPA remained an unresolved issue.As stated earlier,it merely functions as the Implementational Blueprint for Tripoli 76.Ergo it isn't a solution in and of itself UNLESS it serves to spur full implementation of Tripoli 76.While the Philippine Government has maintained that it has satisfied its onus under the FPA,the MNLF has held to the diametrically opposite position.As Misuari sat in stir the OIC,which has Facilitated the GPH-MNLF Peace Process since day one recognised that unless the GPH and MNLF viewpoints moved a lot closer to each other there would be no way to end the 30 years of bloodshed.In the Winter of 2006 the OIC deployed Sayeed Kassem el Masry,Speacial Envoy of the OIC Secretary General as the leader of a small OIC delegation (actually,the"delegation"consisted of Masry,his boyfriend who was billed as his"aide" and Libyan Representative Salem M.Adem) which was tasked with conducting a Field Visit to the Philippines so as to take a first hand look at the position(s) of both parties,but with an added secret agenda of trying ti facilitate Misuari's release from detention.
On May 17,2006 Sayed Kassem el Masry led his delegates on a 5 day OIC Field Mission,officially titled,"2006 Field Visit to Mindanao"and immediately paid a requisite courtesy call at the DFA (Dept.of Foreign Affairs) in Manila.From there the delegation wasted no time in directly travelling to Misuari's"cottage"tucked behind 2 fenced in enclosures topped with razor ribbbon at the PNP compound at Fort Santa Rosa,Laguna Province.Misuari conferred with the delegation,reiterating his concerns both about the FPA as well as about his detention which at that point had reached half a decade without resolution.The next morning the delegation,joined by in-country representatives (Ambassadors and Consular Generals from Embassies to the Philippines) from the OIC-PCSP (Peace Committee for the Southern Philippines) which is merely an expanded form of the Group of 8 (8 OIC member states that have taken the GPH-MNLF Peace Process as their pet project) and a delegation from GPH led by Secretary Jesus Dureza of OPAPP (Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process) left for a 3 day tour of Mindanao with time in Marawi City,Cotabato City and Jolo City.Returning on May 20 they met with GMA,the prancing pony of politeness herself,President Gloria M.Arroyo.Knowing that she couldn't pull the OIC's chain GMA whispered pillow talk and then pushed her own agenda,the desire of the Philippines to gain Observer Status at the OIC.With that unfufilled wish dangling in the air the 2 sides issued a Joint Communique in which they both acknowledged that the FPA's Phase II implementation has been left wanting.
Upon returning to Jeddah(where the OIC is based) el Masry composed his official report quickly and submitted it at the 33rd ICFM,the annual OIC Conference of Foreign Ministers,in Baku,Azeribijan (June 19 to June 21,2006).The jist of the report is that the Philippine Government strongly feels that it has succesfully implemented most if not all of Phase II.The MNLF holds a diametrically opposed viewpoint and there is a dire need with which to bring these 2 viewpoints more in alignment so as to salvage FPA.The OIC promptly passed a Resolution,#2-33-MM,which called for a Tripartite Review Process (GPH,MNLF and the OIC,in Section# 5 of the Resolution).The Tripartite Review was handed a mandate to not only review implementation but to develop modalities designed to foster and facilitate such implementation.
With the Philippine Government forced to agree the OIC tenatively schedualed the 1st Tripartite Review for November of that same year,2006.At the Government's insistence the Review was re-schedualed time and again before finally transpiring in November of 2007 (11/12-11/14).The GPH Delegation was chaired by Nabil Tan,Undersecretary for OPAPP while the MNLF's was led by attorney Randolph"Bong"Parcasio who was Chief Counsel for the MNLF and who had held the post of Executive Secretary under the Misuari Administration at ARMM.Ideally Misuari would have been in the driver's seat but he was still confined at Fort Santa Rosa.However,Misuari had personally picked each MNLF delegate and had Parcasio read a speech in his stead so that the entire affair had Misuari's thumbprint.The Review actually did manage to accomplish something in that both sides articulated a total of 36 Areas of Concern vis a vis Implementation of the FPA.In a quick review of these issues it was discovered that only 21 of them were at all cpntentious.
Having accomplished this the tet a tet could stake a claim to productivity but the meeting's 2nd mandate was to devise a mechanism with which to spur further implementational progress.All 3 delegations agreed to form a Tripartite Joint Secretariat composed of 5 members each from the MNLF and GPH.The Secretariat held its first meeting on December 10,2006 and ensconced itself in the Indonesian Embassy in Makati City in Metro Manila.At the First Review the 3 delegations agreed to form 5 Joint Working Groups to tackle the 21 contentious issues which they then categorised 5 ways:
1) National Defense and Security
2) Education
3) Economic and Finiancial Systems in addition to Natual Resource Exploitation ("exploitation"in the financial sense as in MPSAs,i.e."Mineral Production Sharing Agreements").
4) Administrative System and Right of Representation in addition to Participation in the National Government and All State Agencies.
5) Shar'ia (Islamic Jurisprudence) and the Judiciary
The exact structure of Working Groups,or"JWGs,"and their protocols were to be devised through the Tripartite Joint Secretariat.In addition,the 3 delegations agreed upon the formation of Ad Hoc Working Group,or"AHWG."AHWG was tasked with aiding in the JWG process as well as in assisting the Secretariat.The Secretariat met in January of 2008 and empanelled the 5 JWGs as well as AHWG and so the Tripartite Process began in earnest.
The 2nd Tripartite Review had actually been schedualed to take place concurrently to the Secretariat meeting but had,as was so often the case,been delayed.Again,all 3 Panels were Chaired by the same men that had led them at the 1st Review.Held only a few weeks behind scheduale (2/14-2/16) it was convened at the OIC Cultural Centre (IRCICA,OIC Research Centre) in Besiktas District Istanbul,Turkey.Mostly remembered as the Review where the gloves came off and delegates from the MNLF and GPH very nearly came to blows,in the end they agreed that the 5 JWGs were a decent beginning but that the groups needed fleshing out,more definition.Despite just having been formed the JWGs issued a collective Progress Report.
In March of 2009 the 3rd Tripartite Review took place at the Heritage Hotel in Metro Manila's Pasay City (3/11-3/13).Once again el Masry,Parcasio and Tan Chaired their respective delegations.The JWGs and Secretariat issued Progress Reports but the most notable development was that Misuari was in attendance for the first time having been released from detention on bail in April of 2008.On substantiative issues,the Review Process probably had its most accomplished period with all 3 Panels having agreed upon the formation of a Joint Legal Panel composed of delegates from the MNLF and GHP,to be co-Chaired by Leah Tandora Armamenta and Misuari.Speaking of Misuari,he certainly provided the entertainment by railing on and on about"GPH Massacres."Noone thought to remind him however that he had spent almost the entire decade in stir for getting more than 100 people killed.I reckon 100 violent deaths constitute a"massacre"but then again we ARE taking about Mindanao.The Joint Legal Panel,or JLP,was created to deal with the underlying issue in all of this,from the unresolved points of contention to the continued disparity in viewpoints between the Government and the MNLF.Its primary focus soon became the drafting an Ammendatory Bill for Congress to use in crafting a revision of,or even a full replacement for RA# 9054 (Expanded Organic Act).Hmmmmm...where have we heard THAT before?Ammendment or replacement og the Organic Act?Who would have imagined?
On January 22,2010 the JLP inked a Draft Bill at the Secretariat,housed in the Indonesian Embassy in Makati City.After presentation at the 4th Tripartite Review it would be submitted to Congress.Just a month later came the 4th and most recent Tripartite Review,in Jeddah,Saudi Arabia (2/22-2/23).Unlike the 3rd Review,Misuari Chaired the MNLF Panel while Secretary Teresita Q.Deles Chaired that of the GPH.There were 2 very notable accomplishments at this last meeting,namely the creation of the BDAF,or Bangsamoro Development Assistance Fund to act as the budgetary clearinghouse that had been omitted from the SPCPD and which was the single error most responsible for the failure to satisfactorily implement the FPA.Secondly,On the 3 remaining contentious issues:
1) Economic issues related to the Exploitation of Natural Resources,specifically Revenue Sharing between the Autonomous Region and the Government
2) Monitoring Entity for continued and sustained implementation of Phase II of the FPA
3) Umbrella for budgetary allocations specifically for development
the Panels agreed to form 3 Technical Committees,to be termed"Expert Groups".Now that the BDAF is being created the 3rd issue really will only deal with developing the BDAF's TORs (Terms of Reference,i.e."Protocols") so that it is a done deal really only leaving 2 issues.Of the 2,the Monitoring Body is a no-brainer in that it would simply be an evolution of the Tripartite Review Process.The real issue then will be Revenue Sharing on Natural Resources and since this has been hashed out in the GPH-MILF Peace Process with very favourable terms to the MILF I believe the light at the end of the tunnel is in sight.Of course that only means that Misuari and the MNLF will no longer be able to use the FPA and Tripoli 1976 as a scapegoat.It does NOT mean contention will disappear,nor will the violence still flaring up amongst the 5 extant MNLF Factions suddenly disappear.
The counterinsurgency on Mindanao from a first hand perspective. As someone who has spent nearly three decades in the thick of it, I hope to offer more than the superficial fluff that all too often passes for news. Covering not only the blood and gore but offering the back stories behind the mayhem. Covering not only the guns but the goons and the gold as well. Development Aggression, Local Politics and Local History, "Focus on Mindanao" offers the total package.
Friday, April 29, 2011
MNLF,First Quarter of 2011:MNLF Peace Process:4th Tripartite Review Held in Jeddah,and a History of the Tripartite Modality
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