***CONTINUED FROM PART III***Responding to the Court Martial Panel's Response to the defence Petition on Adverse Publicity, in which the Panel had contended that the Supreme Court held no Powers of Review over the Military System of Justice, the Court conceeded that Jurisdiction WAS the primary manner of interface between the Court and the Military System. However, it maintained that Rule#65 clarified the issue and provided a rationale for further Review.
Quoting a portion of Rule#65 verbatim, the Court pointed out that a "grave abuse of discretion" could (easily) lead to errors in determining Jurisdiction, ergo "grave abuse of discretion" is itself a form of legal malfeasance open to Court Review. Again, I hesitate to delve too deeply into rationales, especially with regard to cited Case Law, since my goal with this series of entries is merely to outline the event itself ("Jabidah Massacre,"i.e. the failed "Operation Merdeka"). As I stated in an earlier entry I fully intend to go into great detail on the legalese in a future series of entries.
On "Publicity" per se, the Court pointed out that the actual recipient of Adverse Publicity is the state, i.e. the AFP, not the defence. This contention is incredibly problematic but again, this is neither the time nor place for me to explore that. The Court further observed that with 2 Restraining Orders already implemented, the case was undergoing a "cooling off" period during which attention would wane, including negative attention, ergo that concern by the defence was over stated.
The Court's prediction concerning an inattentive public , for the most part, was realised and very, very quietly, in 1971, the 24 defendants had their case (using the singular since they WERE tried in the collective) dismissed.
The 24...
Capt.Alberto G.Sateco
Benjamin"Lt.Baqui"Munar
M.Sgt.Benjamin C.Munar
Reynaldo"Lt.Rey"Munar
Eugenio Alcantara (who for Op.Merdeka was assigned the "rank" of Lt.)
Capt.Cerilo Oropesa
Capt.Teodoro P.Facelo
Capt.Ruperto E.Amistoso
1stLt.Eduardo B.Batalla
2ndLt.Rolando Abadilla
M.Sgt.Frederico Ilangilang
M.Sgt.Cesar Calinawagan
T.Sgt.Timoteo C.Malubay
T.Sgt.Pedro Banigued
S.Sgt.Narciso T.Dabbay
Cpl.Rolando Buenaventura
Cpl.Felix Lauzon
Cpl.Evaristo Ruiz
Cpl.Orlando Decena
Cpl.Francisco Grinn
Cpl.Agustin Dagdag
Cpl.Alfredo F.Forfieda
Pfc.Wlfredo Latonero
and last but not least...
Maj.Eduardo L.Martelino, the Operations Officer for the entire mission and man considered most culpable by most observers.
Maj.Martelino won a promotion to Col.for his trouble but retired shortly thereafter to Tawi Tawi. Converting to Islam and taking the name Abdul Latif (while retaining his surname Martelino) he married the young Sama woman he had been involved with prior to the case (and prior to the entire scheme itself). They made their home, ironically, on Siminul Island, the small islet where the whole affair began. In late 1978 Col.Martelino was killed under mysterious circumstances, on Sabah, perhaps befitting a man who had lived his entire life in volved in covert activities and as a man obsessed with Sabah.
Jibin Arula's life has taken a quieter path. During the Senate Investigations into Operation Merdeka and the deaths on Corregidor, his patron Gov.Montano had arranged to bring Arula's wife, Noring to Cavite. She and Arula lived together in a small non-descript home next to his protector and friend, Chief of Police de Sagun, in Tres Martires. For 2 years,as Arula worked at a job wrangled for him by the Governor, as a sort of inter-office messenger in the Cavite Provincial Capitol Building. Noring had quickly gotten pregnant with their 4th child and after 9 months in Cavite she returned south , to Jolo island, to await the return of her husband.
Jibin Arula never returned to her, having taken a 2nd wife, Lilia. A Bisaya (a non-Muslim tribe/ethnicity) like Noring, she had recently moved to Cavite from her home province of Antique and after marriage settled into what she had hoped would be a quiet life of domesticity.
In 1970 Gov.Montano lost his bid for re-election and Arula's short but heady life as a national celebrity came to an abrupt end. Perhaps recognising that his safety would now be in question he graciously accepted the 12,000 Pesos given to him by the Governor and his wife and moved to her home province of Antique . There he invested his money in livestock and helped his inlaws farm their modest plot. He and Lilia had 3 children of their own and in 1973 he gained custody of his 4 children by Noring as well.
In 1994 Lilia died and Arula made his way south to Jolo. It wasnt long until he came to the notice of the MNLF and Chairman Misuari. As Misuari inked the 96 Jakarta Accord and was given the governorship of ARMM as one of his "gifts,"he found a place for Arula as well. Basically a walking political statement for the MNLF, Arula was made a "paid consultant" at the newly created SCPDC (Southern Philippines Peace and Development Council), an entity also given to Misuari as his 2nd "gift."Making 7,000 Pesos a month he basically maintained a low profile until 2000 when Misuari, reading the writing on the wall began powering down the vast and bloated bureaucracy that characterised everything he touched.
The MNLF which was directly created because of Jibin Arula, and its Chairman Misuari who owes his entire "career" to Arula and his sad tale has done precious little for the man. Today he lives in a poor Manila neighbourhood with the youngest of his 7 children. Very rarely he is brought out, dusted and given some vigirous handshakes and sad clucks of the tongue as Moros and their allies try to parade his misery to try and justify whatever bloodletting has taken place sine 1968.
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